K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) SMT. Bhartiben, wife of the detenue - Dr. Bipin Shantilal panchal, alongwith three other detenus by these four separate wirt petitions under art. 226 of the Constitution of India, have moved this Court, challenging the impugned order of detention dated 22-8-1994, 8-9-1994, 25-8-1994 and 22-8-1994 respectively passed against them, by Mr. A. K. Shrivastava, Joint Secretary to the government of India, New Delhi, respondent No. 2 herein, exercising powers under sec. 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act, 1988, inter alia praying for quashing and setting aside the same and, to set them at liberty forthwith. ( 2 ) PLACING reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishvardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 1995 (3) jt 639 , the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the instant cases since in the grounds of detention, detenus have not been appraised of their Constitutional right to make a representation to Mr. A. K. Shrivastava, the detaining Authority who in turn was also empowered to revoke his own order by virtue of provision under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, their most invaluable right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India to make the representation to the Detaining Authority stands infringed to the said extent and accordingly, therefore, the impugned orders of detention deserve to be quashed and set aside and the detenus be set at liberty forthwith. Making good this submission, the learned Advocates for the petitioners have specifically invited the attention of this Court first of all to para No. 2 of the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment wherein, the following question came-up for consideration :-"2. Making good this submission, the learned Advocates for the petitioners have specifically invited the attention of this Court first of all to para No. 2 of the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment wherein, the following question came-up for consideration :-"2. When an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, is the said officer required to consider the representation submitted by the detenu ?"the said question raised above, thereafter, stands duly answered and concluded in para 38 at page 657 of the said Judgment, which reads as under :-"where the detention order has been made under Sec. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and PIT NDPS Act by an officer specially empowered for that purpose either by the central Government or the State Government, the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention. This right of detenu is in addition to his right to make representation to the said officer, and the said officer is obliged to consider the said representation and the failure on his part to do so results in denial of the right conferred on the person detained to make a representation to the State government and the Central Government where the detention order has been made by an officer specially authorised by a State Government and to the Central government where the detention order has been made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government and to have the same duly considered. This right to make a representation necessarily implies that the person detained must be informed of his right to make a representation to the authority that has made the order of detention at the time when he is served with the grounds of detention so as to enable him to make such a representation and the failure to do so results in denial of the right of the person detained to make a representation. " ( 3 ) MR. H. M. Mehta, the learned Sr. Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly submitted that so far as the Special Civil Application No. 3935 of 1995 is concerned, it is not disputed that the detenu was not appraised (sic.) of his Constitutional right regarding the representation to be made to the Detaining authority and in fact, he has not made any such representation. Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly submitted that so far as the Special Civil Application No. 3935 of 1995 is concerned, it is not disputed that the detenu was not appraised (sic.) of his Constitutional right regarding the representation to be made to the Detaining authority and in fact, he has not made any such representation. In this view of the matter, according to Mr. Mehta, to the said extent, Special Civil Application no. 3935 of 1995 would stand squarely covered by the decision rendered in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishvardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) to the benefit of the detenu of that case who shall have to be ordered to be released forthwith. However, so far as three other Special Civil Applications the same being S. C. A. Nos. 3931 of 1995, 3932 of 1995 and 3934 of 1995 are concerned, likewise the detenu of S. C. A. No. 3935 of 1995 though indisputably the said detenus were not appraised (sic.) of their Constitutional right to make representation to the Detaining authority, viz. , Mr. A. K. Shrivastava, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, new Delhi - Officer who was specially empowered to pass the detention order, but at the same time, it is equally indisputable that they had in fact made representation to the said Detaining Authority itself, and therefore, they would stand entirely on different and distinct footings and accordingly, to that extent, the cases of the said detenus would stand distinguished and not governed by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishvardas Patel (supra ). ( 4 ) IT is indeed not disputed by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that the detenu did make representations to the Detaining Authority. Accordingly, once the detenus admittedly are found to have made representation to the Detaining authority, they cannot be permitted to be conveniently heard to say that technically because they were not so appraised in the grounds of detention of their right of making representation to the Detaining Authority, therefore to that extent same stood, stands violated, irrespective of and merely because of the fact that they in fact did make the representation to the Detaining Authority. As a matter of fact, once a detenu is found to be enlightened and conscious enough of his constitutional right and accordingly having exercised the same, subsequently, he cannot be permitted to take convenient somersault to take shelter behind his feigned ignorance about the right in question just to grab the benefit of the Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of Kamleshkumar Patel (supra ). Applying this test of the ordinary prudent man, it could be safely inferred that but for the fact that the detenus were intelligent, enlightened and conscious enough of their constitutional right to make the representations to the Detaining Authority, there was no reason for any idea just accidently striking their mind to make representation to the said authority. In this view of the tell-tale facts situation, it is indeed not open to the detenu to seek shelter and protection under the Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Kamleshkumar Ishvardas Patel v. Union of India (supra) merely because they were also not so appraised in black and white in the grounds of detention of their rights to make representation to the Detaining Authority. For the aforesaid reasons given, on this point, though Mr. Mehta is indeed on the sounder footing, even then merely because the concerned detenus had made the representations, to the Detaining Authority that fact by itself in the facts of the present cases will not alter or remotely even help salvage the situation any more in favour of the respondents, more particularly because the most crucial and vital point expressly raised on behalf of the detenus, viz. , that they had not received any communication whatsoever whether their said representations have been duly considered by the detaining Authority till date by filing any affidavit on the point. It is indeed quite strange and surprising too that despite the specific point expressly raised in the petition about the representations as far back as in the month of October, 1994 and yet the Detaining Authority had no time to get out of its slumber to controvert the same by filing reply-affidavit. Anyway, bearing in mind extremely serious allegations of Narcotic dealing in huge quantity having gravest impact on public interest, this Court was constrained to inquire from Mr. Anyway, bearing in mind extremely serious allegations of Narcotic dealing in huge quantity having gravest impact on public interest, this Court was constrained to inquire from Mr. Mehta whether from record even he was in a position to squarely meet the point raised by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, as to whether their representations have been duly considered ? To this, Mr. Mehta after inquiring from the instructing officers present in the Court frankly submitted that detention paper/files were as silent as deep-sky. . In substance, the said representations stand not considered till today. However, mr. Mehta further hastened to add that all the representations made by the concerned detenue were indisputably considered by the Central Government which were ultimately rejected. Under the circumstances, though the detenu in Special Civil application Nos. 3931 of 1995, 3932 of 1995 and 3934 of 1995 were not appraised of their constitutional right of making representations to the Detaining Authority, i. e. , specially empowered officer, however at the same time, because since they in fact having made the representations to the Detaining Authority, they are deemed to have been aware of their right to make the representation to the Detaining authority to the said Authority. In this view of the matter, the Supreme Court decision in case of Kamleshkumar Ishvardas Patel v. Union of India (supra) will not be of any assistance to them to the extent claiming right and making grievance of they not being appraised of their constitutional right to make representation to the Detaining Authority. This is the clear distinguishing feature. In fact, as discussed above, when Mr. Mehta was asked to satisfy the conscience of this Court whether the representations made to the Detaining Authority, i. e. , specially empowered officer mr. A. K. Shrivastava were considered or not, he was not in a position to enlighten this Court any further. In this view of the point-blank situation, it is indeed quite difficult for Mr. Mehta to wriggle-out from the Constitutional catch, namely, that the representations made by the detenus in the month of October, 1994 to the detaining Authority were not only not considered expeditiously but they are not considered till today. In this view of the point-blank situation, it is indeed quite difficult for Mr. Mehta to wriggle-out from the Constitutional catch, namely, that the representations made by the detenus in the month of October, 1994 to the detaining Authority were not only not considered expeditiously but they are not considered till today. Once again, it is hardly required to be empasised that every representation particularly the first one made by or on behalf of the detenu received by the concerned authorities should be considered as expeditiously as possible within the reasonable time-limit failing which the Court has indeed no alternative but to declare the further continued detention illegal and unconstitutional. Of course, what indeed could be the reasonable time-limit to consider and dispose of the representation, is a matter which always depends upon the attending facts and circumstances of that particular case. 4. 1 In this view of the ultimate fall-out of the above discussion, all these petitions deserve to be allowed and are allowed accordingly. Accordingly, the Special Civil application No. 3935 of 1995 is allowed on the ground that the same stands squarely covered by the Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Kamleshkumar I. Patel (supra ). Turning to other three Special Civil Application, viz. , Special Civil application Nos. 3931 of 1995, 3932 of 1995 and 3934 of 1995, the same are allowed on the ground that the representations made by each one of them in October, 1994 to Mr. A. K. Shrivastava, Joint Secretary to Government of India, New Delhi specially empowered Detaining Authority herein have not been considered till today, contravening their invaluable fundamental right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India, rendering their further and continued detention unconstitutional. ( 5 ) IN the result, these petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of detention are hereby quashed and set aside. The concerned detenu, viz. , (1) Dr. Bipin Shantilal panchal; (2) Piyush Mulshankar Pandya; (3) Kashyap Arunbhai Patel; and (4) Prahlad maganbhai Patel, are hereby ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, unless their presence in jail is so required in connection with any other proceedings pending against them. Rule made absolute. The concerned detenu, viz. , (1) Dr. Bipin Shantilal panchal; (2) Piyush Mulshankar Pandya; (3) Kashyap Arunbhai Patel; and (4) Prahlad maganbhai Patel, are hereby ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, unless their presence in jail is so required in connection with any other proceedings pending against them. Rule made absolute. ( 6 ) REGISTRY is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to- (i) The Secretary, home Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar and (ii) The Secretary, legal Department, Union of India, New Delhi for getting issued appropriate Circulars to all the Officers "who are specially empowered to pass the orders of detention under the COFEPOSA Act and/or PIT NDPS Act" directing them to (i) appraise the detenus of their right to make representation to the specially empowered Detaining authority; (ii) to consider the representation, if any, at the earliest; and (iii) to file counter-affidavit in time when any question/point is raised which can be replied and accounted for by the Detaining Authority itself only. .