JUDGMENT The following question of law has been referred to this Court by the Tribunal, i.e., Board of Revenue under section 44(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 at the instance of Revenue : "Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, Board of Revenue was justified in reopening the issue as to whether bamboos are tax-paid when this issue had become final by Board's earlier decision dated June 9, 1978 in Second Appeal Nos. 129-V/77 and 130-V/77 as the assessee did not file any reference application under section 44(1) on this point and the case was remanded only for the purpose of reconsideration of penalty under section 43(1) ?" 2. The year of assessment is from October 20, 1971 to November 5, 1972. The assessee who is a forest contractor purchased bamboos from the Forest Department paying purchase tax and thereafter sold the same to third parties after converting bamboos into suitable sizes and shapes. The assessing officer held that the sales were liable to sales tax. Penalty was imposed under section 43(1) of the Act and rule 69-A of the Rules. In first appeal, the turnover was enhanced and penalty under section 43(1) was also enhanced. The assessee filed second appeal before Tribunal which heard the appeal along with another appeal. The assessee contended that the bamboos sold by him were bamboos purchased by him from the Forest Department after paying purchase tax and therefore, the sale did not attract exigibility to sales tax. The Tribunal repelled this contention holding that when bamboos are cut and split by some process a different commodity comes into existence and therefore, he was liable to pay sales tax. However, on the question of penalty, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the first appellate authority for reconsideration. After remand, the first appellate authority passed an order similar to the one passed by it earlier. The assessee took up the matter in second appeal to the Tribunal. Meanwhile in M.P. No. 524/78, this Court held that bamboos which were cut or split did not become a different commodity and cannot be said to have been subjected to any process of manufacture. The assessee sought support before the Tribunal from this decision of the High Court. The Revenue contended before the Tribunal that that aspect of the matter was concluded by the earlier order of the Tribunal. The assessee sought support before the Tribunal from this decision of the High Court. The Revenue contended before the Tribunal that that aspect of the matter was concluded by the earlier order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal disagreed with the contention of the Revenue and held that after the earlier remand the entire matter was alive before the first appellate authority and the aspect regarding liability for sales tax could be re-agitated and in view of High Court decision, exonerated the assessee from liability to pay sales tax. This decision has given rise to the present reference. 3. Two things are beyond controversy. In the earlier second appeal, the Tribunal went into the question whether the sale of bamboo by the assessee after purchasing the same from the Forest Department paying purchase tax was subjected to manufacturing process and became a different commercial commodity and held that it did become a different commercial commodity thereby inviting liability for payment of sales tax. It is also not disputed that on this order wherein on the question of penalty remand was effected, the assessee did not approach the Tribunal to refer any question of law to the High Court. So far as the Tribunal and the lower authorities are concerned, the matter thereby became concluded. 4. Our attention is invited to a number of decisions by learned counsel for the assessee. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Seth Manicklal Fomra [1975] 99 ITR 470, the Madras High Court held that once an order of assessment is set aside, it is open to the concerned officer to consider the entire matter afresh. The reported judgment does not indicate that Appellate Assistant Commissioner had given any decision in regard to any disputed matter, as in the present case. The decision refers to the two decisions of Allahabad High Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1963] 47 ITR 906 and Abhai Ram Gopi Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1971] 79 ITR 339. Learned counsel for the assessee drew our attention to these cases. These decisions also do not show that on any matter in dispute, there was a decision by the appellate authority. Hence these decisions are not helpful to the assessee. Learned Judges of the Madras High Court declined to follow the decision of the A.P. High Court in Pulipati Subbarao and Co. These decisions also do not show that on any matter in dispute, there was a decision by the appellate authority. Hence these decisions are not helpful to the assessee. Learned Judges of the Madras High Court declined to follow the decision of the A.P. High Court in Pulipati Subbarao and Co. v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 35 ITR 673 which took the view that Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction is restricted by the order of Appellate Assistant Commissioner remanding the matter for fresh disposal. 5. We may in this connection refer to two other decisions. One is that of the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Swaraj Motors (P.) Ltd. [1987] 167 ITR 83. T. Kochu Thommen, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench held that the order of remand in regard to a disputed aspect had remained unchallenged, subsequent proceedings of the Income-tax Officer could only be in obedience of that order which is res judicata so far as the assessee is concerned in regard to the aspect decided. Another decision is that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in S. P. Gramophone Company v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal [1986] 160 ITR 417, wherein it was held that if the correctness of the remand order is not challenged through proper proceedings, it should not be open to review when the matter comes again before that authority in appeal or revision against the order passed by the authorities below in accordance with the remand order. 6. The relevant principle governing civil cases has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee AIR 1970 SC 997 . The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the plaintiff cannot obtain relief in view of abolition of Jagirs and the resting of the property in the State. The first appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court and held that civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and it was for the State to get itself impleaded if it is interested in litigation and as the State had not chosen to get itself impleaded, it was open to the plaintiff to press the suit. Appellate Court remanded the suit to the suit to the trial court. After remand, the trial court decreed the suit and the decree was affirmed in appeal. Appellate Court remanded the suit to the suit to the trial court. After remand, the trial court decreed the suit and the decree was affirmed in appeal. In second appeal, the High Court held that in view of abolition of Jagirs, the plaintiff had lost title and therefore he could not get a decree for possession of the suit property. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court was erroneous. The matter of course arose in the context of powers of the appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure. But in the absence of any specific provision in the statute governing the case, we think that the general principle would apply. With respect, we agree with the view taken by the High Courts of kerala and Punjab and Haryana. 7. In its earlier order, the Tribunal decided the controversy as to the exigibility to tax holding that the bamboo was subjected to manufacturing process and became a different commercial commodity and this finding was not sought to be challenged in any way by the assessee by seeking reference to the High Court. The finding became concluded. The concluded finding does not become unsettled on account of the view taken by the High Court in another case subsequently. The matter could not have been reopened either by the assessing authority or by the appellate authority or the Tribunal. We therefore answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this order under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal. Reference answered in the negative.