S. D. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Amrat Ramabhai Vaghari, came to be preventively detained as a bootlegger within the meaning of the PASAA-1985, vide the orders dated July 29, 1994, pronounced by the Commissioner of Police, ahmedabad City, Respondent No. 1 herein. The said orders of detention are under challenge in the present petition. ( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel Ms. Kachhavah who appears on behalf of the petitioner while placing reliance upon the Supreme Court decisions in case of Piyush Kantilal mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and Anr. , AIR 1989 SC 491 : [1989 (1) glr 563 (SC)] and in case of Shri Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta, commissioner of Police and Ors. , 1995 (3) SCC 237 : [1995 (2) GLR 1268 (SC)], urges that, even if the allegation made against the petitioner-detenu are accepted on the face value, then also it cannot be said that the alleged activity on the part of the petitioner-detenu had a reach on public order situation. The learned Counsel, therefore, urges that this petition requires a complete recognition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel points out, placing reliance upon the grounds of detention bearing even date, that two prohibition cases came to be registered against the detenu at Madhavpura police station. In C. R. No. 321 of 1994 the alleged recovery is of 520 litres of country liquor. In the other case, namely, C. R. No. 330 of 1994 the alleged recovery is of 19 litres of the country liquor. The grounds of detention would also show two instances which had allegedly taken place on July 17, 1994 and July 07, 1994. The first incident alleges that the petitioner-detenu was present, with his associates near Shahpur warehouse and at that time he had threatened the witness believing him to be a police agent and later on he was assaulted upon. It is said that a crowd had collected on the spot and that at that time the petitionerdetenu had shown him the razor and, therefore, there was a stampede in the crowd. The second incident dated July 07, 1994, would say that, on that day at about 7 p. m. the witness was asked by the petitioner-detenu to store a particular quantity of the liquor and on his refusal to do so, he was assaulted upon and a crowd was collected. The second incident dated July 07, 1994, would say that, on that day at about 7 p. m. the witness was asked by the petitioner-detenu to store a particular quantity of the liquor and on his refusal to do so, he was assaulted upon and a crowd was collected. The petitioner-detenu had taken out the knife and therefore, there was a stampede in the crowd. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel Ms. Kachhavah places reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in Piyush Kantilal Mehta (supra) with a view to urge that, it has been well settled that the detenu might be a bootlegger within the meaning of Sec. 2 (b) of the PASAA but merely because he is a bootlegger, he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. The learned Counsel points out that, in the said decision before the Supreme Court huge quantities of foreign made liquor, namely, 21,795 ml. and 1,39,750 ml. came to be recovered. Yet the view expressed by the Supreme Court is that, this alleged activity on the part of the petitioner-detenu cannot be said to have a reach on the public order. The Supreme Court decision in Piyush Kantilal Mehtas case (supra) also considers various statements recorded by the sponsoring authority to show that the activities on the part of the detenu had the reach on the public order. In the instant case, as noticed above, the quantity allegedly recovered by the investigating agency while registering two cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, is not to that extent which it was before the Supreme Court. The view would be taken as has been taken in catena of decisions that these activities even accepted to the fullest extent can be said to have a reach on the public order situation. As pointed out, the Supreme Court has considered the facts emerging from the statements recorded by the sponsoring authority. The statements were to the effect that the petitioner -detenu was a high-handed man of fierce nature and his high-handedness had caused terror to the public; he was not afraid of the police; his activities were anti-social; he was also keeping with him a knife and a revolver and he used to threaten the public residing in the vicinity. The statements were to the effect that the petitioner -detenu was a high-handed man of fierce nature and his high-handedness had caused terror to the public; he was not afraid of the police; his activities were anti-social; he was also keeping with him a knife and a revolver and he used to threaten the public residing in the vicinity. Compared to the allegations made therein the allegations in the petition on hand are not that serious. It is only stated that a witness was assaulted by the petitioner-detenu, believing him to be a police agent or a police informer. In the second case, when somebody had refused to store illicit liquor he was assaulted upon. These statements definitely do not stand on higher pedestal than the statements which were before Supreme Court in case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta (supra ). Such statements appear to be nugatory and meaningless when a reference is made to Supreme Court pronouncement in case of Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh (supra ). On the analysis of similar statements the Supreme Court has recorded that such casual and isolated instances can hardly have any implications which may affect the even tempo of life or jeopardize the public order and incite the people to further breach the law and order. The Supreme Court makes it clear by saying that, in their considered opinion such instances cannot be said to be affecting the public order and therefore, in view of what has been stated by Supreme Court in aforementioned two cases it cannot be urged successfully on behalf of the respondents that the registering of two prohibition cases under which small quantities of country made liquor came to be recovered and on the basis of the two alleged instances it should be accepted that the activity of the petitioner-detenu had a reach on the even tempo of life. The contention, therefore, coming from the learned Counsel Ms. Kachhavah for the petitioner in this respect requires to be accepted. ( 5 ) LEARNED Government Counsel Mr. Y. M. Thakkar urges with significant vehemence that, here in this case, there is also the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority that the petitioner-detenu used to indulge in the activity as a bootlegger, knowing full well that the country made liquor is harmful or injurious to the health of the mankind. ( 5 ) LEARNED Government Counsel Mr. Y. M. Thakkar urges with significant vehemence that, here in this case, there is also the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority that the petitioner-detenu used to indulge in the activity as a bootlegger, knowing full well that the country made liquor is harmful or injurious to the health of the mankind. Learned Government Counsel urges in the same context that, because of this activity on the part of the detenu the same be taken as the activity having a reach on the public order situation. Learned Government Counsel places heavy reliance upon the provisions contained under Sec. 3 (4) of the Explanation appended therein. The endeavour on the part of the learned Government Counsel is that, sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of PASAA creates a deeming provision under which the activities of a bootlegger can be said to be adversely affecting or likely to affect the maintenance of the public order. The Explanation says that, if the activity of any person directly or indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm to the public at large, it would be an activity having the reach on the even tempo of the society, therefore to the public order. The said contention appears to be losing its significance when the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta (supra) is once again referred. It should not be over-looked that it was demonstrated before the Supreme Court that huge quantity of foreign made liquor came to be recovered by the police. This factual aspect was well before the Supreme Court. In the same way the pointed attention of the Supreme Court was invited to the provisions contained under Sec. 3 of the PASAA-1985 along with the sub-section and the Explanation. Looking to the quantity seized and looking to this provisions the Supreme Court could have taken altogether a different view by saying that, though it was necessary to show that the alleged activities of the petitioner-detenu were affecting or were likely to affect the maintenance of the public order, the above said aspect regarding the recovery of the huge quantities of the foreign made liquor could have been taken into consideration as a ground for holding that this activity by itself would cause harm or danger to the public or to the members of the society. Despite the glaring fact and despite the narration in extenso of the relevant provisions of PASAA-1985 on which the Government Counsel wants to place heavy reliance in the Supreme Court decision, Supreme Court has not taken this view as suggested by the learned Government Counsel. Naturally, therefore, it is not open for this Court to take such a view after reading the Supreme Court pronouncement in case of Piyush Kantilal mehta (supra ). The learned Government Counsel wanted to distinguish the facts of the present case from the facts of the case before the Supreme Court in the former decision by saying that the present one is a case in which the recoveries are country made liquor while the Supreme Court was concerned with a case of foreign made liquor. The distinction cannot be made and cannot be accepted for the obvious reason that the liquors whether country made or foreign made have the same implications on the health of the general public if taken in a particular fashion or quantity. The say of a contraband liquor, either it is a country made liquor or is a foreign made liquor makes no difference whatsoever so far as the society as a whole is concerned. This distinction, therefore, does not appear to be a genuine one which requires a countenance for taking a different view than what has been taken by the Supreme Court in case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta (supra ). ( 6 ) THE contention, therefore, is that the literature shown in the case on hand even if accepted on the face value, would not go to show that the alleged activities of the petitioner-detenu had reach on the public order. This petition, therefore, requires to be allowed. The same is hereby accordingly allowed and the orders of detention are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner-detenu is hereby ordered to be released from the detention forthwith, if not required in any other criminal case or proceedings. Rule is made absolute accordingly. .