ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) SINCE all these applications involve identical prayer, they are disposed of by this common judgment which shall govern each one of them. The controversy in short is whether conviction can be suspended under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'code' ). The petitioners assert that it can be done, and in any event, according to them, same can be put in eclipse, while it is under challenge is a higher forum. According to the apposite parties, under Section 389 of the Code what is to be suspended is the sentence, or the order appealed against, and to release the appellant on bail if he is in confinement, and nothing beyond it. The controversy centers round the scope and ambit of Section 389. ( 2 ) SECTION 389 of the Code deals with "suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail", as the heading shows. Sub-Section (1) deals with the powers of the appellate court for reasons to be recorded in writing, to suspend execution of sentence or order appealed against, and if the convicted person is in confinement, to release him on bail, or on his own bond. Sub-Section (3) deals with a stage prior to filing of appeal before the appellate court. It provides that where filing of an appeal is intended and the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall - (I) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail,unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the appellate court under Sub-Section (1 ). During this period them sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. It is to be noted that the question of bail is dealt with in Chapter XXIII. The granting of bail which is REFERRED TO in that Chapter, which consists of Sections 436 of 450 both inclusive, is the granting of bail to accused persons. It is to be noted that the question of bail is dealt with in Chapter XXIII. The granting of bail which is REFERRED TO in that Chapter, which consists of Sections 436 of 450 both inclusive, is the granting of bail to accused persons. The only provision in the Code which refers to the grant of bail to a convicted person is contained in Section 389. It may be noted that Section 432 of the Code empowers the appropriate Government to suspend the execution of sentence and Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, the 'constitution') empower the President and Governors of States to suspend the execution of a sentence. In Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 389, the words "convicted person" are used. One essential condition for application of Sub-Section (3) is that the convicted accused must have been on bail at the time of conviction. If he was on bail and the offence for which he is convicted is also bailable, Clause (ii) will apply. If the offence is not bailable but the convicted person is sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding three years, then clause (i) will apply, and in either case the Court shall order that he be released on bail. The bail small be for a period which may enable the convicted person to file his appeal and obtain necessary orders under Sub-Section (1) from the appellate court. Sub-Section (3) has no application where the accused has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding three years. It will also have no application where the accused was in jail when the judgment was pronounced. Sub-Section (1) of Section 389 only provides for suspension of execution of sentence or order appealed against. Reason for such suspension is that the conviction or sentence or both is subject matter of challenge in any appeal, and it may not be proper for a convicted person to suffer sentence which is consequential to conviction, till a final decision is taken is the matter. But reasons have to be recorded in writing before the appellate court exercises that power on consideration of the question whether it would be desirable to suspend the sentence or the order appealed against, pending decision in the appeal, or the sentence or the order appealed against should continue to be operative. But reasons have to be recorded in writing before the appellate court exercises that power on consideration of the question whether it would be desirable to suspend the sentence or the order appealed against, pending decision in the appeal, or the sentence or the order appealed against should continue to be operative. When the execution of sentence is suspended, and the convicted person is in confinement, he may be released on bail on his own bond, or otherwise notwithstanding the suspension, he shall be deemed to be in confinement. Sub-Section (4) throws light on this aspect. It is provided that when the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released in terms of Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (3), shall be excluded is computing the term for which he is so sentenced, what the Sub-Section lays down is that the period of bail shall be excluded in computing the term, i. e. , the period will be left out in making the calculation. ( 3 ) CONVICTION and sentence are conceptually different. The word"convicted' or 'conviction' of a person accused is equivocal. In common parlance no doubt it is taken to mean the verdict at the time of trial; but in strict legal sense it is used to denote the judgment of the Court"per Tindal C. J. Surgese v. Bostofour, 13 LJMC 126. A conviction is complete as soon as the person charged has been found and has pleaded guilty, though it seems that the Court has a locus paenitentise before the conviction is actually draw up. To convict means to declare guilty after trial. In other words conviction is determination of guilt of a person accused of having committed an offence under the Indian Penal Code or any other law. In cases of conviction, a Magistrate has to pass a sentence according to law unless he takes recourse to Section 360 or other ansiogous provision. A sentence follows and does not proceeds a conviction. ( 4 ) "sentence" may bear the wider meaning of judgment or decision or the narrower sense of pronouncement of punishment according to the context, but the primary meaning is "punishment imposed". Sentences which can be awarded by various Courts are indicated in Section 28 and 29 of the Code. A sentence follows and does not proceeds a conviction. ( 4 ) "sentence" may bear the wider meaning of judgment or decision or the narrower sense of pronouncement of punishment according to the context, but the primary meaning is "punishment imposed". Sentences which can be awarded by various Courts are indicated in Section 28 and 29 of the Code. The Code first enumarates the courts by which different offences can be tried, and then proceeds to define the limits of sentences which they can pass. These limits show the maximum sentences which a Court can pass they have nothing to do with the maximum penalty provided for an offence. The question of sentence is always a difficult and complex question. Sentencing is always a matter of judicial discretion subject to any mandatory minimum prescribed by law. Where a fine is imposed on an accused, and it is not paid, Section 30 of the Code provides that he can be imprisoned for a further term in addition to the substance imprisonment awarded, if any. There is a limit to the power of Magistrates to award fines in terms of Section 29, but the powers of a Sessions Court or the High Court are unlimited. Section 63, IPC provides that where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive. Section 31 of the Code deals with sentence is cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. Section 354 of the Code provides that every judgment REFERRED TO in Section 353 shall inter alia specify the offence, if any, of which, and the Section of the IPC or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. Sub-Section (2) of Section 354 provides that when the conviction is under the IPC and it is doubtful under which of two Sections, or under which of two parts of the same Section, and under which Chapter of the IPC the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment is the alternative. The sentence in the case of a conviction is part of the judgment. If the judgment is one of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted. The sentence in the case of a conviction is part of the judgment. If the judgment is one of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted. The judgment shall contain : (i) the point for determinations (ii) the decision thereon; and (ii) reason for the decision. Section 354 (1) (c) clearly requires that the Court should apply its mind to the offence or offences committed by each of the accused and record its finding thereon, and further that it should specify the punishment which it proposes to impose upon the accused. This aspect was highlighted by me in Krishna Chandra Barik v. State of Orissa, 1994 (II) OLR 563. ( 5 ) CONVICTION continues to be operative unless it is set aside by the higher court. The word "execution" as appearing is Sub-Section (1) of Section 389 governs both sentence and order appealed against. The order of conviction is not executable, and therefore, the question of suspension thereof does not arise. The effect of order passed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 389 of the Code is not to affect conviction, and to get over the difficulties accountered on account of the conviction. The conviction is not obliterated by passing of an order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 389. ( 6 ) IT is pleaded by the petitioners that the expression "order appealed against" is wide enough to engulf conviction, and in other words "order appealed against" includes conviction. The plea though attractive is without any substance. As indicated above, the word "execution" relates to both sentence and the order appealed against. The expression "order appeal against" appearing in Section 389 (1), relates to appeals as set out in Section 454 of the Code, and does not encompass conviction. The word "suspend" means to postpone, defer, arrest, delay. Question of suspending "conviction" does not arise because it operates till set aside in either appeal or revision. ( 7 ) STRONG reliance was placed on certain observations made by Delhi High Court in Capt. Sazish Kumar Sharma v. Delhi Administration and others, 1991 Cri LJ 950, and in S. M. Malik and other v. State, 1990 Cri LJ 1919. In S. M. Malik's case (Supra) Delhi High Court observed that where the order appealed against is the order of conviction, the Court is entitled to suspend it under Section 389. Sazish Kumar Sharma v. Delhi Administration and others, 1991 Cri LJ 950, and in S. M. Malik and other v. State, 1990 Cri LJ 1919. In S. M. Malik's case (Supra) Delhi High Court observed that where the order appealed against is the order of conviction, the Court is entitled to suspend it under Section 389. Reference was made by the learned Judge to a decision of the apex Court in Ketti Denabandhu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 1335 to buttres the view. In the said case the apex Court was concerned with maintainability of an appeal where a person had already suffered the sentence. In that context it was observed that a person who has been convicted and sentenced, wants other civil consequences following his conviction not to visit him as also to wipe out the stigma that sticks to him, and therefore, files the appeal. Reference was also made to Workman, U. P. State Electricity Board v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. , (1966) 1 Lab LJ 736 (SC), where it was observed that after the appeal is admitted and bail is granted, there is no final judgment against the appellant. There is nothing in the above decisions which support the view that a conviction can also be suspended. ( 8 ) A decision is a determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and in the legal context, law related to the facts of a particular case. It is an authority for what is decided and set what consequentially or incidentally flows from the conclusion, Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute. "it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussion but the discussion in means to explain and not is define. Judges interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Observations of the Judges are not to be read as Euclid's Theorems, not as provisions of the statute ( 9 ) RELIANCE is also placed on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in V. Sundararamireddi v. State, 1990 Cri LJ 2741. In the said decision a Division Bench of the said High Court observed that the expression "order appealed against" is wide enough to include a conviction. In the said decision a Division Bench of the said High Court observed that the expression "order appealed against" is wide enough to include a conviction. In a later decision of the said High Court, the learned Single Judge observed that there is no provision in either the Code or under any Rules or Regulations under any other enactment for suspension of the conviction. The views of the Division Bench is V. Sundaramireddi's case (Supra) were analysed. It was noticed that though the Division Bench held that even if it is to be held that under Section 389 (1) of the Code a conviction cannot be suspended, yet the convicted person may invoke Section 482 of the Code. In my view Section 482 does not come into operation at all in such a case. Conviction is a conclusion, a determination of guilt. The question of keeping the same in abeyance or suspending it does not arise. Further, I am unable to agree with the view of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (sic) M. Srinivasalu Reddy v. State Inspector of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Nellore Range, Nellore, 1993 Cri LJ 358, that the expression "order appealed against" includes conviction, in view of analysis made above. ( 10 ) THE petitioners pleaded that in view of conviction, each of them may be effected in service. While exercising power under the Code, a Court is not empowered to look into this aspect. It is for the employer to take appropriate decision in such matters. ( 11 ) IN the ultimate analysis, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that a conviction cannot be suspended under Section 289 (1) or under any other provision of the Code. What would be the effect of a conviction so far as is relates to the employment of a convicted person is a matter for the employer, and the appellate court under the Code is not concerned with that aspect. The prayer is each case to keep the conviction under suspension is untenable, and is rejected. Petition dismissed.