Judgment : This petition is under Sec. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the investigation by the respondent in R.C.No. 36/A/91, dated 312. 1991. .2. The petitioner is arrayed as the 9th accused in the First Information Report registered in R.C.No.36/A/ 91 mentioned above. The petitioner has stated that he is a manufacturer and also dealer in fertilizers under the name and style of M/s. Lakshmi Fertilizers in Salem District, that the petitioner is a selling agent of Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers which is a manufacturer of fertilizers in Bombay having its sales branches through out India, that the petitioner has given bank guarantee to the extent of Rs. 3 lakhs to the said Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers as security for the supply of their materials, that in the transaction between the said Rashtriya Chemicals and him, there was running account, that at regular intervals, he used to reconcile the discrepancies in the accounts, that he was able to push up the sales of the products of the Rashtriya Chemicals to several crores of rupees per annum, that sometimes the then Marketing Manager’s office at Madras delayed proposely to give credit for the amount payable by the manufacturer to the dealer like him on account of which there was delay in clearing the payment by the dealers, that the Deputy General Manager, One Mr. S.V. Bhaid, of the manufacturing unit of Rashtriya Chemicals lodged a private complaint on 9. S.V. Bhaid, of the manufacturing unit of Rashtriya Chemicals lodged a private complaint on 9. 1993 before the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, against the previous Marketing Manager P.V. Jagannathan, that the complaint which was forwarded to the Central Crime Branch Egmore, Madras was investigated under Sec. 156(1), Code of Criminal Procedure and they referred the case a civil nature, but the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) has suo motu registered the case against him and thirteen others for the alleged offences under Sec. 120-B read with Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code and 13(1)(c) and (e) read with Sec. 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act alleging that he and other dealers were given supply of fertilizers by the then Marketing Manager beyond the value of the bank guarantee receiving illegal gratifications, that this allegation is false, that it is a practice of the manufacturer to supply the fertilizers to the dealers beyond the bank guarantee in order to clear the deteriorating stock, that even though the minutes of the Marketing Division shows that Tamil Nadu Marketing Federation owes a sum of Rs.49.35 lakhs to Rashtriya Chemicals no action had been taken against them but the First Information Report is registered against him and some dealers when especially no individual has lodged any complaint to the respondent, that the respondent is frequently directing him to appear before them and produce documents, abusing the process of the court, and therefore the First Information Report mentioned above, registered against him has to be quashed. 3. The respondent has filed counter stating that the first accused P.V. Jagannathan, who was the Marketing Manager of Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers (hereinafter to be referred to as R.C.F.). misusing his position for supplying fertilizers to the dealers beyond the bank guarantee value furnished by them receiving illegal gratification from them, that this illegal gratification was paid to the partnership firm by name Anuradha Enterprises of which one Anuradha, wife of Jagannathan, and Vedhantham, brother of Jagannathan, were partners and the Marketing Officer had abused his official position in connivance with the dealers, who are arrayed as accused Nos.5 to 15 in the First Information Report that as the information was received by the respondent, the case was registered against them and the investigation is not mala fide or motivated. It is also stated that there is huge outstandings to the tune of Rs.2.17 crores due from 11 dealers from 1993 onwards and a sum of Rs.42,54,744 is also due from the petitioner, that during the course of investigation, the petitioner was directed to produce the account books by issue of notice under Sec. 91, Code of Criminal Procedure, but the petitioner without producing the records, has filed the petition to stall the investigation, that as the allegations show the prima facie case against the petitioners, the investigation has to be proceeded according to law and the petition has to be dismissed. .4. In the First Information Report dated 312. 1991 it is stated that the first accused P.V. Jagannathan was the Marketing Manager of R.C.F., a Government of India Fertilizer Manufacturing Unit at Maharashtra and the accused Nos.5 to 15 are the dealers in fertilizers. It is also mentioned that the accused No.2 Anuradha is the wife of the first accused and Vedhantham, accused No.3, is his brother. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners of the 4th accused Nos.2 and 3 are the partners of the 4th accused M/s. Anuradha Enterprises, it is further alleged in the First Information Report that the first accused Marketing Manager was expected to give supply of fertilizers to the dealers after obtaining the bank guarantee from them for the value of the fertilizers to be supplied to them, that the Marketing Manager was not empowered to supply fertilizers beyond the value of the bank guarantee furnished by them but the accused 5 to 15 and some other dealers, in connivance with the Marketing Manager/ first accused, were able to get supply of fertilizers far beyond value of the bank guarantee furnished by them and this was done by first accused after collecting huge amount from the dealers accused 5 to 15 as illegal gratification for the favour shown by him to them by supplying fertilizers far beyond the value of the bank guarantee. It is also stated that the dealers were remitting the illegal gratification in the bank account of the fourth accused of which the family members of the 1st accused are the partners and the first accused was able to collect the amount of about Rs.75 lakhs to Rs. It is also stated that the dealers were remitting the illegal gratification in the bank account of the fourth accused of which the family members of the 1st accused are the partners and the first accused was able to collect the amount of about Rs.75 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore from the dealers in this mode and therefore the case was registered for the offences under Sec. 120-B read with Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code and Sec. 13(1) (c) and (d) read with Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai attacks the proceedings under the First Information Report on two grounds namely that the First Information Report has not been registered in the proper manner as contemplated under Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure and no details have been furnished against the petitioner, who is 9th accused in the First Information Report to make out a prima facie case for the alleged offences against him and therefore the First Information Report against the petitioner is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed. 6. The learned Senior Counsel referring to Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure argues that the Information relating to the Commission of the cognizable offence, if given orally, shall be reduced to writing by the Officer in charge of the police station or if the information was in writing, the same shall be signed by the person giving it and its substance thereof shall be entered in the book to be kept by the officer in charge of the police station, that the copy of the information recorded shall be given to the accused and only by this method, the First Information Report can be registered by the police, but in the first Information Report registered by the respondent, no one has given any complaint either orally or in writing against this petitioner and others, but the respondent has simply recorded suo motu that reliable information had been received for the malpractices mentioned therein and this type of registering the complaint suo motu by the respondent police is contrary to law and therefore the First Information report is not sustainable against the petitioner. The learned senior counsel refers to the observation of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527. The learned senior counsel refers to the observation of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527. The Supreme Court in that case has observed as follows: “32. It is therefore manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an Officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Sec. l54(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, the said police officer has no other option except enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form that is to say, to register the case on the basis of such information.” According to the learned senior counsel the above expression of the Supreme Court makes it clear that for a cognizable offence, the information to the officer in charge of a police station must satisfy the requirements of Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure which requires a complaint either orally or in writing signed by the informant and as no such complaint has been received in this case from anyone, the First Information Report cannot be registered suo motu by the respondent police. On a reading of Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be easily understood that when information is given either orally or in writing to an officer-in-charge of a police station, the formalities mentioned therein have to be complied with. The sentence is so clear that every information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station’ [Italics supplied]. Therefore, it is futile to argue that only by complying with Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, the police is entitled to take up the investigation of a case. Sec. 157, Code of Criminal Procedure is the opening door for investigation by the Police and it reads, “If from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which he is empowered under Sec. 156, Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offences upon a police report”. This section enumerates the conditions under which a police officer is entitled to take up an investigation. This section enumerates the conditions under which a police officer is entitled to take up an investigation. The two conditions referred in this section are either from information received or otherwise indicating that the information may be as mentioned under >Sec. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, or otherwise which refers to by any other mode. This aspect has been considered elaborately in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527 wherein the Apex Court observes: “41 ....However, the said statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence is subject to the fulfilment of a prerequisite conditions, contemplated in Sec. 157(1). The condition is that the officer-in-charge of a police station before proceeding to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, should have reason to suspect, the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Sec. 156 to investigate. Sec. 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XX of 1861) required the Police Officer on receipt of a complaint or information constituting any of the offences specified in column 3 of the Schedule annexed to that Act should proceed with the investigation, but this Code did not require the condition of entertaining the reason to suspect the commission of an offence before commencing the investigation.” Again paragraph 51, it is observed, “Resultantly, the condition precedent to the commencement of the investigation under Sec. 157(1) of the Code is the existence of the reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence which has to be, prime facie, disclosed by the allegation made in the first information laid before the Police Officer under under Sec. 154(1). Ultimately, in paragraph 54, the Apex Court concludes the scope of Sec. 157, Code of Criminal Procedure as follows: "From the above discussion, it is pellucid that the commencement of investigation by a police officer should have reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence as required by Sec. 157(1) and secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an investigation even before he starts an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to Sec. 157(1) of the Code." The Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore, (1964) 1 Crl.L.J. 140, gives the following expression. "Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a Police Officer, the receipt of information is not a condition recedent for investigation. Sec. 157 prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either on information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on information or otherwise." In Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1973 Crl.L.J. 185 also the same view is repeated by the Apex Court in the following words: "As observed by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18, the receipt and recording information report by the police is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. Nor does this stature provide that such information report can only be made by an eyewitness. The First Information Report under Sec. 154 is not even considered a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant’s evidence in court." In view of the above pronouncements of the Apex Court, it cannot be argued that unless a complaint either orally or in writing signed by the informant was given, the First Information Report registered by the respondent/police has no sanctity of law. 7. The First Information Report registered in this case reads that reliable information has been received to the effect that P.V. Jagannathan, first accused, while serving as Marketing Manager, with the connivance of the fertilizers dealers viz., accused 5 to 15, had received illegal gratification from the dealers for supplying the fertilizers beyond the value of the bank guarantee furnished by them. It cannot be said that the contents of this information will not make out an offence because the first accused being public servant could not do favours to the fertilizer dealers for his personal gains, receiving, illegal gratification. When such information relating to a cognizable offence is received, certainly the police is entitled to take up the investigation. It cannot be said that the contents of this information will not make out an offence because the first accused being public servant could not do favours to the fertilizer dealers for his personal gains, receiving, illegal gratification. When such information relating to a cognizable offence is received, certainly the police is entitled to take up the investigation. The Supreme Court has observed in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527 as follows: "But this Code did not require the condition of entertaining the reason to suspect the commission of offence before commencing the investigation." There was no reason for the police to suspect the truth of this information which would be ascertained only by investigation and therefore it was a duty cast upon the police officer in charge of the Police Station to proceed with the investigation relating to the information he received. 8. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai advanced his argument stating that the information which the police has given in the First Information Report is very vague and it does not satisfy anything against the petitioner, who is arrayed as 9th accused therein, and no details are given about any overt act in connection with this petitioner and the vague statement that the dealers had paid illegal gratification to the first accused is not sufficient the prima facie make out a cognizable offence for investigation against the petitioner. The learned senior counsel relied upon the decisions in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Srivastava, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 1 and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 949 in support his argument. In the first case, the Supreme Court has held that when the allegations in the First Information Report are found to be vague and it appeared from the allegations that the accused had no intention to make any wrongful gain or wrongful loss to the bank guarantee, there was no prima facie case for cognizable offence and therefore, the proceedings against the accused was not sustainable. In the latter case cited by the learned senior counsel for the first time, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings even in the investigation stage holding that the materials on record did not disclose any offence for investigation. In the latter case cited by the learned senior counsel for the first time, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings even in the investigation stage holding that the materials on record did not disclose any offence for investigation. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court observing that "if the court interfered with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of justice suffers", however after scanning the entire circumstances in that case, it has found that no offence was disclosed in that case and therefore it observed that if the materials did not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted and on a consideration of the materials in that particular case when it is specified that no offence was disclosed, it would be the duty of the court to stop the investigation to prevent any kind of uncalled for an unnecessary harassment to an individual. But on a cursory look at the First Information Report relating to this case, it cannot be said that neither the information given therein will constitute an offence nor the information therein is vague leading to the doubt as to the identify of the accused person. The information given therein specified the individual’s namely first accused the Marketing Manager and the dealers accused 5 to 15. This information further details the limit of bank guarantee by these dealers, the limit upto which the fertilizer was to be supplied to them. The petitioner herein is the proprietor of Lakshmi Fertilizers, Shevapet, Salem, and he had furnished the bank guarantee in October, 1989 to the extent of Rs.3 lakhs. Page 3 of the First Information Report reads that though he had given the bank guarantee only Rs.3 lakhs, he was supplied with fertilizers for Rs.38 lakhs, far exceeding bank guarantee value. The First Information Report further reads that the Marketing Manager, first accused, was expected to give supply of fertilizers only upto the limit of the bank guarantee value, however, the dealers viz., accused 5 to 15 and some others, in connivance with first accused, was able to get supplies far beyond the value of the bank guarantee because of the illegal gratification they paid to the first accused. The bank guarantee limit given by the petitioner and the value of the fertilizer supplied to him are specifically mentioned in the First Information Report. Further, the mode of payment of the illegal gratification also is mentioned in the First Information Report and that is accused 2 and 3, being the brother and wife of the first accused, were the partners of fourth accused, a partnership concern, which is having bank account in Union Bank of India, Nugambakkam and it is alleged that the dealers were remitting the illegal gratification to the account of the abovesaid fourth accused partnership firm. When so much details are given specifying the names of the persons, the mode of operation etc., the argument of the learned senior counsel that these informations are vague as against the petitioner, holds no water. It is true that the liberty of the citizen is guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. But under the pretext of calling the First Information Report as an information without details, the petitioner cannot block the investigation itself. In Arumugham Kolathiriyar v. Ponnalagu Pandrar, 1957 M.W.N. (Crl.) 125, this Court has held that even if the name of one of the accused or names of some of the witnesses are not mentioned in the First Information Report, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the prosecution story as the First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia and it is not the beginning and ending to every case but it is only a complaint to State the affairs of law and order. It is further observed in this decision that only at the investigation stage all the details can be gathered and for the reason the First Information Report does not show all the details, it is not a ground to reject the prosecution case. The above view is expressed after the trial of the case itself. But in this case, the investigation alone has started on the information. Therefore, only from the available information, the police could gather all the details and ascertain the truth. Hence, it cannot be contended that the allegations are vague and therefore there should not be an investigation by the police. 9. The learned senior counsel Mr. But in this case, the investigation alone has started on the information. Therefore, only from the available information, the police could gather all the details and ascertain the truth. Hence, it cannot be contended that the allegations are vague and therefore there should not be an investigation by the police. 9. The learned senior counsel Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai placed another argument that the transaction between the petitioner, who is a dealer in fertilizers, and R.C.F. is a business transaction in which the products of R.C.F. were pushed into the market through the petitioner dealer and to avoid the accumulation of the stocks, the manufacturer supplied the product to the dealer over and above the quantity agreed to be supplied on the basis of the bank guarantee, but that will not convert into a criminal liability upon the dealer, when especially the dealer is always prepared to pay the value of the goods supplied to him and as it is purely a civil liability, the prosecution of the petitioner is only to harass him and, the prosecution shall not be allowed. The learned counsel cited the decision in Hari Prasad v. Bishun Kumar, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 301 in which case, the complainant gave large amounts in full faith on the accused to start a business but the accused persons started the business in their own names. When the accused persons were prosecuted for the offence under Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court has held that starting the business with the funds of the complainant but in the names of the accused, would amount only to breach of contract and therefore it was only a civil dispute. The learned senior counsel would argue that similarly in this case also, the first accused had supplied the fertilizer in excess to the value of the bank guarantee on the hope that the petitioner would re-pay the value of the fertilizer and he is always prepared to pay back the entire value of the supply and there is no necessity for criminal prosecution. If there is no allegation that the dealers had paid illegal gratification to the first accused for getting the excess quantity of fertilizer over and above the bank guarantee, certainly it would be only a civil dispute in case the value was not paid by the dealers. If there is no allegation that the dealers had paid illegal gratification to the first accused for getting the excess quantity of fertilizer over and above the bank guarantee, certainly it would be only a civil dispute in case the value was not paid by the dealers. But when such a serious allegation is found in the First Information Report that the dealers were remitting the illegal gratification in the account of the fourth accused for the benefit of the first accused, it cannot be treated as a mere civil liability. Therefore, this argument also falls to the ground. 10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor Mr. Rajamanickam argued that when the police have received information about the shady transaction between first accused and the dealers mentioned in the First Information Report, they took up the investigation and asked the petitioner to produce his account books to find out whether any fund of the petitioner was channalised to the account of the fourth accused, the petitioner was requesting time to produce the account books under the pretext that they had been sent to his auditor and in the meanwhile, he has filed this petition for quashing the proceeding and has also obtained stay of the investigation itself and therefore, the whole investigation is blocked now. In paragraph 9 of the petition, the petitioner has admitted that he was directed by the respondent police to produce the account books and also appeared before the police, which, according to him, is an abuse of process of the court. When it is brought to the notice of the respondent/ police that the first accused is misusing his position as the Marketing Manager with the connivance of the dealers and was collecting illegal gratification of doing favours to them, the police shall not remain idle keeping its eyes closed and it is their duty to investigate the matter. As mentioned above, there is no reason to suspect the truth of the allegation at this stage and the whole thing could be made clear only after the investigation. Therefore, it will not be proper to interfere at the stage of investigation itself when especially the First Information Report makes out a prima facie case against this petitioner also. This Court, Privy Council and Supreme Court have held in a series of decisions the undesirability in interfering with the investigation of the police. Therefore, it will not be proper to interfere at the stage of investigation itself when especially the First Information Report makes out a prima facie case against this petitioner also. This Court, Privy Council and Supreme Court have held in a series of decisions the undesirability in interfering with the investigation of the police. In Emperior v. Nazeer Ahmed, 1945 M.W.N. (Crl.) 9, the Privy Council has held that the court’s function begins when a charge is preferred before it and not until then and the court can legitimately intervenue only on prosecution but not in the stage of investigation. In State of West Bengal v.Basak, 1962 M.W.N. (Crl.) 163, also the Supreme Court has held that under Secs. 154 and 156 of Chapter 14, Code of Criminal Procedure, the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the Police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Sec. 439 or under the inherent power of the court under Sec. 561(A), Code of Criminal Procedure. Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 117 also the ratio laid by the Supreme Court is that as the investigation under the Code takes in several aspects and stages ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the Police as to whether on the material gathered and collected, a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial and the submission of either a charge-sheet or a final report is dependant on the nature of the opinion so found the formation of the said opinion by the police is the final step in the investigation and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority. This observation of the Supreme Court discourages the practice of interfering with the investigation. This aspect is further clarified well in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527. This observation of the Supreme Court discourages the practice of interfering with the investigation. This aspect is further clarified well in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527. In paragraph 62, their Lordships observe as follows: "The sum and substance of the above deliberation results to a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences in legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorized to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our constitution. Needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to unfathamable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will tantamount to recognition of "Divine Power" which no authority on earth can enjoy." Further in paragraph 108, after analysing the entire law on the subject, the Supreme Court has given the guidelines in which matters the police could not exercise the power of investigation. The following are those guidelines. "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. The following are those guidelines. "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R., or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is a express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with a mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." The First Information Report in this case does not fall within the above parameter of the Supreme Court. 11. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. B.R. Bajaj, (1994) 1 J.T. 103 , the Apex Court would observe, "8.....These are some of the important allegations in the F.I.R. which make out a cognizable offence at that stage and the registration of an F.I.R. is only the beginning of the investigation. 11. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. B.R. Bajaj, (1994) 1 J.T. 103 , the Apex Court would observe, "8.....These are some of the important allegations in the F.I.R. which make out a cognizable offence at that stage and the registration of an F.I.R. is only the beginning of the investigation. That being the case, High Court has grossly erred in quashing the F.I.R. itself when several aspects of the allegations in the F.I.R. had still to be investigated.... ....Suffice it to say that the learned Judge has treated the whole matter as though it was an appeal against the order of conviction and that should never be the approach in exercising the inherent power under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C. particularly at the stage of F.I.R. when the same discloses commission of an cognizable offence which had still to be investigated thoroughly by police. We do not think that in this case, we should make a further detailed consideration about the contents of the F.I.R. we are satisfied that this is not at all a fit case for quashing the F.I.R. under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C." In view of these dictums, laid down by the Supreme Court, it will not be proper in this case to quash the First Information Report when especially it discloses the commission of the cognizable offences namely offences under Sec. 120-B read with Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code and Sec. 13(1)(c) and (d) read with Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 12. It appears from the averments in the petition that the Deputy General Manager of R.C.F. Mr.S.V. Bhaid subsequently lodged a private complaint on 9. 1993 before the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, against the first accused and the dealers including the petitioner herein for the alleged malpractice and for the accumulation of arrears, that the learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the Central Crime Branch under Sec. 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure for investigation and the said complaint after investigation has been referred as civil dispute and filed final report to that effect. It was also argued before the that as the Central Crime Branch has filed the report after investigations that it is civil dispute, the First Information Report registered by the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation has to be quashed. It was also argued before the that as the Central Crime Branch has filed the report after investigations that it is civil dispute, the First Information Report registered by the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation has to be quashed. The learned Special Public Prosecutor Mr.Rajamanickam submitted that when the First Information Report registered by the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation is pending, with the learned 14th Metropolitan Magistrate from 312. 1991 onwards, the learned Magistrate could have forwarded the complaint of the Deputy General Manager dated 9. 1993 to the respondent because already the case is registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation but the learned Magistrate had forwarded the complaint to the Central Crime Branch and the referred charge sheet filed by the Central Crime Branch will not affect the right of the respondent to investigate the crime as this F.I.R. was registered two years before the private complaint of Deputy General Manager. As is stated in the petition itself that the Private complaint of the Deputy General Manager Mr. S.V. Bhaid was filed only on 9. 1993 whereas the First Information Report by the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation was registered on 312. 1991, the subsequent investigation by the Central Crime Branch cannot affect the Investigation undertaken by the respondent. Therefore, he referred charge-sheet of the Central Crime Branch has no relevancy on this proceedings. Anyhow, as the reasons given by the petitioner to quash the proceedings are not acceptable to concede the request of the petitioner, this petition is not sustainable and is liable to be dismissed. 13. In the result, the petition is dismissed.