Judgment 1. The Court: The petitioner who is an employee of the Steel Authority of India has filed this writ application praying, inter alia, for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to rectify his date of birth as communicated by him in terms of his letter dated 5th May, 1993. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner was appointed as a Night Relay Supervisor by M/s. Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. by letter dated 9/10th November, 1955 for a period of three months. It further appears that he was further promoted to the post of Senior Statiun Supervisor. According to the petitioner he passed the Matriculation Examination from Benaras Hindu University. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the certificate issued by the said University. The petitioner has contended that from a perusal of the service record card it would appear that his date of birth has been recorded therein as 9th November, 1933 as the age of the petitioner on the date of appointment is stated to be 22 years. In relation to proof of age the petitioner has produced certificate from Benaras Hindu University where it has been stated- " Benaras Hindu University Admission Examination 1955 Roll No. 2269. This is to certify that Kameshwar Pd. Srivastava son of Adya Sharan Prasad of the Central Hindu School born on 8.9.1939, passed the-Admission Examination held in the month of March 1955, and was placed in the Third Class." 4. The petitioner by a letter dated 5.5.93 addressed to the Deputy General Manager (Mines), Steel Authority of India Limited, Gua Ore Mines submitted a certificate stating that at the time of appointment he could not file the same. It has been contended that keeping in view of the fact that he has passed Matriculation Examination from the Central Hindu School of Benaras wherein the date of birth has been recorded as 8.9.1939, the same should be accepted as correct. The petitioner evidently passed the said examination in March, 1955. 5. It has been contended that keeping in view of the fact that he has passed Matriculation Examination from the Central Hindu School of Benaras wherein the date of birth has been recorded as 8.9.1939, the same should be accepted as correct. The petitioner evidently passed the said examination in March, 1955. 5. However, by an order dated 8th October, 1993, the said application of the petitioner was rejected stating "With reference to your applications for correctness of age in the record, we are to inform that your application have been examined carefully at Higher level and as per decision taken it is conveyed that the age recorded in your personal file at the time of entry into employment of the Company has been treated as final and binding." 6. Mr. Prosad Bagchi learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Steel Authority of India Ltd. itself has issued a Circular dated 17.3.1994 the relevant clauses whereof read thus: "4.3. Each person entering the services of the Company shall, in support of declaration of the date of birth, submit Matriculation/School Final Examination Certificate or equivalent examination or School Leaving Certificate. "4.4. In case of those who have not passed Matriculation/School Final Examination/equivalent examination at the time of entering the service, the following documents containing his date of birth may be accepted as evidence of age. In the order in which they are enumerated below (in other words evidence at (b) will be accepted only if evidence (a) is not possible, and so on J. "(a) School Certificate from educational institution where the candidate/employee studied. "(b) Service record/Service Certificates issued by the previous employer in case of candidates/employees who had been in employment under public sector enterprises/Government departments on local body prior to joining SAIL. "(c) Attested extracts from register of Birth & Death maintained by Gram Panchayats, Municipality, Municipal Corporation, Town/Notified area or an appropriate authority. "4.8. In a case where the Matriculation or School Final or Equivalent Examination certificate or any acceptable document as produced by the employee/candidate, indicates only, the age in terms of year and month, the date of birth for the purpose of service records may be taken as the last date of such month. "4.8. In a case where the Matriculation or School Final or Equivalent Examination certificate or any acceptable document as produced by the employee/candidate, indicates only, the age in terms of year and month, the date of birth for the purpose of service records may be taken as the last date of such month. If age is mentioned in years only, the year of birth may be arrived after deducting the given age from the year concerned and the last date of the year so arrived at, shall be taken as the date of birth." The learned counsel submits that keeping in view the fact that in the records maintained by the respondents the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded on the basis of Matriculation Certificate, it was incumbent upon the respondent to correct the said date of birth pursuant to his aforementioned representation dated 5.5.1993. 7. Mr. Narayan Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the date of birth recorded in the service Book at the time of his joining was signed by the petitioner. It has been pointed out that the petitioner was initially appointed by the Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. the properties, assets and liabilities of which have since vested in the Steel Authority of India Limited. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, an advance notice of retirement was issued to the petitioner on 12th August, 1992 wherein it was stated that he would retire on 30th November, 1993 on completion of sixty years of age. According to the learned counsel the petitioner only upon receipt of the said letter filed the aforementioned representation dated 5th May, 1993 enclosing therewith a purported Admission Examination Certificate of the Benaras Hindu University and requested that his date of birth be corrected to read as 8.9.1939. According to the learned counsel, in that view of the matter, this writ petition should not be entertained. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submitted that in any event, keeping in view the fact that the entire cause of action has arisen at Gua, in the district of Singbhum, within the State of Bihar, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submitted that in any event, keeping in view the fact that the entire cause of action has arisen at Gua, in the district of Singbhum, within the State of Bihar, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application. The learned counsel in support of his aforementioned submission placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in ONGC vs. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 and unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Re. Rabindra Prasad Agarwal) disposed of on 21st September, 1994. He further submitted that this application should be dismissed inter alia on the ground that the petitioner has approached the authorities after a long time and on the eve of his superannuation. Reliance in this connection has been placed on AIR 1993 SC 2647 and also on a decision reported in (JT 1993 (3) SC 711) Union of India vs. Barnam Singh. 8. From the records it thus appears that admittedly the petitioner's date of birth was recorded in his Service Book as 9.11.1933. The petitioner joined the Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited in the year 1955. His age on the date of appointment was determined as 22 years. However, in the said records, the proof of age in respect of the petitioner has been stated to be the Matriculation Certificate. It is also evident from the records that he filed a representation only upon receipt of the notice of superannuation. It is also significant that the said notice was served on the petitioner much before his actual retirement. 9. The contention of the learned Counsel that the matriculation certificate is the conclusive proof for recording the correct date of birth is not necessary to be considered, inasmuch as, in my opinion the records unmistakably show that the petitioner is guilty of gross delay and latches on his part. The petitioner was appointed by Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. which was a Public Limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act on 9/10th November, 1955. The petitioner filed the application for correction of his date of birth only after he was served with the notice of retirement dated 12th of August, 92, which is contained in Annexure 'D' to the writ application. The petitioner filed the application for correction of his date of birth only after he was served with the notice of retirement dated 12th of August, 92, which is contained in Annexure 'D' to the writ application. It is not the contention of the petitioner nor can it be contended that he was not aware of the date of birth recorded by the said Iron & Steel Company Ltd. in his Service Book. 10. In Bhupendra Nath Chatterjee vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1977 (3) SCC 491 the Supreme Court has held that the date of birth recorded in the service records should be accepted as correct. In Union of India vs. Harnam Singh reported in JT 1993 (3) SC 711 : (1993) 2 SCC 162 , the Supreme Court held :"A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay". The Apex Court, however, allowed the appeal preferred by the Union of India stating "In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in issuing the direction in the manner in which it has been done. The application for correction of date of birth, entered in the service book in 1956, for the first time made in September 1991, was hopelessly belated and did not merit any consideration. As already noticed, it had not been made even within the period of five years from the date of coming into force of Note 5 to FR 56(m) in 1979. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth and the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained." 11. In Secretary & Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth and the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained." 11. In Secretary & Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. vs. R. Kirubakaran, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2647 , the Supreme Court, inter alia, held that when no time limit is prescribed for filing an application for correction of date of birth, it should be done within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case has observed that the applicant has to produce evidence in support of his claim which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant to prove that of his date of birth recorded in his service book in wrong. 12. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered by the Supreme Court again in State of T.N. vs. T. V. Venugopalan, reported in 1994 (6) SCC 302 wherein the Supreme Court in no unmistakable term has laid down that a belated application on the eve of retirement should not be accepted. 13. The circular letter issued by the Steel Authority of India Ltd. cannot be relied upon by the petitioner in view of the fact that the said circular letter has been issued by the said authority in 1994. Therefore, the aforementioned circular letter was not in existence when the petitioner joined the service. 14. There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner was appointed by the Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. at Gua which is situated in the State of Bihar. The petitioner had all along served at the said place. The impugned order dated 8.10.93 has also been issued from Gua and served upon the petitioner. 14. There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner was appointed by the Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. at Gua which is situated in the State of Bihar. The petitioner had all along served at the said place. The impugned order dated 8.10.93 has also been issued from Gua and served upon the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that from the said order, it would appear that the said order is based upon an order passed by a higher authority as it has been stated therein "With reference to your applications for correction of age in the record, we are to inform that your applications have been examined carefully at Higher level and as per decision taken it is conveyed that the age recorded in your personal file at the time of entry into employment of the Company has been treated as final and binding." The learned Counsel points out that from the said letter it would appear that the Raw Materials Division of the Steel Authority of India is situated at the Chartered Building in the town of Calcutta and thus there cannot be any doubt that the said order was passed by the concerned authority at Calcutta which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Counsel contends that thus a part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and in support of his aforementioned contention he relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 1983 Cal 307 and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Jharia Talkies & Cold Storage Put. Ltd., reported in 1992 (2) CHN, p. 80. There cannot be any doubt that in terms of clause 2 of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India the High Courts within whose jurisdiction cause of action in its entirety or a part thereof has arisen, will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. 15. In this case there is nothing on record to show that any order has in fact been passed by any authority in the town of Calcutta. 15. In this case there is nothing on record to show that any order has in fact been passed by any authority in the town of Calcutta. Only because the Raw Materials Division of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. is situated at Chartered Building in the town of Calcutta, it does not mean that the case of the petitioner who is an employee in the lower rank was considered at the corporate office of the respondents or by any authority whose office is situtated at Calcutta. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711 the Supreme Court has clearly held that a Court within whose jurisdiction no part of cause of action has arisen, should not exercise its jurisdiction. Following the aforementioned decision a learned Single judge of this Court in Re: Rajendra Prasad Agarwal by an order dated 21.9.94 has held: "The whole intent and purport of the judgment is to give a proper meaning to the expression 'cause of action' or the citus theory as propounded in the Constitution. In order to attract jurisdiction of this Court, either the cause of action or the citus theory as envisaged under Art. 226 of the Constitution, as amended, must be satisfied and in the event there is a contra-finding, it would lead to an anomalous situtation for every High Court to exercise jurisdiction over every matter. Be it noted further that Metal Scrap Trade Corporation, though, has office at Calcutta, but that does not mean and imply that this Court will have jurisdiction pertaining to a tender issued from Vyjag and when the supply under the tender was also to be effected from Vyjag." 16. In Hindustan Aluminium's case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court held that the petitioner company had suffered losses in business at Calcutta as a direct consequence of the orders impugned therein and on that ground observed that a part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. The aforementioned decision of the Division Bench has also been taken into consideration in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.'s case (supra). The aforementioned decision of the Division Bench has also been taken into consideration in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.'s case (supra). It may, however, be noticed that the Division Bench in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. having observed that a part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, refused to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter holding "Notwithstanding the fact that we are of the opinion that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the order impugned in the writ petition is that of the Collector, Dhanbad, and that at one stage the matter had gone up to the Patna High Court for determination of a very vital issue which has a material bearing in this case. Judicial propriety demand that in such a situation the writ petitioner should have gone before the Patna High Court against the order impugned in the instant writ petition." 17. Yet again, a learned Single Judge of this Court in a case reported in 1944 (1) CHN p. 444 has clearly held that it is for this Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter if it finds that two High Courts have territorial jurisdiction over the same. In the aforementioned case. also the Calcutta High Court has refused to entertain the writ application despite holding that a portion of the cause of action arise within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 18. For the reasons aforementioned and keeping in view the parameters of jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, in my opinion, it is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. For the reasons aforementioned, the application is dismissed, but in view of the fads and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 20. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Appeal dismissed.