B. N. KIRPAL, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge, who had upheld the order passed by the municipal Commissioner of Ahmedabad, who had directed the removal of the unauthorised construction in the hotel, known as "shalin Hotel", which order had been passed pursuant to the notice issued under Section 260 (1) of the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. ( 2 ) THERE is no dispute that the building, as constructed and as in use as of today, is not in accordance with the building plans, which were passed in so far as the cellar or the basement is concerned. The basement was meant to provide for underground parking but this is not being done as of today. It was contended before the learned single Judge that in a number of other cases also, the parking area, shown in the basement, has been converted for other use, but no action has been taken. The learned single Judge has rightly held, after referring to numerous decisions of this Court and the Supreme court, that just because no action has been laken against any other wrongful act does not mean that the appellant should be absolved of complying with the law. In other words, Article 14 does not give a right to claim equal benefit from unlawful and illegal action of inaction. ( 3 ) THE respondents have tried to explain as to why action has not been taken with regard to the similar illegalities committed by the other hotels. One of the reasons given by the respondents in their affidavit for the action not being taken is the pendency of civil litigation before the City Civil Court and interim orders being passed. ( 4 ) IN our opinion, the position in law regarding non-grant of injunctions with regard to such illegal constructions or misuse has been clearly enunciated in the judgment under Appeal of the learned single Judge, which judgment we approve, and we direct that the copies of the judgment of R. K. Abichandani, J. dated 28th June 1995 and the judgment should be circulated forthwith amongst all the judges of the City Civil Court and the subordinate courts, who will keep the principles enunciated therein in view while deciding similar cases. ( 5 ) WE would also expect the Municipal corporation to take similar action against all those buildings, which have been constructed and or are being used not in accordance with the building plans or the building byelaws. The message must go out loud and clear, viz. that laws which include the by laws, are meant to be obeyed and not flouted and that monetary or any extraneous influence should not deter a Municipal authority from discharging its public duties and functions. The action which has been taken in the instant case by the respondents is in accordance with law and needs to be commended. ( 6 ) BEFORE parting, it would be useful to refer to the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh, J. T. 1995 (1) SC 445, at page 449:". . . Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the- illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accodance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accodance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. . . . "what is observed aforesaid with regard to the exercise of the judicial restraint by the High Court under Article 226 would also apply when a Civil Court is called upon, to exercise its discretion under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and the same principles would be applicable. ( 7 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is dismissed and the interim orders granted by the single Judge are also vacated. The Corporation is at liberty to take action as per the order passed by the Municipal Commissioner. ( 8 ) COPY of this order be sent to the corporation forthwith. ( 9 ) COUNSEL for the appellant wants lime to remove the illegal construction which has been made. The appellant has had time since 1991 when the first notice was issued to it and we see no reason as to why any more lime should be granted. . ( 10 ) WE also see no reason to stay the operation of this judgment. The learned single Judge as well as this Bench has merely applied the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions to the undisputed facts which exist on record and, therefore, the question of staying the order does not arise. Appeal dismissed. .