M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant's learned Advocate points out that appellants 2 and 4 are the l. rs. Of deceased appellant 3 and that they are already on record. It is, therefore, unnecessary to take any further steps. La. Ii to stand disposed of. ( 2 ) THE point involved in this appeal is one of someconsequence. The brief facts which are undisputed indicate that the appellants had availed of certain overdraft facilities from the respondent-bank for a substantial sum of money aggregating to about Rs. 15 lakhs. Neither the loan amount nor the interest was paid whereupon, the bank decided to refer the matter to arbitration. Obviously, in order to provide for an expeditious forum for the recovery of such outstandings, the bank had entered into an agreement with the appellants in October 1991 whereunder it was provided for that in the event of a dispute/difference, that the matter may be referred to arbitration. On the bank following this course of action, the respondents to the arbitration proceedings filed a suit before the trial court contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction, the main ground being that there is no dispute in existence. They contended that the bank and themselves are not at loggerheads in respect of anything and that it was because of financial stringency and a number of factors that had contributed to their inability to repay the loan that they were in default. The contention was that only in the event of a dispute arising, that the matter was to be referred to an arbitrator for resolution of that dispute and in the absence thereof, that the entire arbitration proceedings were uncalled for and were without jurisdiction. ( 3 ) THE bank seriously contested the suit and took out i. a. ii before the trial court for dismissal of the suit on the ground that under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, that the suit was not maintainable insofar as the parties have by an agreement in writing, agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. The learned trial judge upheld this contention and dismissed the suit and it is against that order that the present appeal is directed. ( 4 ) THE main argument advanced by the appellants' learned Advocate is that the facts of this case will indicate that there is no dispute between the parties. The learned trial judge upheld this contention and dismissed the suit and it is against that order that the present appeal is directed. ( 4 ) THE main argument advanced by the appellants' learned Advocate is that the facts of this case will indicate that there is no dispute between the parties. She has submitted that even in response to the notice of demand received from the bank, that her clients have only demonstrated their inability to pay, they have not disputed the fact that the amount was advanced to them, their liability to repay them, etc. And that therefore, there is nothing that falls for adjudication before the learned arbitrator. According to the learned advocate, it is necessary to construe clause 1 to the arbitration agreement which reads as follows:" 1. Any dispute/difference between the parties and the bank touching rights and liabilities, pertaining to or connected with or incidental to the transactions between the parties and the bank shall be referred to the sole arbitrator to be appointed by the chairman of the bank for the time being from the panel of arbitrators to be maintained by the chairman from time to time. It shall be open to the bank or the parties to move the chairman of the bank to make a reference to arbitration, whenever the occasion arises. The reference so made by the chairman to any one in the panel shall be binding on the bank and the parties and shall not be liable to be questioned. Without prejudice to the generality of the clause above, it is hereby clarified that any dispute/difference pertaining to construction or interpretation of loan documents, rate of interest costs, charges, expenses, etc. Or anything connected with or incidental to the execution of documents or ancillary, thereto shall be deemed to be dispute covered by this arbitration agreement". ( 5 ) THE submission proceeds on the footing that the cause of action, if any, to refer the matter to the arbitration could only arise if there has been a 'dispute/difference' between the parties. She submits that this requirement is condition precedent, because in that event, the arbitrator will have to resolve the conflict that has arisen. The argument is reinforced by alluding to the second paragraph of clause 1 wherein different heads have been set out such as interpretation of loan documents, rate of interest costs, charges, expenses etc. She submits that this requirement is condition precedent, because in that event, the arbitrator will have to resolve the conflict that has arisen. The argument is reinforced by alluding to the second paragraph of clause 1 wherein different heads have been set out such as interpretation of loan documents, rate of interest costs, charges, expenses etc. And the learned Advocate submits that in the event of the parties not being in agreement in relation to any of these factors alone, that the matter could be referred to arbitration. It is her submission that if it is a question of mere enforcement of a liability, that the only remedy lies in taking out appropriate legal proceedings before a court and that an arbitrator is not the designated authority for this purpose. As regards the reliance placed by the learned trial judge on the decision in the case of M/s. Jhabbu mal jang bahadur v nanak chand aggarwal and another, the learned Advocate submits, that the facts before the court in the Delhi case were different insofar as the opposite party had remained silent when the notice of demand was made and in these circumstances, the Delhi High Court took the view that it constituted a dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (a ). It is her submission that on facts, there is a total absence of a dispute in this case and that therefore, the invocation of the arbitration clause is unsustainable. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate who represents the respondent-bankhas supported the decision of the trial court and he submits that the aforesaid case applies squarely to the facts of the present case. He amplifies his submission by pointing out that in the aforesaid decision, the Delhi High Court had occasion to consider the case law in detail over the years including the liability as enunciated by the Supreme Court as also some of the older decisions going back to the year 1919. He amplifies his submission by pointing out that in the aforesaid decision, the Delhi High Court had occasion to consider the case law in detail over the years including the liability as enunciated by the Supreme Court as also some of the older decisions going back to the year 1919. The decisions in questions are set out below: (1) hindustan copper limited, jhunjhunu v Assam bearing agencies, Delhi ; (2) M/s. National small industries corporation limited, New Delhi v M/s. Punjab tin printing and metal industries, ajraunda, faridabad (haryana) and others; (3) M/s. Pearl hosiery mills, ludhiana v union of India and another ; (4) ghulam qadir bakshi v state of jammu and kashmir and others ; (5) jammu forest company v state of jammu and kashmir ; (6) union of India v birla cotton spinning and weaving mills limited; (7) madan lal (dead) by l. r. v sunder lal and another; (8) nandram hanutram v raghunath and sons limited; (9) uttam ckand saligram v mahmood jewa mamooji; (10) chandanmull v donald campbell. ( 7 ) AS regards this aspect of the matter, i do not need to enterin to a detailed examination of the definitions of the term 'dispute' nor is it necessary to have to go to words and phrases judicially defined, etc. The arbitration clause which I have reproduced earlier, takes cognizance of two situations namely, disputes and differences. One does not have to do any legal hair-splitting or go into the genesis of the two terms, but what a court is required to do is to glean from clause 1 on a consideration of the facts of the present case as to whether the reference to arbitration was competent. To my mind, it was unnecessary for the appellants to have in so many words, raised a controversy with regard to any of the terms and conditions of the transaction of that matter, to have raised a dispute in the conventional sense of the term before the bank got the authority to refer the matter to arbitration. In terms of the contract or the agreement between the parties, an obligation was cast on the appellants to perform certain functions namely, to repay the amount in the manner as agreed to. Undoubtedly, they have stated that it was due to certain difficulties and inabilities that they had defaulted. In terms of the contract or the agreement between the parties, an obligation was cast on the appellants to perform certain functions namely, to repay the amount in the manner as agreed to. Undoubtedly, they have stated that it was due to certain difficulties and inabilities that they had defaulted. The ground on which the default has taken place whether deliberate, voluntary or otherwise is to my mind, a secondary question because, the facts of the matter indicate that in spite of demands from the bank, the money was just not forthcoming. The bank was, therefore, placed in a position whereby it had no option left except to approach a competent forum to place the facts of the case before it and to obtain an order for payment of the amount. The bank was certainly an aggrieved party to this extent and in these circumstances, it would be impossible to hold that a dispute or difference had not arisen. The only interpretation possible on a clear construction of clause 1 is that it is an omnibus provision which would confer on the bank the right to refer the matter to an adjudicating authority for purposes of resolution in a case where nonpayment has taken place. It would be inconceivable to hold that such a situation is outside clause 1 or that it is excluded. To my mind, clause 1 is all inclusive or all pervasive and the bank was more than fully justified in having referred the matter to arbitration. ( 8 ) ONCE it is held that the parties have agreed to refer their disputes or differences to arbitration, the bar under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act is automatic and the learned trial judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in having dismissed the suit. It cannot be said that merely because some contentions were raised before the trial court questioning the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, that the court should have mechanically continued with the hearing of that suit for the next two decades if prima facie, and in law, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding of that type. It cannot be said that merely because some contentions were raised before the trial court questioning the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, that the court should have mechanically continued with the hearing of that suit for the next two decades if prima facie, and in law, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding of that type. The learned judge has not only acted correctly, but to my mind, this is a salutary practice and it is only hoped, that the trial courts will hereinafter be more vigilant in sifting out, from out of the proceedings instituted before them those which deserve to be heard on merits and those which require to be culled at the initial stage itself. ( 9 ) BEFORE parting with this case, i need to observe that, legal thinking in different parts of the world particularly in europe and north america have now recognised the alternate disputes resolution procedure commonly known as a. d. r. as a forum to supplement the load on the courts. It is well known that the courts in this country are heavily overburdened as the situation now exists and therefore, the bank was well-advised in having provided for an alternate forum by way of an arbitration. To my mind, the present appellants will not be prejudiced in the least insofar as it would be open to them to canvass all pleas before the learned arbitrator and that to my mind, is an additional ground on which the order of the learned trial judge requires to be upheld. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position, the appeal fails and stands disposed of. The interim orders, if any to stand vacated. M:f. Saldanha, j. Dated: 14-7-1995 regular first appeal No. 282 of 1995 for being spoken to after the judgment had been dictated, appellant's learned Advocate brought it to the notice of the court that there is a recent decision of this court in the case of Karnataka housing board, Bangalore and others v M/s. , vaijanath tubewells limited, gulbarga, wherein, an identical issue had arisen for determination before the court in relation to an arbitration agreement. The learned Advocate submitted that unfortunately, that decision was not brought to the notice of the court and that if the ratio of that case were to be applied, that the decision in this appeal could possibly have been exactly the opposite. The learned Advocate submitted that unfortunately, that decision was not brought to the notice of the court and that if the ratio of that case were to be applied, that the decision in this appeal could possibly have been exactly the opposite. The matter was therefore, relisted and I have heard the learned advocates with regard to this aspect of the matter. The appellant's learned Advocate draws the attention of the court to the various references in the judgment in support of her argument that mere non-payment or inaction on the part of the appellants cannot be construed as involvement in a dispute nor can it justify the reference to arbitration in this instance. In particular, a parallel is sought to be drawn between the facts of the decision referred to above and the present case and the argument proceeds on the footing that a learned single judge of this court had earlier taken the view that a dispute had not arisen in that instance. The learned single judge has observed that it is necessary for a court making a reference to first establish the existence of an agreement for arbitration and secondly, examine as to whether a dispute has arisen which requires resolution through the arbitration process. On this basis, it is submitted, that since there is no dispute as far as the present proceedings are concerned, the appellants having in fact admitted their liability, that no reference could have been initially made to arbitration. --- *** --- .