Judgment :- The petitioner in this original petit ion challenges the validity of Ext. Pit) judgment passed by the fourth respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam in M.V.A.A.No. 492/95 and also the subsequent order passed by the said Tribunal, Ext. P12 dated 27-6-1995 passed on the application for review submitted by the petitioner herein seeking for a review of Ext. PIO judgment. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of the O,P. are as follows: The petitioner filed an application for grant of an inter-state route. The third respondent also has filed another application for same inter-state route. Both these applications along with the third respondent's application were considered by the Karnataka State Transport Authority and granted the same as per Ext. P1 resolution subject to counter signature by the Kerala State Transport Authority. The Kerala State Transport Authority rejected the request of the petitioner for a counter signature as per Ext. P3 order dated 3-8-1993. Therefore the petitioner lias filed Ext. P4 appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and the order passed by the Kerala State Transport Authority was set aside by the Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal and remanded the mailer again to the State Transport Authority, Kerala, the first respondent herein. 3. As per Ext. P5 order dated 21-2-1994, the State Transport Authority, Kerala decided to seek advise of the State Transport Authority, Karnataka in respect of the availability of any remaining permit in the light of Ext. P2 inter-State agreement entered into between The State of Karnataka and Kerala date A 26-6-1976. 4. The matter was again considered by the State Transport Authority, Kerala in the light of the opinion expressed by the State Transport Authority, Bangalore wherein they had held that the permit should be granted in accordance with the chronological order in which the grant was made. 5. The mailer was again considered by the first respondent, the State Transport Authority, Kerala and allowed the application submitted by the petitioner for counter signature of inter-State permit covered in Ext.P2 inter-State agreement as per Ext. P7 order dated 29-11-1994. By the said order, the first respondent refused the request made by the third respondent, the Karnataka State Transport Corporation for counter signature of the inter-State permit granted in their favour. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the third respondent, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore represented by its Managing Director had preferred Ext. P7 order dated 29-11-1994. By the said order, the first respondent refused the request made by the third respondent, the Karnataka State Transport Corporation for counter signature of the inter-State permit granted in their favour. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the third respondent, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore represented by its Managing Director had preferred Ext. P8 Memorandum of Appeal before the fourth respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Kerala on 25-3-1995 evidenced by Ext. P8 Memorandum of Appeal under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. In the said appeal, the petitioner herein was not originally made as a respondent. No revision also had been filed against the counter signature granted in favour of the petitioner under Ext. P7 before the fourth respondent by the third respondent or any other person aggrieved under S.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 8. Thereafter the petitioner filed Ext. P9 affidavit dated 29-3-1995 before the fourth respondent in Exf.P8 appeal filed by the third respondent and prayed for impleading himself as additional third respondent in that appeal, pending consideration before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In the said affidavit, Ext. P9, the petitioner has specifically staled before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the appeal preferred by I he third respondent is haired by limitation. It is also specifically stated that Ext. P7 impugned order appears to have been received by the applicant for the permit, namely the Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, bangalore/on whose behalf the appeal is preferred much before 25-2-1995. It is also averred in the affidavit that this must be in the last week of January, 1995. It is 'further averred in the affidavit filed by the petitioner dial the appellant in that appeal namely, the third respondent herein had not mentioned this crucial date in the appeal filed by them before the appellate tribunal on 25-3-1995. Therefore, the petitioner has submitted that the appeal preferred by the third respondent be dismissed as barred by limitation. He has also prayed for impleading himself as additional (bird respondent in the appeal. 9. The third respondent considered the appeal as well as the application for impleadment and passed Ext. P10 judgment dated 31-5-1995 wherein the application submitted by the petitioner for impleadment is allowed. He has also prayed for impleading himself as additional (bird respondent in the appeal. 9. The third respondent considered the appeal as well as the application for impleadment and passed Ext. P10 judgment dated 31-5-1995 wherein the application submitted by the petitioner for impleadment is allowed. But in respect of the question of limitation raised by the petitioner, the fourth respondent found that there is nothing in the records produced by the respondents I and 2 to show as to whom the impugned order is in fact communicated to the appellant. Therefore the contention that the appeal is barred by limitation was found to be unsustainable. 10. But the fourth respondent has found that Ext. P7 order rejecting the application submitted by the third respondent is not sustainable and therefore set aside that order rejecting the application submitted by the third respondent for counter-signature and remanded the case back to the State Transport Authority, the first respondent for fresh consideration. 11. But in the said judgment, Ext. P10, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal found that the question as to whom among the petitioner and the third respondent has to he preferred for grant of counter-signature is a matter which requires serious consideration at the hands of the State Transport Authority, Kerala, the first respondent, even though against the grant of the application submitted by the petitioner for counter-signature of the permit, the third respondent did not file any revision before the Appellate Tribunal under S.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 12. Thereafter she petitioner has filed Ext. P11 affidavit and petition for review of Ext. P10 judgment. In Ext. P11 the petitioner has again specifically stated that the appellant namely, the third respondent had not mentioned the crucial date on which the order under appeal had been received by them. It is also slated in the affidavit filed in support of the review petition that the order under appeal was received in Bangalore on 28-1-1995 and there is a seal of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore affixed on the order under appeal with endorsement No. C.O.R.2298 dated 28-1-1995. The petitioner therefore submitted that the appeal filed by the third respondent before the tribunal on 25-3-1995 is therefore clearly barred by limitation and this is an error apparent on the face of record which requires a review of Ext. PIO judgment passed by the Tribunal. 13. The petitioner therefore submitted that the appeal filed by the third respondent before the tribunal on 25-3-1995 is therefore clearly barred by limitation and this is an error apparent on the face of record which requires a review of Ext. PIO judgment passed by the Tribunal. 13. The tribunal thereafter considered the said review petition and passed Ext. P12 order dated 27-6-1995 rejecting the application for review. The petitioner therefore challenges the validity of Ext. P10 judgment as well as Ext. P12 order passed by the fourth respondent, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Kerala as illegal, unjust and passed without jurisdiction. 14. I heard the" learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Government Pleader for R1, R2 and R4 and also counsel for R3. 15. 'The only question to be decided is whether the appeal, Ext. P8 filed by the third respondent before the fourth respondent, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Kerala on 25-3-1995 is filed within the time prescribed under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act. I ft he appeal is filed not within 30 days from the date of communication of the order impugned, the order passed by the tribunal on such appeal is clearly without jurisdiction since the appeal itself is barred by limitation. 16. Ext. P8 appeal is admittedly filed by the third respondent before the tribunal on 25-3-1995. In Ext. P8, the appellant namely, the third respondent has clearly slated that the order impugned in the said appeal namely Ext. P7 was received by the appellant. On 25-2-1995 The appellant is the K.S.R.T.C., Bangalore represented by its Managing Director who was the applicant for the permit also, even though the appeal is preferred by the Divisional Controller, K.S.R.T.C., Mangalore Division on behalf of the Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. Bangalore. 17. If, as a matter of fact, the appellant received the impugned order on 25-2-1995 as staled in the Memorandum of Appeal, the appeal preferred on 25-3-1995 is perfectly well within the time prescribed under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, namely thirty days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against. 18. The statement made by the petitioner in Ext. P9 affidavit that the appeal is barred by limitation since the order appealed against namely Ext. 18. The statement made by the petitioner in Ext. P9 affidavit that the appeal is barred by limitation since the order appealed against namely Ext. P7 was received by the appellant who is the applicant for the permit namely the Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C'., at Bangalore in The last week of January, 1995, was not denied by the (bird respondent by way of any counter affidavit or statement before the State Transport Tribunal. In Ext. P11 affidavit also the petitioner had specifically staled that Ext. P7 order was received by K.S.R.T.C„ Bangalore on 28-1-1995 and The same was endorsed on the order appealed against with endorsement No.C.O.R.2298 dated 28-1-1995. for this affidavit also, The third respondent has not filed any counter affidavit or statement denying the above statement. 19. In this original petition also the petitioner has specifically averred that Ext. P7 order was received by The appellant namely, the third respondent at Bangalore on 28-1-1995 and this was specifically noted on the order impugned under endorsement No. C.O.R.2298 dated 2.8-1-1995, This statement made by the petitioner had not been denial at all by the third respondent before this Court also. In The light of the above un controverted statement made by the petitioner that the order under appeal was received by the appellant at Bangalore on 28-1-1995, the appeal filed on 25-3-1995 is clearly barred by limitation. 20. The relevant statutory provision for filing the appeal is S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under S.89(i) of The Act, The aggrieved person may, within the prescribed time limit and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The relevant rule is R.140(i) of The Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules which stipulates that an appeal under S.89 of the Act shall be filed within thirty days of receipt of the order appealed against. Therefore, The crucial question that has to be considered in the case is the date on which Ext. P7 order was received by the appellant. 21. As slated earlier, the applicant as well as the appellant is the K.S.R.T.C., Bangalore represented by its Managing Director. The appellant had received the said order on 28-1-1995. This fact the petitioner had sworn to in more than three affidavits, two before the S.T.A.T. and one before this Court and the same had not been denied at all by third respondent before any authority. The appellant had received the said order on 28-1-1995. This fact the petitioner had sworn to in more than three affidavits, two before the S.T.A.T. and one before this Court and the same had not been denied at all by third respondent before any authority. In the light of the above positive statements in the affidavit filed by the petitioner, it was for-the appellant namely the 3rd respondent to satisfy The tribunal and this Court that they filed the appeal well within thirty days time prescribed under the rules. 22. As staled earlier, if is The positive statement of the appellant in the Memorandum of Appeal, Ext. P8, that the impugnt"1 order was received by the appellant on 25-2-1995 whereas the endorsement on the impugned order communicated to the appellant shows that it was received by The appellant at Bangalore on 28-1-1995 and not on 25-2-1995 as wrongly slated by the appellant in Ext. P8 Memorandum of Appeal. Therefore, in the light of the above un controverted facts, it has to be held that the appellant had received the order impugned on 28-1-1995 and therefore the appeal filed on 25-3-1995 is clearly barred by limitation prescribed under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with S.141 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules. Therefore the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain Ext. P8 appeal and pass Ext. P10 judgment on such highly belated appeal. 23. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to the notice of this Court the provision contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 namely S.64 of the 1939 Act. Under 1939 Act also, an appeal shall be filed by an aggrieved person before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal within the lime prescribed and in the prescribed manner. Under R.170 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961, an appeal under S.64 of the 1939 Act has to be preferred within thirty days of the receipt of the order appealed against. Thus both under the 1939 M;V. Act and the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961 and under the M. V. Act, 1988 read with Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, a period of thirty days from the receipt of the order appealed against is prescribed. There is no provision to condone the delay prescribed under 1939 or 19X8 M.V. Act. Thus both under the 1939 M;V. Act and the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961 and under the M. V. Act, 1988 read with Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, a period of thirty days from the receipt of the order appealed against is prescribed. There is no provision to condone the delay prescribed under 1939 or 19X8 M.V. Act. In the absence of any such provision, there is absolutely no jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal, to condone any delay in filing the appeal. Admittedly, the appellant namely the third respondent 'has not died any application to condone the delay also. Under such circumstances,1 see no justification for the (tribunal to entertain Ext. P8 appeal on merits and pass Ext. P10 judgment. Ext. P10 judgment is passed without jurisdiction and the same is ab initio void since the appeal itself was filed out of time and the same is barred by limitation. 24. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to my notice" the relevant provision regarding the filing of revision under the 1988 Act namely S.90 of the M.V. Act, 1988. As per the said provision, a revision is maintainable before the tribunal within thirty days from the date of the order. But there is a proviso added to S.90 wherein it is staled that the tribunal may entertain the application for revision after expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The above proviso was introduced for the first time in 19X8 act whereas in the 1939 M.V. Act, there is no Much provision enabling The tribunal even to entertain a revision filed alter the lime prescribed. Thus it is clear that the Parliament did not confer any jurisdiction on the tribunal to entertain an appeal filed after thirty days prescribed under the Rules. 25. There was absolutely no justification for the appellate tribunal to entertain Ext. P8 appeal and pass Ext. P10 judgment Thereon. As staled earlier, in Ext. P10 judgment, the tribunal had directed to consider the relative merits and demerits of the appellant, namely the third respondent and that of the petitioner herein who is the additional third respondent in the matter of consideration of the application for counter-signature of the permit granted in favour of the petitioner as well as The third respondent. P10 judgment, the tribunal had directed to consider the relative merits and demerits of the appellant, namely the third respondent and that of the petitioner herein who is the additional third respondent in the matter of consideration of the application for counter-signature of the permit granted in favour of the petitioner as well as The third respondent. Such a direction is legal and justified only in case the appeal is preferred within the time-prescribed by law. Since the appeal itself is filed alter the lime prescribed by law, it has to be held that Ext. P10 judgment and the directions contained therein are clearly illegal and liable to be set aside. Ext. PIO judgment is therefore hereby set aside. 26. There is also no justification for the tribunal for not allowing the applications submitted by the petitioner for review of Ext. P10 judgment. Ext. P12 is the order passed by The tribunal on the application for review submitted by The petitioner. In para.3 of Ext. P 12, the tribunal found that there is some seal on the copy of the impugned order produced along with the appeal bearing the date 28-1-1995 and it was clear that the copy of the order was received by Bangalore office on 28-1-1995. But according to the tribunal, it is not an error apparent on the face of the record and this has not caused any miscarriage of justice in the case. 27. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that even before disposing of the appeal and the appeal was pending consideration before the tribunal, the petitioner preferred Ext. P9 affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned order was received by the appellant in January, 1995 itself and therefore the appeal preferred on 25-3-1995 is clearly barred by limitation. The tribunal rejected that plea on the ground that there was nothing on record produced by respondents I and 2 to show as to when the impugned order is in fact communicated to The appellant. In fact, on record, there were entries to prove, that the order was communicated and received by the appellant, at Bangalore on 28-1-1995. The said finding arrived at by the tribunal is therefore absolutely perverse and it has caused miscarriage of justice. Even after filing an application for review of Ext. In fact, on record, there were entries to prove, that the order was communicated and received by the appellant, at Bangalore on 28-1-1995. The said finding arrived at by the tribunal is therefore absolutely perverse and it has caused miscarriage of justice. Even after filing an application for review of Ext. P10 judgment, and even after satisfying that the order appealed against was received by the appellant on 28-1-1995, the tribunal was not prepared to accept the serious mistake committed by him in entertaining the appeal or rectify the error committed by him. The error is apparent on the face of record and it has caused miscarriage of justice. The order impugned and produced by the appellant namely the third respondent before the tribunal prima facie establishes that the same was received by-the appellant at Bangalore on 28-i-1995. After having found that the order impugned was received on 28-1-1995, I see no justification for the tribunal in passing Ext. P12 order. The reasoning of the tribunal is clearly unsustainable and the same is perverse. The tribunal has not applied its mind properly while passing Ext. P10 judgment and Ext. P12 order. Ext. P 10 is clearly illegal and passed without jurisdiction. Ext. P12 order is passed without considering the relevant materials and grounds submitted by the petitioner. I, therefore set aside both Exts. P 10 and P12. Ext. P8 appeal filed by the third respondent on 25-3-1995 is declared as one filed out of time as the same is barred by limitation. The third respondent Is therefore not entitled to get any relief on the basis of Ext. P8 appeal. The original petition is therefore allowed. Exts. P10 judgment and P12 order arc therefore set aside. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.