SATYA NARAYAN CHAKRABARTY, J. ( 1 ) CRIMINAL Revision No. 2221 of 1989 and Criminal Revision No. 409 of 1990 were heard together as per order dated 26-2-1990 of this Court. Both the cases are directed for quashing the proceedings in Trial No. 7 of 1989 Case No. (G. R. 2771 of 1988) in respect of an alleged offence under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Ss. 8, 9 and 10 of the said Act for alleged violation of paras 4, 5 (ii) (b), 19 (i) and 26 of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1960 pending in the 1st Special Court (E. C. Act) at Calcutta. ( 2 ) CRIMINAL Revision Case No. 409 of 1990 was filed on behalf of minor Madhur N. Parasuramka as his case was split up and as he could not be tried jointly with other major accused persons. ( 3 ) UPON a First Information Report lodged by a Sub-Inspector of Police, Enforcement Branch against Keswa Prasad Parasuramka and Shyam Prakash Parasuramka, Barabazar Police Station Case No. 775 dated 1-2-1986 under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Essen tial Commodities Act, 1955 was started. It was alleged that the accused persons were found selling cotton sarees on behalf of Messrs. Sewa Kunj (Proprietor - Anup Kumar Parasuramka) from the shop of Messrs. Mansukhari Hazarimal at 201-B, Ma hatma Gandhi Road, without the relevant licence and in violation of the provision of para 4 of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1960. The said First Information Report was based on a General Diary Entry 68 dated 1-12-1988. 1n course of search, 52 pieces of dhotis with Finlay Mills trade mark and 502 pieces of cotton sarees (printed) styled as S. N. prints ('mathusree' etc.) were seized and the two accused persons were arrested and released on P. S. Bail on Medical ground. The Investigating Officer, by report dated 7-3-89, submitted a final report before the Judge stating that the accused be discharged as no sufficient evidence was forthcom ing against them. By order dated 26-4-1989 the learned Judge did not accept the report of the Inves tigating Officer but directed further investigation by a senior and competent officer and report. After further investigation nothing could be found against the accused petitioners and the I. O. prayed for their discharge. By order dated 26-4-1989 the learned Judge did not accept the report of the Inves tigating Officer but directed further investigation by a senior and competent officer and report. After further investigation nothing could be found against the accused petitioners and the I. O. prayed for their discharge. The learned Judge, however, upon con sideration of the materials available on record and statements of witnesses took cognizance of the of fence under S. 190 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for violation of paras 4, 5 (ii) (b), 19 (1) and 26 of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1966, punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act read with Ss. 8, 9 and 10 of the said Act fixing 11-7-1989 for supply of copies to the accused persons and issuing process against absentee accused by his order dated 14-6 -1989. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners argued before me that the Learned Special Court was not entitled to take cognizance on the basis of the final report, as the same did not contain facts constituting the offence. The Special Court could not take cogni zance suo motu as was taken by the learned Judge which is not sustainable and the proceedings must be quashed. He tried to argue that no Textile Licence was required for M/s. Sewa Kunj which was not dealing in cotton textile, but the firm was carrying on an altogether different business viz. Synthetic Tex tile goods which does not come within the purview of the said Control Order, that the textile licence being in favour of the firm Messrs. Mansukhrai Hazarimal, even though, one of the partners was a minor being shown in the application as minor represented by his mother as natural guardian, there was no violation of the condition of licence as the licence was issued to the firm and not to its indi vidual members, that no separate licence under Group 'c' was required, as the firm had a licence under Group "b2" category which covers business in retail. that as there was no change in tire Constitu tion and mode of business of the firm having a textile licence in the name of the said Firm, there is no violation of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order or the conditions of licence, that the fact that one of the partners had started a new business as the sole proprietor in respect of a com modity which is not at all covered by the said Control Order did not require to be communicated to the Textile Authority and accordingly the Learned Court below was not justified to take cognizance on the alleged materials. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate for the State on the other hand has submitted that the Trial Judge has given reasons in his order for taking cognizance and he could not go into the evidence at this stage and the same will be considered at the time of trial and there is no reason to quash the proceedings at this stage. ( 6 ) THE decisions reported in (1984) 1 Cal HN 74 : (1984 Cri LJ (NOC) 158) and 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 140 (Pat) cited by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners have no application to this case. In the case reported in (1984) 1 Cal HN 74 : (1984 Cri LJ (NOC) 158) the Special Judge being of the view that police should not have submitted the final report took cognizance and decided to take evidence, which is not the case here. In the other case referred to the police report did not provide foundation for taking cognizance which is also not the case here. The report in writing of the facts constituting the offence made by a person, who is a public servant as defined in S. 21 of the Indian Penal Code includes a police report and undoubtedly a police officer submitting the report will be a public servant within the mean ing of S. 21, I. P. C. So cognizance on police report is also covered by S. 11 of the E. C. Act. The police report means not only the opinion and conclusion of the police officer but it includes the documents seized and statement of witnesses recorded by police under S. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the learned Court in this case on the basis of such police report containing facts constituting offence was entitled to take cognizance of the offence. The police report including its accompaniments here discloses facts constituting the offence so as to afford a basis for enabling the judge to take cogni zance of the offence and whether there is legal evidence or not will be considered by the Judge at the time of framing of charge. It also appears that there was change in constitution of the partnership busi ness due to death of one of the partners and induction of the minor partner, but whether the change was reported within the stipulated period or not with surrender of licence will also be considered by the learned Judge along with the other materials at the time of framing charge against the accused and he may discharge the accused if he considers the charge to be groundless. In a similar case reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3537 : (1993 AIR SCW 2861) the Hon'ble Apex Court held that invoking inherent powers prior to commencement of trial aid leading of evidence to quash the prosecution is not desirable except only in exceptional circumstances and the case dealt with by Their Lordships was not one of these exceptional cases and the case in hand is not also an exceptional case. To my considered mind, therefore, there is no reason to quash the proceedings so as to cut short the normal course of criminal trial. The Criminal Revi sion cases are accordingly dismissed and the interim orders of stay of the proceedings of the court below grunted by this court on 6-12-1989 and 26-2-1990 are vacated. Petition dismissed.