R. K. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THE accused, petitioner herein, stood changed under Section 307 and 391, I. P. C. upon trial, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Athagarh, convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six years for the offence under S. 307, IPC and one year for the offence under Section 324, I. P. C. and ordered both the sentences to run concurrently. The accused then challenged the judgement and order of the Assistant Sessions Judge in appeal and upon hearing the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, while setting aside the conviction under Section 307, I. P. C. upheld the conviction under Section 324 and reduced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for five months. It is against this judgement the accused has preferred the present revision. ( 2 ) FACTS of the case lie in a narrow compass. On 5-11-89 at about 3 P. M. P. W. 1 Rajkishore Rout and his brother Chandra Sekhar Rout, P. W. 9 while returning from Nuapatne Spinning Mill, the accused obstructed them near Chandi Bazar Chhok of Nuapatne and abused in filthy language and thrust a Muna, a pointed iron weapon, into the belly of Chandrasekhar. P. W. 1 Rajkishore Rout and P. W. 5 Susants Kumar Rout when intercepted they were not spared. The accused also assaulted them with Muna and caused injuries on their person. The incident was reported to the police and after usual investigation charge-sheet was laid. Upon trial, the accused was found guilty and convicted as hereinbefore stated. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the accused though assailed the judgement of the appellate court on several grounds, but he only confined his mission that the learned appellate court committed grave error in not extending the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Elucidating the point he urged that considering the genesis and origin of the incident nature of injuries sustained by P. W. 9, the learned appellate court should have released the accused on probation, particularly when the was a first offender. ( 4 ) THE incident as alleged in the F. I. R. was trivial in nature; inasmuch as the accused on seeing Chandrasekhar P. W. 9 near Chandi Bazar Chhok questioned as to why he dashed cycle to his mother. ( 4 ) THE incident as alleged in the F. I. R. was trivial in nature; inasmuch as the accused on seeing Chandrasekhar P. W. 9 near Chandi Bazar Chhok questioned as to why he dashed cycle to his mother. To this when Chandrasekhar denied, the accused being annoyed assaulted him with a pointed iron rod. From this it is evident that there was no premeditation or pre-plan to assault P. W. 9. Everything happened at the spur. Added to it there is also no evidence that there was bad blood between P. W. 9 and the accused. Furthermore, the injuries sustained by P. W. 9 were simple in nature. It is borne out from the report of the first treating physician (Ext. 3) that P. W. 9 received two stab injuries of which one was on the left side of chest wall 6" below the left nipple and it was simple in nature, the size being 1/2" "1/4". The second stab injury was on the right upper ana and it was also simple in nature. The other two injured, namely, P. W. 1 and 5 who according to the prosecution received injuries at the hand of the accused were sent for medical examination. Their injury reports marked Exts. 4 and 5 reveal that they only sustained two superficial abrasions. The learned First Additional Session Judge, Cuttack, on reappraisal of the evidence came to hold that the offence under Section 307, I. P. C. could not be brought home and on such finding he set aside the conviction. He, however, maintained the conviction under Section 324, I. P. C. but reduced the sentence to five months rigorous imprisonment. He completely overlooked the beneficial provision of the Probation of Offenders Act and failed to extend its benefit to the accused. It is well known proposition of law that it is obligatory on the court to apply the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act where it is permissible and extend the benefit thereof to the accused. If the Court declines to give such benefit, in that case it is incumbent upon it to assign good reasons. Reference in this context may be made to Section 361, Cr. If the Court declines to give such benefit, in that case it is incumbent upon it to assign good reasons. Reference in this context may be made to Section 361, Cr. P. C. A similar case like the present one came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Ranka Sahu v. State, reported in 1995 (2) OLR, page 1 : (1995) 8 OCR 404, where it is observed that the criminal courts instead of discharging their sentencing function in a mechanical manner should assign special reasons, if they decline to extend the benefits of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. 5-6. Sections 360 and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and the Children Act, 1960 and other similar laws are indicative of the intention of the Legislature that rehabilitation of offenders and not mere deterrence are amongst the objects of administration of criminal justice in our country. While determining the question whether deterrent punishment should be awarded or humanistic approach should be made to reform and rehabilitate the offender, it is necessary for the court to take into consideration amongst others the personality of the offender, his age, character, antecedent and above all the nature and seriousness of the offence as well as the motive for the crime. Court should not feel complacent by saying that it has complied with the statutory requirement merely by observing that it is not a fit case to extend the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. It should be kept in mind that sentence is not a routine or mechanical exercise. An offender should not be treated as an outcast of the society after finding him guilty of the offence. An onerous duty is cast on the court to see whether the law demands to keep him confined in the prison bar or a humanistic approach should be made to reform him. This duty should not be discharged lightheartedly and in a mechanical manner without looking as to what the Legislature mandates in the various provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and other Acts. 7. In the case in hand admittedly the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. This duty should not be discharged lightheartedly and in a mechanical manner without looking as to what the Legislature mandates in the various provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and other Acts. 7. In the case in hand admittedly the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. As the evidence goes, for trivial matter the accused assaulted Chandrasekhar P. W. 9 with a pointed iron rod causing two injuries which are simple in nature. So keeping in view the genesis and origin of the incident and nature of injuries, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where the accused should be released under the Probation of Offenders Act. 8. In the result, while maintaining the conviction of the accused under Section 324, I. P. C. , sentence of five months rigorous imprisonment awarded to him is suspended. He be released on probation of good conduct by entering into a bond of Rs. 2,000/- with one surety for a period of one year to the satisfaction of the trial court to appear and receive sentence when called upon and during the said period he shall keep peace and be of good behaviour. Ordered accordingly. .