R. P. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the same in all revisions and he invokes jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the proceedings before the trial Magistrate urging that he has been subjected to unfair trial in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, considering the scope and extent of that provision as pronounced by the Supreme Court of India in its various judgements. ( 2 ) ARTICLE 21 of the Constitution of India lays down that no persons shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The reliance placed by the petitioner's counsel is on the following judgements. 1. Biswanath Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 1994 Cri LJ 242 : 1993 AIR SCW 3631 (SC ). 2. Santosh Dey v. Archana Guha, 1994 Cri LJ 1975 : AIR 1994 SC 1229 : 1994 AIR SCW 1480. 3. S. G. Nain v. Union of India, 1992 Cri LJ 560 : AIR 1992 SC 603 : 1992 AIR SCW 2201 (SC ). The first two judgements are in cases arising from Bihar and were delivered by Hon'ble Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy and Hon'ble Justice S. P. Bharucha. The 3rd judgement is a case arising from Bihar and was delivered by Hon'ble Justice Kuldip Singh and Hon'ble Justice M. M. Punchhi of the Supreme Court of India. In these judgements, it was held, on the authority of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, that the right of speedy trial is vested in favour of the accused and violation of that right entails prejudice to the accused in trial and such delayed prosecution is liable to be quashed. Each of these cases was decided on its facts and circumstances for finding out if there was such delay on the part of prosecution as to cause prejudice to the accused and violation of his right to speedy trial. With these findings, the prosecutions were quashed. ( 3 ) IN the first case, referred above, their Lordships noticed that the F. I. R. was lodged on 10th December, 1977, charge-sheet was filed by police on 9th February, 1983 i. e. after more than five years. It was a case of misappropriation of funds worth Rs. 1,15,000/- belong to State Co-operative Marketing Unit where the accused was a Depot Manager. It was a case of misappropriation of funds worth Rs. 1,15,000/- belong to State Co-operative Marketing Unit where the accused was a Depot Manager. There was no explanation of the delay in filing charge-sheet by the police. Thereafter, there had been no progress in trial. The accused had been arrested on January, 1978 and released on bail. The Court framed the formal charges on the accused on 25th April, 1989, i. e. six years after the formal charge-sheet filed by the police, The charges were under Sections 408 and 468, I. P. C. and Section 7 of E. C. Act. After the framing of formal charges by the Court, the accused approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings. The Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition on 25-7-89. The accused approached the Apex Court by Special Leave Petition in October, 1989, there was no stay of further proceedings by the Apex Court. So the trial continued and when the matter came up for hearing before the Supreme Court, the prosecution had completed its evidence and the accused had been called upon to enter the defence. In these facts and circumstances, their Lordships considered certain other special circumstances of this case that the accused had been suspended and then dismissed from service and his Provident Fund and Gratuity had been forfeited and he had crossed age of superannuation. It was held that in calling upon the accused now to enter his defence after 16 years, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was bound to cause prejudice to him. Their Lordships said that but for these circumstances, their Lordships would have taken stricter view as indicated in the Constitution Bench Decision in Abdul Rahman Antule v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 Cri LJ 271 : 1992 AIR SCW 1872 (SC ). ( 4 ) IN the second case referred above, the incident had taken place on 20th July, 1976, charge-sheet was filed by the Police on 20th December, 1976 for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 307, 324. I. P. C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. However, it was only in 1980 that this was committed to Court of Sessions and during trial, by 1986 only two witnesses had been examined. Then the accused approached Patna High Court for quashing the trial on account of delay. I. P. C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. However, it was only in 1980 that this was committed to Court of Sessions and during trial, by 1986 only two witnesses had been examined. Then the accused approached Patna High Court for quashing the trial on account of delay. The petition was allowed by the High Court and the proceedings were quashed. The complainant approached the Apex Court under Special Leave Petition. Their Lordships observed that the appeal by special leave had not been filed by the State and the complainant had not been able to explain why the accused was committed in 1980 i. e. four years after the charge-sheet was filed by the police and why only two witnesses had been examined between 1980 and 1986. In fact in this case a batch of similar appeals had come up before the Apex Court. The High Court in all those cases quashed the proceedings because of inordinate delay. In another case, which was before the Supreme Court in this SLP, the accused was committed before the Sessions in July, 1974 but the charges were framed on 13th April, 1983 by the Sessions Court i. e. after 8 years. The default was found to be on account of prosecution. In another case, the occurrence took place on 9th April, 1973. Gun shot injuries were caused to the victim, F. I. R. had been lodged on the same day and the victim died. The charge-sheet was filed before the Magistrate on 25th May, 1974, and the accused was committed to the Sessions. However, no trial started for years and the accused was transferred to another Court on June 3 1980. Even then it took two more years to frame a charge-sheet by the Court and in 1982 evidence began and only four witnesses were recorded over a period of two years. Even thereafter, the prosecution obtained 90 adjournments for producing witnesses. The writ petition was filed by the accused in August 1986 for quashing the proceedings due to delay, it was allowed by the High Court and the same was upheld by the Supreme Court in its judgement. Even thereafter, the prosecution obtained 90 adjournments for producing witnesses. The writ petition was filed by the accused in August 1986 for quashing the proceedings due to delay, it was allowed by the High Court and the same was upheld by the Supreme Court in its judgement. In all those cases, the Apex Court found that these were cases of inordinate delay in trial caused by the prosecution and these were not cases of what might be called a 'systemic delays' caused by inherent weaknesses of the system, as had been explained in the case of A. R. Antule (supra ). In the first case cited above, trial under Section 409, I. P. C. was pending for almost 14 years, the Supreme Court quashed the trial holding that fair trial had become impossible due to delay. ( 5 ) I have narrated these facts of cases arising before the Apex Court in order to have an idea that it was in the facts and circumstances of each case that the Court tried to find out whether there had been inordinate delay in the trial resulting in prejudice to the accused. ( 6 ) NOW, I take up the number of circumstances appearing in the four cases arising before this Court in the present four petitions. 1. Crl. Rev. No. 18/95; The occurrence had taken place during 11-9-80 to 9-1-81. It is a case of misappropriation of public fund by public servants. FIR had been lodged on 21st February, 1984. The police filed charge-sheet on 30th July, 1987 under Section 407, I. P. C. The record of the case was received by the Special Court and forwarded, to try the case on 11th January, 1988 in the Court of S. D. J. M. Contai where the chargesheet has been filed. The accused did not appear in the Special Court till 17-11-88. He appeared on 17-11-88. From 11-1-88 to 17-11-88 the case continued to be adjourned for calling the accused before the Special Court. The period from 17-11-88 after appearance of the accused before the Special Court till 20-11-89 was spent in calling certain documents and articles from hand writing expert and supplying copies to the accused. Then the case was fixed on 21st December, 1989 for hearing on charge. The accused then continued to seek adjournment up to 6th June, 1990 i. e. four hearings, for argument an charge. Then the case was fixed on 21st December, 1989 for hearing on charge. The accused then continued to seek adjournment up to 6th June, 1990 i. e. four hearings, for argument an charge. It was only on 6th June, 1990 that his counsel argued on the point of charge, and formal charge-sheet was framed on the same date by the Special Court and the case was adjourned till 9th August, 1990 for prosecution evidence. The record shows (as per copies of the order-sheet filed), that after that date, on the first date, the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was adjourned till 12th February, 1991. Thereafter, it appears that the Presiding Officer was transferred and no substitute was appointed and the Court remained vacant. This position was continued up to 25th February, 1992 i. e. one year. Then the matter appeared before New Judge, Special Court who fixed it for evidence on 4th May, 1992 and witnesses were summoned. A prayer was moved perhaps by his counsel for seeking adjournment which was allowed on 25th June, 1992. However, on that date the witnesses did not appear and case was adjourned till 4th December, 1992 for further orders. The order sheet also shows by that tune requisite 'powers' had not been received by Presiding Officer. May be the Presiding Officer had been changed by that time but that factor was not clear except that power of the Court was awaited. On 4th December, 1992 the accused was again absent and the case was adjourned to 3rd March, 1993. On such date the accused was also absent and his counsel appeared for seeking adjournment. The matter was fixed for three hearings on 28th, 29th, 30th June, 1993 for evidence. However, on 28th June, 1993 again the Presiding Officer was on leave so that the case was adjourned till 19th, 20th, 21st August, 1993. Then the record about 19th to 21st August has not been placed before Court. There is an order sheet of 29th August 1993, which shows that the accused was absent and even for prosecution nobody was present so that the case was adjourned to 16th, 17th, 18th December, 1993. On 16th December, 1993, the accused had not appeared but no coercive action was taken against him by the substitute Presiding Officer. There is an order sheet of 29th August 1993, which shows that the accused was absent and even for prosecution nobody was present so that the case was adjourned to 16th, 17th, 18th December, 1993. On 16th December, 1993, the accused had not appeared but no coercive action was taken against him by the substitute Presiding Officer. Again the Presiding Officer was on leave, the case was fixed for prosecution evidence on 7th, 8th, 9th February, 1994 and four witnesses were ordered to be summoned. Next it appears that on 4th February, 1994, the learned Additional Sessions Judge took up this case for changing the dates from 7th February, to 9th February, on the ground that be had to attend Shradh Ceremony of his father-in-law. The parties and the witnesses were ordered to be informed. Accordingly, the trial of the case was adjourned till 7th, 8th, 9th March, 1994. On 7th March, 1994, witnesses were present and the accused was also present but the prosecution prayed for adjournment by a written application. The objection of the accused was heard but the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the application and the case was adjourned till 7th June, 1994 for recording evidence of prosecution. It was directed that the prosecution must get ready on the day for recording evidence. On 7th June, 1994 the Court was busy in other matters and so the case was fixed for the next day. On 18th June, 1994 two witnesses were examined i. e. P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 were examined. The case was adjourned to 2nd September, 1994. The present petition for quashing the proceeding because of delay, appears to have been moved on 5th January, 1995, the order sheets between September to December, 1994 have not been brought to my notice by the learned Advocates. It may be noticed that the four cases earlier REFERRED TO against the accused had been filed and were under trial in the same Court. I will take up only salient dates of hearing of those other three cases without going into the details of every date of hearing, as done in the first case. In Crl. Rev. No. 19, the F. I. R. was recorded on 15th February, 1983 under Section 409 and 120b, I. P. C. , the police submitted charge-sheet under Section 173, Cr. In Crl. Rev. No. 19, the F. I. R. was recorded on 15th February, 1983 under Section 409 and 120b, I. P. C. , the police submitted charge-sheet under Section 173, Cr. P. C. on 5th August, 1984 and the case was adjourned till 2-4-87 when Special Court Murshidabad was conferred with powers to try such cases. Earlier he was awaiting powers. The copies were supplied to the accused on 2-12-87. In between February, 1988 to 29th February, 1989 the prosecution had obtained at least 12 adjournments for making submission on charge for one reason or the other. Only on one hearing, case had to be adjourned because of the demise of some Id. Advocate. Then it was noticed that certain documents had not been received from hand writing expert and the case continued to he adjourned up to 4th May, 1990 for hearing on charge. Thus about 6 adjournments had to be given by the Court for those documents and supply of the copies to the accused. The matter ultimately came up on 6th June, 1990 for framing of the charge and then the charge was framed under Section 409, I. P. C. The case was fixed for evidence of prosecution on 19th August, 1990. It appears that on the date of hearing the accused was absent. That was on 20th September, 1990 on next date i. e. 11th December, 1990 witnesses were examined, the case was adjourned to 12th February, 1991 and on that date the Court was vacant and there was no Presiding Officer and this position of their being no Presiding Officer was continued till 24th February, 1992 i. e. a matter of one year, for which six adjournments were granted in expectation that a Presiding Officer would he coming and then the case was fixed for 4th May, 1992 for prosecution evidence. On that date the accused did not appear. On the next date i. e. 29-6-92, witnesses were examined and the case was adjourned to 4th September, on which day the Presiding Officer happened to be on leave and the case was adjourned to 3rd March, on which date the accused absented himself and the learned counsel sought adjournment and the case came up to 28th January. The dates of hearing were same or substantially the same as have been noticed in the case of Cr. Rev. No. 18 noted above. The dates of hearing were same or substantially the same as have been noticed in the case of Cr. Rev. No. 18 noted above. So the situation was the same, after the trial started. It should be noticed that on 5th February, 1988 which was the first day for consideration of the charge the accused's advocate has applied for adjournment for arguments on charge as they had to engage some Senior Counsel. These adjournments were between 2-3-88 to 7-2-89. Then it was noticed from the case diary that certain Alamats had not been received. So direction was given to call them. So this continued and then Handwriting Expert's report was received and the matter came up to 29-11-89 in five further hearings. Then on 21-12-89 and 13-2-89 accused applied for adjournment and on 3-4-90 and 4-5-90 accused were absent. Ultimately, on 6-6-90 charge was framed under Section 409, I. P. C. Thus between 21-12-89 to 6-6-90 the accused continued to seek adjournment. So this was the course of trial in this case or these were the reasons of adjournments. We can clearly say that one and a half year had been lost because the prosecution continued to seek adjournment for advancing arguments on question of charge and did not disclose that the alamats had not been received and then on their disclosure, alamats were called. But when everything was available, the accused continued to seek adjournment for six months. This one and a half year delay was caused by prosecution in the year 1988-89 and seven month, delay by accused during 1989-90. I have seen during which period the accused or his counsel sought adjournments at the stage of evidence recording and how the case continued to be pending for more than two years nearly, without there being any Court. Appointment of Courts or their transfer is controlled by High Court. So when a Court is vacant it is for the High Court to send officers in those Courts. If the officers are not available, not much can be done. It is inevitable weakness of system. Revision No. 20 and 21 being against the same accused and on similar connected allegations of defalcation of money, more or less similar course of procedure followed except for minor differences here and there. If the officers are not available, not much can be done. It is inevitable weakness of system. Revision No. 20 and 21 being against the same accused and on similar connected allegations of defalcation of money, more or less similar course of procedure followed except for minor differences here and there. In case No. 20 the date of FIR was 5-2-83 and report under Section 173 was filed by police on 9-10-86. Record was recalled by Special Court on 31-7-87. The case continued for framing of charge up to 4-5-90 for similar reasons as in earlier two cases. Ultimately, the charge was framed on 6-6-90. At the evidence stage also the case had to be adjourned because there were no Presiding Officers in the Court and on some days the accused were either absent or he sought adjournments. This happened on eighth hearing. On 8-6-94 two witnesses had come. The number of witnesses in this case are not known. It has not been disclosed to this Court, as to what is the list of witnesses as the lower Court record were not called and the accused had filed copies of the most order sheets. In case No. 21 also the relevant dates are similar. Date of FIR was 10-2-83; police report filed on 9-10-86, record received by Special Court on 20-10-87 and thereafter 11 adjournments had to be given for hearing on charge for reasons which are similar as in cases No. 18 and 19. Charge was framed on 6-6-90. These cases continued to be adjourned for evidence either because Court was not there, no officers being appointed, or Court was on leave or accused was seeking adjournment, his Counsel not being present or the accused being absent. On some days the witnesses were not present; but that too appeared to be because summons were not issued, as the previous dates orders were not clear, the accused being earlier absent. Thus up to 8th June, 1994 only 4 witnesses could be examined. The course of events was similar as cases Nos. 18 and 19. I need not go into the details over and over again. The question is whether this course of trial disclosed sufficient cause to hold unfairness in trial so as to take drastic action of quashing the trial as having contravened the provision of fair trial which is inherent in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 18 and 19. I need not go into the details over and over again. The question is whether this course of trial disclosed sufficient cause to hold unfairness in trial so as to take drastic action of quashing the trial as having contravened the provision of fair trial which is inherent in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was in the case of "abdur Rahman Antulay v. R. S. Nayank" cited at AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 Cri LJ 2717 : 1992 AIR SCW 1872, that a five-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India recognised that the right of speedy trial was inherent in Article 21 of the Constitution in so far as the trial 'in accordance with law' must means fair trial 'which further should mean' a trial without unreasonable delay'. Their Lordships said on the question of speedy trial that time limit for criminal proceedings cannot be drawn and that when there is delay in trial, quashing charges is not the only course open to the Court and proper directions can be given as the Court may deem fit. The apex Court laid down certain guidelines with regard to the speedy trial but refused to lay down time limit for trial of any case. Their Lordships have laid down 11 important propositions which are as follows :1. That a fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. 2. This right encompasses all the stages namely stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. 3. The important concerns underlying the right to speedy trial, from the point of view of the accused are : (A) period of remand and pre-conviction detention; (B) Anxiety and expenses to the accused and disturbance to his vocation resulting from prolonged trial; (C) possibility of impairment of ability of the accused to defend due to lapse of time. The witnesses may not be available. 4. Their Lordships recognised that accused, in many cases, are interested in delaying the trial. Their Lordships recognised that in a number of cases delay was a known defence tactic and that delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution as the witnesses become not available. The witnesses may not be available. 4. Their Lordships recognised that accused, in many cases, are interested in delaying the trial. Their Lordships recognised that in a number of cases delay was a known defence tactic and that delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution as the witnesses become not available. Their Lordships said that the test of unfairness would be the question as to who was responsible for delay and that proceedings taken by either party in good faith to indicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them cannot be treated as delaying tactic nor the time taken in pursuing such proceedings, be counted towards delay. 5. All the attending circumstances must be looked into including the nature of offences, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of Courts concerned and prevailing local condition etc. Their Lordships term these delays as "systematic delays. "6. These would not be counted towards unfairness of trial. ( 7 ) EACH and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. So test of prejudice is also important. ( 8 ) THE Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors and determine in each case if right to speedy trial has been denied. ( 9 ) IT is neither advisable nor practicable to fix time limit for trial of offences. The other principles laid down are either about conclusions from earlier noted factor or to what orders may be passed by Courts in case delay is noticed or other incidental aspects. So they need not be noticed in detail. The proceedings of trial in the present cases to be tested on the touchstone of above principles and not merely on the factual aspect that in certain cases on the given proceedings, the Supreme Court reached a particular conclusion of delay. In this case the initial investigation had taken about 3 years. Offence under Section 409 is punishable with imprisonment up to life. These are serious offences. There is always delay in investigation of economic offence like this. In fact, the defalcations came to light after long periods, in these cases. The FIRs were recorded when the defalcation came to light. It was after about more than two years of the defalcation period. Three years were spent in investigation, but the charge-Sheet was not barred by time. So individually, on that factor, accusation of delay cannot be laid down at the door-step of prosecution. The FIRs were recorded when the defalcation came to light. It was after about more than two years of the defalcation period. Three years were spent in investigation, but the charge-Sheet was not barred by time. So individually, on that factor, accusation of delay cannot be laid down at the door-step of prosecution. The accused were not in custody during this period. For how long he remained in custody has not been disclosed although that was a relevant fact. Presumably he was bailed out at an initial stage. At the charge stage, there is procedure of supplying copies and then the accused or his counsel did seek time and accused became absent on several important dates when hearing could be made. The next factor is that no Presiding Officer was present in the Court as none was provided and the earlier one had gone on transfer. So the Court was vacant for more than two years. That was a systemic delay. Similarly, when the Presiding Officer was on leave it is part of systemic delay. Prosecution cannot be held guilty for that. Even during actual trial after charge was framed, the accused or his counsel sought adjournments on a number of important dates when the witnesses came or the accused absented himself. Then the Court remained either vacant or on leave. Witnesses were recorded on some days. Of course, on some days prosecution also sought adjournment or witnesses were not present. But they should not be called many in number in comparison to what adjournments occurred due to other reasons noted above. The net result of my above discussion is that, if we test these proceedings on the touch-stone of principles laid down in Antulay's case AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 AIR SCW 1892 : 1992 Cri LJ 2717 (supra) and the fact and circumstances, it is not a case of delay caused by prosecution. These are cases of delay substantially due to system i. e. Presiding Officer not being there and accused seeking adjournment. Of course at charge stages delays in three cases was because the prosecution had been seeking adjournment for about one and a half year. The investigation stage cannot be said to be a part of delay in this case. I am unable to hold that in such cases the accused is not (sic) prejudiced by whatever delay had occurred for whatever reasons. The investigation stage cannot be said to be a part of delay in this case. I am unable to hold that in such cases the accused is not (sic) prejudiced by whatever delay had occurred for whatever reasons. In my view, therefore, considering all the factors as discussed above, none of these cases is fit enough to take action for quashing the proceedings. The revisions were filed as back as January, 1995. It shall be duty of the prosecution to have their witnesses searched and served so that they appear before the trial Court. Even at this stage I will refrain from fixing number of hearing for the trial as the number of witnesses has not been disclosed to this Court but I will direct that the learned trial Court shall refuse to grant adjournments to either party when witnesses are present and shall hear the cases, fix the cases for hearing so that a continuity of recording evidence is maintained. Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court. Order accordingly.