Research › Browse › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 289 (GUJ)

AHMEDABAD GREEN BELT KHEDUT MANDAL v. STATE

1995-06-30

R.K.ABICHANDANI

body1995
R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners seek a direction on the respondents not to treat the lands, which were included in the erstwhile Green Belt zone and which were, in the Final Development Plan, as sanctioned by the State Government on August 12, 1983, under Sec. 12 (2) (k) of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban development Act, 1976, released from the earlier reservation from the agricultural zone and reserved for Public housing for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, the Urban Development Authority, the Gujarat Housing Board, the Gujarat Slum clearance Board and the State Government, as indicated in the table contained in schedule II to the Resolution dated 12th August, 1983 at Annexure-A to the petition, as "vacant land". A direction is also sought that the provisions of the urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") should not be applied to these lands and no proceedings should be taken in respect thereof under the said Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is an Association, registered as a non-trading Corporation, and represents the interest of the agriculturists who are occupants of the lands designated as predominantly agricultural zone and known as "green Belt" in the development Plan of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as sanctioned by the state Government for the years 1965 to 1975. Thus, these lands were designated only for being used as agricultural lands. The said Development Plan came into force from 1-11-1965 under which a strip of about 660 ft. of lands, all around the City of ahmedabad, was designated as agricultural zone. The persons represented by the petitioner No. 1 Association and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are occupants of certain lands which were in the former "green Belt". ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, on or about March 18, 1974, i. e. , before the expiry of the period of 10 years for which the said Development Plan was in force from 1-11-1965, a declaration of intention to frame a Revised Development Plan was made by the municipal Corporation through its Administrator and it was stated that the "green belt" was likely to be cancelled. According to the petitioners, the Revised development Plan as prepared by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was forwarded to the State Government for its sanction. According to the petitioners, the Revised development Plan as prepared by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was forwarded to the State Government for its sanction. The State Government wanting to modify the Development Plan published modifications in the Gazette on 31-8- 1978 calling upon the public to make its suggestions. As the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 came into force from February 1, 1978, the state Government treated the Development Plan submitted by the Ahmedabad municipal Corporation as a Draft Development Plan submitted to it in view of the provisions of Sec. 124 of the New Act. The State Government by its Resolution dated 12-8-1983, which is questioned by the petitioners, declared that modifications were finalised and sanctioned the Plan and Regulations along with the modifications. In paragraph 26 of the said Resolution dated 12-8-1983 it was provided as under :-"the lands designated as predominantly Agricultural Zone (Green Belt) in the principal Development Plan of Ahmedabad which are now proposed to be reserved as Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Housing in the Revised Development Plan shall be released from this reservation and the lands so released shall be reserved for Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, gujarat Housing Board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board and the State Government under Sec. 12 (2) (k) of the Act for "public Housing" as indicated in the table below, which shall be developed through detailed schemes providing for such housing including utility services and basic community facilities also by Ahmedabad municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority. Gujarat Housing board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board and the State Government. " ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners the lands once included in the Agricultural zone, i. e. , "green Belt" as on 17-2-1976 being the date of commencement of the urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could never be after that date, treated as "vacant land" so as to attract the provisions of the said Act. A direction is, therefore, sought on the respondents to hold that provisions of the said Act did not apply to these lands and to restrain the authorities from taking any proceedings under the said Act in respect of these lands. ( 5 ) THE case of the respondent authorities is that the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation had declared its intention to revise the Development Plan on 18-3-1974 under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. ( 5 ) THE case of the respondent authorities is that the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation had declared its intention to revise the Development Plan on 18-3-1974 under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The Ahmedabad municipal Corporation thereafter on 15-1-1976 published a Development Plan in the Official Gazette under which the lands which were earmarked as "green Belt" in the earlier Development Plan for the years 1965 to 1975 came to be released from predominantly Agricultural Zone and were proposed as reserved for "public housing". Therefore, on 17-2-1976 when the Act came into force in the State of gujarat these lands were not in the "green Belt", i. e. , in a Predominantly Agricultural zone and were shown as reserved for public housing under the Revised Development Plan published on 15-1-1976. Therefore, the lands which thus became "vacant land" on 17-2-1976 would attract the provisions of the said Act. It is, therefore, contended by the respondent authorities that the lands which were formerly included in the "green Belt" could be dealt with under the provisions of the said Act for the purpose of ascertaining whether any excess "vacant land" was held by any holder. ( 6 ) IT was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners by their learned Counsel mr. G. N. Desai relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2465 and the decision of this Court in Rameshbhai M. Basida v. The Competent Authority and Anr. rendered on 4-2-1994 in Special Civil Application No. 4295 of 1987 by the Honble mr. Justice A. N. Divecha, that these lands can never be considered to be "vacant land" because as on 17-2-1976 when the Act came into force in the State of Gujarat they were in the predominantly Agricultural Zone known as "green Belt". It was contended that not only these lands were shown in the Agricultural Zone but they were actually used as agricultural lands. It was contended that not only these lands were shown in the Agricultural Zone but they were actually used as agricultural lands. It was further submitted that these lands were not included for any purpose other than agriculture, in any master plan as on the date on which the Act came into force on 17-2-1976 and therefore, by specifying them in any subsequent master plan for use otherwise than agriculture, they cannot be treated as "vacant land" and no proceedings can be initiated under the provisions of the said Act in respect of such lands. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Development Plan which is said to have been published on 15-1-1976 in the Official Gazette was only a draft of a plan and cannot be treated as a "master plan" within the meaning of Sec. 2 (h) of the said Act. Therefore, the fact that the lands which were earlier specified in the Agricultural zone, i. e. , "green Belt", were under this Revised Development Plan prepared by the Municipal Corporation shown as specified for the purpose other than agriculture, will not render these agricultural lands as having been specified for the purpose other than agriculture as on the date on which the Act came into force from 17-2-1976. It was submitted that this plan was sanctioned by the State Government much after the coming into force of the said Act on 17-2-1976, and, therefore, these lands continue to remain agricultural lands not included in the master plan for any other purpose as on 17-2-1976. Mr. Desai further argued that Sec. 3 of the said act alone was the substantive provision around which procedural provisions revolve. He submitted that what was intended by Sec. 3 of the said Act could not be undone by any machinery provisions of the said Act. According to him the provisions of sec. 6 were only machinery provisions and they could not have any impact on the substantive provisions contained under Sec. 3 of the said Act under which a person could not hold any "vacant land" in excess of the ceiling limit and which did not affect holding of agricultural lands which were not specified in the master plan for any other purpose. ( 7 ) THE learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. ( 7 ) THE learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. S. N. Shelat, appearing for the respondent authorities on the other hand, contended that there were various provisions in the Act which were relatable to the holding of "vacant land" from time to time. He submitted that there was no permanent immunity granted to any land other than "vacant land". There were provisions which indicated that the lands which were not "vacant land" may become "vacant land" later on, or, the lands to which the provisions of Chapter VIII did not apply become amenable to these provisions. It was also submitted that a general declaration against the applicability of the provisions of the Act in respect holdings of the vast number of persons represented by the petitioners cannot be granted. It was submitted that holding of each person is required to be considered separately in order to determine whether that person held any excess "vacant land" and therefore, all the lands held by such person at the relevant point of time are required to be taken into account. He submitted that the Revised Development Plan which was published in the Official gazette on 15-1-1976 under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 which were applicable at the relevant point of time, was a "master Plan" within the meaning of Sec. 2 (h) and 2 (o) (c) of the said Act and since the lands of the said earlier "green Belt" were specified in the Master Plan for a purpose other than agriculture, they can be treated as "vacant land". ( 8 ) SEC. 3 of the said Act provides that, "except as otherwise provided in this act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this act applies under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1 thereof". The expression "commencement of this Act" in Sec. 3 is to be read in light of the provisions of Sec. 1 (3) which inter alia, provides that "save as otherwise provided in this Act, any reference in this Act to the commencement of this Act shall, in relation to any State or Union territory, mean the date on which this Act comes into force in such State or Union territory". So far as the State of Gujarat is concerned, admittedly, the Act came into force on 17-2-1976. The "appointed day" as defined in Sec. 2 (a) in relation to the State of Gujarat was 28-1-1976 being the date on which the Bill was introduced in Parliament. ( 9 ) THE expression "on and from" in Sec. 3 would mean that the person is not entitled to hold any "vacant land" not only on the date of commencement of the act but also from the date of such commencement, i. e. , even after the coming into force of the Act. The effect is that on and from 17-2-1976, on one hand no person will be entitled to hold any "vacant land" in excess of the ceiling limit and on the other hand a person can continue to hold land other than "vacant land (as defined in Sec. 2 (q) of the said Act which read with Explanation (C) to Sec. 2 (o) of the act) without any ceiling limit. Therefore, if there is no "master plan" or the agricultural land is not shown in the master plan for any other use as on 17-2-1976, by a subsequent change in the master plan showing it for use other than agriculture cannot be treated as "vacant land" as on 17-2-1976 under Sec. 3 of the said Act. In Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of U. P. (supra) it was not in dispute that the act came into force in the State of U. P. on 17-2-1976 and further that there was no master plan for that area at that time, i. e. , on 17-2-1976. In this context the supreme Court held that the area of "vacant land" in excess of the ceiling limit held by the appellant was to be determined as on 17-2-1976 when the Act came into force in the State of U. P. It is clear that the Supreme Court confined its holding to a situation where by a "master plan" which came into force on 24-2-1980 specifying the land in question for purpose other than agriculture, land of a person who had filed statement under Sec. 6 (1) declaring his holding as on 17-2-1976 being the date of commencement of the Act, was being treated as a "vacant land" on 17-2-1976 on which date it admittedly was not a "vacant land". The Supreme Court was not dealing with a situation where a "non-vacant land" had subsequently become vacant land, in which case, a statement is required to be filed under Sec. 6 (1) read with Explanation (ii) thereof declaring the extent of his holding as on that later date. In such a case, obviously the computation of excess "vacant land" cannot be done as on the earlier date of 17-2-1976 being the date on which that land was not a "vacant land". Therefore, if there was no master plan or the agricultural land was not specified in the master plan for any other use as on 17-2-1976, by a subsequent change in the master plan, specifying it for use other than agriculture it cannot be treated as a "vacant land" as on 17-2-1976 under the provisions of Sec. 3 of the said Act. This is all that the Supreme Court has said. There is nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court which can lead to a conclusion that a land which is not a "vacant land" can never after 17-2-1976 become a "vacant land". The Supreme Court could not have intended to paralyse the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act which specifically contemplate and deal with a situation where the land which was not a "vacant land" becomes at a later point of time a "vacant land". ( 10 ) SEC. 6 (1) of the said Act read with its Explanation (ii) enjoins a duty even on a person whose non-vacant land (i. e. , agricultural land not specified for any other use in the "master plan") has become "vacant land" by any reason whatsoever, to file a statement before the Competent Authority of all "vacant land" held by such person as on the date when such "non-vacant land" became "vacant land". Therefore, if on any date after 17-2-1976 the land which was not a "vacant land" becomes a "vacant land" for any reason whatsoever, then the holding of a person for the purpose of determining excess vacant land is to be computed with reference to that subsequent date and not 17-2-1976. Thus, if on such subsequent date, the non-vacant land has become "vacant land" by virtue of its being specified in the master plan, then the holding as on such later date has to be computed for determining excess vacant land and not with reference to 17-2-1976. Thus, if on such subsequent date, the non-vacant land has become "vacant land" by virtue of its being specified in the master plan, then the holding as on such later date has to be computed for determining excess vacant land and not with reference to 17-2-1976. This is precisely the purpose and effect of sec. 6 (1) read with Explanation (ii) thereof. The words "has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever" are of very wide amplitude. There is no prohibition against the land which as on 17-2-1976 was agricultural land and not specified in the "master plan" for any other purpose being earmarked in the "master plan" on a later date for purpose other than agricultural and thereby making it "vacant land" as on that later date. Albeit, the authorities cannot include them in a "master plan" for the purpose other than agriculture and treated them as "vacant land" as on the earlier date on 17-2-1976 for the purpose of computing the holding of a person as on 17-2-1976. The Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State U. P. (supra) frowned upon such a course being adopted when the form under Sec. 6 (1) was filled in, in respect of the holding as on 17-2-1976 and the land which was not a "vacant land" as on that date (being the date of commencement of the Act with reference to which the statement under Sec. 6 (1) was filed) was sought to be treated as "vacant land" as on that earlier date though the "master plan" specifying it for the purpose other than agriculture came into force only on 24-2-1980 and there was no "master plan" on 17-2-1976. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that "just as holder of the land cannot by his subsequent action reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities cannot by any subsequent action increase the area of the excess land by a similar action". Thus, by a subsequent action of specifying agricultural land for any other purpose in a "master plan" the authorities cannot add that area as "vacant land" as on the earlier date when it was in fact not a vacant land. Thus, by a subsequent action of specifying agricultural land for any other purpose in a "master plan" the authorities cannot add that area as "vacant land" as on the earlier date when it was in fact not a vacant land. In cases where the land has become vacant land on a subsequent date the holder is required to file his statement in respect of his holding as it stands on that date and not as on the earlier date of 17-2-1976 as provided by Sec. 6 (1) of the said Act. In the same way, where any Notification has been issued under clause (n) of Sec. 2 declaring any other area to be an "urban agglomeration" every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit as on the date of publication of such Notification is required to file a statement under sec. 6 (1) specifying the vacant land held by him as on that date as a result of which his holding will be computed with reference to that latter date and not 17-2-1976 when such land could not have been treated as "vacant land" because at the time it was not in an "urban agglomeration". ( 11 ) THERE is no embargo on transfer of land which is not a "vacant land" unlike sec. 5 which makes any transfer of "vacant land" null and void. Therefore, the agricultural land which was not in the master plan can be transferred by the owner even after the coming into force of the Act under Sec. 1 (3 ). Nor is there any prohibition under the said Act against putting agricultural land to other use by taking appropriate permission under the relevant laws. If the operation of the Act is to be pegged as on 17-2-1976 irrespective of alterations of the agricultural land to other non-agricultural use, then vast agricultural holdings within "urban agglomeration" can be converted into non-agricultural use and be held with impunity without any ceiling, making mockery of the Act which has effectively taken away on the basis of Sec. 3 the excess vacant land of persons who were holding lands other than agricultural lands or agricultural lands specified for other purpose in the master plan as on date of the commencement of the Act. The result will be shockingly discriminatory creating an invidious classification amongst persons holding vacant lands, namely, a class of persons holding the land within the ceiling area having been statutorily deprived of the excess vacant land and a class of persons who were on the commencement date holding agricultural lands without any ceiling limit and have become holders of land which has at a later date become "vacant land" by virtue of its conversion into non-agricultural use or inclusion in the "master plan" for use other than agriculture or any other reason whatsoever. The latter class can hold unlimited "vacant land" while the former cannot hold beyond the ceiling limit even though both hold land not mainly used for agriculture and therefore "vacant land". Obviously, the Act does not contemplate such discrimination amongst the holders of "vacant land" and creation of the vacant land which can be held within the ceiling limit and the land which can be held without such limit by converting non-vacant land into "vacant land", and, that is why the provisions of Sec. 6 (1) take care of lands subsequently becoming vacant and enjoin a duty on the holder to file the statement of excess vacant land as on that later date. Just as Sec. 6, inter alia, deals with the lands becoming vacant, Sec. 15 applies to cases where any person acquires any vacant land by which the aggregate holding exceeds the ceiling limit. In such case statement of vacant land is required to be filed in 3 months of the date of such acquisition and the provisions of Secs. 6 to 14 apply to such statement, as provided by Sec. 15 (2 ). To dismiss the provisions of Secs. 6 or 15 as machinery provisions is to mutilate the effectiveness of the Act defeating the purpose of imposing a ceiling on "vacant land" in "urban agglomeration" with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hand of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in "urban agglomeration" to subserve the common good. ( 12 ) IT will be noticed that no question regarding applicability of Sec. 6 (1) in the context of Explanations (ii) or (iii) thereof which relate to holding of excess vacant land as on the dates later than the commencement date falling under clause (i) of the Explanation arose before the Supreme Court, and obviously therefore, those provisions were not necessary to be discussed though undoubtedly the Supreme court was aware of these provisions. It can never be said that the decision of the supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra) did not take into account the provisions of Sec. 6, as was rightly held in the decision of this Court in Rameshbhai m. Basida (supra ). These provisions were, however, not discussed by the Supreme court, because, as aforesaid the question did not arise of computing the holding as on any later date contemplated by clauses (ii) or (iii) of the Explanation to Sec. 6 (1 ). In this view of the matter, even the subsequent inclusion of these agricultural lands in the Final Development Plan and by virtue thereof reserving them for "public housing" under Sec. 12 (2) (k) of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development act, 1976, would have the effect of non-vacant land becoming "vacant land" within the purview of Sec. 6 (1) read with Explanation (ii) thereof, enjoining a duty on the holders of that area to file a statement under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act as regards their holdings as on that later date. The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to a copy of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court from which the matter before the Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra) arose and pointed out that sec. 6 (1) was directly under consideration of the Supreme Court. As noted above, the Supreme Court was fully aware of the said provision but was not concerned with the effect of Explanations (ii) and (iii) of Sec. 6 (1) in that case. ( 13 ) THE matter can be examined even as regards the position as on 17-2-1976 when according to the petitioners these agricultural lands were not specified in the master Plan for any other purpose and they were shown in the reserved area of green Belt. ( 13 ) THE matter can be examined even as regards the position as on 17-2-1976 when according to the petitioners these agricultural lands were not specified in the master Plan for any other purpose and they were shown in the reserved area of green Belt. As noted above, according to the respondent authorities there already was a Development Plan published on 15-1-1976 which should be treated as a "master Plan" within the meaning of the said Act and in which these lands were specified for the purpose other than agriculture. In this context the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 which was in force at the relevant time when the Development Plan was published on 15-1-1976 have to be noted. Under Sec. 2 (2) of that Act a Development Plan means a plan prepared under Sec. 3 for the development or redevelopment of the entire area within the local limits. Under Sec. 3 (1) thereof every local authority was required to prepare and publish in the prescribed manner a Development Plan and submit it to the State Government for sanction. It is, therefore, clear that the Development Plan was to be prepared by the local authority before it could be submitted to the State Government for sanction. This amounts to a clear statutory recognition of existence of a Development Plan even before it is submitted for sanction to the State Government. Secs. 4 to 9 embrace the procedure which is required to be followed by the local authority for preparing a Development Plan before submitting it to the State Government. The initial stage is declaration of intention to prepare a Development Plan under Sec. 4 (1 ). The publication of such declaration under Sec. 4 is to be made as prescribed in Rule 3 of the Rules framed under the said Act. It is brought on record that such intention was declared by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 18-3-1974 for revising the Development Plan before carrying out survey of the area for the purpose of preparing a Development Plan. It is provided by Sec. 4 (2) that a copy of the development Plan shall be sent to the State Government and another copy shall be open to the inspection of the public at all reasonable hours at the head office of the local authority. It is provided by Sec. 4 (2) that a copy of the development Plan shall be sent to the State Government and another copy shall be open to the inspection of the public at all reasonable hours at the head office of the local authority. The copy which is sent to the State Government has to contain the particulars mentioned in Sec. 8 of the Act. The Development Plan thus prepared is to be published by the local authority as provided by Sec. 9 of the Act and if the local authority does not prepare it the State Government can prepare it under Sec. 3 (4) and publish it under Sec. 3 (4) read with Sec. 4 (1) of that Act. It is, therefore, obvious that before publication contemplated by Sec. 9, a Development Plan is already prepared by the local authority and a copy of that plan is sent to the government. It is pertinent to note that Sec. 9 speaks of inviting suggestions within two months from the date of publication of the "development Plan". The local authority is required to consider such suggestions and may, at any time before submitting the Development Plan to the State Government, modify such plan as it thinks fit. Therefore, a Development Plan which has already been prepared may be modified pursuant to suggestions which may be received by the local authority. Even sec. 10 indicates that the Development Plan which is published under Sec. 9 by the local authority has already come into existence and if the State Government wants to make any modifications it is required to publish only such modifications in the official Gazette. Finally, the State Government is required only to publish its sanction as per clause (d) of Sec. 10 (1) in the Official Gazette and thereupon the development Plan together with the Regulations sanctioned has to be called "the final Development Plan". Finally, the State Government is required only to publish its sanction as per clause (d) of Sec. 10 (1) in the Official Gazette and thereupon the development Plan together with the Regulations sanctioned has to be called "the final Development Plan". These statutory provisions read with Sec. 12 of the said act which imposes a restriction on development work after publication of intention under Sec. 4 (1), clearly indicate that the Development Plan comes into existence before it is even published under Sec. 9 by the local authority and its being a "prepared Development Plan" does not depend on sanction of the State Government, though, for the purpose of making it an effective Final Development Plan, such sanction is required under Sec. 10 which is a stage subsequent to preparation of a development Plan and its submission to the State Government. In the present case, the advertisement of the Revised Development Plan was published on 15-1-1976 as required by Rule 4, in the Official Gazette and as stated on oath in an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents the lands which were earlier shown in the "green belt" for the years 1965 to 1975 came to be released from predominantly agricultural Zone and were proposed as reserved for "public Housing". The notification regarding the Revised Development Plan published on 15-1-1976 shows that it was prepared under Sec. 3 (1) read with Sec. 17 with particulars as required under Secs. 5, 7, and 8 of the Bombay Town Planning Act and published. The said notification reads as follows :- july 1267"gujarat GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, JANUARY 15, 1976 / PAUSA 25, 1897 AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION revised DEVELOPMENT PLAN it is hereby notified that the Revised Development Plan for the City of Ahmedabad is prepared under Sec. 3 (1) read with Sec. 17 with particulars as required under secs. 5, 7 and 8 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 and published. The Development Plan covers the area within the jurisdiction of the Ahmedabad municipal Corporation as extended by Notification No. KP/75-68/pmc-1273/1972/p, dated 17th March 1975, Panchayat and Health Department, Government of Gujarat. A copy of the Development Plan with a report under Sec. 8 is available for public inspection in office of the Town Development Officer of the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation during office hours. A copy of the Development Plan with a report under Sec. 8 is available for public inspection in office of the Town Development Officer of the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation during office hours. If within two months from the date of publication of this Notification in the official Gazette any member of the public communicates in writing to the Local authority by a letter addressed to the Municipal Commissioner any suggestion relating to such Plan, the Local Authority shall consider such suggestions. Municipal Corporation, ahmedabad. Dated 3-1-1976 R. BASU municipal Commissioner. " ( 14 ) HAVING regard to the provisions of the Act of 1954 and the above Notification published on 15-1-1976 it is clear that the said Revised Development Plan referred to in the said Notification and published by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was a "master plan" within the meaning of Sec. 2 (h) of the said Act which expression means the plan "by whatever name called" prepared under any law for the time being in force for the development of an area within an urban agglomeration and providing for the stages by which such development shall be carried out. Therefore, all these lands of the petitioners and of all those represented by the petitioners which were in the Development Plan for the years 1965 to 1975 specified as Agricultural Zone and in a "green Belt", ceased to be land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture on being specified in the said Revised Development Plan prepared by the Ahmedabad municipal Corporation and published on 15-1-1976, by virtue of the provisions of sec. 2 (o) Explanation (C) of the said Act. As a result of this, all these lands became "vacant land" on 15-1-1976 and the provisions of the said Act which came into force in the State of Gujarat on 17-2-1976 could be applied to these lands for the purpose of ascertaining whether the holding of a person exceeded the ceiling prescribed for "vacant land". In this view of the matter, even on this ground the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra) or the decision of this Court in Rameshbhai M. Basida v. The Competent Authority (supra) cannot help the petitioners, because, as on the date of coming into force of the Act in State of gujarat on 17-2-1976 these lands had already become "vacant lands". ( 15 ) IN this view of the matter, there is no substance in this petition and the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated with immediate effect. .