VENKATAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1995 DIGILAW 28 (KAR)

H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THESE revision petitions have been filed under Section 121-a of the K. L. R. Act and do arise from a common judgment and order dated 5-12-1988 passed, in irf/mys/appeal 84-88 allowing the appeal, by the land reforms appellate authority, mysore, after having set aside the Order, dated 2-6-1988 bearing No. K. l. rm. 1827/74 passed by the land tribunal, mysore, in the matter under Section 48-a (1) of the Land Reforms Act. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case in nut cell are that the applications were filed under Section 48-a of the Karnataka land reforms act and had been moved by the present revisionist-applicant clalming occupancy rights with respect to land in dispute viz. , sy. No. 23, the total area of which is 12 acres 33 guntas and out of which 1. 7 guntas in karab land i. e. non-cultivable land. Both the petitioners by separate application clalmed rights under Section 48-a of the act with respect to 6 acres 20 guntas. ( 3 ) IN l. r. r. p. No. 6430/88 the petitioner had clalmed the rights with respect to 6 acres 20 guntas, while in l. r. r. p. No. 6431/88 the petitioner clalmed his rights with respect to 6 acres 13 guntas i. e. , in respect of entire 12 acres 33 guntas. The clalm of the revisionist-applicants was contested by the land owner viz. , respondent No. 3 in both the cases. The parties filed documentary evidence and adduced oral evidence. The land tribunal considered the evidence of the parties and recorded the following findings: (a) that applicants i. e. , the present revisionist are cultivating the land since 1969; (b) that there is no evidence to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant. The tribunal has held that the applicants failed to establish that whether applicants were the tenant under r-3 or whether tenants of narayana rao i. e. , earlier owner prior to the sale in favour of the opposite party. It is not clear that prior to sale whether there was any agreement to give possession of the land. The tribunal has held that the applicants failed to establish that whether applicants were the tenant under r-3 or whether tenants of narayana rao i. e. , earlier owner prior to the sale in favour of the opposite party. It is not clear that prior to sale whether there was any agreement to give possession of the land. The tribunal in spite of the above finding held that the present applicants could have moved an application under Section 48-a clalming themselves to be the tenant of the landlord on the basis of deeming clause and observed that it is proved that the applicant had been cultivating the land prior to 1-3-1974 and so they are deemed to be the tenants of the landlord. Having applied the doctrine or concept of deemed tenancy the learned tribunal held that the applicants were entitled to the grant of the relief under Section 48-a of the act and as such allowed the claim and held them to be the occupants and tenants. ( 4 ) FEELING aggrieved from the order of the tribunal dated 2-6-1988, the petitioners filed an appeal challenging the order of the tribunal before the land reforms appellate authority. The appellate tribunal by its judgment dated 5-12-1988, as mentioned earlier, allowed the appeal and set aside the tribunal order referred to above viz. , dated 2-6-1988. The appellate authority considered the matter and held that there is no reliable evidence to prove the contract of tenancy in favour of the appellant that is the present applicants. It further held that the learned land reforms tribunal acted illegally in applying the concept of "deemed tenant" and in giving benefit of the concept of the deemed tenancy in favour of the present revisionist-applicants i. e. , respondent in the appeal. As such it recorded the finding to the effect that the land bearing sy. No. 23 measuring in all 12 acres 33 guntas of madagalli village was not tenanted land and that venkataiah and late chanriaiah were not the tenants of the same on the appointed day and as such the tribunal's order dated 2-6-1988 granting the occupancy rights over different portions of the sy. No. 23 in favour of respondents-applicants under sections 45 and 48-a of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is illegal. No. 23 in favour of respondents-applicants under sections 45 and 48-a of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is illegal. With these findings as mentioned earlier the learned appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the tribunal. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the learned appellate authority the present applicants in the two revision petitions have come up before this court by filing the above mentioned revisions. ( 5 ) I have heard Sri Mahantesh S. Hosmath and assisted by Sri Srinivas an Advocate of this court as well as Sri Basavaprabhu patil assisted by Sri G. Srinivas an Advocate of this court. Learned counsel for the revisionist Sri Mahantesh Strenuously urged before me that the appellate authority acted illegally and thereby it committed jurisdictional error by setting aside the judgment and order passed by the tribunal, where under the occupancy rights had been granted in favour of the revisionist-applicants. Sri Mahantesh, submitted that learned appellate authority erred in law in taking the view that tribunal acted illegally in holding the revisionist-applicants to be the tenant by applying the deeming clause. He further submitted that in fact the evidence on record proves that the present applicants have been in possession of the land in dispute and have been cultivating the land in dispute as a tenant and the finding to the contrary recorded by the tribunal or by the appellate authority to the effect that contract of tenancy is not proved is erroneous. He further submitted that the land reforms tribunal and the land reforms appellate authority acted illegally in not relying upon the entries contained in revenue records. According to Sri Mahantesh, the learned counsel it has clearly established that applicants-revisionist have been cultivating the land on lease. Learned counsel submitted that the authorities erred in law in not applying the presumption relating to entries, in view of Section 133 of the land revenue act. Learned counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the basis on which the entries have been rejected is not good in law. He further submitted that in civil suit, he has been granted temporary injunction and even the applicants possession was covered by the temporary injunction so their possession is valid and lawful. Learned counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the basis on which the entries have been rejected is not good in law. He further submitted that in civil suit, he has been granted temporary injunction and even the applicants possession was covered by the temporary injunction so their possession is valid and lawful. Sri Mahantesh further argued that the land tribunal and land appellate authority had no jurisdiction to go into the question of tenancy or the question to the effect whether applicants were tenants, in view of the order or decision of the civil court in os No. 398/71 where by the learned ii additional munsiff had granted interim injunction. It is on the basis of these submissions the learned counsel for the applicants has challenged the order of the appellate authority. ( 6 ) THE above contention of the learned counsel for the applicants have hotly been contested by Sri Masavaprabhu Patil, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 in two revision petitions. ( 7 ) SRI Basavaprabhu Patil, learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the scope of jurisdiction of this court under Section 121-a of the act is revisional jurisdiction. It is not same as that of the appellate court namely court of first appeal. Sri Basavaprabhu, learned counsel further contended that the jurisdiction is limited and confined to jurisdictional question or the question of illegality of the order or with reference to irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the subordinate authorities of the court. Sri Basavaprabhu patil as such submitted, it is not open to this court to reappreciate the evidence and to interfere with the finding of the fact recorded by the appellate authority to the effect that the revisionist- applicants were not tenants of the land in dispute and that the land had not been leased out or given to the applicants in that capacity. He submitted that it has been found that the applicants have been unauthorised occupant. Sri Patil further submitted that the learned counsel for the revisionist-applicants is wrong in submitting that the land tribunal and the land reforms appellate authority had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the applicants were the tenants of the land on behalf of the land holders. He submitted there was no decision of the civil court in the suit even if issues might have been raised. He submitted there was no decision of the civil court in the suit even if issues might have been raised. Sri Basavaprabhu Patil invited my attention to the Provisions of Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act and contended that the suit that has been pending had been stayed. In view of Section 133 of the act the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the applicants were the tenants. He further submitted that the decision on this question can never be rendered by the civil court in view of Section 133 of the act. He further submitted that temporary injunction is granted on the ground that there is a prima facie case before the civil court and interest of Justice and balance of convenience pending decision, requires that status-quo be maintained. The parties were so directed to maintain status-quo and as such there cannot be any question by applying the principle of res judicata. So Sri Patil submitted that the authorities under the Land Reforms Act viz. , land reforms tribunal and the learned appellate authority could decide that question and so there is no question of jurisdictional error. Sri Patil further submitted that learned appellate tribunal was correct in holding concept under expression or the words "deemed tenant" contained in Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act was not applicable to the case and had been illegally applied by the land reforms tribunal. There are certain ingredients which have got to be established in order to apply the doctrine of deemed tenancy to a case, before it and these ingredients had not been established by the applicants nor had been so found by the tribunal or the appellate authority. It may be mentioned here that during the course of the argument an application was moved by the revisionist's counsel to file certain documents, the copies of which had been filed for perusal of the court which according to the counsel for the parties had been filed before the tribunal and which has been considered by the tribunal as well as by the appellate authority. The documents had been filed by the revisionist-applicants in support of the contention to the effect that there is proof of contract of tenancy, though it has mentioned therein with reference to the name of the applicants and those revenue records, applicants appeared to be mentioned as the lease-holder. The documents had been filed by the revisionist-applicants in support of the contention to the effect that there is proof of contract of tenancy, though it has mentioned therein with reference to the name of the applicants and those revenue records, applicants appeared to be mentioned as the lease-holder. When those documents were produced, learned counsel for the parties indicated and pointed out that this document had been considered by the authorities in original and those documents have been rejected for the reasons that lease documents had not been prepared according to law. Learned counsel for the opposite party indicated that two applicants whose names are alleged to be contained in column-19 were not related to each other instead they were coming from distinct families and castes and when the two claimed that the lands were tenanted to them, and that both of them clalmed separate portions were let out to them, the documents did not indicate the division of the land at all among the two and did not in fact specify that the land was leased for one or another and therefore learned counsel for the respondent contended that there is no specification of the portion of land with portions are alleged to have been leased out in those revenue records. The documents clearly show that they are not prepared according to law and as such learned counsel for respondent contended that there was no ground to raise the presumption under Section 133 of the act. It was further contended that the presumption thereunder could be rebutted and the tribunal as well as appellate authority have taken the view that the presumption under Section 133 being rebuttable has been rebutted by the evidence led by the parties. Sri Patil submitted that in this view of the matter the order of the land tribunal did not suffer from any error of law or error of jurisdiction nor did it suffer from any illegality or irregularity as to the procedure. It may be mentioned here that learned counsel for the revisionist has very fairly submitted before the court that he does not raise the contention on the ground that the orders suffer from any irregularity as there is no question of irregularity. Learned counsel submitted and he made his best efforts to indicate that order suffers from illegality. No other contention has been made by learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel submitted and he made his best efforts to indicate that order suffers from illegality. No other contention has been made by learned counsel for the parties. ( 8 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by learned counsel for the parties. That as regards the revisional jurisdiction of this court it is provided and defined under Section 121-a of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. "section 121-a of the act reads as under:"121-A. Revision by the high court:the high court may at any time call for the records of any order or proceeding recorded by the appellate authority under this act or any other law for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality of such order or as to the regularity of such proceeding and may pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit: provided that no such Order, shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard". There is no doubt that revisional jurisdiction is part of the wider appellate jurisdiction of the high court as observed and held by the Supreme Court in shankar ramchandra abhyankar v krishnaji dattatraya bapat, but it is not as wide as that of the first appeal. The jurisdiction of the revisional court is always circumscribed and limited by the conditions provided and prescribed by the Provisions of the act concerned. The appellate jurisdiction of the 1st appellate court ordinarily is very wide, and it can re-appreciate the evidence and set aside the finding on the ground of reliability or non-reliability but that is not the scope of revisional jurisdiction except in cases where the findings of jurisdictional facts are involved. The necessary condition for application of Section 121-a of the act are that the order or proceedings should have been recorded by the appellate court. It means that no revision can be filed directly from the order of original authority under Section 121-a of the act. In other words, if an order passed by the original authority is appealable then no revision will lie without having recourse to the remedy of appeal. The second condition appears from perusal of Section that the records may be called for, for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or otherwise of the order impugned or as to the regularity or irregularity of the proceedings. The second condition appears from perusal of Section that the records may be called for, for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or otherwise of the order impugned or as to the regularity or irregularity of the proceedings. If either of the conclusions are shown to exist then and then only the court gets jurisdiction to pass such orders as it thinks fit in the interest of justice. So this condition under Section 121-a of the act confines scope of jurisdiction to the question of legality or illegality of the Order, regularity or irregularity of the proceedings. If the order is shown to the illegal or suffering from illegality this court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the order or the proceeding appear to be suffering from irregularity of substantial nature in the sense the proceedings and procedure followed are irregular, and that said irregularity has resulted in erroneous decision as well as in causing injustice, this court gets power to interfere with that order or proceeding. The expression "illegality" has been defined in blacks' law dictionary, 6th edition as under: illegality:that which is contrary to the principles of law as testing mere rules or procedure. Expression illegality has been defined to mean as against the or not authorised by law. What is legal that has also defined to mean in conformity to law or according to law. Thus expression legality means indicates that this court proceed to examine whether the order in question is in accordance with law and conformity to substantive law. When an order can be said to have been made 'according to law', to be legal and not suffering from illegality, it has come up for consideration before their lordship of the Supreme Court in a case in the context of Section 35 of the Delhi ajmir rent (control) act in hari shankar and others v rao girdhari lal chowdhury. In that case their lordship of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to refer with approval the observations of Hon'ble Mr. Justice beaumont the Hon'ble chief Justice as he then was of the Bombay high court in the case of bell and company limited v woman hemraj. Their lordship in para 9 observed as under: "the Section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the provincial small cause courts act. Justice beaumont the Hon'ble chief Justice as he then was of the Bombay high court in the case of bell and company limited v woman hemraj. Their lordship in para 9 observed as under: "the Section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the provincial small cause courts act. That Section has been considered by the high court in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of beaumont, c. j. (as he then was) in bell and company limited, supra, were the learned chief justice, dealing with Section 25 of the provincial small cause courts Act, observed:"the object of Section 25 is to enable the high court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The Section does not enumerate the cases in which the court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and i certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the high court would not have arrived at". But, in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the high court would not have arrived at". This observation has our full concurrence". The Section which is dealt here is almost the same as Section 25 of small cause courts act. ( 9 ) A reading of this decision firstly shows that a decision may be illegal if the orders suffer from error of jurisdiction or is contrary to the Provisions of law or that decision of the court is based on evidence which should not have been admitted or the like. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 121 of the act or under Section 25 of provincial small cause courts act is wider than the jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is limited to the question of examining whether the decision is in accordance with law and in conformity with the Provisions of law and not otherwise. ( 10 ) KEEPING these basic principles in view, i proceed to examine the contentions of learned counsel for the parties. ( 11 ) THAT as regards the contention of learned counsel for the applicants that the appellate authority acted illegally in taking the view that the land tribunal acted illegally and not in accordance with law by not holding the applicants to be the tenants of land, at least on the basis of doctrine of deemed tenancy in absence of any lease deed or patta and by setting aside the order of tribunal on that ground, in my opinion there is no substance. In my opinion even if the findings as it stands that the revisionist-applicants have been in possession of the land in dispute since, 1969, as per the findings of the land tribunal, the mere factum of possession and cultivation of the land by the revisionists-applicants will not make them the tenant. Tenancy is the subject matter of contract of lease and it has to be proved by the parties on the basis of legally admissible evidence. The authorities have recorded the findings, so far the contract of tenancy is concerned or the factum of letting is concerned, that the applicants have failed to prove the same. That is a finding of fact. The authorities have recorded the findings, so far the contract of tenancy is concerned or the factum of letting is concerned, that the applicants have failed to prove the same. That is a finding of fact. That with reference to the question which has been raised by the revisionist with reference to certain revenue records entries of latter stage of period so far as the land tribunal is concerned it has no doubt held that the applicants have been found to be in possession and cultivation of land since, 1969, and therefore, they should be deemed to be the tenant in eye of law. In my opinion that the order and findings of the original tribunal was not be in accordance with the law applicable. Really tribunal raised presumption under deemed clause without material, circumstances and conditions being established or shown to exist which are essential to be alleged and proved in order to apply the doctrine of deemed tenancy under Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. ( 12 ) SECTION 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 is material for the purpose and need to be quoted and referred, but before i quote Section 4, it would be just and proper to refer to the Provisions of Section 2 (33) and 2 (34) of the Act, which read as under: 2 (33 ). "tenancy" means the relationship of landlord and tenant; 2 (34 ). "tenant" means an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from the landlord and includes. (I) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4; (II) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the Karnataka tenants (temporary protection from eviction) Act, 1961; (IIA) a person who cultivates personally any land on lease under a lease created contrary to the Provisions of Section 5 and before the date of commencement of the amendment act; (III) a person who is a permanent tenant; and (IV) a person who is a protected tenant". Explanation. a person who takes up a contract to cut grass, or to gather the fruits or other produce of any land, shall not on that account only be deemed to be a tenant". Explanation. a person who takes up a contract to cut grass, or to gather the fruits or other produce of any land, shall not on that account only be deemed to be a tenant". ( 13 ) THIS definition of tenant firstly shows that tenant firstly means the only tenant in the sense that person who cultivates the land and he holds that land on lease granted to him by landlord. The lease is defined in Section 105 of Transfer Of Property Act. Lease as per definition Transfer Of Property Act is beyond doubt, a contract entered into between the lessor (the landlord) and the lessee to enjoy the property for certain considerations. The expression apart from the tenant in the principal sense of the terms lessor and the lessee includes certain other types of persons and one of those is a person who is covered by Section 4 of the act under the "deeming clause". If a person's case is covered under deeming clause then according to sections 2 (33) and 2 (34) read with Section 4 he will also be a tenant. That Section 4 of the act reads as under:"4. Persons to be deemed tenants:a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not, (a) a member of the owner's family, or (B) a servant or a hired labourer on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of owner's family, or (C) a mortgagee in possession: provided that if upon an application made by the owner within one year from the appointed day (i) the (tribunal) declares that such person is not a tenant and its decision is not reversed on appeal, or (ii) the (tribunal) refuses to make such declaration but its decision is reversed on appeal; such person shall not be deemed to be a tenant". a bare reading of this Section will firstly show that the deeming clause can be made applicable to the person who clalms a right or status of tenant under deeming clause, provide he first of all alleges, proves, shows and establishes that he is cultivating the land belonging to some other person and that he is lawfully cultivating the same and further that he does not belong to any of these category of persons as specified under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Section 4, that he is not a member of the family of the owner of the land nor he is a servant or hired labourer payable either in cash or in kind nor is a mortgagee in posses- sion. A reading of clause (b) further shows that a person who gets, crop share or share in the crop produced by the land or persons getting share in crop may stand at different footing. ( 14 ) THAT in the present case it has been found by land tribunal that the petitioner had been cultivating the land since 1969. It is not established nor has it been found to be proved or established that he was cultivating the land lawfully or with the permission of the owner of the land in any manner as has been observed by the tribunal. But one fact is clear, if at all, that the applicants are unauthorised occupants there is no proof if under any process of law the proceedings were initiated to evict the applicants from the land. The appellate authority found that no lawful cultivation has been established initially. In my opinion the deeming clause could not be applied. A person who wants to clalm tenancy rights on the basis of deeming clause has to establish that he has been cultivating the land as tenant with the consent of the land owner. As the necessary ingredients have not been indicated or established, therefore deeming clause under Section 4 of the act cannot be applied to the fact of the present and so in my opinion the appellate authority was justified in holding that the land tribunal acted illegally in applying the principles of "deemed tenant" under Section 4 of the act without necessary ingredients been proved. Thus considered in my opinion the contention of learned counsel for the revisionist-applicants on this aspect that appellate authority committed acted illegality by not giving benefit of the deemed tenant clause to revisionist-applicants is without substance and as such is rejected. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the revisionist-applicants submitted that there were revenue record entries of period prior to 1969 and in those entries the name of applicants have been mentioned as persons cultivating the land and the name of owner of the land is also mentioned. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that on the basis of these entries the applicants possession should have been considered to be lawful as tenant as there is use of expression "guthiga receipt". The appellate authority really has considered these documents and found that these documents to be not reliable for the reasons mentioned in the judgment of the learned appellate authority. The appellate authority observed that with reference to these entries in the phani of 1964-65 and 1968-69 which are marked as ex. 1 to 6 respectively. "admittedly venkataiah and channaiah are not the brothers because venkataiah is s/o hanumaiah, whereas channaiah is son of havina channaiah. It is clear from the notice issued to them by the land tribunal which are at pages 11 and 17 of the tribunal file. But in phani the area cultivated by each person is not shown in column 19 except writing the name of venkataiah and channaiah. The area cultivated by each of them is not mentioned. That phani entries which are made lawfully and correctly have got presumptive value but no other type of entry marked writing of the name of the person in column 19 will not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that he is a tenant of the land. In the document referred to above the area cultivated by each of the tenants is not shown and therefore we have to reject this document. Apart from this if really channaiah and venkataiah were the tenants of the land clalmed by them they should have been shown in phani to all these survey numbers prior to the year 1964 and the respondents in both the appeals have not chosen to produce phani for the years prior to 1964-65 and no explanation is forthcoming. On this ground also much value cannot be attached to the entries in ex. On this ground also much value cannot be attached to the entries in ex. B-1 and b-6 respectively. The appellate tribunal has further mentioned, that these entries had been made during the course of litigation with reference to os No. 378 of 1991 and particularly when there was a dispute between the parties. The relevant observations in these connections are to the effect, that when any entries are made in r. t. c. during the disputed period is not of much assistance on the basis of the said entry, it cannot be said that the land in dispute were tenanted one as on the appointed day and the respondents were tenants of the same on that day: it is a fact that since the date of transfer of the land by narendra in favour of the present respondents vide deed in 1969 when the dispute arose by filing of the suit by the present applicant. In my opinion the learned appellate court did not committed any illegality or material irregularity or error of law in not relying upon those entries. Apart from that as regards presumption under Section 133 of the act is rebuttable. ( 16 ) SECTION 133 of the land revenue act reads as follows:"presumption regarding entries in the records:an entry in the record of rights and a certified entry in the register of mutations shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor". ( 17 ) USE of expression "shall be presumed to be true until contrary is proved". Firstly it shows that presumption is rebuttable and as such the question of raising presumption stands rebutted by the evidence led by the parties. In the present case the tribunal as well as the appellate authority in particular perused the evidence of the parties in detail and thereafter the appellate tribunal appears to have come to the conclusion that the respondents have proved to the contrary. In the present case the tribunal as well as the appellate authority in particular perused the evidence of the parties in detail and thereafter the appellate tribunal appears to have come to the conclusion that the respondents have proved to the contrary. Thus the present opposite parties in the revision have proved that survey No. 23 was never let out and the present revisionist-applicants were not tenants of this land in dispute on the appointed day and that oral evidence lead on behalf of respondent No. 3 before the appellate tribunal was believable and that the evidence produced by the otherside i. e. , the applicants was not reliable and that entry was not also reliable in view of other evidence lead by the parties. This being the position, in my opinion it become pure question of appreciation of evidence i. e. , oral and documentary and circumstantial for authorities original and the appellate which authorities arrived at a conclusion to the effect that no agreement of letting or agreement of lease has been established. That being the position arrived at, in my opinion, there has been no question of illegality. Even if for a movement if may be taken that the finding could have been arrived at otherwise on appreciation of evidence. It is within the jurisdiction of the court of facts to arrive at a finding after appreciating the oral and documentary and circumstantial evidence. After taking into consideration the evidence and material furnished before me, it may be that it might have committed an error in the appreciation of evidence but that appreciation or misappreciation of the evidence cannot be termed to be something which may be deemed to be an illegality or irregularity in the order nor does it evolve a question whether the order is according to law or it suffers from error of law or of jurisdiction or it suffers from error of procedure. That this court cannot sit in any appreciation of evidence done by a court of first appeal. In this view of the matter, it is not open to reappreciate the matter as there are limits within which the court has to act. As regards to the question of res judicata with regard to applicant's status as tenant of to that effect is there any civil courts finding which may be said to be binding. In this view of the matter, it is not open to reappreciate the matter as there are limits within which the court has to act. As regards to the question of res judicata with regard to applicant's status as tenant of to that effect is there any civil courts finding which may be said to be binding. No finding of the civil court has been placed before me except certain judgments on the basis of which the learned counsel for the revisionist-tenant attempted to develop argument that findings of the civil court are binding. But there is no judgment of the civil court before me in which it can be said that there was a dispute about the status of the revisionist and that the same had been decided by the civil court. Really it appears to be that during the pendency of the suit in the civil court change came in the law and the jurisdiction of the civil court was taken away and the matter was to be decided on such point vide Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act reads as under: "133. Suits proceedings etc. , involving questions required to be decided by the tribunal: (1) notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, (i) no civil or criminal court or officer or authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land (xxx) decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person clalming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st march, 1974; (ii) such court or officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the tribunal for decision; (iii) all interim orders issued or made by such court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be; (iv) the tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause (1) and communicate its decision to such court, officer or authority. The decision of the tribunal shall be final. The decision of the tribunal shall be final. (2) nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the civil or criminal court or the officer or authority from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in that sub-section. A perusal of this question firstly shows that notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, where a suit is pending or proceedings is pending concerning the land and the question therein is involved to the effect whether such land is or is not an agricultural land and whether the person clalming to be in possession of the land is or is not a tenant of the said land, from prior to 1st march, 1974 the civil court shall not decide the said question but such suit or proceedings shall be stayed and that such a question shall be referred to the tribunal for decision. The interim orders issued or made by such courts is referred any question (iii) Section 133 shall stand dissolved and vacated and as per clause 4 of Section 133 it is a tribunal that has to decide the above mentioned question and then it has to forward its decision to the concerned court or officer of the authority. Thereafter the civil court may further proceed to decide the suit and if plalntiff is entitled to clalm any such relief in the suit as clalmed and it may decree the suit or otherwise it may dismiss. But decision on this question is to be given by the tribunal and not by the civil court. So it appears to me that when suit has been pending in the civil court the question after enforcement of act 16 of 1976 with effect on 16-12-1975 the civil court would not have decided and when there is no decision prior to the date there is no question of res judicata. Having thus considered I am of the opinion that the present case is one which is concluded by it pure findings of fact and it does not involve the question of illegality in the order nor does it involve the question of irregularity in the procedure. In my opinion the order of the appellate authority is in accordance with law. It does not suffer from illegality instead it is legal and valid. The revision as such is hereby, dismissed. In my opinion the order of the appellate authority is in accordance with law. It does not suffer from illegality instead it is legal and valid. The revision as such is hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs. Parties are to bear their own costs. Both revisions are decided by this common judgment and the revisions are dismissed. No order as to costs. ( 18 ) SRI Subbanna, learned high court government pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks. --- *** --- .