JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, by this habeas corpus petition, has challenged the legality and the validity of the detention order dated 10-10-94 (Annexure. 3) passed by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, under Section 3 (2) and (3) of the National Secuity Act, as well as the order Annexure. 6 dated 30-11-94, passed by the State Government, by which the order Annexure.3, passed by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, was confirmed and the petitioner was ordered to be detained for a period of one year, i.e., with effect from 10-10-94 to 9-10-95. 2. The petitioner is a resident of Jaisalmer and is a citizen of India. He was found engaged in anti-national activities and, therefore, in order to refrain him to induge in anti-national and anti-social activities in future, the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, after his subjective satisfaction on the material available on record, thought it proper to order for the detention of the petitioner. The learned District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, therefore, on 10-10-94, passed the order Annexure.3 ordering for the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year, i.e..with effect from 10-10-94 to 9-10-95 as the activities of the petitioner, according to the detaining authority, were adversely affecting the national security and public administration. The order of detention, along with the grounds, was served upon the petitioner while he was in the Central Jail, Jodhpur. The detention order Annexure-3, passed by the detaining authority, was approved by the State Government on 17-10-94. The petitioner made a representation to the Advisory Board through the Jail Authority on 6-11-94. The meeting of the Advisory Board was to be held on 8-11-94 and, therefore, this representation made by the petitioner was sent to the advisory board by the Jail Authorities. The State Government placed all the relevant material before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board considered the representation made by the petitioner and the other material available on record and approved the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year. The State Government, thereafter, by its order dated 30-11-94, confirmed the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year, i.e., with effect from 10-10-94 to 9-10-95. The Advisory Board considered the representation made by the petitioner and the other material available on record and approved the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year. The State Government, thereafter, by its order dated 30-11-94, confirmed the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year, i.e., with effect from 10-10-94 to 9-10-95. The petitioner has challenged the order Annexure-3 passed by the detaining authority as well as the order Annexure.6 passed by the State Government confirming the detention order passed by the detaining authority, on the grounds that (i) the representation made by the petitioner was not considered by the State Government; and (ii) while passing the detention order, the detaining authority had taken into consideration the grounds which were the part of the grounds of detention of two previous detention orders which have been quashed and set-aside - one by the High Court and the other by the Supreme Court - and, therefore, the grounds of detention taken in those earlier detention orders should not have been considered while passing the present detention order Annexure.3. The detention order, passed by the detaining authority, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set-aside. The learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, has supported the orders Annexure.3 and Annexure.6 passed by the detaining authority as well as confirmed by the State Government, respectively, and submitted that the representation was made by the petitioner to the Advisory Board and not to the State Government and, therefore, the State Government was not required to consider the representation made by him. in reply to the contention No.2 raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding consideration of the material, it has been argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that the earlier grounds of detention are not the sole grounds of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and those grounds have been mentioned as they were necessary to point-out the intecedents of the petitioner and apart from those grounds there are much more material available on the-record for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order Annexure.3. 3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. 3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The first contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the representation made by the petitioner on 6-11-94 was addressed to the Advisory Board but it was the bounden duty of the State Government, also to consider and decide the representation made by the petitioner and it cannot withheld its consideration on the ground that it was not addressed to the State Government but addressed to the Advisory Board. The mode of address of the representation is only a method of form which cannot whittle down the requirement of the mandate enshrined under Article 22 (5) (v) of the Constitution of India. The representation was addressed to the Advisory Board and the same was forwarded by the Jail Authorities to the Advisory Board. Before placing it to the Advisory Board, the representation must have been considered y the appropriate Government which was required to consider the same, but the same has not been done by the State Government in the present case on the pretext that the representation was not addressed to it. Whether the presentation was addressed to the Advisory Board or to the State Government, the law requires that it should be considered by the State Government independently. In K. Dariusz v. The Union of India 1990 (1) SCR 98 , the detenu made a representation which was addressed to the Chain nan of the Advisory Board and that representation was not considered by the Union of India on the pretext that it was not addressed to the Union of India and, therefore, the Central Government was not required to consider the same. Repelling these contentions, it was held by the Supreme Court that:- "As in the instant case though the representation was addressed to the Chairman, Central Advisory Board, the same was forwarded by the Jail Authority and it must be taken to have been a representation to the appropriate Government which was to consider it before placing it before the Advisory Board and the same having not been done Article 22 (5), has to be held to have been violated." The same cotrroversy again came-up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in : Smt. Gracy v. The State of Kerala, 1991 (1) JT SC 371 . In the case of Smt. Gracy, the detenue addressed her representation to the Advisory Board but the same was not considered by the Central Government. A contention was raised by the Central Government that since the representation was addressed to the Advisory Board and not addressed to the Central Government, it was not necessary for the Central Government to consider the same independently. Dealing with the contentions raised by the Central Government, the Apex Court held as under:- "The contents of Article 22 (5) as well as the nature of the duties imposed thereby on the detaining authority, supports the view that so long as there is a representation made by the detenue against the order of detention, the aforesaid dual obligations under Article 22 (5) arose, irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both. The mode of address is only a method of form which cannot whittle down the requirement of the Constitutional mandate in Article 22 (5) enacted as one of the safe-guards provided to the detenu in a case of preventive detention." The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in: Moosa Husein Sanghar v. The State of Gujarat 1993 (1) JT SC 44 , wherein it has been held, "merely because the representation was addressed to the Advisory Board and not to the State Government, did not absolve the State Government from the Constitutional obligation flowing from Article 22 (5) to consider the said representation." The State Government was under an obligation to consider the representation made by the detenu at its own without being influenced by any view expressed by the Advisory Board. The obligation of the Government to consider the detenus representation is independent and different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider such representation. The Government, while considering the representation, is required to ascertain essentially; whether the order is in conformity with the powers under the Act while the Advisory Board at the time of considering the Representation in the case of the detenu, has to examine whether there is sufficient material available on record which warrants the detention of the petitioner. The Government, while considering the representation, is required to ascertain essentially; whether the order is in conformity with the powers under the Act while the Advisory Board at the time of considering the Representation in the case of the detenu, has to examine whether there is sufficient material available on record which warrants the detention of the petitioner. The consideration of the representation by the Advisory Board is a safe-guard provided for the detenu and cannot be said to be a substitute for consideration of the representation by the appropriate Government and that right is an independent right of the detenu. As the-representation made by the petitioner was not considered by the State Government in the present case, the order of detention (Annexure.3) as well as the order of confirmation (Annexure.6) passed by the State Government, are liable to be quashed and set-aside. 5. The other ground, on which Annexure.3 and Annexure.6 have been challenged, is that the detaining authority had taken into consideration the earlier grounds of detention, on the basis of which the two detention orders were passed, which were quashed and set-aside one by the High Court and the other by the Supreme Court. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, is that though the grounds taken in the earlier detention orders have been taken into consideration but those were not the sole grounds which formed the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the present detention order Annexure.3. Once the order of detention has been set-aside by the High Court and/or by the Supreme Court in the Habeas Corpus Petition (s) even on technical grounds, the grounds taken by the detaining authority should not have been taken into consideration either as a whole or in part along with the fresh grounds of detention to reach at the subjective satisfaction for the detention of the person concerned. When once the previous orders have been quashed and set-aside, revoked, cancelled or expired, no fresh order can be issued on the same grounds, on which the earlier order had been made. When once the previous orders have been quashed and set-aside, revoked, cancelled or expired, no fresh order can be issued on the same grounds, on which the earlier order had been made. It is only on the basis of the fresh facts which has arisen after revoking, cancelling or expiry of the earlier order which can be taken note of while forming the subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention and if while passing the order of detention the grounds taken in the earlier order (s) of detention, which orders have been quashed and set-aside, have been taken into consideration, the subsequent order of detention is liable to be quashed and set-aside. It has been held by the Supreme Court in: Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v. N.L. Kalna AIR 1989 SC 1234 as under:- "Where the detaining authority, while passing the second order of detention, had referred to the earlier detention order and the judgment of the High Court quashing it, presumably for the purpose of showing that the detenu, in spite of earlier detention order was continuing as bootlegging activities and the detenting authority said clearly in affidavit in reply that he took into consideration the previous grounds of detention also for his conclusion that the detenu was engaged in bootlegging activities since long then in other words the detaining authority had taken into consideration the earlier grounds of detention which grounds had been nullified by the High Court, the subsequent detention order was vitiated on the ground that the detaining authority had taken into consideration the grounds of earlier detention order along with the other materials." In the case of: Jahangir Khan Fazalkhan Pathan v. the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad AIR 1989 SC 1812 , the Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid view and held that "the order of detention cannot be made after considering the previous grounds of detention when the same had been quashed by the Court and if such previous grounds of detention are taken into consideration while forming the subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making the detention order, the order of detention will be vitiated. It is of no consequence if the further fresh facts disclosed in the grounds of the impugned detention order have been considered." In the present case, some of the grounds taken while passing the detention order Annexure.3 were the grounds taken in the earlier detention orders which were struck-down one by the High Court and the another by the Supreme Court. The detaining authority took into consideration the previous grounds of detention as well as the new grounds for it. The grounds taken in the earlier detention orders were nullified by the High Court or the Supreme Court. The earlier grounds mentioned in the detention orders may have affected the subjective satisfaction of the detaining order Annexure.3. In such circumstances, the detention order Annexure.3 as well as the order of confirmation (Annexure.6) cannot be sustained in spite of the fact that some fresh facts were, also, taken in the consideration by the detaining authority in arriving -- at the subjective satisfaction that the detention of the petitioner is necessary for preventing him to engage in the activities prejudicial to the security of the nation. The order Annexure 3 passed by the detaining authority ordering for the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year from 10-10-94 to 9-10-95 and the order Annexure. 6 confirming the order of detention, passed by the State Government, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside. 6. In the result, the Habeas Corpus Petition, filed by the petitioner, is allowed and the order Annexure 3 dated 10-10-94 passed by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, as well as the order Annexure 6 dated 30-11-94, passed by the State Government confirming the order of detention, are quashed and set aside. The petitioner may be released forthwith if he is not required in any other case. This shall, however, not affect the detention or prosecution of the petitioner for any other offence under the Criminal Law and it shall, also, not be construed as a direction to release him in case he is in custody as a result of refusal of bail.Petition allowed. *******