Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by 37 persons who are claiming themselves as Shebaits of the Shiv Lingum of Singheshwar asthan Temple in district of Madhepura. 2. These petitioners, Inter alia, challenge the constitutional validity of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust (Amendment) Act, 1992. They have also challenged in this writ petition the scheme which has been framed by the administrator of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust. The said scheme was issued vide notification No 121 dated 5th May, 1993 which has been published bv the Government of Bihar in the district gazette on 22nd May, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the said Scheme ). The appointment of respondent No 2 as the Administrator of the Board on 10th September, 1992 published in the gazette on 19th September 1992 has also been challenged in this writ petition. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that under the provisions of Sec.32 of the Bihar Hindu Religious trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter refered to as the said Act) trustees cannot be appointed. 3. For proper appreciation of the challenge made in this writ petition, the facts of the case may be noted. Tn the district of Bhagalpur there is a very ancient temple known as singheshwar Asthan Temple and the presiding deity of the said temple is lord Shiva The people of the area hailed the said idol and held the same in great reverence. The said idol and the place was worshipped as a religious temple by the members of the public. 4. On the allegations of mis-appropriation of temple property by the then Pularis a suit was filed under Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said suit was numbered as Title Suit No.3 of 1937. The said suit was ultimately decreed Under the said decree a Committee was formed which was known as Singheshwar Asthan Temple Committee. A scheme was framed by the said Committee and the said Scheme was to be reviewed by the district Judge, Bhagalpur at the end 9f every five years from the date of the constitution of the said Committee. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, an appeal was preferred before this Court which was numbered as first Appeal No 226 of 1945 and this Court vide its judgment date 9th january, 1948 affirmed the findings of the trial court. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, an appeal was preferred before this Court which was numbered as first Appeal No 226 of 1945 and this Court vide its judgment date 9th january, 1948 affirmed the findings of the trial court. From the findings of the appellate court it became clear that the said temple was treated as a public religious temple and the trust created for the maintenance of the said temple was also treated as a Public Religious Trust. Pursuant to the judgment given by this Court in the said First Appeal No.226 of 1945, a temple committee was constituted and the management of the temple was looked after by the said committee according to the scheme framed by the district Judge, Bhagalpur. Then on the enactment of Bihar Hindu Religious trust Act, 1950, the provisions of Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made inapplicable to any religious trust in the State of Bihar and as such the District Judge. Bhagalpur passed an order dated 20th April, 1957 to the effect that it was not possible for the judgeship of Bbagalpur to ignore the implications of the provisions of the said Act. Relevant provisions in regard thereto, namely, sub-section (5) of Sec.4 of the said Act are set out below: -"the Religious Endowments Act 1863, (20 of 1863) and Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall not apply to any religious trust in this State, as defined in this Act. " 5. Thereafter by an order dated 28th November, 1962 the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust (hereinafter referred to as the said Board) notified the then existing scheme and appointed a committee known as Singheshwar Asthan Temple Trust Committee The said scheme framed by the District Judge was further modified and altered bv the scheme dated 2nd May, 1980 But before that sometime in the year 1977 the Bihar hindu Religious Trust Board was superseded and for specified period a special Officer was appointed to discharge the functions of the said Board. The period of supersession was thereafter extended from time to time and special Officers were being appointed by the Government of Bihar from time to time. Thereafter by the notification dated 22nd September, 1990 Sri radha Kant Yadav (respondent No.2) was appointed Special Officer. The period of supersession was thereafter extended from time to time and special Officers were being appointed by the Government of Bihar from time to time. Thereafter by the notification dated 22nd September, 1990 Sri radha Kant Yadav (respondent No.2) was appointed Special Officer. The said respondent No 2 is a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly As the period of supersession was being extended from time to time and the Board was not re-constituted, a proceeding was initiated before this Court by one mahanth Binod Shankar Giri Chela of Lata Mahanth Sheo Shankar Giri. In that proceeding being C. W. J C. No 58 of 1992 a Division Bench of this Court was pleased to observe as follows : - "it is shocking to conscience that though the period of more than 14 years has expired, but no steps have been taken for re-constitution of the Board by the State Government for the reasons best known to it. The learned Advocate General was not appearing in this case, but on our request, he appeared in this case on behalf of the State and after consulting the Government, he informed the Court that State Government, is now ready to take all possible steps for it constitution of the Board within the time fixed by this Court. Steps for re-constitution undisputedly under bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are required to be taken by State Government. Learned Advocate General says that steps for re-constitution of the Board should be taken by Legal Kememrancer-cum-Law secretary Government of Bihar. Accordingly, pending bearing of this application, we direct the Law secretary-cum-Legal Kemembrancer. Government of Bihar, who is permitted to be impleaded as respondent No 5 in this case to take all possible steps for re-constitution of the Board latest by 15th September.1992. It is clarified that all concerned must take steps for re-constitution in such a manner so that the same is completed within the aforesaid time fixed. In case, for any reason what-so-over the Board is not re-constituted within the aforesaid time, then from 16th September, 1992 Sri Radba Kant yadav. the present Special Officer (respondent No.2) shall cease to function and from that date Law Secretary (respondent No.5)who is an Officer from Bihar Superior Judicial Service shall discharge all the functions of Special Officer so long re-constitution of the Board is not completed. " 6. the present Special Officer (respondent No.2) shall cease to function and from that date Law Secretary (respondent No.5)who is an Officer from Bihar Superior Judicial Service shall discharge all the functions of Special Officer so long re-constitution of the Board is not completed. " 6. It is clear, therefore, that the Division Bench gave a decision on 13th March, 1992 to complete the re-constitutioa of the Board by 15th september, 1992. If the Board cannot be constituted within that time in that case also under the aforesaid directions Sri Radha Kant Yadav, respondent No.2 in this proceeding could not continue The allegation of the petitioner is that in order to allow the said Sri Radha Kant Yadav, respondent no.2, to continue as the Special Officer and in order to get rid of the direction contained in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in c. W. J. C. No.58 of 1992, an amendment was brought about in Sec.8 of the said Act and Sec.8-A of the said Act was introduced by way of the said amendment. The provisions of Sec.8-A of the said Act are set out below :- "8-A The Board of Hindu Religious Trust shall, from the date of coming into force of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts (Amendment)Act, 1992 ceases to function and the Government, shall appoint an Administrator to exercise all the power of the Board till the new Board under Sec.8 is constituted. " The said amendment was published in the Gazette on 9th September, 1992 and on 10th September, 1992 by a notification issued in exercise of the powers confered by the amended Sec.8-A of the said Act, respondent No.2, who was all the time continuing as Special Officer, was made the administrator of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board to exercise the powers and function of the said Board until further orders. The said notification gazetted on 19th September 1992. 7. It is common ground that the appointment of respondent No.2 as the Administrator of the said Board was purported to have been made in exercise of powers conferred under Sec.8-A of the said Act. The said notification gazetted on 19th September 1992. 7. It is common ground that the appointment of respondent No.2 as the Administrator of the said Board was purported to have been made in exercise of powers conferred under Sec.8-A of the said Act. The said notification dated 19th September, 1992 gazetted on 19th September 1992 is set out below :- "s. O.251 dated the 19th September, 1992.-In exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.8-A of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1, 1950) the Governor of Bihar is pleased to appofnt hereby Sri Radha Kant Yadav, Member of the Bihar legislative Assembly, as Administrator. Bihar Hindu Religious trusts Board to exercise the powers and functions of the Bihar hindu Relisious Trusts Board until further orders. " 8. The amended provisions of Sec.8-A of the said Act has already been set out above. From a perusal of the amended provisions of the said act. it is clear that the Government is empowered under the said Section to appoint an Administrator to exercise all the powers of the Board till the new Board under Sec.8 of the said Act is constituted. But the notification appointing respondent No 2 as the Administrator shows that such appointment has been made until further orders 9. It 5s. therefore, clear that the said notification dated 19th September, 1992 even though is purported to have been made in exercise of the powers under Sec.8-A of the said Act, has not, in fact, been made in exercise of the powers under Sec.8-A of the said Act inasmuch as Sec.8-A of the said Act does not authorise appointment of the Administrator to exercise the powers of the Board for an indefinite period but the appointment by the gazette notification dated 19th September, 1992 of respondent No 2 as the administrator of the said Board has bsen made for an indefinite psriod, namely. until further orders The impugned order of appointment dated 19th September, 1992 is, therefore, ultra vires the provision contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act and as such the said appointment not being made in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act is wholly un-authorised and without jurisdiction. 10. until further orders The impugned order of appointment dated 19th September, 1992 is, therefore, ultra vires the provision contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act and as such the said appointment not being made in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act is wholly un-authorised and without jurisdiction. 10. In this connection it may be recalled that the learned Advocate general appearing behalf of the State Government, while upholding the provisions contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act, submitted that the said section 8-A of the said Act has been enacted by way of an interim arrangement and for a temporary period but from the appointment made under section 8-A of the said Act, it is clear that the said appointment has not been made for a temporary period. On the other band the said appointment has been made for indefinite and un-defined length of time. As such the said notification dated 19th September, 1992 is bad in law and without jurisdiction. 11. On the question of constitutional validity of Sec.8-A of the said Act, the Court is of the view that the said Section, as enacted, was obviously intended to serve a limited purpose, namely, that the said section was enacted to tide over the temporary phase before the constitution of the board and till the Board is constituted, an Administrator can be appointed to exercise all the powers of the Board only for the period of interregnum. As such no constitutional right of the petitioner is said to have been violated by the enactment of the said section. Therefore, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sec.8-A of the said Act has no merit. The constitutional validity of Sec.8 of the said Act has been upheld by the apex court in more than one judgment. 12. The next challenge which has been made by the petitioner is that the said Administrator having been appointed on 19th September, 1992 for an indefinite period of time has purportedly framed a scheme dated 5th May, 1993 which has been published in the District Gazette dated 28th May, 1993. From a perusal of the said scheme it would appear that the same has been framed by the Administrator in exercise of the powers under Sec.81 (b)read with Sec.32 of the said Act for the so called batter manegement of the Trust Committee. From a perusal of the said scheme it would appear that the same has been framed by the Administrator in exercise of the powers under Sec.81 (b)read with Sec.32 of the said Act for the so called batter manegement of the Trust Committee. Under the said scheme there has been incorporation of Singbeswar Asthan Temple Trust Committee with a perpetual succession and common seal and the said Trust Committee so incorporated consists of a various trustees appointed by the Administrator. This would appear from clause 4 of the said scheme. The said Trust Committee constituted under the said Scheme thus has all the trappings of a permanent body even though under clause 28 of the said scheme it has been said that the scheme shall continue for five years but the aforesaid Committee with the appointment of various trustees and having been incorporated perpetually seems to have been created permanently under the said Scheme The said Scheme has been challenged on various grounds by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has defended the said scheme by contending inter alia, that the said scheme is valid and has been framed in exercise of the powers contained in Sec.32 of the said Act and if the petitioner has any grievance, he can take recourse to the provisions of Section 32 (3) of the said Act by making an application before the District Judge but recourse to this Court by filing writ application under Article 226 of the constitution is not maintainable. Both the issues, namely, (i) the objection of the respondents about the non-maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedy as well as (ii) the grounds of attack of the petitioners on the legality of the said scheme are taken up together and discussed in this judgment as both these issues are inter linked and the decision of one has a direct bearing on the other. 14. This Court is of the view that the said scheme having been prepared by respondent No.2 whose appointment is wholly ultra vires the provisions contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act is also vitiated by the same illegality, namely, that the scheme also becomes invalid in the eye of law. 14. This Court is of the view that the said scheme having been prepared by respondent No.2 whose appointment is wholly ultra vires the provisions contained in Sec.8-A of the said Act is also vitiated by the same illegality, namely, that the scheme also becomes invalid in the eye of law. In other words the Administrator, in view of his invalid appointment cannot validly exercise the powers of the Board as provided under Section 8-A of the said Act. Therefore, the framing of the scheme by the administrator by the purportedly exercising the power of the Board under sections 32 and 81 (b) of the said Act is equally un-authoriscd and bad in the eye of law. 15. The statutory remedy given under Sec.32 (3) of the said Act is obviously given against a scheme which is framed within the four corners of Sec.32 of the said Act. In other words, when a scheme is framed under Sec.32 of the said Act, an application to modify or substitute the same can be made before the District Judge but in the initant case the impugned scheme has been framed dehors Sec.32 of the said Act, even it is purported to have been framed under Sec.32 of the said Act. Therefore, against the framing of such an unauthorised scheme, a writ petition can be entertained. The impugned scheme having been framed without the authority of law, as aforesaid, can be challenged in a writ petition. 16. The other ground of challengs to the said scheme is that the said scheme has been framed without hearing the petitioners who are persons interested. In this connection reference may be made to the definition of the word person interested in a religious trust as given in Sec.2 (g) of the said Act. 16. The other ground of challengs to the said scheme is that the said scheme has been framed without hearing the petitioners who are persons interested. In this connection reference may be made to the definition of the word person interested in a religious trust as given in Sec.2 (g) of the said Act. The said definition clause namely, Sec.2 (g) of the said Act is set out below :- "person interested in a religious trusts means any person who is entitled to receive any pecuniary of other benefit from a religious trusts and includes - (i) any person who has a right to worship or to perform any rite, or to attend at the performance of any worship or rite, in any religious institution connected with such trust or to participate in any religious or charitable administration under such trust ; (ii) the founder and any descendant of the founder ; and (iii) the trustee ;" 17. It is clear that the said definition clause is a very wide one and includes within its sweep even a person who has to worship or to perform any rite or to attend at the performance of any worship or rite in any religious institution connected with such trust or participate in any religious or charitable institution under such trust. 18. Within the range of the aforesaid definition clause, the petitioners certainly come under the the category of person interested in a religions trust. 19. Specific allegation has been made in paragraph 33 of the writ petition that the said scheme has been framed without any notice to the petitioners. This has been dealt with in paragraph 28 of the counter affidavit of respondent Nos.1 and 2. But this fact has not been controverted. A perusal of the said scheme also does not show that the same has been framed either after hearing the petitioners or persons interested in a religious trust. 20. It goes without saying that the right to get notice given to person interested under Sec.32 (1) (a) of the said Act is a right of natural justice. The Supreme Court, has in widening the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, held that right of natural justice is facet of Article 14 of the Constitution of India union of India V/s. Tulsi Ram Patel reported ia AIR 1985 SC page 416 at page 1460, paragraph 95. 21. The Supreme Court, has in widening the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, held that right of natural justice is facet of Article 14 of the Constitution of India union of India V/s. Tulsi Ram Patel reported ia AIR 1985 SC page 416 at page 1460, paragraph 95. 21. In that view of the matter the right of being heard has been elevated to the status of a fundamental right when such a right is statutorily recognized as has been done in the instant case under Sec.32 (1) (a)of the said Act. The said right thus is given the protection of the laws which to the second limb of the monumental guarantee under Article 14 of the constitution. The second limb of Article 14 of the Constitution, namely, equal protection of laws means protection given under specific laws in force (See Sri Srinivasa Theatre v Governments of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1992 SC page 999 at page 1004. paragraph 9. The said guarantee enshrined under Artcle 14 of the Constitution has been admittedly denied to the petitioners in the framing of the said scheme. The said scheme is therefore, ultra vires the provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. It is well settled when fundamental rights of persons are infringed, the persons aggrieved may not exhaust the statutory remedy and may for the protection of the fundamental right file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Judging from this angle also the writ petition is maintainable. 23. The next ground of challenge against the scheme is that assuming arguendo that the scheme is otherwise valid but even then acting under Section 32 read with Sec.81 (b) of the said Act while framing the scheme, the trustees cannot be appointed. But under the impugned scheme the permanent trust committee has been created and the trustees have been appointed. 24. On examining the said argument this Court finds that a validly appointed administrator while acting in exercise of powers given to him under section 8-A, may by taking a course to Sec.32 read with Sec.81 (b)of the said Act, can at the most exercise the powers of the Board. 24. On examining the said argument this Court finds that a validly appointed administrator while acting in exercise of powers given to him under section 8-A, may by taking a course to Sec.32 read with Sec.81 (b)of the said Act, can at the most exercise the powers of the Board. From a perusal of the various provisions under the said Act, it appears that the Board has no power to appoint trustees save and except under the provisions contained in Sec.33 of the said Act which empowers the Board to appoint only temporary trustees. The power to appoint trustees lies only with the District judge under Sec.48 of the said Act but under the impugned scheme purported to have been enacted in exercise of the powers under Sec.32 read with Sec.81 (b) of the said Act, the trustees have been appointed. The appointment of the trustees under the said Scheme is thus wholly unauthorised and invalid in the eye of law. As such the said scheme, as has already been noted, is not one within the meaning of Sec.32 of the said act and in that case the legality of the said scheme can be questioned in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 25. It has also been urged by the petitioners that the question of exhaustion of statutory remedy is normally raised at the time of admission of the writ petition Once a writ petition is admitted and posted for final hearing, it cannot normally be dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of the statutory remedy. In the instant case the writ petition has been admitted by order dated 18th April, 1994 and has come up before this Court for final hearing. It also appears from the order sheet that before admission of the matter, the matter was heard by a learned Division Bench of this Court on several dates Therefore, it was open to the said Division Bench to take into account the aforesaid objection about the non-exhaustion of the statutory remedy, even then the writ petition has been admitted. On this point several decisions both reported and un-reported have been cited from the Bar But in view of the decision already arrived at by this Court on the maintainability of this writ petition, no decision need be given on this aspect of the question, 26. On this point several decisions both reported and un-reported have been cited from the Bar But in view of the decision already arrived at by this Court on the maintainability of this writ petition, no decision need be given on this aspect of the question, 26. For the reasons stated above, the principal objection raised by the respondents about the maintainability of the writ petition fails As the writ petition is maintainable and can be adjudicated by this Court, this Court holds, for the reasons stated above, as hereunder : " (a) The appointment of respondent No.2 as the Administrator of the said Bihar State Hindu Religious Trust is bad in law and without jurisdiction. The Gazette notification dated 19th september.1992 appointing the respondent No.2 as the Administrator is quashed. (b) The Scheme framed by the said Administrator, namely, respondent No.2, is also ultra vires, un-constitutional and wholly invalid in the eye of law and as such the said scheme is quashed. The trustees appointed under the Scheme must vacate their office forthwith. (c) Since there cannot be any vacuum in the management of the said trust which is a Trust of a public character, this Court in exercise of its inherent power and for the ends of justice and in public interest and for the management of the said Trust appoints the district Judge. Madhepura as the sole Administrator to run and manage the affairs of the said 1 rust for a period of six months from the date of either receipt or production of a copy of this judgment. (d) This Court further directs that the appointment of respondent no 2 having been quashed, he must hand over the charge of the entire management of the Trust including all its properties, assets, bank accounts and all other Books and documents to the District judge, Madhepura on or before 31st, May.1995. (e) The said respondent No 2 will not be permitted to withdraw any amount beyond Rs 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) from today till 31st May, 1995 for running the day today expenses. (f) If the charge is not handed over by respondent No.2 within 31st may, 1995, the District Judge, Madhepura will be entitled to assume charge of the said Trust including all its properties and assets, books of accounts etc. , on his own and if necessary with police help. (f) If the charge is not handed over by respondent No.2 within 31st may, 1995, the District Judge, Madhepura will be entitled to assume charge of the said Trust including all its properties and assets, books of accounts etc. , on his own and if necessary with police help. (g) After taking over charge, the District Judge, Madhepura must complete the constitution of the Board in accordance with law on or before 31st December, 1995 and make over charge to the newly constituted Board by 1st January, 1996. " This writ petition thus succeeds to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to cost. Order accordingly