V. D. Gyani, J- The following question of law has been referred to in this Court for its opinion : “Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that notwithstanding minority of the partners during the major part of the accounting year, registration should be granted as on the date of execution of the partnership deed towards the end of the accounting year, she became major ?” 2. This case relates to the assessment year 1982-83. The respondent assessee formed his partnership firm as evidenced by partnership deed dated 23.2.82. Although the partnership was formed by an oral agreement with effect from 1st January, 1981 for carrying on business of manufacturing of veneer, used by the plywood industry. The firm comprised of 5 partners, namely, (1) Sajjan Kumar Bhajanka, (2) Prem Kumar Bhajanka, (3) Nirmal Kumar Bhajanka, (4) Smti Bimla Devi Chamaria and, (5) Smti Sangita Devi Chamaria. The assessee firm applied for registration under Form No. 11 on 24.3.82 before the ITO but he refused to entertain the same on the ground that one of the partners Smti Sangita Devi Chamaria was minor on the date on 1.1.81 when the partnership was formed by an oral agreement. It further held : “a minor can not legally enter into an agreement, therefore, the firm could not be said to have been legally constituted with effect from 1.1.8 J.” He therefore, passed order under section 185 (1) (e) of the Income Tax Act rejecting the claim for registration. The assessee preferred an appeal contending that even if Sangita Devi Chamaria was a minor on 1.1.81, registration of the firm could not be legally refused as on the date of execution of the partnership deed i.e. 22.3.82, she had attained majority. The appeal was decided in favour of the assessee and the ITO was directed to accord registration to the firm. The department took up the matter before the appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal on consideration of various submissions made and the facts and findings as available on records following a decision of this Court as reported in 12$ ITR5S3 and other two judgments including that of the Supreme Court (PD Seshan & Co. The department took up the matter before the appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal on consideration of various submissions made and the facts and findings as available on records following a decision of this Court as reported in 12$ ITR5S3 and other two judgments including that of the Supreme Court (PD Seshan & Co. vs. CIT) 26 ITR 27 and (CIT vs. Fare Laboratories) 154 ITR 141, came to the conclusion that Kumari Sangita, though a minor was admitted to the benefits of the partnership in terms of an oral agreement by the contracting parties who indisputably had the capacity to contract. 3. One significant fact as observed by the Tribunal is that the firm constituted by oral agreement has not been found to be a bogus firm even by the ITO, as can be seen from order Annexure A. This Court considering the essential requirements of section 184 and 185 of the Income Tax Act held as follows : “The cumulative effect of section 184 and 185 of the Act read with the relevant rules is that if the application for registration made by a firm gives requisite particulars prescribed by section 184 and 185 of the Act and the Rules, the ITO cannot reject the prayer, if there is a firm in existence; a firm may be said to be not in existence if it is a bogus or in other words not a genuine one or if, in law, the constitution of partnership is void. Therefore, the limit of jurisdiction of the IT authorities is restricted to find out two facts : (1) Whether the application is in due compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, and (2) Whether the firm, represented in the instrument of partnership, is a bogus one or has no legal existence. The discretion conferred on the authorities is a judicial one and ought not to be exercised in a capricious and impetuous way but in a disciplined and responsible manner. The discretion conferred on the authorities is a judicial one and ought not to be exercised in a capricious and impetuous way but in a disciplined and responsible manner. When an order refusing registration goes beyond the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction conferred on the authorities this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.” As regards the rights of a minor admitted to partnership under section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, this Court held as follows : “It will be seen that on attaining majority a minor admitted to the benefits of the partnership, has two options open to him : (1) he may elect to become a partner. If he elects to be a partner, he need not do anything nor give any public notice. On the expiry of the six months he becomes a partner of the firm. If a minor on becoming a major and knowing that he had been admitted to the benefit of a partnership keeps silent thereafter and fails to give the requisite public notice his inaction tentamounts to election to become a partner and he becomes liable for all the obligations of the firm “from the date of his admission to the benefits of partnership”. It follows, therefore, that he may, either by a consentient act on his part, become a partner or become so by his inaction for a six months as allowed. On a perusal of section 30 (5) and (7) it becomes clear that if during the subsistence of the partnership a person who was admitted at the time when he was a minor, to the benefits of partnership does not elect to become a partner within six months of his attaining maajority would become a partner after the expiry of the said period (six months) and thereafter his rights and liabilities would be the same as those of the other partners as from the date of his admission to the benefits of the partnership.” In the instant case, the finding as recorded by the AAC and the Tribunal are concurrent. The findings as recorded by the Tribunal on the question ant of registration, are concurrent, although learned counsel appearing for the Revenue urged that the plausibility of the explanation furnished by the assessee and accepted by the AAC as well as the Tribunal is far from convincing, we are not impressed by this submission. 4. The findings as recorded by the Tribunal on the question ant of registration, are concurrent, although learned counsel appearing for the Revenue urged that the plausibility of the explanation furnished by the assessee and accepted by the AAC as well as the Tribunal is far from convincing, we are not impressed by this submission. 4. In view of the foregoing discussion, the question as referred to is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee, and against the revenue.