VIJENDER JAIN ( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order of learned Addl. Sessions Judge granting anticipatory bail to respondent Smt. Kuldeep Kaur on 25. 2. 92 who was charged for the offences under Sections 304-B/498-A/34 Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has argued that the first anticipatory bail application was dismissed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on 5. 12. 91. By that order regular bail application of other accused was dismissed and present respondent s anticipatory bail was also dismissed. Therefore, the respondent filed another application before the Sessions Court on 19. 2. 92, through another lawyer another anticipatory bail application was moved before the Sessions Judge on 21. 2. 92. On being pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge that why two applications were moved, application dated 21. 2. 92 was withdrawn and on the application dated 21. 2. 92 anticipatory bail was granted to the respondent on 25. 2. 92. ( 3 ) IN the support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that there is a difference in the language of Sections 438 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). Learned counsel has urged that as far as Sec. 439 of the Code is concerned there cannot be any limit which can be read into the language of Sec. 439 of the Code for the accused person for moving applications for obtaining bail and the court. may grant bail in view of the changed circumstances or subsequent happenings which may be material on the basis of which the court could be persuaded that it is in the interest of justice that the person may be granted bail. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that no such interpretation could be given to the language of Sec. 438 of the Code. In support of his arguments he has cited EKKARI GHOSH @ JITENDRA vs. STATE IV (1994) CCR 2655, Kalidas Mitra Vs. The State 1989 (3) Crimes 652 , MALLA RAMA RAO and ANOTHER vs. STATE I (1992) CCR 745 and 1993 (2) ccc 149. ( 4 ) THE second leg of the contention of learned counsel forthe petitioner for the cancellation of bail of the respondent is that there was no material before the learned Addl. The State 1989 (3) Crimes 652 , MALLA RAMA RAO and ANOTHER vs. STATE I (1992) CCR 745 and 1993 (2) ccc 149. ( 4 ) THE second leg of the contention of learned counsel forthe petitioner for the cancellation of bail of the respondent is that there was no material before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to have come to a conclusion after he had dismissed the application on 5. 12. 91 as no subsequent change in the circumstances took place so as to warrant grant of anticipatory bail to the respondent. ( 5 ) 0n the other hand, Mr. R. N. Mittal learned counsel for the respondent has argued that while the court has been given concurrent jurisdiction for granting anticipatory bai under Sec. 438 of the Code, in a citizen has been given a choice to approach the court of Session or High Court but there is no limitation which has been provided in the Code so as to come to a conclusion that more than one application for anticipatory bail under the provisions of Sec. 438 of the code is not maintainable. In support of his contention Mr. Mittal has cited 1991 (3) Crimes 796, Nahar Singh v. The State of Rajasthan 1983 (2) Crimes 583 and Suraj Bhan etc. v. State 1980 RLR 493 . ( 6 ) I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. ( 7 ) IT is pertinent to quote Sec. 438 (1) of the Code which is as follows :- " When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. " ( 8 ) THE legislative intention is manifest from the plain language of said Section. The basic of some information, which expression results from reason to believe , is apprehending arrest on account of certain accusations he may invoke the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or of the High Court. " ( 8 ) THE legislative intention is manifest from the plain language of said Section. The basic of some information, which expression results from reason to believe , is apprehending arrest on account of certain accusations he may invoke the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or of the High Court. Question is whether Session Court or the High Court where such application has been moved for bail in anticipation of arrest in the event of dismissing that application has got the jurisdiction to entertain the second application. In my considered opinion no such fatter could be imposed on the power of the court either of the Session or of the High Court that once an application for anticipatory bail is dismissed that court ceases to have jurisdiction to entertain second application under the provisions of Sec. 438 of the Code. To give that meaning would be to impose restrictions on the power of Sec. 438 of the Code which legislature never intended to do. ( 9 ) WITH great respect to the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Kalidas Mitra s case (supra) even in the said judgment two judges have not agreed to the view expressed by A. C. Sen Guptaj, who spoke for the Division Bench. Justice J. N. Hore who was the other member of the Division Bench in the last paragraph of the said judgment stated :- "i agree with my Lord that petition for anticipatory bail is liable to be rejected on merits. I do not however express any opinion about the maintainability of a second application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the court after rejection of another application under Section 438 of the Code before the same Court. " ( 10 ) HAD the legislature intended that there is a bar to the maintainability of the second application for anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 of the Code it could have laid down expressly as has been done in respect of exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 397 of the Code has laid down that if an application for exercise of revisional power has been made by any person either to the High Court or to a Court of Session no further application by the same person shall be entrained by either of them. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 397 of the Code has laid down that if an application for exercise of revisional power has been made by any person either to the High Court or to a Court of Session no further application by the same person shall be entrained by either of them. Therefore, this Section provides a bar against fresh petition if petition has been made either to the Court of Session or to the High Court for exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nothing of this kind has been provided that rejection of bail application by Sessions Court curtails further right to apply to the High Court or to that Court itself, and in the absence of any such provisions such bar cannot be imported in Sec. 438 of the Code. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, not as a general rule but as a rule of caution once a court has dismissed or rejected the anticipatory bail application normally unless and until there are other circumstances or material brought before it the court may not like to exercise its jurisdiction. In this case I would not advertto the circumstances and. merit as the bail was granted on 25. 2. 92. The charge has been framed. I was told that forthe last 4 or 5 monthsthere was no presiding officer in the court therefore the trial could not be expedited. As it is an old case and nothing untoward has been brought to the notice of the court regarding the conduct of the respondent who was released on anticipatory bail I would not like to interfere in this matter. However, the trial court is directed to expedite the trial. ( 12 ) - Any expression by the learned Sessions Judge on the merit of the case will not be taken into consideration while deciding the case on merits. ( 13 ) WITH these observations the petition is disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the trial court.