P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional petition has been taken out by the accused of G. R. Case No. 1047 of 1981 arising out of Raipur, P. S. Case No. 15 dated 24-9-81 registered for the offence under Section 409 of the I. P. C. and has been directed against an order dated 8-2-93, whereby the prayer under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. for stopping further investigation in the case and for the discharge of the accused/petitioner was rejected. ( 2 ) THE main thrust of the instant case revision is based on the provision of law laid down under sub-Section (5) of Section 167 of the Cr. P. C. as amended by Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1988. The amendment as made under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. enjoins upon the Magistrate that in a case like the present one, which has been registered; for the offence under Section 409 of the I. P. C. , if the Investigation is not concluded within a period of two years from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance, the Magistrate shall make an order of stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for a special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period as mentioned above is necessary. It may be added that Section 167 (6) further provides that any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under S. 167 (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied on an application made to him or otherwise that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under Section 167 (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify. ( 3 ) IN the above back drop of the legal proposition what is relevant in the instant case to be noticed is that after the F. I. R. was lodged as long back as on 24-9-81, the petitioner accused was granted anticipatory bail by an order dated 22-12-81 of this Court passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1768/81 with a direction that in the event of the petitioner being arrested in connection with the instant case he will be released on bail subject to the condition that he will meet the Investigating Officer of the case as and when required. This order was communicated td the concerned Magistrate i. e. , the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bankura on 16-1-81. The petitioner/accused entered appearance in this case before the said Magistrate while surrendering himself there with a petition for bail on 24-9-86, when it was observed by the Magistrate that in view of the anticipatory bail it would not be just and proper to accept surrender of the accused in the Court before receipt of the charge-sheet. The order was obviously with regard to the bail petition. Be that as it may, the surrender or the appearance of the petitioner/accused before the Magistrate on 24-9-86 would be deemed to be a definite compliance of the appearance' as contemplated under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. It would be further relevant to point out that the beneficial aspect of stopping the further investigation and discharge of the accused was then not available, because the amendment to that effect under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. came into force only with effect from 2-5-89 as per the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1988. Therefore, no question then arise in the instant case of stopping the investigation or discharging the accused by lapse of two years from the date of his surrender on 24-9-86. This is for the simple reason that even after a lapse of two years i. e. , on 23-9-88 the benefit as provided by the amendment was not available. ( 4 ) AS already noticed above the benefit of stopping the investigation and discharging the accused as provided by an amendment in Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. certainly came into force from 2-5-89 i. e. , on the day when the investigation of the instant case was still pending. ( 4 ) AS already noticed above the benefit of stopping the investigation and discharging the accused as provided by an amendment in Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. certainly came into force from 2-5-89 i. e. , on the day when the investigation of the instant case was still pending. Here, it would be apposite to refer to the decisions of this Court in Shakti Majhi v. The State of West Bengal, 1993 (II), Calcutta High Court Notes, page-154 and Shyamal Kumar Chakraborty v. The State of West Bengal, 1993 Calcutta Criminal Law Journal (Calcutta) 31. The aforesaid decisions which were based on some other authoritative decisions as REFERRED TO therein, have amply made it clear that the new sub-Section (5) of Section 167 of the Cr. P. C. inserted by the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1988 shall apply to all the investigation initiated before but not concluded and which were pending on the date of such commencement. Banking upon these authorities I have no option than to hold that the petitioner/accused of the instant case became entitled to the benefit as laid down under the amended provision of S. 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. from May 2, 1989 and onward. ( 5 ) AT this juncture, it is worthy of notice that though the amended provision of Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. came into force on 2-5-89, no step whatsoever appears to have been taken on behalf of the prosecution for continuation of the investigation till 8-2-93 when the impugned order was passed on a move made at the instance of the accused for his discharge under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. , that is to say, even after a lapse of more than three years and eight months of the enforcement of the said law. P. C. , that is to say, even after a lapse of more than three years and eight months of the enforcement of the said law. Here, I feel inclined to refer to paragraph 26 of the authority REFERRED TO above as 1993, Calcutta Criminal Law Journal (Cal) 31, wherein a legal proposition has been laid down that the Magistrate shall, to the knowledge of the accused and the Investigating Officer, take up the matter without delay either suo motu or on prayer, for a consideration of passing of an appropriate order either stopping the investigation and discharging the accused or allowing the investigation to continue, if the Investigating Officer even at this stage satisfies him that it is necessary so to do for the special reasons and in the interest of justice. So, a question arises what could be the period which could be reasonably considered as without delay. Here it is well to notice that even if the instant case had been instituted some time later than 2-5-89 and the accused had appeared some time after that, the provision of law under Section 167 (5) as it stood then would have entitled him for an order of discharge only after two years of his appearance in absence of any order for continuation of the investigation. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no order of continuing the investigation prior to 8-2-93. That being as such, in the instant case when the accused had entered appearance as long back as on 20-4-86 and when the benefit of amended provision under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. was made available to him after 2-5-89, he would be certainly entitled at any rate to the benefit, for want of an order of continuation having been passed within two years from the enforcement of the aforesaid provision of law. In any view of the matter the law would never permit the liberty of availing an order of continuation of an investigation after a long lapse of more than three years as occurred in the instant case. At the best, the Investigating Officer should have availed the opportunity of moving the Court for continuation of investigating within a reasonable time and without much delay, that is to say, soon after the enforcement of the amended Act on 2-5-89. At the best, the Investigating Officer should have availed the opportunity of moving the Court for continuation of investigating within a reasonable time and without much delay, that is to say, soon after the enforcement of the amended Act on 2-5-89. It would rather be apt to mention that a responsibility is enjoined upon the Magistrate also to see that the mandates of law under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. is adhered in its real spirit and it is not impaired by efflux of time or by lack of initiative of a party. ( 6 ) APART from the inordinate delay occurred in taking decision under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. , it was also pertinent to take note of the special reason assigned in the impugned order for continuation of the investigation on the request made by the Investigating Officer. It is obvious that when the prayer for discharge of the accused was made under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. , the Investigating Officer came with a prayer for issuing notice under Section 91 of the Cr. P. C. to the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society, Bankura, for production of certain documents before him so as to complete the investigation. Those documents might have some relevance with the investigation of the case but the point is as to why not such prayer was made by the Investigating Officer soon after the F. I. R. was lodged on 24-9-81. There was absolutely no reason for Investigating Officer to sleep over the matter for about 12 years and to make such prayer for production of certain documents when the question of discharge of the accused was raised under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. on 8-2-93, when the impugned order was passed. The ground for continuation of the Investigation was obviously not fair and for that reason, in my-considered opinion, the same cannot be termed as a special reason, which, in the interest of justice, would necessitate the continuation of the investigation. P. C. on 8-2-93, when the impugned order was passed. The ground for continuation of the Investigation was obviously not fair and for that reason, in my-considered opinion, the same cannot be termed as a special reason, which, in the interest of justice, would necessitate the continuation of the investigation. This inordinate delay would rather encroach the right of the accused for a speedy trial as granted under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as well I am of-course conscious of the fact that the case relates to alleged criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of certain cash and stock of fertiliser and cloth as well certain entries in the books of account which all taken together have been valued at Rs. 3,69,489. 07 p. but the gravity of the alleged offence alone would not certainly take away of the effect of law as provided under Section 167 (5) of the Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) THUS, for the reasons above, this petition-in-revision must succeed and, accordingly it is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the further investigation in the case as REFERRED TO above is directed to be stopped. It is further directed that the accused/petitioner be discharged. Revision allowed.