Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. This civil revision application arises out of an order dated 20.4.1993, passed by the learned Munsif, in exercise of its power under Sec. 18(2) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It appears that the application filed on behalf of the petitioner under Sec. 18(2) of the Act was heard on merit by the learned Munsif and he rejected the same holding that the petitioners have not proved the notice served upon them by Opp. Party under Sec. 18(1) of the Act. 2. The short facts giving rise to this civil revision application are as under. The suit premises in question was let out to the Opp. Party on the basis of fixed term tenancy created w.e.f. 7.1.1988, for a term of five years ending on 6.1.1993. The agreement of fixed term tenancy has been filed in this application and has been marked as Annexure-2 to the same. In the agreement, there is no clause for renewal of the lease. However, since the fixed term tenancy was expiring, the Opp. Party served a notice purported to be under Sec. 18(1) of the Act, dated 1.12.1992, upon the petitioners by registered post, which was delivered on 2.12.1992. The petitioners having received the notice filed their objection under Sec. 18(2) of the Act, before the learned Munsif on 14.12.1992 with a prayer to terminate the fixed term tenancy. The application aforementioned, however, has been rejected by the learned Munsif as indicated above, giving rise to this application. 3. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Sub-section (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act could not have been rejected and as per the requirement of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, the learned court below could have extended the maximum period of one year or could have terminated the fixed term tenancy, He however, contended that since the Court had no other option, the order impugned rejecting the objection could not have been passed. 4. He further contended that the notice purported to have been served upon the petitioners has since been admitted by the Opp. Party, there was no need of its being proved in the court below. 4. He further contended that the notice purported to have been served upon the petitioners has since been admitted by the Opp. Party, there was no need of its being proved in the court below. He has drawn my attention to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Opp. Party. In Paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the notice was not served upon the petitioners for extension of the period of the existing lease; rather it was for execution of a fresh lease. Mr. N.K. Prasad further contended that since there was no provision in the agreement for extension or renewal of the lease, there was no question for making a prayer by serving a notice upon the petitioners, to renew the lease, rather the same was a notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Section 18 of the Act for extension of the maximum period of one year, as stipulated under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act. 5. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Opp. Party, however, contended that the purported notice served upon the petitioners was not a notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act, but it was a notice for specific performance of the contract. It was further been urged by Mr. Debi Prasad that since mere was no notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act, the learned Court below has rightly rejected the application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act. 6. From the impugned order, it appears that the learned court below has rejected the objection filed on behalf of the petitioners, merely on the ground that the alleged notice purported to be under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 has not been proved. I find from the impugned order that the learned court below has noticed the fact that a notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act was served upon the petitioners calling upon them to perform the contract by renewing the agreement for a period of further five years. The fact that notice was served under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act is also borne out from Paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed in this case on behalf of Opp. Party. The fact that notice was served under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act is also borne out from Paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed in this case on behalf of Opp. Party. Though, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the notice was for the execution of a fresh lease and not for extension of the period of the existing lease, but it has to be construed that in absence of any provision in the lease deed for its renewal, it is a notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act, and rightly, therefore, the petitioners filed their objection under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, within 15 days as required under the Act. 7. Under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, it is incumbent upon the court, when a notice under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 has already been served upon the landlord, either to terminate the lease or extend the same for such a period as it deems proper in the circumstances, but not exceeding one year, as Laid down under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act. The court below, therefore, failed to exercise the power conferred upon it under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act and has erroneously rejected the application filed on behalf of the petitioners. 8. From the facts stated above, prima facie, I am satisfied that the learned court below has failed in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Sub-section (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act. the power under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act is only limited, either to extend the period not exceeding one year or to terminate the lease, and since the same has not been exercised by the learned court below, in my opinion, it will be an empty formality to remit back the matter to the court below for fresh consideration and the error committed by the court below should be rectified in exercise of my power under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. 9. In the case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar V/s. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, , it has been held that revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is also a part of appellate jurisdiction, in view of the fact that revisional court like an appellate court is a superior court and it held as follows: Such a right was one of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the court below. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. In the well known work of story on constitution (of United States) Vol. 2 Article 1761, it is stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in any form in which the legislature may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762 the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States, are by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial. A writ of error is a process of common law origin, and it removes notihng for re-examination but the law. The former mode is usually adopted in cases of equity and admiralty jurisdiction; the latter, in suits at common law tried by a jury. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below. Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior courts in those of superior courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. 10. A Bench of this Court relying upon the decision rendered in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankars case (supra) has held in the case of Jai Prakash Jalan V/s. Rambilash Madan Gopal reported in 1991 (2) PLJR 224, that to rectify the error committed by the court below, High Court in exercise of its power under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can also exercise power of appellate court. 11. In view of the legal proposition noticed above and taking into consideration the fact that the court before whom the application under Sec. 18(2) of the Act was filed had no option, but to extend the lease or to terminate the same, I feel inclined to rectify the error committed by the court in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. 12. In this view of the matter, this application is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. The fixed term tenancy created in favour of the Opp. Party is hereby terminated. There shall be no order as to costs. 13. Before I part with the judgment, I would like to observe that even if the extension has not been granted to the Opp. Party for a maximum period of one year, as required under the law, the Opp. Party remained in possession of the suit premises till date, though the fixed term tenancy expired on 6.1.1993, therefore, the petitioners will be at liberty to take recourse to law under Sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 of the Act, for eviction of the Opp. Party.