JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The writ petitioner was appointed as Trainee Amin in May 1974. The copies of the appointment letter are annexed with the writ petition and marked as Annexure "B". He was confirmed in his post subsequently. On the complaint that the matriculation certificate used by the petitioner for securing his job was forged, the petitioner was suspended from service by an order dated 1.3.1979 by the then Settlement Officer. A copy of the order of suspension is annexed with the writ petition and marked as Annexure "A". Thereafter, the Inquiring Authority (Respondent No.3) by letter dated 27th June, 1980 withdrew the order of suspension. A copy of the said letter has been annexed with the writ petition and marked as letter Annexure "C". Thereafter a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner after the lapse of four years informing him that Sri B. Chakraborty, Deputy Commissioner of Departmental Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, had been appointed to hold enquiry into the charges levelled against him. A copy of the charge-sheet has been annexed with the writ petition and marked as letter Annexure "D". The petitioner duly submitted his reply to the said charge-sheet denying the allegations. A copy of the said reply has been annexed with writ petition and marked as Annex-D/1. The writ petitioner filed an application before the Dy. Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries, Vigilance Commission for being represented by a lawyer or by a Co-employee in the said proceeding but the Deputy Commissioner by his Memo dated 23.8.84 informed the petitioner that he had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. A copy of the said letter is annexed with the writ petition and marked as Annex-E. On an earlier occasion the Disciplinary Authority refused a prayer of the petitioner for legal assistance on the ground that charges were very simple and the presenting. Officer was appointed was not a legal practitioner. A copy of the said letter dated 26.12.83 is annexed with writ petition and marked as Annex-E/1. The charges were relating to forgery and different documents and a number of witnesses had to be examined and intricate questions of law were involved in the case. The presenting Officer was a highly qualified trained prosecutor being a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption (Head-quarters). The charges were relating to forgery and different documents and a number of witnesses had to be examined and intricate questions of law were involved in the case. The presenting Officer was a highly qualified trained prosecutor being a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption (Head-quarters). The petitioner was informed the same by a latter copy which has been annexed with writ petition and marked as Annex-F. The presenting Officer examined the witnesses in English. The writ petitioner could not properly understand the examination-in-chief and was prevented from putting questions in cross-examinations. On 28.5.90, the petitioner appeared before the Vigilance Commission and filed an application stating that it was very difficult for him to bring witnesses who were working in school in Bihar since this school was closed for summer vacation and as such the petitioner wanted adjournment to a date after the reopening of the school for bringing witnesses on his behalf but the prayer was refused. A copy of the said letter is annexed with writ petition and marked as Annexure-J. The petitioner has been served with the second show-cause notice leading to the dismissal from service. According to the petitioner, the findings of the disciplinary authority are vague, indefinite and are not in conformity with the: legal provision under the West Bengal Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1971. Moreover, the enquiry report is vague, indefinite and the findings of Inquiring Authority are perverse. It has been further alleged by the writ petitioner that both the appointing authority and the enquiring authority represented to the petitioner by informing him that the charge was very simple and that there would be no major punishment. The appointing authority also recorded an order to take a lenient view but in another breath he decided to dismiss the writ petitioner from service. Thus, the appointing authority acted a mala fide and in a vindictive manner. The appointing authority has not considered the record of the enquiry and has not recorded its own findings and the alleged charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice does not comply with Rule 10(2)(b) of the C.C.A. Rules inasmuch as no ground has been for set cut for dismissal. The appointing authority has not considered the record of the enquiry and has not recorded its own findings and the alleged charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice does not comply with Rule 10(2)(b) of the C.C.A. Rules inasmuch as no ground has been for set cut for dismissal. In view of the lapse of a period of four years, between the second suspension and the charge-sheet and of a period of seven years between charge-sheet and the second show-cause, inordinate delay gives rise to the presumption of abandonment charge-sheet mutual the petitioner. 2. The petitioner has come before this Court for the following reliefs :–– "A. Writ of the mandamus commanding the respondents, their agents and servants forbear from given effect or further effect and from proceeding further with the charge-sheet enquiry report, suspension order, second show-cause notice, etc and further for bearing them from dismissing the petitioner from service; B. Writ of the mandamus commanding the respondents not to proceed further in the matter and to revoke, cancel or drop the entire proceeding and to allow the petitioner to resume his duty; C. Writ of certiorari directing the respondents their agents and servants to produce all the records, reports, etc. In connection with the matter so that justice can be administered by this Court and other reliefs." 3. A supplementary affidavit has been sworn by the writ petitioner containing the certain documents. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents No.1 and 2, it has been stated that the writ petitioner entered government service on 1.6.74 in the post of Antin in Purulia Revisional Settlement Office. The minimum qualification for the said post of Amin was School Final pass from any Board. The petitioner declared his educational qualification stating that he had passed School Final Examination in the year of 1969 from Bihar School Examination Board. On verification it transpired that the writ petitioner did not pass the said School Final Examination at all and entered government service by making a false declaration. An enquiry was held by the Commissioner of Departmental Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal after giving proper opportunities to the petitioner. After completing the enquiry, the Inquiring Authority submitted report to the Disciplinary authority holding that the petitioner used a forged admit card and that he did not actually appear at the Secondary School Examination, 1969 from Government Higher Secondary School, Dhanbad. After completing the enquiry, the Inquiring Authority submitted report to the Disciplinary authority holding that the petitioner used a forged admit card and that he did not actually appear at the Secondary School Examination, 1969 from Government Higher Secondary School, Dhanbad. The Disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Inquiring Authority after considering the matter and was of the opinion that the petitioner should be dismissed from service. Second show-cause notice dated 17.8.90 was issued in comformity with the rules, the petitioner has been dismissed from service with effect from 1.11.90. Other allegations of facts made in the writ petition have been denied. It has been further stated that the Settlement Officer being the appointing authority of the petitioner was the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. It has been further stated that the Director of Land Records of Service, West Bengal is the appointing authority in this case. It has been stated that a considerable time was required to conclude the enquiry as the Inquiring authority had to examine a good number of witnesses and documents. The material averments made in the supplementary affidavit filed by the writ petitioner have also been denied. 4. In the affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the petitioner, the material allegations made in the writ petition have been reiterated and the material allegations of facts made in the affidavit-in-opposition have been denied. 5. Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate appeared on behalf of the writ petitioner, has submitted that the main grounds of attack in this writ petition are that the charges are stale, that there has been abandonment of the charge, that the petitioner has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity of defending himself properly as no legal assistance was given to him, that according to the second show-cause notice, a lenient view of the matter was to be taken but actually he was dismissed from service, that the charge shows a biased mind and that the punishment was disproportionate with the gravity of the offence. 6. Mrs. Manjari Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that there was some delay in giving the charge-sheet but that was due to the fact that various documents and many witnesses had to be examined. So the ground of attack that there was abandonment of charge due to delay is without any foundation. It has been further submitted by Mrs. So the ground of attack that there was abandonment of charge due to delay is without any foundation. It has been further submitted by Mrs. Gupta that the petitioner was not deprived of a reasonable opportunity of defending himself properly simply due to the fact that his prayer for allowing him to enrage a lawyer or a Co-employee to help him was refused, as the charges were simple nature and did not involve complicate questions of law and fact. In this connection, she has drawn the attention to Court to Rule 10(5)(ii) of the West Bengal Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1971, the relevant portion of the Rule, amended in 1976, reads as follows:–– "(ii). The government servant against whom departmental proceedings have been instituted may take the assistance of any other government servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or the Disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, permits to do so". 7. With regard to the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the writ petition it has been submitted by Mrs. Gupta that under Rule 10(12), the Disciplinary authority having regard to its findings of the charges is of opinion that the penalties specified in Clause (IV) to (VIII) of Rule 8 should be imposed. It is obliged to give a notice upon the delinquent Officer calling him upon to submit a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In this case, the proper authority acted within its jurisdiction and get the second show-cause notice served and upon considering the second show-cause submitted passed the appropriate order under sub-rule 15 of Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service (C.C.A.) Rules, 1971. It has been further submitted by her that as the gravity of the charge was very serious, therefore, the punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate with the offence. 8. In this case, the writ petitioner got employed on 1.6.1974. He was first suspended on 1.3.79 and that suspension order was withdrawn on 27.6.80. The charge-sheet was issued on 20.8.83 and the show-cause to the charge-sheet was filed by the petitioner on 2.7.84. 8. In this case, the writ petitioner got employed on 1.6.1974. He was first suspended on 1.3.79 and that suspension order was withdrawn on 27.6.80. The charge-sheet was issued on 20.8.83 and the show-cause to the charge-sheet was filed by the petitioner on 2.7.84. The petitioner made a prayer for allowing him permission to engage a lawyer but that prayer was rejected on 6.8.84, the second show-cause notice was issued on 17.8.90 and the writ petitioner was suspended with effect from that very day. The petitioner replied to the second show-cause notice on 14.9.90. Thereafter the writ petition was filed on 6.11.90. It was affirmed on 30.10.90 on which date the order of dismissal was passed and it was served upon the petitioner on 23.1.90 (vide para 3 of the supplementary affidavit and paras 38 and 39 of the affidavit-in-opposition). 9. Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the writ petitioner has submitted with great emphasis that here is a glaring case where the writ petitioner has been deprived of the reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary proceeding which is a right guaranteed under Article 311(2) of our Constitution. In this connection, the learned Advocate has submitted that the general law is that where is an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the employer is represented by a legally trained Officer, refusal of permission to the employee to be defended by a lawyer amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity (vide: (1) Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 109 ). But according to him even where no legally trained prosecutor is engaged by the employer, the request of the delinquent to engage a lawyer to defend himself cannot be refused where the employer engaged a trained prosecutor. Obviously, Mr. Bhattacharyya, relied upon the principles laid down in (2) C. L. Subhraminium v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1972 SC 2178 . In the case of the Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay's case (supra) it was held that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal, the delinquent Officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner, the refusal to grant this request, would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated. 10. 10. It was further held in that case that one has to consider the nature of the enquiry, who held it, where it is held and what is the atmosphere? The domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment or a part of it. Can it even be compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a Court presided over by an unbiased Judge? The enquiry Officer combines the Judge and prosecutor rolled in one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to the uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of the employer who simultaneously deny that opportunity to delinquent employer. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the employee is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not an euphemism for, Courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rig our to all those who must be responsible for fairplay in action. 11. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the petitioner has in support of his contention relied upon the principles laid down in a Division Bench decision in (3) Bholanath Das v Director of Rationing, Govt. of W. B., 77(2) SLR 293. In that case it has been held if the charges are grave and serious and the delinquent has a feeling that he would not be able to have, his case defended properly and more particularly of the fact that he will have to face a trained prosecutor, the question of granting him the assistance as asked for on the application of the general principles of natural justice read with the provision of reasonable opportunities has in Article 311(2), even in the absence of the provision for such assistance in the relevant Rules, will, have to consider keeping in view of the fact that when an employee is charged with serious misconduct, he may lose mental equilibrium or balance and he may not be able to deal with the complicated questions of fact and law as involved. The guiding principles should be compliance with the Rules of natural justice and reasonable opportunity. The guiding principles should be compliance with the Rules of natural justice and reasonable opportunity. The complexities of a case in relation to the delinquent and the circumstances in which he has been placed should be the criteria or guidance for allowing or refusing the assistance has been asked for. 12. It has been further held in that case that the principles of natural justice, as has been graphically put by Coke consists in (1) vocate, (2) interrogate, and (3) adjudicate. Unless these principles are fulfilled there would certainly be a case for thinking that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Rules of natural justice require that the delinquent must have a feeling that justice have been done in his case and that no injustice has been caused him by the refusal to have the assistance has asked for. 13. In the above-mentioned case particular reference was made to a Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in (4) Baidhar Dass v. The Stale of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1970 Orissa 220, which was a case under Rule 15 of the Orissa Civil Service (C.C.A.) Rules, 1930. On a consideration of the scope within the meaning of 'reasonable opportunity' under Article 311 it has been held in that case as follows :–– "Article 311(2) of the Constitution which guarantees a reasonable opportunity to a public servant ensures, (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can only do if he has told what is the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based on; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted upon him ?" 14. In that case, the Disciplinary authority denied the representation of the employee by a lawyer at the enquiry but allowed the department to be represented by a trained prosecutor, namely, an Anti-Corruption Inspector. In that case, the Disciplinary authority denied the representation of the employee by a lawyer at the enquiry but allowed the department to be represented by a trained prosecutor, namely, an Anti-Corruption Inspector. It has been held in the facts of that case that such action of the authority concerned was not only arbitrary and illegal but was against the spirit of Article 311(2) as such refusal to the employee to have his case represented by a lawyer would mean deprivation of reasonable opportunity to him has guaranteed to a public servant. 15. In (5) India Photography Company Ltd. v. S. M. Kumar, 1983 (2) CHN 288, respondent was an employee of the appellant. He was charged with fraud, forgery and misrepresentation. In the domestic enquiry, he wanted to be represented by a lawyer in view of the seriousness of the charges. The company having refused to grant such prayer, the plaintiff instituted a suit challenging legality of the enquiry and filed an application for injunction. The Court restrained further proceedings of the enquiry until the plaintiff was permitted to be represented by a lawyer though the Court was conscious that originally a delinquent had no absolute right to a legal representation in a domestic enquiry but that he was of the view that in the particular case, denial of legal assistance might amount to denial of natural justice. In appeal from the said order, it was contended that in a domestic enquiry the person accused must conduct his own case and there is no scope for invoking the principles of natural justice for demanding a right to be represented by a lawyer. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that in a complicated case like the one before the Court the person accused could hardly make out the defence without the assistance of a lawyer. The appeal failed. Against that order the appellant went in second appeal. Held, that there was no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned Court below as the decision was arrived at on the application of the correct principles of law. 16. Mrs. The appeal failed. Against that order the appellant went in second appeal. Held, that there was no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned Court below as the decision was arrived at on the application of the correct principles of law. 16. Mrs. Gupta, learned Advocate for the State has submitted that in this case a legally trained Officer was not appointed as Presenting Officer, therefore the writ petitioner has no right to be represented by a lawyer, specially in view of the provisions of Rule 10 of sub-rule 4(2) of the W.B.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1971. 17. It appears from the submissions made by the learned lawyers of both sides that the main thing that the Court should discourage involvement of legal practitioners in simple domestic enquiries for avoiding complications and delay has been lost sight of by both sides. The legal representation is not an essential element of natural justice in all cases. But the Court cannot ignore the importance of such representation in exceptional cases where refusal of such representation would itself constitute denial of the principles of natural justice. No cut and dry principles can be laid down in this respect and the issue should be left to the consideration of the authority concerned in the light of the facts of the individual cases. So, the primary factor is to see whether the case is of such a serious nature that the denial of the prayer for representation through the lawyer will amount to the denial of principles of natural justice. In the case at hand, the charges are very serious as these relate to allegations of forgery, fraud and misrepresentation. It is the case of the respondent authority that the authority concerned took a long time to process the good number of documents and examined witnesses. In the circumstances, it was too much to expect that the delinquent employee who had passed the school leaving examination only would be able to maintain his normal mental balance while exposed to serious charge and pitted against a trained prosecutor who was ultimately a man of the employer. Thus it was a clear case where the denial of the assistance of a lawyer as prayed for by the writ petitioner by the respondent authority constituted a denial of the opportunity to defend himself has contemplated under Article 333(2) of our Constitution. 18. Thus it was a clear case where the denial of the assistance of a lawyer as prayed for by the writ petitioner by the respondent authority constituted a denial of the opportunity to defend himself has contemplated under Article 333(2) of our Constitution. 18. The other point which has been stressed with emphasis by Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the writ petitioners is that the charges against his client were stale and deemed to have been abandoned. There is no dispute about the fact that he was suspended on 1.3.79 and the suspension order was withdrawn on 27.6.80 and the charge-sheet was issued on 20.8.83. Thus, it is obvious that there was a delay about four years between the first suspension and the charge-sheet. 19. Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate has in this connection, referred to (6) Binayak Dutta v. Stale of West Bengal, 1991 (1) CLJ 291 . In that case, the writ petitioner was charge sheeted on 9.4.88 on two counts of taking illegal gratification on some dates between the 6th March, 1976 and 15th November, 1976. He was found guilty in the departmental proceedings and second show-cause notice was issued upon him whereupon he filed a writ petition challenging the departmental proceeding. 20. The learned Court allowing the writ petitioner held that the inordinate delay in commencing and concluding the proceeding is a ground for quashing the entire proceeding. 21. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate has also referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in (7) P. F. George v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1983 (1) SLR 569. In that case the disciplinary proceeding in respect of the defalcation of government money was detected in 1957 and the charge-sheet was submitted in 1958 and the reply was submitted in July 1959 but no action was taken in support of the said charges till 12th of December, 1964. Subsequently, the Officer was promoted. Held that, inference could be that charges shall be deemed to have been given up and abandoned. 22. Mr. Bhattacharyya has referred to a Bench decision of our High Court in (8) Subrata Chaki v. State of West Bengal, 90 CWN 290, in support of his contention. In that case for making violent demonstrations, the appellants were put under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were drawn up against them. 22. Mr. Bhattacharyya has referred to a Bench decision of our High Court in (8) Subrata Chaki v. State of West Bengal, 90 CWN 290, in support of his contention. In that case for making violent demonstrations, the appellants were put under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were drawn up against them. While disposing of the writ petition, the learned Trial Judge directed the respondents to conclude the enquiry within three months from the date of the order. All interim orders were vacated. The appellants were granted interim orders by the learned Court of appeal below when it was brought to the notice that no steps were taken by the respondent to conclude the disciplinary proceedings although three months had elapsed. The orders for suspension imposed upon them were stayed. During the pendency of the appellants, two petitioners/appellants were given promotion and no steps were taken by the respondents except forwarding the relevant files to the person who was the Disciplinary authority. The applications for considering the subsequent facts were also preferred by the appellants. Their case was that the respondents had abandoned the disciplinary proceedings and hence the charge-sheet and the connected disciplinary proceedings ought to be quashed and that it would be tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellants if the disciplinary proceedings were held after a delay of more than five and half years. 23. Held, it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case whether because of inordinary delay either to initiate or conclude the disciplinary proceedings, the same ought to be quashed and such proceedings have been delayed because of the conduct of the delinquent himself, where he certainly cannot plead that he had been denied reasonable opportunity because of lapse of time. Again the delay would not be fatal in case the Disciplinary authorities remain restrained by an order of the Court or are prevented by any other sufficient cause from concludings the proceedings. Held, where the unusual delay was not explained by the Disciplinary authority or the Inquiry Authority and the charge was one of the holding violent demonstrations, sought to be proved by oral evidence, the appellants would be seriously prejudiced if the disciplinary proceedings be allowed to commence after the lapse of five and half years. 24. Mr. Held, where the unusual delay was not explained by the Disciplinary authority or the Inquiry Authority and the charge was one of the holding violent demonstrations, sought to be proved by oral evidence, the appellants would be seriously prejudiced if the disciplinary proceedings be allowed to commence after the lapse of five and half years. 24. Mr. Bhattacharyya, has referred to another Single Bench decision of this Court in (9) Subhash Chandra Basu v. The Bank of Baroda reported in 1991 (2) Cal. LT page 111 (HC). In that case, the point canvassed by the writ petitioner was that for alleged misdemeanour made during the years of 1971 to 1973, he could not be proceeded against departmentally in 1987 and the charges were technical in nature and the petitioner was not placed under suspension even. Held, no charge could be framed on the basis of the stale materials, more so, when the charges are technical in nature and do not involve gross irregularities committed by the writ petitioner in discharge his duties as the Branch Manager. Held, further that the respondents concerned having received the reply to the show-cause notice about six years earlier and not having taken any steps to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, they cannot be permitted to do so on the basis of stale charges relating to alleged incidents taking place between the years of 1971 and 1973. 25. In the case at hand, it is alleged that, the writ petitioner gave a forged admit card for being appointed as government servant in 1974. His order of suspension was served in 1979 and it was withdrawn after a year and the petitioner was allowed to join in 1980 and the charge-sheet was issued in 1983 and the show-cause was filed in the next year. Therefore, it is obvious that the charge-sheet was submitted about ten years after the alleged incident in 1974 though the fact that there was such a forgery came to the notice in or about 1978-79. The enquiry was completed in 1990 when the second show-cause notice was served. No explanation has been given for the unusual delay of four years between 1979 and 1983 and subsequently of five years between 1984 and 1989. 26. Mrs. The enquiry was completed in 1990 when the second show-cause notice was served. No explanation has been given for the unusual delay of four years between 1979 and 1983 and subsequently of five years between 1984 and 1989. 26. Mrs. Gupta, learned Advocate for the State has tried to explain the delay by stating what has been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that the authority concerned had to examine a lot of documents and to examine many witnesses to complete the enquiry and to submit the charge-sheet. This explanation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, does not appear to be very convincing for the unusual delay. There was no order of injunction restraining the authorities from proceeding with the matter at any stage nor can the delay be contributed to the conduct of the writ petitioner. The petitioner was allowed to work during the period from withdrawal of the suspension order in 1980 upto 16.8.90. On the following date, be was placed under suspension again on serving second show-cause notice. In view of the principles laid down in the cases cited by Mr. Bhattacharyya, discussed above, the charge-sheet was submitted on stale charges and therefore it constituted an injustice upon the writ petitioner as the matter was allowed to be proceeded with after lapse of so many years. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner is accepted. 27. Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate, for the writ petitioner has addressed the Court on several other points as discussed above but in view of the findings made above it will be only of academic interest to go into the other questions raised by him. Therefore, this Court does not propose to go into those questions any further. In view of the findings made above, it is held that the writ petition succeeds. Let a writ of mandamus issue commanding the respondents, their agents and servants to forbear from giving effect or further giving effect and from proceeding or further proceeding with the charge-sheet, enquiry report, suspension order and second show-cause notice in Annexure-C contained in order No. 38/327, 17/333 and 17/335 dated 17.8.90 and the enquiry report dated nil from dismissing the petitioner from service in the manner alleged. The impugned charge-sheet, enquiry report, second show-cause notice and order of dismissal are also quashed, the writ petitioner will get all the benefits as if he was in service from the date of the suspension on 17.8.90 till the date of joining, if he has not already attained the age of superannuation. In that case, he will get the benefits upto the date of his superannuation and other reliefs.