JUDGMENT - A.P. SHAH, J. :--This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the orders passed by the authorities rejecting the petitioners' application under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short "Act"). 2. Briefly stated the facts which have given rise to this petition are :- We are concerned with three pieces of agricultural lands bearing Survey Nos. 169/2, 193 and 170/1 situated at Village Top, Taluka Hatkanangale, District Kolhapur. There is no dispute that the petitioners were the tenants in respect of the said lands which belonged to the respondents. The respondents obtained an Exemption Certificate under section 88-C of the Act and on the strength of the said Certificate they terminated the tenancy of the petitioners and applied for possession under section 33-B on the ground that they require the lands for their personal cultivation. It is not necessary to deal with the proceedings under section 33-B in detail but suffice it to say that finally the application was granted and an order was made for restoration of the ½ land to the respondents. In pursuance of the order passed under section 33-B, the respondents took out an Execution Application. Now there is no dispute that in execution the petitioners were wrongly dispossessed on March 21, 1978 of the entire land although the order was restricted to only ½ portion. It appears that the petitioners had filed an execution appeal but the same was dismissed on March 24, 1982. The petitioners thereafter filed the present proceedings under section 32-G, for fixing the price of the lands contending inter alia that in view of the order passed under section 33-B, of the Act for restoration of possession of the ½ portion of the land they have become deemed purchasers in respect of the remaining half land which is allowed to be retained by them in view of the proviso to section 33-C(1) and as such they are entitled to purchase the said land in accordance with provisions of section 32-G. 3. The application of the petitioners was rejected by all the three Authorities mainly on the ground that after their wrongful dispossession the petitioners ought to have made an application for restoration of possession under section 29 within the prescribed period of two years and since the petitioners have failed to apply within the said period their right as well as remedy is lost and therefore the petitioners are not entitled to purchase the lands. 4. Before I deal with various submissions advanced at the bar, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 32 provides that every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from his landlords the land held by as tenant on the Tiller's day i.e. April 1, 1957. The Act further provides that such tenant is entitled to purchase the land under section 32-G. The legislature has introduced certain provisions for protection of the small landlords and one of the provisions which is relevant for our purposes is 88-C. Section 88-C contemplates an application by the landlord for a certificate provided his holding does not exceed an economic holding and his total income including the rent of the land does not exceed Rs. 1,500/-. Such landlord is defined as "certificated landlord". A certificated landlord has a right to apply for restoration of possession under section 33-B(1) of the Act which reads as follows :- "33-B(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in section 31, 31-A or 31-B a certificated landlord may, after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (3), terminate the tenancy of an excluded tenant, if the landlord bona-fide requires such land for cultivating it personally." Sub-section (6) of section 33-B provides that :- "The tenancy of any land left with the tenant after the termination of the tenancy under this section shall not at any time afterwards be liable to termination again on the ground that the landlord bona-fide requires that land for personal cultivation." 5. Now we shall consider the provisions of section 33-C(1) which are extremely material for the purposes of this petition and the same read as follows :- "33-C(1). Now we shall consider the provisions of section 33-C(1) which are extremely material for the purposes of this petition and the same read as follows :- "33-C(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 88-C, every excluded tenant holding land from a certificated landlord shall, except as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), be deemed to have purchased from the landlord, on the first day of April 1962, free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if such land is cultivated by him personally, and :-- (i) The landlord has not given notice of termination of tenancy in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 33-B, or (ii) The landlord has given such notice, but has not made an application thereafter under section 29 for possession as required by the said sub-section (3), or (iii) The landlord, not belonging to any of the categories specified in sub-section (4) of section 33-B, has not terminated the tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1962 under section 29 possession of the land : Provided that, where the landlord has made such application for possession, the tenant shall, on the date on which the application is finally decided, be deemed to have purchased the land which he is entitled to retain in possession after such decision." On a bare perusal of the proviso to section 33-C it is clearly seen that where the landlord makes an application for possession, the tenant shall on the date on which the application is finally decided be deemed to have purchased the land which he is entitled to retain in possession after such decision. Thus the proviso creates a fiction whereby the tenant is elevated to a status of a deemed purchaser on the date of the decision of application under section 33-B. The scope of the proviso was considered by Malvankar, J., in the case of (Kondiba v. Gajanan)1, reported in 1974 Mh.L.J. page 275. Malvankar, J., had held that the proviso is in the nature of an independent provision and it confers right of a deemed purchaser upon the tenant. Malvankar, J., had held that the proviso is in the nature of an independent provision and it confers right of a deemed purchaser upon the tenant. Thus it is crystal clear that on the date on which the application under section 33-B was decided the petitioners became deemed purchasers as far as the remaining ½ portion of the land which was allowed to be retained in their possession. 6. It is not disputed that in violation of the order passed under section 33-B the landlords have wrongly taken possession of the entire land. If that is so, the excess land is liable to be restored to the tenant because the landlord has no right to retain such land in view of the proviso whereby the tenants have been given status of a deemed purchaser. 7. The effect of the scheme of the Act conferring rights of ownership on the tenant was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of (Amrit Bhikaji Kale and others v. Kashinath Janardhan and another)2, reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. page 711. The Supreme Court observed :- "On the Tillers' day the landlord's interests in the land got extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord was kindled or created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law of Transfer of Property Act came to an end. The landlord from the date of statutory sale was only entitled to receive the purchase price. Without any act of transfer inter vivos, the title of the landlord was extinguished and created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. Therefore, the tenant became the deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957. The Lands Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction to proceed on the footing that the date of sale was postponed. It was neither an incorrect order nor an erroneous order but the Lands Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 32-F. All subsequent proceedings, therefore, were ab-initio void and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right in holding that the orders passed therein were nullity. It was neither an incorrect order nor an erroneous order but the Lands Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 32-F. All subsequent proceedings, therefore, were ab-initio void and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right in holding that the orders passed therein were nullity. The Tribunal clutched at a jurisdiction not vested in it and in such a situation the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding purporting to be between landlord and tenant on the erroneous assumption that tenant was still a tenant though he had long since become the deemed purchaser. The compulsory purchase by operation of law had taken place as early as on 1-4-1957 and that legal position could not be washed away." 8. Turning then to the next question whether the petitioners' rights are extinguished by reason of their failure to apply for possession under section 29 within the prescribed period, I may observe that the issue is no longer res integra. It is well settled that section 29 confers a right on the tenant to apply for restoration of possession in case he is dispossessed otherwise in due course of law. But surely section 29 cannot have application to the facts of the present case because section 29 applies only when the parties are admittedly in relationship of landlord and tenant, but where the tenant has become deemed purchaser section 29 has no application. The distinction between section 29 and section 84 of the Act which contemplates a summary eviction of the unauthorised occupant is elaborately explained by the Supreme Court in (Vallabhbhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1190. There the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the tenant surrendered land to the landlord before the tillers day i.e. before he could became a deemed purchaser. It appears that subsequently, the tenant challenged the surrender on the ground that it was not in writing and was not verified as required by the law. The Supreme Court held that section 84 has no application because it provides only for a summary remedy for eviction of an unauthorised occupants. It was held that the remedy of the tenant, if any, is to apply under section 29. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are found in paragraphs 6 and 7 and they read as follows :- "6. It was held that the remedy of the tenant, if any, is to apply under section 29. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are found in paragraphs 6 and 7 and they read as follows :- "6. The question then is whether a tenant who has a remedy under section 29(1) can still apply to the Collector under section 84. In other words, whether the Legislature has provided alternative remedies under both the sections to such a tenant? The words "any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land" in section 84, no doubt, are words of wide import and would include a landlord who is in unauthorised occupation or is wrongfully in possession. A landlord who under an invalid surrender is in possession of the land is, no doubt a person in unauthorised occupation or is wrongfully in possession. But then section 84 in express terms limits its application to three types of cases only, namely of a person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of the land (a) the transfer or acquisition of which etc. is invalid under the Act, or (b) the management of which has been assumed under the Act, or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the provisions of the Act and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person." "7..........That being the position, the instant case would fall only under Clause (c) and not under Clause (a) as contended by Mr. Bhandare, and therefore, the condition that section 84 would only apply to cases for which there is no other remedy under any of the provisions of the Act must apply to the present case. This condition shows that while giving drastic powers of summary eviction to an administrative officer the legislature was careful to restrict this power firstly because the result otherwise would be to deprive the person evicted under section 84 of his remedy of appeal before the Collector which he would have if the orders were to be passed under section 29(1) and secondly, because it would enable a tenant to by-pass a judicial inquiry by the Mamlatdar under section 29(1) by directly applying to the Collector under section 84. Such a result would not have been intended by the legislature. Such a result would not have been intended by the legislature. Therefore, the contention that sections 29(1) and 84 provide alternative remedies and a choice to the tenant cannot possibly be correct." 9. Now as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioners have become deemed purchasers under the proviso to section 33-C. The petitioners cannot therefore invoke section 29 which contemplated dispossession of a tenant. The only provision which is attracted in such situation is section 84. In fact, it is the duty of the authorities to evict the landlords from the excess portion taken by them in execution and restore the same to the tenant. In somewhat similar situation Naik, J., in the case of (Vithoba Ram Rahane and another v. Bhalchandra Sadashiv Joshi)4, reported in 1993 Mah.L.J. page 419, has held that where the tenant in possession of land on tillers day acquiring status of purchaser is illegally dispossessed from the land an application under section 84 is maintainable. 10. In my opinion the view taken by the authorities below is clearly erroneous as it tends to defeat the avowed object of the Act to confer ownership rights on the tenants. It is difficult to see as to now the landlords can retain the land which has been wrongfully taken by them in execution proceedings. 11. In the result the petition succeeds. The impugned orders are set aside. The S.D.O., Karvir Division, Kolhapur, who is the Competent Authority under section 84, is directed to take steps to remove the landlords from the ½ portion which has been given in possession of the landlords in excess of the order under section 33-B, under the provisions of section 84 of the Act and place the said land in possession of the petitioners-tenants. The Agricultural Land Tribunal shall fix the price of the land and pass appropriate orders under section 32-G, of the Act. No order as to costs. 12. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed. *****