P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and orderdated 31/03/1990, of an Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, by which the appellanthas been convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penalcode and Section 27 of the Arms Act and has been sentenced to undergo lifeimprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00 and in default to undergo furtherrigorous imprisonment for one year on the first count and sentenced to undergorigorous imprisonment for two years on the second count with the direction that thesubstantive sentences shall run concurrently. ( 2 ). The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant s brother Jaibhagwan had been stabbed by Tek Chand-deceased and a case was registeredagainst Tek Chand for an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penalcode on 13/06/1987, vide copy of the F. I. R. Ex. PW9/a. Tek Chand was having anelectric shop bearing No. WZ-297/c, JJ. Colony, Madipur, Delhi. On 13/05/1988,it is alleged that while Tek Chand was present in the shop at about 3. 30 P. M. that theappellant came to that shop and had stabbed Tek Chand with a knife and Tek Chandhad succumbed to his injuries as a result of the said assault. ( 3 ). The police came to the spot on the basis of a report No. l8 recorded at Policepost Madipur, Delhi, copy of which is Ex. PW19/a wherein it is recorded that at 4p. m. a message was received from the Police Officer Incharge of apolice van thatpolice Van-9 had removed the injured from Madipur Bus Stand to some unknownhospital. A copy of this report was handed over to ASI Om Parkash PW15 whoaccompanied by Constable Mahabir Singh had reached the said place and he metrajesh Kumar PW5 and recorded his statement Ex. PW5/a in which Rajesh Kumardisclosed that he was a resident of house No. E-370, JJ. Colony, Madipur and he isalso having a shop bearing No. WZ-297/c at that place and at about 3. PW5/a in which Rajesh Kumardisclosed that he was a resident of house No. E-370, JJ. Colony, Madipur and he isalso having a shop bearing No. WZ-297/c at that place and at about 3. 30 P. M. he wasproceeding to his house from the shop that he saw Naresh i. e. appellant coming outof the shop of Tek Chand and running away and he went to the shop of Tek Chandand found Tek Chand lying in a pool of blood and he with the help of Anil Kumarhad put Tek Chand in a police jeep and Anil Kumar told him at that time that Nareshkumar s/o Nawal Kishore of Village Madipur had stabbed Tek Chand and thereafter Anil Kumar had gone with the injured in the police jeep and got him admittedin Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. There is also a mention that a criminal case ofstabbing Jai Bhagwan, brother of the appellant, is pending against Tek Chand in thecourt and he had assaulted Tek Chand to take revenge. ( 4 ). On the basis of this statement a case was registered under Section 307 of theindian Penal Code vide F. I. R. No. 166/88 at about 4. 45 p. m. at Police Station Punjabibagh as per copy of the F. I. R. Ex. PW12/b. At this stage we may point out that in thepaper book the office had put a translation of the F. I. R. in English which containscertain cuttings regarding the date and the time but we have seen the original F. I. R. which is in Hindi and find that there is no cutting either in the date or in the time. Thelearned Counsel for the appellant in all fairness did not pursue any further contention on the basis of such cutting appearing in the translated copy of the F. I. R. prepared by our Registry. ( 5 ). Coming back to the case, PW16 SI Harpal Singh had also on receivinginformation reached the place of occurrence and on being informed that the injuredtek Chand had been removed to the hospital, he reached there and obtained themedico Legal Certificate of Tek Chand which disclosed that he had been shown asbrought dead. He took into possession the two sealed parcels containing a shirt anda vest of the deceased vide memo Ex. PW11/a. He recorded the statements ofprabhu Dayal and Anil Kumar in the hospital. He took into possession the two sealed parcels containing a shirt anda vest of the deceased vide memo Ex. PW11/a. He recorded the statements ofprabhu Dayal and Anil Kumar in the hospital. PW9 Inspector Sumer Singh, SHO ofthe Police Station concerned, had conducted the inquest proceedings and preparedthe necessary papers which are Ex. PW8/a and had sent the dead body of Tek Chandfor post-mortem vide application Ex. PW8/b alongwith brief facts Ex. PW8/c. Thepost-mortem on the dead body of Tek Chand was performed by Dr. L. K Baruah. Hefound in all six injuries out of them five were incised wounds and he opined thatinjury No. 5 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and he alsogave the opinion that injuries were possible with the knife, which was later onallegedly recovered at the instance of the appellant on the basis of his disclosurestatement, which was also sent to the doctor for his opinion. ( 6 ). The appellant was arrested on 15/05/1988 and was interrogated inpresence of PW1 Mahesh Kumar and PW2 Khazan Singh, brother of the deceasedand is stated to have made a disclosure statement Ex. PW2/a and got recovered theknife from a drain nearby the place of occurrence of which sketch was prepared andthe same was also converted into sealed parcel. The appellant s shirt, which washaving some blood stains and appeared to have been washed, was also taken intopossession. The case property was sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory. The reports of the CFSL Exs. PW16/ci to C4 disclose that there was human bloodpresent on the knife which was of o group and the said o group human blood wasalso found on the clothes of the deceased and so also his sample blood. However,the blood stains found on the shirt of the appellant were found to be of b group,hence that shirt is not connected with the commission of the crime. ( 7 ). The learned Additional Sessions Judge has believed the testimony of PW3prabhu Dayal and had sought corroboration to certain material facts from thetestimony of PW4 and PW5 and had also believed the recovery of the knife at theinstance of the appellant which was blood stained and the blood stains were foundto be same group 0 which was the blood group of the deceased and thus broughthome the offences to the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. ( 8 ). ( 8 ). The learned Counsel for the appellant has in his usual vehemence contendedthat the prosecution case is not made out beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch asprabhu Dayal has not been named as an eye witness in the F. I. R. whereas Anilkumar, who is alleged to have disclosed the name of the appellant to Rajesh Kumar (PW5), has turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case on this point andeven Rajesh Kumar had turned hostile by deposing that he has not been disclosedthe name of the appellant by Anil Kumar and thus, there was no credible witnessesexamined by the prosecution which could have supported the prosecution version. He has also urged that although Tek Chand s death had come to the notice of thepolice soon after the-information was sent by the Duty Constable to the Police Postwhich was recorded at 4. 45 p. m. in Daily Diary No. 22, copy of which is Ex. PW19b,but no special report is proved to have been sent to the higher authorities includingthe Metropolitan Magistrate of the area concerned. So, it is urged that in the presentcase in the absence of these safe-guards and also absence of any proof of anycorresponding copy of the Daily Diary which is required to be recorded as soon asthe F. I. . R is recorded containing the substance of the FIR, it must be inferred thatf. I. R. in the present case must have been ante-timed and the name of the appellanthas been falsely implicated in this case perhaps due to the enmity which theappellant had with the deceased. ( 9 ). The learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, has contended thatmere lapses of the investigating police in not complying with the various provisionsof the Code of Criminal Procedure which require that the substance of the F. I. R. mustbe recorded in the Daily Diary and as soon as heinous crimes like murder is shownto be committed, a special report may be immediately sent to the higher authoritiesincluding Metropolitan Magistrate, are not sufficient to throw away the prosecutioncase which is clearly made out on the basis of credible and truthful statements of theeye witnesses which find due corroboration from the recovery of the weapon ofoffence at the instance of the appellant. He has urged that the various apparentcontradictions pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant with regard tothe statements of the witnesses particularly of the witnesses to the recovery of knifeare innocuous and do not go to the root of the matter and the case of the prosecutionis well made out particularly when the blood stains found on the knife were foundto tally with the bood of the deceased and that knife was also opined to have beenused for stabbing Tek Chand. The cut marks found on the shirt of the deceased wereopined to have been possible with the aforesaid knife. ( 10 ). It is true that name of Prabhu Dayal PW3 does not find mention in the F. I. R. or in the sketch prepared by the Investigating Officer at the place of occurrence. Ifwe keep the testimony of Prabhu Dayal in view it is evident that he on seeing theappellant running away from the shop. of Tek Chand had pursued him to somedistance and thereafter he had gone to the hospital learning that the injured had beenremoved to the hospital and it is in the hospital that he met the Investigating Officerand had disclosed that he was the eye witness and he gave the statement. It is quiteclear as far as law is concerned that it is not absolutely necessary that names of all theeye witnesses must figure in the F. I. R. It depends upon the facts of each case to seewhether a particular eye witness is a truthful witness or not and also to examine thereason as to why his name could not come in the F. I. R. If the Court is satisfied thatthere was no lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer in recording the F. I. R. andthe eye witness was not available at the time the F. I. R. was recorded, it cannot be saidthat eye witness was later on put up just to support the prosecution case. ( 11 ). Prabhu Dayal PW3 is totally independent witness. He has no links eitherwith the appellant or with the deceased or with the other eye witnesses. It is evidentthat when he saw the ocurrence his attention was directed towards the appellantrunning away from the shop of Tek Chand and he thought it fit to pursue him. ( 11 ). Prabhu Dayal PW3 is totally independent witness. He has no links eitherwith the appellant or with the deceased or with the other eye witnesses. It is evidentthat when he saw the ocurrence his attention was directed towards the appellantrunning away from the shop of Tek Chand and he thought it fit to pursue him. It ispossible that Rajesh Kumar or even Anil the other witnesses produced by theprosecution might not have noticed Prabhu Dayal so that his name could be alsodisclosed in the F. I. R. ( 12 ). It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the testimony of Prabhudayal is not natural inasmuch as he had not raised any hue and cry while pursuingthe appellant in order to attract the passers by or persons who might be present onthe very busy Bus Stand located )ust near the shop of Tek Chand. It is true thatprabhu Dayal has stated that he has not raised any hue and cry while he waspursuing the appellant, but it has not come in evidence that there was any publicperson present at the Bus Stand at that time whose attention could have beenattracted by raising hue and cry. When a person is following another person it is notalways necessary that it would come to his mind to raise alarm because that personhimself is not affected by the crime committed by the either person. We have gonethrough the testimony of Prabhu Dayal closely and we find that he is straightforward and truthful witness. He had seen the appellant coming out of the shop oftek Chand and he just followed him. He had also seen Tek Chand being stabbed bythe appellant. The learned Counsel for the appellant has pointed out to thetestimony of Anil PW4 where, while being hostile to the prosecution, he has statedthat there were chics both on the front side of the shop as well as on the rear side. Thecontention raised is that any person walking in front of the shop of Tek Chand wouldnot have been in a position to witness the occurrence which took place inside theshop. Anil Kumar is hostile witness and he has not supported the prosecutionversion with regard to his having witnessed the stabbing and he was duly confronted With his police statement where he had given the eye witness account. Anil Kumar is hostile witness and he has not supported the prosecutionversion with regard to his having witnessed the stabbing and he was duly confronted With his police statement where he had given the eye witness account. It isclear from the testimony of the Investigating Officer who had prepared the sketchthat no question had been put to him that there were any chics found at the shop oftek Chand and no such chics have been shown in the sketch prepared at the spot. Mere fact that hostile witness Anil Kumar had thought it fit to show favour toaccused in his cross-examination by admitting that there were chics present at theshop of Tek Chand at the time of the occurrence does not mean that whatever he istelling the court is true. we should not forget that he has already turned hostile to. the prosecution and in his anxiety to support the appellant, he has come out with thefact which is not alluded to by any of the other witnesses. The defence has not crossexamined other witnesses or the Investigating Officer to elicit this fact whether thereexisted any chics or not at the shop of Tek Chand. The sketch of the premisesprepared soon after the occurrence does not show the presence of any such chics. So,on this score it cannot be said that Prabhu Dayal could not have seen the occurrencetaking place in the shop of Tek Chand when he had come there for unloading certaingoods from his hand-driven cart. There is not even a suggestion to Prabhu Dayal thathe has any reason to falsely implicate the appellant for this crime. ( 13 ). At any rate the testimony of Rajesh Kumar PW5, who is author of the F. I. R. ,also shows that he had also seen the appellant running away from the shop of Tekchand. This part of his statement was not challenged in cross-examination. It is truethat on certain facts, which he had given to the police in the F. I. R. , he had beenconfronted with as he had not given those facts in his statement in court as hedeposed that Anil Kumar had not told him that the appellant had stabbed Tekchand which fact stands mentioned in the F. I. R. given by this witness. At any raterajesh Kumar is also an independent witness. At any raterajesh Kumar is also an independent witness. He is a neighbour shopkeeper and hasno axe of his own to grind by falsely implicating the appellant in this crime. Thestatement that he had seen the appellant coming out of the shop of Tek Chand afterthe commission of the crime and running away from the spot is quite credible andin our view has been rightly believed by the Lower Court. ( 14 ). The learned Counsel for the appellant has cited various judgments insupport of his contention that as there has taken place lapses on the part of theinvestigating agency in not proving the Dairy Diary report containing the substanceof the F. I. R. and not showing that any special report was sent to the Metropolitanmagistrate, thus it should be held that the F. I. R. in this case was not recorded at thetime purported to have been mentioned in the F. I. R. He has made reference to Thestate of Punjab v. Tarlok Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1221 . In the said case it was found thatf. I. R. purported to have been lodged at 3. 45 p. m. but the special report had notwas lodged without lapse of unnecessary time. We have gone through the judgmentand we find that witnesses who were examined were not truthful. So, keeping inview all these facts, the High Court had acquitted the accused in that case whichacquittal was upheld by the Supreme Court. ( 15 ). He has also REFERRED TO to Balaka Singh and Others v. The State of Punjab, AIR1975 SC 1962. In the said case, there was omission to report the names of some of theaccused in the inquest repiort and keeping in thevarious.-facts appearing in that casethe Supreme Court held that such omission led to some doubt of complicity of thefour accused who were not mentioned in the inquest report. It was also found as afact that in all probability the F. I. R. was recorded after the inquest report wasprepared. ( 16 ). It was also found as afact that in all probability the F. I. R. was recorded after the inquest report wasprepared. ( 16 ). Reference is then made to Ishwar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2423 , wherein the extraordinary delay took place in sending the F. I. R. in acase pertaining to serious offences, it was held that extraordinary delay in sendingthe F. I. R. is a circumstance which provides a legitimate basis for suspecting that thefirst Information Report was recorded much later than the stated date and houraffording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments and set up a distorted version of the occurrence. He has also cited Vijindersingh v. The State, 1984 (1) Crimes 237, where the eye witnesses made manyimprovements of grave magnitude in the statements in court and there were deeplyinterestd witnesses, a Bench of this Court in that case had found that there delay insending the F. I. R. to the Magistrate as required under Section 157 of the Code ofcriminal Procedure and thus, held that this delay has resulted in false implicationof the accused in that case. ( 17 ). He has also cited the case Lala Ram b Another v. State, 36 (1988) DLT 8, inwhich also it has been highlighted the necessity of complying with the requirementof Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Rule 24. 1 of the Punjabpolice Rules for recording the substance of the F. I. R. in the Daily Diary and forsending the special report to the Ilaqa Magistrate in a case of murder promptly. ( 18 ). It is true that these safe-guards have been provided by the statute to ensurenot only the fair investigation being done by the prosecution but also that there isprompt recording of the F. I. R. which sometimes lead the court to believe theprosecution version as it has come out without any delay. ( 19 ). He has also REFERRED TO to Jagjit Singh v. State, 1990 (2) Delhi Lawyer 135 (DB), where again same principles have been laid down by this Court. Lastly he hasreferred TO to Arjun Marik and Others v. State of Bihar, JT 1994 (2) SC 627. In the saidcase the evidence was found to be shaky and inconclusive. ( 19 ). He has also REFERRED TO to Jagjit Singh v. State, 1990 (2) Delhi Lawyer 135 (DB), where again same principles have been laid down by this Court. Lastly he hasreferred TO to Arjun Marik and Others v. State of Bihar, JT 1994 (2) SC 627. In the saidcase the evidence was found to be shaky and inconclusive. There were infirmitiesin the prosecution evidence coupled with that there was delay in sending specialreport to the Magistrate and thus, the court held that all these facts are fatal to theprosecution case. ( 20 ). It depends on the facts of a particular case to see as to whether such lapseof the prosecution should lead the court to disbelieve eye witness or not. Referencemaybe made to Murder Reference No. 8 of 1976, State v. Dharampal, decided by adivision Bench of this Court on 6/05/1977. It was found that there was no nameof the accused mentioned in the substance of the F. I. R. recorded in the Daily Diary,still keeping in view the facts of that case as the witnesses were truthful the court heldthat this lapse on the part of the investigating agency would not go to show that F. I. R. was ante-timed to falsely implicate the particular accused. ( 21 ). The learned Counsel for the State has cited State of U. P. v. Gokaran andothers, AIR 1985 SC 131 , where it was laid down by the Supreme Court that it is notthat as if every delay in sending a delayed special report to the District Magistrateunder Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would necessarily lead to theinference that the F. I. R. has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timedor ante-dated or that the investigation is not fair and forth-right. ( 22 ). It is an absurd proposition of law that if there takes place lapse at the levelof the police investigating the crime, this lapse should result in every case in drawingan inference against the prosecution that the witnesses put forward by the prosecution as eye witnesses are not truthful witnesses or have been just put up to supportthe prosecution version at a belated stage. It is also settled law that even if there isone solitary eye witness whose evidence is truthful and credible such an eyewitness s testimony alone can be sufficient to bring home the offence to a particularaccused. Reference may be made to Vahula Bhushan @ Vehuna Krishnan v. Stateof Tamil Nadu, AIR 1989 SC 236 , in this connection. ( 23 ). In the present case, we find that the Additional Sessions Judge has rightlyplaced implicit reliance on the straight-forward and truthful evidence of Prabhudayal PW3 which finds due corroboration also from the testimony of author of thef. I. R. PW5 Rajesh Kumar. ( 24 ). However, in the present case we also find that there is recovery of theweapon of offence at the instance of the appellant on the basis of the disclosurestatement made by him. It is true that PW2 Khazan Singh is the brother of thedeceased and PW1 Mahesh is his friend and they would be, of course, anxious to seethat the culprit in the case is apprehended and for that purpose they had come to thepolice to find out whether the culprit has been arrested or not. It is in their presencethat the police had interrogated the appellant on 15/05/1988, which. led to therecovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant. Of course, thereare certain discrepancies appearing in their statements with regard to the drain fromwhich the knife was allegedly recovered. PWI has stated that the drain was locatedat a distance of 10-15 paces from the place of occurrence whereas PW2 had statedthat it was at a distance of 400-500 yards. Some persons have little sense of distance. So, such a discrepancy would not go to show that the statements of the witnesses arenot credit-worthy with regard to the core of the matter regarding the disclosurestatement having been made which led to the recovery of the weapon of offence atthe instance of the appellant. It has been then pointed out that PWI has stated thatthere was some grill covering the drain from where the knife was got recoveredwhereas PW2 has stated that it was uncovered drain. It has not been pin-pointedfrom the statements of the witnesses in cross-examination as to whether the wholeof the drain was uncovered or a particular portion of the drain was uncovered or aparticular spot of the drain was covered. It has not been pin-pointedfrom the statements of the witnesses in cross-examination as to whether the wholeof the drain was uncovered or a particular portion of the drain was uncovered or aparticular spot of the drain was covered. It is possible that particular spot of the drainmight have the grill over it while the other portion might not have any such grill. So,it cannot be said that there has occurred any such serious discrepancy in thestatements of these witnesses which could lead this court to draw an inference thatthis knife has been just planted on the appellant. Presence of the blood of the samegroup as that of the deceased on the knife ensures that this knife was the weapon ofoffence and these witnesses are also supported by the police officials, namely, PW10constable Harpal Singh and PW16 SI Harpal Singh that the appellant had made adisclosure statement and had got recovered the said knife from the said drain. Hence, we hold that the recovery of knife also gives due corroboration to theprosecution case. So, in view of the above discussion, we hold that the conviction of the appellantis well based and we, thus, dismiss the appeal and maintain the conviction and sentences of the appellant.