JUDGMENT : I.S. Mathur, J. 1. The petitioner prays for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 3.1.1995 and 24.1.1995. By the first mentioned order, learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Azamgarh has passed an order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P.C., and by the order dated 24.1.1995, revision against the first mentioned order has been dismissed by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and, in my opinion, there is no force in this writ petition. It would appear that an order under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C., was passed in respect of the land in dispute. The contention of the petitioner. Ram Surat Sonkar was that the land belonged to the temple while the opposite parties 3 and 4 claimed it to be a burial ground. The Magistrate passed the order under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C., on 3.1.1995 and on the same day, he passed the impugned order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P.C., directing the attachment of the land in dispute. A suit, being suit No. 475/91 was pending between the parties in the court of IX Additional Munsif, Azamgarh and on an application for temporary injunction, the Court has directed the status quo to be maintained. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised three objections against the orders of the courts below, namely that the Magistrate was bound to drop the proceedings in view of the civil suit pending between the parties, the order of attachment could not have been passed on the same day on which the order under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C. was passed and no case for emergency was made out. The law regarding jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C., or 146 (1), Cr. P.C. when a civil suit between the parties is pending is now quite settled. In Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. and others, 1985 AWC 128, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. In Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. and others, 1985 AWC 128, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation." 3. In Dharampal and others v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others, (1993) SCC 435, Hon'ble Supreme Court has further laid down that determination by civil court in regard to possession may not necessarily be a final determination and it may be by way of order of injunction or appointment of a receiver. The Supreme Court has observed:- "The determination by a competent court of the rights of the parties, spoker of there has not necessarily to be a final determination. The determination may be even tentative at the interim stage when the competent court passes an order of interim injunction or appoints a receiver in respect of the subject matter of the dispute pending the final decision in the suit. The moment the competent court does so, even at the interim stage, the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate has to come to an end. Otherwise, there will be inconsistency between the order passed by the civil court and the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate. The moment the competent court does so, even at the interim stage, the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate has to come to an end. Otherwise, there will be inconsistency between the order passed by the civil court and the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146 itself takes cognizance of such a situation when it states that "Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of any breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute." 4. In Harpal v, State of U. P. and others, Writ Petition No. 313 of 1994. decided by me on 7.2.1995, these two decisions were interpreted and it was observed that, according to these decisions, the proceedings under Section 145 will be incompetent on account of pendency of a civil suit only if that suit relates to question of title and possession and the civil court has either decided the question of possession, even by way of interlocutory order, or this question is still open for determination and the parties could approach the civil court for appropriate orders in regard to the injunction or appointment of a receiver. It has been further held in the said case that, merely because the civil court passes an order of status quo, the Magistrate will not be divested of his jurisdiction under Section 145, Cr. P.C. because the civil court, in such a case, could not be said to have either decided the question of possession nor it could be said to be a case where the parties did not approach the civil court for appropriate orders. In two other decisions of this Court, namely, Raju and others v. State of V. P. and others. 1994 (31) ACC 537 and Raj Bahadur and others v. State of U. P. and another, 1994 (31) ACC 654, decided by Hon'ble K. L. Sharma. J. and Hon'ble R. R. K. Trivedi. J., also, it has been held that, an order of the civil court for maintaining status quo cannot divest the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under Section 145, Cr. J. and Hon'ble R. R. K. Trivedi. J., also, it has been held that, an order of the civil court for maintaining status quo cannot divest the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under Section 145, Cr. P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Prakash Chand Sachdeva v. The State and another, AIR 1994 SC 1436 and decisions of this Court in Mushtaq Alt v. State of U.P. and others, 1990 All LJ 391, Sheo Badan Singh v. Aditya Prasad Singh and others. 1989 All LJ 473 and Sri Mahabirji Mandir Committee v. State of U.P. and another, 1993 All LJ 895. in support of his submission that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. shall become incompetent if a civil suit in respect of the same matter is pending. I have gone through these decisions and. in my opinion, none of them are of any help to the petitioner. 5. In Sachdeva's case, dispute arose between the father and son regarding possession of the house. In this case, the decision of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant's case was referred. Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the legal position laid down in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant's case that a suit or remedy in civil Court for possession or injunction normally prevents a person from invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court "particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute." Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "the normal rule is as stated by the Court in Puri's case." However, the Supreme Court further observed : "But that was a suit based on title. And that could be decided by civil Court only. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibily and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. Where the dispute is not on the right to possession but on the question of possession the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance under Section 145, Cr. P.C." 6. Where the dispute is not on the right to possession but on the question of possession the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance under Section 145, Cr. P.C." 6. The observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. C. Sachdeva's case only mean that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 145, Cr. P.C. will be ousted only when the civil suit was based on title but where the dispute is not regarding the right to possession but on the question of possession, the Magistrate will be entitled to take cognizance under Section 145, Cr. P.C. In that particular case, it was held that there was no dispute of title between the appellant and respondents and the matter related only to the question of possession. It was accordingly held that proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. were not barred. Therefore, this case will be of no help to the petitioner. None of the other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner supports the proposition that, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145. Cr. P.C. will be barred merely because of the pendency of the civil suit. In Shiv Badan Singh v. Aditya Prasad Singh, 1989 All LJ 473, a civil suit was pending between the parties but no order regarding appointment of a receiver or injunction was passed. A learned Single Judge referred to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant's case and observing that the parties had an opportunity to approach the civil court for appropriate orders, held that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. were not warranted. That was clearly not a case where the civil court had already been approached but had refused to adjudicate the matter regarding possession even by way of an interlocutory matter. The factual situation was that, no orders whatever had been passed in regard to issuance of injunction or appointment of receiver. In the present case, already indicated above, the civil suit was pending and the concerned party had approached the civil court for interim injunction but the only order made by the civil court was for maintaining status quo. Accordingly, Sheo Badan Singh's case is clearly distinguishable on facts. 7. In the present case, already indicated above, the civil suit was pending and the concerned party had approached the civil court for interim injunction but the only order made by the civil court was for maintaining status quo. Accordingly, Sheo Badan Singh's case is clearly distinguishable on facts. 7. In Mushtaq Ali v. State of U.P. and others, 1990 All LJ 391, the relevant fact was that the civil court had already decided the question of title and possession by way of an ex parte decree and it was thereafter that proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P.C., was drawn. The concerned party had moved an application before the Civil Judge for stay of the execution of the decree but the decree was in existence on the date the proceedings were drawn. It was on this ground that the learned Single Judge held that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. could not be drawn. 8. In Mahabirji Mandir Committee v. State of U. P. and another, 1993 All LJ 895, the actual possession of one of the parties was not disputed. A civil suit was also pending. The learned Single Judge found as a fact, that the question of possession was not in dispute and even if the civil suit had been withdrawn as stated before the court, proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P.C, will be incompetent as the question of possession was not In dispute. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In the present case, the question of possession is quite obviously in dispute. Even if there were any observation in any of these decisions which could be interpreted to mean that merely filing of a civil suit will be a bar to Magistrate exercising his jurisdiction under Section 145, Cr. P.C, those observations cannot obviously be relied upon in view of the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. This must also answer the suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, if there is any difference of opinion, the matter may have to be referred to a larger Bench. Since the question under investigation stands clearly answered by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there could be no question of reference to a larger Bench in regard to the proposition of law indicated above on the basis of the said Supreme Court's decisions. 9. Since the question under investigation stands clearly answered by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there could be no question of reference to a larger Bench in regard to the proposition of law indicated above on the basis of the said Supreme Court's decisions. 9. It is also difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that orders under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C. and 146 (1), Cr. P.C. could not be passed on the same day or simultaneously. No such inference can be drawn from a plain perusal of these sections. 10. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P.C, could be passed only if there were any emergency for passing such an order. The proposition of law envisaged by the learned counsel is quite correct but not so the inference that, in the present case, there was no emergency. Learned Magistrate has specifically stated that there could be communal disturbance resulting in untoward incident and it is for this reason that, in his opinion, there was need for attachment of the property regarding which notice under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C, had already been issued. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that this does not indicate existence of any emergency. The apprehension of communal disturbance which may result in untoward incident is certainly a fact germane to the breach of peace and necessity of taking emergent action. This inference has been drawn by the learned Magistrate on the basis of the facts which have been broadly indicated in the order, therefore, it cannot be accepted, that there was no fact indicating existence of any emergency. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon Shitla Prasad v. Additional Sessions Judge and others, Writ Petition No. 3359 of 1993, decided on September 27, 1994, in support of his submission that there should exist emergency before the Magistrate could pass an order. As already indicated above, there could be really no controversy regarding the legal proposition envisaged in this decision. But a perusal of the decision will indicate that the inference as to absence of emergency has been drawn because the proceeding under Sections 145/146, Cr. P.C., continued to be pending for a very long time, it continued from 21.1.1983. As already indicated above, there could be really no controversy regarding the legal proposition envisaged in this decision. But a perusal of the decision will indicate that the inference as to absence of emergency has been drawn because the proceeding under Sections 145/146, Cr. P.C., continued to be pending for a very long time, it continued from 21.1.1983. It was accordingly held that pendency of these proceedings for such a long time was indicative of the fact that there was no emergency for passing order under Section 146, Cr. P.C. As has been noticed above, in the present case, no such situation arises. Both the orders, under Sections 145, Cr. P.C. and 146, Cr. P.C, have been passed on 3.1.1995 only and a finding of fact has been recorded by the Magistrate on the basis of the police report that there was apprehension of communal disturbance and untoward incident resulting. It cannot be said that the satisfaction recorded by the learned Magistrate was arbitrary or without any basis nor this is a case where the proceedings have continued for a long time. Accordingly, this decision, relied upon by the learned counsel could be of no help to him. 11. It is trite to say that certiorari is a very limited Jurisdiction. IT is available only when there is either jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the face of record. Error of fact, whatsoever gross that error may be is not relevant for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari No case for Jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the face of record has been made out. The petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.