S. K. SEN, J. ( 1 ) ON or about March 28, 1995 an execution application was moved without notice with an intent to put the decree dated April 21, 1994 into execution as against the judgment-debtor. The decree arises out of an award of the sole arbitrator in Award Case No. 349 of 1992 and is a money decree. ( 2 ) ON the said application for execution, an ad interim order was passed by me directing the State Bank of India, Park Street, Calcutta not to part with the money in question till March 31, 1995 and the matter was adjourned till March 30, 1995. In the meantime, the judgment-debtor also moved an application alleging inter alia following points: (a) No execution proceeding would lie or be proceeded with as against the respondent herein in view of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 and that the proceeding before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) is still pending. The decree holder does not have any right to put the decree into execution. (b) It was submitted that the order dated March 29, 1995 on the Execution Application should be vacated and the execution application itself is liable to be dismissed or permanently stayed so long and until proceeding at BIFR is finally dispose of or is finally concluded. ( 3 ) ON 30th March, 1995 the following order was passed modifying the earlier ad interim order. "affidavit in opposition is to be filed by 10-4-95. Affidavit in Reply by 17-4-95 and the matter is adjourned till 18-4-95. The ad interim order passed on 28-3-95 stands modified to the extent that State Bank of India, Park Street, Branch, Calcutta C and I Division Appejay House will hold a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- until further orders. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking. " ( 4 ) ON April 4, 1995 an application was made by the judgment-debtor for dismissal of the application for execution and for setting aside of the above orders passed in the said execution proceedings on the ground that by reason of the provisions of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the said application for execution would not lie and no orders could be passed thereon. On the said application an order was passed on April 4, 1995 wherein the order dated 28-3-95 was stayed on the condition that in the event any money was withdrawn by the judgment-debtor from the concerned account, the same would be kept in a fixed deposit account and advocate on record of the judgment-debtor would intimate the opening of such fixed deposit account if the same took place. Till date no intimation of any fixed deposit account has been given. ( 5 ) THE following questions arise for determination in the instant proceeding : (a) Whether the execution proceeding would lie or be proceeded with as against Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. , which is under BIFR and proceeding whereof are still pending. (b)Whether Section 22 of the said Act would enable any decree-holder to put the Money Decree into execution for attachment or payment out of the properties, movable or immovable of the respondent, the petitioner herein. (c) Whether the execution proceeding filed against the respondent Corporation is liable to be stayed and/or suspended under the provision of the Act. (d) Whether any interim order having an effect of executing the said decree and securing the said decree in course of execution should be stayed and/or vacated in the facts of the case. (e) Whether the order dated March 28, 1995 as modified on March 30, 1995 be vacated and / or stayed. ( 6 ) THE contention of the learned Advocate for the judgment-debtor MAMC Ltd. may be summarised as follows : (a) M. A. M. C. is a declared sick Industrial undertaking and is entitled to the benefit of Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. (b) Under Section 22 of the said Act this is squarely applicable in the instant case with regard to M. A. M. C. Ltd. The decree holder cannot put the decree into execution except with the express consent and approval of BIFR. (c) Admittedly the decree-holder has not obtained any consent or approval of BIFR and as such execution application is ex facie not maintainable. (c) Admittedly the decree-holder has not obtained any consent or approval of BIFR and as such execution application is ex facie not maintainable. (d) The proceedings before BIFR is pending and that BIFR case arising out of the reference made to BIFR by MAMC Ltd. being case No. 510 of 1992 is still pending as would be clearly evident from the fact that even the last minutes of the meeting as forwarded by BIFR reference to the said case No. 510 of 1992 was made. (e) M. A. M. C. Ltd. is still alive. No order of winding up is passed. On 3rd/11th January, 1995 BIFR has only viewed that the company may not be viable and sought for representation from the interested parties by an intended notice dated 11th January, 1995 being Annexure H to the M. A. M. C. 's petition. The said notice and proceedings with regard to the proposed winding up of the company is already stayed and there is every likelihood of revival of the company having regard to the representation and pending scheme with BIFR. (f) From the letter of Joint Secretary being Annexure K to the M. A. M. C's petition filed by M. A. M. C. it appears that the matter is under active consideration of the Ministry and the BIFR is the statutory authority to consider the scope and implementation of any viability of the company. It has been submitted on behalf of the judgment-debtor that the case referred to BIFR has not been rejected. In other words the viability proposal and consideration of BIFR is very much alive. BIFR has not taken any final decision as contemplated under Section 20 of the said Act nor the Scheme under Section 17 was finally rejected. Even in the Notice dated 11th January, 1995, it is not confirmed that any order of winding up has been passed or that the BIFR has rejected the scheme for reconsideration of the said company. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, it is the contention of the decree holder that there is no pending scheme under Section 17 (3) as envisaged under Section 22 of the said Act. It is also the case of decree holder that the execution of the decree is just and legal. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, it is the contention of the decree holder that there is no pending scheme under Section 17 (3) as envisaged under Section 22 of the said Act. It is also the case of decree holder that the execution of the decree is just and legal. In support of their contention the following decisions were cited :- Bengal Lamps Ltd. v. Jurmanite Nicco Ltd. reported in 1990 (2) CLJ 339 ; Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Mehboob Productions P. Ltd. reported in 1993 (1) CLJ 340 : 1993 Supreme Court Cases and an unreported decision of the Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Manjula Bose being C. P. No. 642 of 1987 in the matter of India Jute and Industries v. Free India Dry Accumulator dated 3rd February, 1989. ( 8 ) IT would appear that in view of the amendment of Section 22 of the Act, the decision reported in 1990 (2) CLJ 339 in Bengal Lamps Ltd. v. Jurmanite Nico Ltd. and the said unreported decision are no longer valid now. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate has submitted that in view of amendment of Section 22 no suit for enforcement can be filed and there is no question of trial of the said suit; more so initiation of proceeding is also prohibited. The very object of Section 22, has been submitted is that the sick company should not be burdened with legal proceedings, attachment, execution and other enforcement of monetary liability so that the viability and prospective reconstruction of the sick company can be considered in the absence of any legal proceedings that is the reason why the suspension of legal proceedings was provided for. The nature of proceedings automatically attracted by and under Section 22 includes execution of a decree. There is no bar for a creditor to approach BIFR for its approval and consent for the purpose of initiating or pursuing any legal remedy including the execution of a decree. But it is expressly barred under the said section to initiate or proceed in any suit or legal proceeding like execution of the decree without the consent of the BIFR. ( 10 ) IT has been submitted on behalf of the judgment-debtor that under Section 22 (3) operation of the contract award etc. are also suspended. Section 22 (5) provides for exclusion of the period while reckoning the period of limitation. ( 10 ) IT has been submitted on behalf of the judgment-debtor that under Section 22 (3) operation of the contract award etc. are also suspended. Section 22 (5) provides for exclusion of the period while reckoning the period of limitation. A creditor is not out of court altogether but his remedy is suspended for a period during which the matter is pending before the BIFR. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for MAMC has also relied upon the judgment and decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. reported in 1993 (2) SCC 144 . It has been contended on behalf of the MAMC that the proceedings under Section 29 of State Financial Act which is not even a legal procedure is held to be hit under Section 22 (1) of the Act. The learned Advocate has submitted that Section 22 (1) must be widely considered and construed. It has also been submitted that Section 25 should be broadly interpreted, keeping in mind the idea and purpose of the Act to revive the sick units. ( 12 ) IT has been submitted on behalf of the judgment-debtor that even the special Act of the nature of State Financial Corporation and powers conferred on the Corporation under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act have been held to be inoperative during the pendency of the matter before BIFR although the status of the Financial Corporation as secured creditor is much higher than that of a decree holder of an unsecured debt. ( 13 ) IT has been submitted that the execution in the instant case is one of the legal proceedings expressly barred under Section 22 (1) and as such the application is thoroughly misconceived. ( 14 ) IT has been submitted by the decree-holder, on the other hand, that Section 22 of the Act has no application in the facts and 3 circumstances of the case and does not constitute a bar to the application for execution made by the decree holder or proceeding with execution and orders being passed thereon. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate for the decree-holder has referred to the records of the reference before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Section 15 of the Act made on 28th February, 1992 which was received by BIFR on 3rd March, 1992 and Registered as case No. 510 of 1992. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate for the decree-holder has referred to the records of the reference before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Section 15 of the Act made on 28th February, 1992 which was received by BIFR on 3rd March, 1992 and Registered as case No. 510 of 1992. On 14-10-92, BIFR came to the conclusion that the judgment debtor had become a Sick Industrial Company in terms of the Provisions of Section 3 (1) (0) of the Act. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the fact that it was necessary to take measures under Section 15 in exercise of powers conferred on IFCI under Section 17 (3) of the Act, IFCI was appointed operating agency to examine the viability and prepare a scheme for revival of the Company. The said operating agency was directed to submit a scheme by 16th January, 1993. On 3rd January 1995 it was recorded that no viable scheme was made for rehabilitation of the judgment debtor and BIFR came to a prima facie conclusion that it was not possible and practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time nor was it feasible to adopt any of the measures specified in Section 18 of the Act in relation to the Company and that it was just and equitable that it should be wound up. In such circumstances, BIFR directed a public notice for winding up of the judgment-debtor under Section 20 of the Act fixing 14th March 95 for consideration of objection/ suggestions or alternative proposals, if any, which should reach the BIFR by 23rd February, 1995. ( 17 ) NOTICE was also issued inviting the objections / suggestions in the matter. ( 18 ) IT may be noted that a writ petition was filed by the employees Union of the judgment-debtor seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus commanding the BIFR not to give further effect to the said order of January 3, 1995 which was issued on 12th January 1995. In the said writ application, an order was passed on February 7, 1995 whereby the respondents therein including the BIFR were restrained from proceeding any further on the basis of the order passed in case No. 510 of 1992 on January 12, 1995 being Annexure-C to the writ petition i. e. order dated January 3,1995 issued on January 12, 1995. In the said writ application, an order was passed on February 7, 1995 whereby the respondents therein including the BIFR were restrained from proceeding any further on the basis of the order passed in case No. 510 of 1992 on January 12, 1995 being Annexure-C to the writ petition i. e. order dated January 3,1995 issued on January 12, 1995. ( 19 ) THE said order was communicated to the BIFR and on the basis of the same, BIFR on March 14, 1995 passed an order to the effect that in view of the above and pending vacation of the said interim order further proceeding in case No. 510 of 1992 would be held in abeyance by BIFR. ( 20 ) IT has been submitted that Section 22 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the High Courts to pass any order and the same has to be strictly construed. In the instant case according to the learned advocate for the petitioner Section 22 has no application since no inquiry is pending under Section 16 of the Act nor any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation and no appeal is also pending under Section 25 of the Act. ( 21 ) IT has further been contended by the learned Advocate for the decree-holder that since there is no inquiry pending under Section 16 of the Act, the inquiry came to an end on the judgment-debtor being declared a sick industrial company by BIFR within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (O) of the Act. ( 22 ) IT has also been submitted that no scheme under Section 17 of the Act is under preparation or consideration for the following reasons :- ( 23 ) SINCE IFCI which was appointed by BIFR by order dated 14-10-92 as operating agency and order entrusted it to prepare a scheme but it was unable to prepare a viable scheme. ( 24 ) IN this connection, the learned Advocate for the decree holder has submitted that the scheme referred to under Section 17 of the Act is the scheme prepared under Section 17 (3) of the Act. ( 24 ) IN this connection, the learned Advocate for the decree holder has submitted that the scheme referred to under Section 17 of the Act is the scheme prepared under Section 17 (3) of the Act. In this connection he has relied upon an unreported judgment of Manjula Bose, J. as she then was dated 4 February 13, 1989, in the matter of India Jute and Industries Ltd. and Free India Dry Accumulators Ltd. ( 25 ) IT has further been submitted that there is no scheme under Section 17 (3) of the Act. In the instant case it cannot be said that any scheme referred to under Section 17 of the Act is under preparation or consideration with regard to the judgment-debtor. ( 26 ) IT has been disputed on behalf of the decree-holder that there was any scheme in existence by the employees. ( 27 ) IT has further been submitted that even assuming such a scheme is there such scheme is not a scheme under Section 17 (3) of the Act. It has also been submitted on behalf of the decree-holder that no documentary evidence has been produced to show that such a scheme was there although the order dated 7-2-95 has recorded that such a scheme is there. ( 28 ) IT has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the decree-holder that the order of 7-2-95 passed by the Calcutta High Court does not stay the operation of the order of 3-1-95 issued on 12-1-95 by BIFR. It only restrains further proceeding on the basis of the said order viz. recommending a final order of winding up. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is any scheme before BIFR for consideration. ( 29 ) THE learned Advocate for the decree-holder has also submitted that the decisions relied upon on behalf of the judgment-debtor have no application to the facts of the instant case. Accordingly it has been submitted that the application made by the judgment-debtor should be dismissed, and execution proceeding should be allowed and order should be passed directing the State Bank of India C and I Divn. Park Street Branch, and State Bank of India, MAMC Branch to pay the said sum to the decree-holder. ( 30 ) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and also the decisions cited. Park Street Branch, and State Bank of India, MAMC Branch to pay the said sum to the decree-holder. ( 30 ) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and also the decisions cited. The question involved in the two applications is whether by reason of provision of Section 22 of the Act, the application for execution is liable to be dismissed. In order to appreciate the question involved, it is necessary to consider the relevant Sections of the BIFR Act. ( 31 ) SECTION 15 (1) provides that where an industrial company has become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors of the Company, shall, within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year at the end of the which the company has become a sick industrial company, make a reference to the BIFR for determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company. If, however, the Board of Directors of the Company had for sufficient reasons formed an opinion before the finalisation of the duly audited accounts that the company had become a sick industrial company, they could make a reference within sixty days after the formation of such opinion for determination of the measures to be adopted with respect to the company. Upon receipt of such reference with respect of such company or upon information received or upon its own knowledge as to the financial condition of the company a duty is cast by Section 16 (1) on the BIFR to make such inquiry as it deems fit for determining whether any industrial company has become a sick industrial company. Where the BIFR deems it fit to make such an inquiry or to cause an inquiry to be made into any industrial company, sub-section (4) requires it to appoint one or more persons to be a special director or special directors of the company for safeguarding the financial and other interests of the company. Section 17 provides that if after making an inquiry under Section 16 the BIFR is satisfied that a company has become a sick industrial company, it shall after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case decide, whether it is practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. Section 17 provides that if after making an inquiry under Section 16 the BIFR is satisfied that a company has become a sick industrial company, it shall after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case decide, whether it is practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. If the BIFR decides in the affirmative it shall, by order in writing give such time to the company as it may deem fit to make its net worth positive but if it decides in the negative and considers it necessary or expedient in the public interest to adopt all or any of the 5 measures specified in Section 18, it may, by a written order direct any operating agency to prepare a scheme providing for such measures in relation to such company. Section 18 provides that where an order is made under the aforesaid provisions in relation to any sick industrial company, the operating agency shall prepare a scheme with respect to such company providing for any one or more of the following measures, namely- (a) the reconstruction, revival or rehabilitation of the sick industrial company; (b) the proper management of the sick industrial company by change in, or take over of management of the sick industrial company; (c) the amalgamation of the sick industrial company with any other industrial company. (d) the sale or lease of a part or whole of any industrial undertaking of the sick industrial company; (e) such other preventive, ameliorative and remedial measures as may be appropriate. A copy of the draft scheme prepared by the BIFR is required to be sent to the sick industrial company as well as the operating agency. After the draft scheme is finalised, it has to be sanctioned by the BIFR and then brought into force with effect from such date as the BIFR may specify in this behalf. Provision is also made for reviewing a sanctioned scheme and making modifications therein if the exigencies of administration so require. After the draft scheme is finalised, it has to be sanctioned by the BIFR and then brought into force with effect from such date as the BIFR may specify in this behalf. Provision is also made for reviewing a sanctioned scheme and making modifications therein if the exigencies of administration so require. Where the scheme relates to preventive, ameliorative, remedial or other measures with respect to any sick industrial company, the scheme may provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances, guarantees, reliefs, concessions or sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any scheduled bank or other bank, a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority to the sick industrial company, vide Section 19 (1) of the Act. Section 20, however, provides that where the BIFR after making an inquiry under Section 16 is of opinion that it is just and equitable to wind up the sick industrial company, it may forward its opinion in that behalf to the concerned High Court whereupon the High Court shall, on the basis thereof, order winding up of the sick industrial company. ( 32 ) SECTION 22 (1) provides as follows :-"22 (1 ). Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Industrial Company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. "in the instant case reference was made to the BIFR as per provisions of the special amendment to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 with the approval of the Board by resolution No. D-5 of the 157th meeting held on 28th February, 1992. "in the instant case reference was made to the BIFR as per provisions of the special amendment to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 with the approval of the Board by resolution No. D-5 of the 157th meeting held on 28th February, 1992. ( 33 ) THE case was registered under case No. 510 of 1992 and the date of first hearing was on 14th October, 1992 before the Chairman and Members of Bench II Special. The said reference was made under Section 15 (1) of the said Act of 1985. Hearing took place before the BIFR Bench on 14th October, 1992 and it was decided that it would be necessary in public interest to take measures specified under Section 18 of the said Act in relation to the petitioner Corporation and in exercise of the powers under Section 17 (3) of the said Act Industrial Financial Corporation of India (IFCI) was appointed as the Operating Agency (OA) to examine the viability and for preparing a viability study report. Such 6 operating Agency was appointed for examining a viability of the petitioner Corporation and to prepare a viability study report for revival of the petitioner Corporation. ( 34 ) THEREAFTER proceeding took place from time to time before the BIFR on the representation of the petitioner Corporation, Workmen Union and also the report of the Operative Agency have been considered from time to time. ( 35 ) ON 3rd January, 1995 the said Bench which took up the matter came to prima facie conclusion"that it is not practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time nor is it feasible to adopt any of the measures specified in Section 18 of the Act in relation to the company and that it is just and equitable that it has to be wound up. Accordingly, the Bench directs the issue of public notice (s) for winding up of the company under Section 20 of the Act fixing 14-3-1995 at 10. 30 A. M. for consideration of objections suggestions or alternative proposals, if any, which should reach the Bench by 28-2-95. Accordingly, the Bench directs the issue of public notice (s) for winding up of the company under Section 20 of the Act fixing 14-3-1995 at 10. 30 A. M. for consideration of objections suggestions or alternative proposals, if any, which should reach the Bench by 28-2-95. " ( 36 ) PURSUANT to such order a notice was issued on January 11, 1995 to the effect that a hearing would take place on March 14, 1995 in the office of the BIFR and the said parties are already invited for giving suggestions / objection it any, with supporting documents in triplicate with regard to the opinion of the Bench that it is just and equitable that the Corporation should be wound up. A copy of the said notice dated January 11, 1995 has been annexed to the application of the judgment-debtor. ( 37 ) IT appears from the orders dated January 3, 1995 and 12th January, 1995 and the notice dated 11th January, 1995 that the proceedings before the BIFR has not been finally disposed of. Further date has also been fixed for consideration of suggestion/ objection of all concerned as to whether the Corporation should be wound up or not. In the meantime, writ application was filed in this Court in the Appellate Side on February 7, 1995 by Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Employees' Union alleging that the scheme submitted by the workmen has not been considered by the BIFR. While considering question as to whether the Company should be wound up or not, an interim order was passed in the writ application restraining the respondents from proceeding any further on the basis of the order passed in case No. 510/92 on 12th January, 1995, being Annexure 'g' to the said writ petition. The said writ petition is still pending. ( 38 ) SEVERAL points have been raised in the writ petition and it was prayed that investigation by BIFR should be properly made and the decision dated January 3, 1995 should not be given effect to. ( 39 ) IN view of the said order of February 7, 1995 at the meeting held on March 14, 1995 further proceedings as regards winding up etc. of the Corporation as contemplated by BIFR vide their order dated January 3, 1995 issued on 12th January, 1995 are kept in abeyance. ( 39 ) IN view of the said order of February 7, 1995 at the meeting held on March 14, 1995 further proceedings as regards winding up etc. of the Corporation as contemplated by BIFR vide their order dated January 3, 1995 issued on 12th January, 1995 are kept in abeyance. In the facts and circumstances the matter is very much pending before the BIFR for investigation. In fact the matter is sub-judice in view of pendency of the said writ petition being C. O. No. 1963 (W) of 1995 (Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Employees' Union v. Union of India), in which in terim order has been passed as already noted. In view of the order dated February 7, 1995 and pending proceeding in respect of the said writ petition filed by the Employees' Union the inquiry under Section 16 and/or scheme referred under Section 17 is still under consideration and / or needs final approval of BIFR and the final decision of BIFR has not yet been made attracting the provision of Section 22 of Act in all respect. ( 40 ) NO winding up of the petitioner Corporation has taken effect nor an order of winding has been passed as contemplated under Section 22 of the said Act and accordingly no finality has also reached as regards BIFR proceeding. ( 41 ) IN my view, the order of January 3, 1995 and 12th January 1995 are only the prima facie opinion on the part of the BIFR holding that it may not be practicable for the Corporation to make its net worth positive 7 and it may be just and equitable that it is to be wound up and (no) order under Section 22 of the Act has been passed and on the contrary on perusal of last paragraph of the order dated January 3, 1995 and 12th January, 1995 it would be revealed that "the Bench directs the issue of public notice of winding up under -Section 20 for consideration of objection/suggestion or alternative proposals if any. . . . . . . . " No further proceeding would now be taken, having regard to the order of stay granted by the Hon'ble Court in the aforesaid writ petition. ( 42 ) UNDER the Act, the decree-holder is required to obtain previous consent of BIFR before initiation of the execution proceeding. . . . . . . . " No further proceeding would now be taken, having regard to the order of stay granted by the Hon'ble Court in the aforesaid writ petition. ( 42 ) UNDER the Act, the decree-holder is required to obtain previous consent of BIFR before initiation of the execution proceeding. It does not appear, however, that any such consent has been obtained. Without obtaining such consent, in my view, the instant application for execution will not be maintainable. ( 43 ) THE learned Advocate for the decree-holder has relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of Bengal Lamps Ltd. v. Jurmanite Nicco Ltd. , reported in 1990 (2) CLJ 339 . The question involved in the said decision was if mere Registration of reference under Section 15 amounts to pendency of inquiry, under Section 16 and if such reference under Sec. 15 comes under the scope of the S. 22 (1) of the Act. ( 44 ) THE Division Bench held "that the scheme of the Act would show that a distinction is drawn between reference, enquiries and schemes. Apart from the heading of Chapter III to the Act the regulations would also show that a distinction is drawn between a reference and an enquiry. Regulation 19 deals with reference under Section 15 of the Act while Regulation 20 deals with enquiries under Section 16 of the said Act. An enquiry under Section 16 is therefore only a stage in the proceedings contemplated under the Act. If one were to adopt the analogy of a suit the inquiry could be equated with the actual trial. A trial cannot be said to be pending merely because a suit is filed. Similarly an enquiry under Section 16 cannot be said to be pending merely because a reference is filed. In any event the words of the statute are explicit. Section 22 refers to an enquiry under Section 16 of the Act. Had it been the intention of the legislature to extend provisions of Section 22 to a reference made under S, 15 the legislature would have provided for that expressly. This the Legislature has not chosen to do. The use of the words "under Section 16" limits the words "enquiry pending" in Section 22 (I ). The provisions of S. 22 (1) apply only to such enquiries and to no other. This the Legislature has not chosen to do. The use of the words "under Section 16" limits the words "enquiry pending" in Section 22 (I ). The provisions of S. 22 (1) apply only to such enquiries and to no other. It is well established that if the language is clear the Court must give effect to it "for the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature". ( 45 ) IN view of the express wording of the statute, there is no question of the application of the principles of beneficial construction. In any event Section 2 of the Act indicates that the Act has been enacted for giving effect to the directive principles as contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. The principles contained in Articles 19 (b) and (c) relate to subserving the common good as opposed to concentration of wealth. ( 46 ) IT would appear from the statements of objects and reasons of the Act that one of the objects of the Act is to salvage the productive assets and realise the amount due to the Banks and other financial institutions to the extent possible from the non-viable Industrial Companies through liquidation of those Companies. ( 47 ) IN other words the benefits of the legislation is not aimed merely at reviving a sick industry but also to put an end to a nonviable sick industry with a view to protecting investment of public funds. ( 48 ) AT the time of the registration of a reference the Secretary is expected only to see whether the documentation is in order. The Secretary is not required to come to any decision regarding the merits of the reference. There is necessarily some hiatus between the registration of the reference and the commencement of the enquiry. As stated above one of the objects of the Act is to protect public investment made through financial institution. For example, a Company with the 8 mischievous intent of avoiding its creditors could file a reference under Section 15 with untruthful but correct documentation. As stated above one of the objects of the Act is to protect public investment made through financial institution. For example, a Company with the 8 mischievous intent of avoiding its creditors could file a reference under Section 15 with untruthful but correct documentation. It may be that the circumstances of the case may not warrant the filing of a reference in fact and if the contention that documentation, being in order the Secretary would register the reference under Regulation 19 and the enquiry under Section 16 would be pending from that date is accepted in that event the result would be that recovery proceedings by a financial institution would be stalled for a crucial period allowing the dishonest Company time to siphon off its assets. This could not have been the intention of the legislature. ( 49 ) SECTION 16 (3) of the Act also indicates that the enquiry is to be commenced by the Board. The Board is required to complete the enquiry within 60 (sixty) days from the commencement of the enquiry. This cannot mean that the Board must complete the enquiry within 60 (sixty) days from the registration of the reference but must be construed as meaning from when the Board first applies its mind. Mere registration of a reference by the Secretary to the Board cannot mean any application of mind by the Board itself. ( 50 ) FURTHERMORE it will appear from Section 22 (1) that proceedings may be continued against the Industrial Company with the consent of the Board. This would suggest that the Board would have to apply its mind for the purpose of determining whether the consent should be granted or not. If the Board has not commenced enquiry at all, it would not be in a position to accord such consent. ( 51 ) MERELY because Parliament in its wisdom has made Section 22 (1) applicable to appeals and permitted proceedings against the company to be stayed pending such appeal, it cannot lead to the conclusion that the phrase "an enquiry Section 16" in S. 22 (1) must include a reference under S, 15 of the Act. ( 52 ) IN the instant case such question does not arise. ( 52 ) IN the instant case such question does not arise. Since the registration stage was long over and there is no dispute that in the enquiry stage order was passed from time to time ( 53 ) ACCORDINGLY in my view, the principles decided in the aforesaid decision does not apply to the facts of the instant case. The other decision cited by learned Advocate for the petitioner is the case of Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Mehboob Productions Private Ltd. , reported in 1993 (1) CLJ 340. BIFR granted time to the Gramophone Company to make its work procedure by 93-94 and it is within that time, the winding up application was made. The question was whether the terms of Section 22 prevent institution of winding up application during the period when the time permitted under Section was elapsing. ( 54 ) AS already noted in the instant case enquiry cannot be said to have been concluded since the matter of investigation was still open in view of the facts and record. The question, therefore, appears to be immaterial and the decision also cannot assist the petitioner. The unreported decision in the case of the India Jute and Industries Ltd. v. Free India Dry Accumulator Ltd. delivered on 13th February, 1989 has been relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The said decision, in my view, does not finally decide the issue nor any final order was passed in the said matter. ( 55 ) THE learned Judge in the said decision made it clear that the order was passed without prejudice to the point of jurisdiction, although the learned Judge mentioned specifically only two points that the company had become sick, and that there was no recommendation by the Board for winding up. There is no indication, however, that all other points of jurisdiction were finally decided upon and not merely a preliminary finding subject to further consideration. ( 56 ) MOREOVER, no principle has been decided in the said case. It is well settled that a decision is binding on the basis of ratio-decidendi. No ratio has been formulated in the said decision and as such in my view, the said decision has no binding effect. ( 56 ) MOREOVER, no principle has been decided in the said case. It is well settled that a decision is binding on the basis of ratio-decidendi. No ratio has been formulated in the said decision and as such in my view, the said decision has no binding effect. On behalf of the judgment-debtor learned Advocate has referred to the following decisions :- (1) Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State 9 Inddustrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. , reported in (1993) 2 SCC 144 and also (2) The Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 1017 equal to 1990 (2) SCC 440 . ( 57 ) IN the case of Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. (supra), it was held that the expression proceeding under Section 22 (1) must be widely construed. It cannot be confined to legal proceedings understood in the narrow sense. It includes all proceedings in Court of Law and or a legal tribunal for attachment and sale of debtors' property, notwithstanding the use of that expression in the marginal note. In the aforesaid decision, the appellant and industrial concern defaulted in repayment of loan or advance or other instalments and failed to meet obligations under the terms of the agreement with the Financial Corporation and the proceeding was initiated under Section 29/ 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Notwithstanding the bar of Sec. 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called 1985 Act), the Supreme Court in this context held that the provisions contained in Section 22 will be applicable to such proceedings initiated by State Financial Corporation under S. 29/31. The Supreme Court further held that where an inquiry is pending under Section 16/17 or an appeal is pending under Section 25 of the 1985 Act there should be cessation of the coercive activities of the type mentioned in Section 22 (1) to permit the BIFR to consider what remedial measures it should take with respect to the sick industrial company. ( 58 ) AS already noted in the instant case, notice has been directed to be issued by order of BIFR dated 11th January, 1995 fixing date of hearing of 14th March, 1995 to consider suggestions/objections for revival of the company. ( 58 ) AS already noted in the instant case, notice has been directed to be issued by order of BIFR dated 11th January, 1995 fixing date of hearing of 14th March, 1995 to consider suggestions/objections for revival of the company. The said suggestions/objections along with supporting documents were directed to be filed with the Registrar of the Board by 26th February, 1995. ( 59 ) AT the hearing of the Special Bench of the Board dated 14th March, 1995 it was recorded as follows :-"at today's hearing the representative of the workers stated that the union of workers had filed a writ petition in the High Court at Calcutta on 7th February, 1995 challenging the validity and / or legality of the purported order issued on 12th January, 1995 by the BIFR (Bench-II Special) in Case No. 510/92 in respect of Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. directing issuance of public notice for winding up of the company. The Hon'ble Court had directed for filing of affidavit-in-opposition within 3 weeks and affidavit-in-reply within one week. Pending hearing of the application and having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner an interim order had been passed restraining the respondents from proceeding on the basis of the order passed in Case No. 510/92 dated 12th January, 1995. He added that no one appeared on behalf of BIFR and leave was given to the respective parties to communicate this order to the BIFR which had been directed to act on the basis of such communication. Shri D. C. Samant, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Industries, stated that a copy of similar communication was also received by him from the worker's Union. Considering the facts on record and submissions made at today's hearing the Bench held that pending vacation of the interim order of the Calcutta High Court restraining BIFR from proceeding further on the basis of its order passed on 12th January, 1995 further proceedings in the case are held in abeyance. " ( 60 ) IN the meantime, on 10th February, 1995 Joint Secretary, Ministry of Heavy Industries, sent a letter to the Registrar of BIFR to the effect as follows:"i am directed to refer to your letter dated 11-1-1995 forwarding therewith the minutes of the BIFR hearing held on 3-1-1995 along with show cause notice on the above subject. " ( 60 ) IN the meantime, on 10th February, 1995 Joint Secretary, Ministry of Heavy Industries, sent a letter to the Registrar of BIFR to the effect as follows:"i am directed to refer to your letter dated 11-1-1995 forwarding therewith the minutes of the BIFR hearing held on 3-1-1995 along with show cause notice on the above subject. As already mentioned in the said hearing, Government would not have any objection if a private sector investor is found to take over 0 the company and that privatisation could be by way of an open advertisement to the highest bidder. In case of such an offer, Government would consider financial restructuring to the new private investor on merits. It may be relevant to mention that when the BIFR Bench had earlier directed the IFCI (OA) to go for an advertisement to find new promoter (s) for MAMC, Government decision to consider financial restructuring was not available and hence it has not specifically come out in the advertisement. In view of the latest developments, the Department would pray that the BIFR may direct the IFCI (OA) to readvertise for finding a new private investor for MAMC who may be made aware about the Government's intention regarding consideration of financial restructuring. It is hoped, readvertisement with intention of financial restructuring on the part of Government may elicit interest from private investors. " ( 61 ) IT therefore, appears that there is still scope for fresh consideration of any scheme or suggestions and the Board could not go into the matter in view of the interim order passed in the writ petition. In my view, the proper course for the decree-holder / creditor under such circumstances was to approach the Board for permission to proceed against the company for recovery of dues / outstanding and then to proceed in execution, if such permission was granted. If the approval is not obtained remedy is not extinguished, it is only postponed. ( 62 ) IN this connection, the judgment and decision in the case of Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 1017 may be taken note of. If the approval is not obtained remedy is not extinguished, it is only postponed. ( 62 ) IN this connection, the judgment and decision in the case of Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 1017 may be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 11 of the said judgment at page 1020 observed and held as follows :"it may be against the principles of equity if the creditors are not allowed to recover their dues from the company, but such creditors may approach the Board for permission to proceed against the company for the recovery of their dues/outstandings/overdues or arrears by whatever name it is called. The Board at its discretion may accord its approval for proceeding against the company. If the approval is not granted, the remedy is not extinguished. It is only postponed. Subsection (5) of Section 22 provides for exclusion of the period during which the remedy is suspended while computing the period of limitation for recovering the dues. In our opinion, the High Court was justified in quashing the recovery proceedings taken against the properties of the company and we accordingly, reject this petition, with no order as to costs. " ( 63 ) ACCORDINGLY in my view, the application for execution fails since no approval of the Board has admittedly been obtained prior to proceeding in execution. ( 64 ) BOTH the applications of the plaintiff/ decree-holder and of the judgment-debtor stand disposed of. There will however be no order as to costs. ( 65 ) THE learned Advocate on behalf of the decree-holder prays for stay of the operation of this judgment and order which is stayed for a period of two weeks from today. ( 66 ) ALL parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Order accordingly.q