JUDGMENT Basudev Panigrahi: This is an application filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the District Delegate at Alipore in Act 39, Case No. 198/93 (Succession). 2. One Sunil Kumar Banerjee, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner and the proforma opposite parties nos. 2 to 8 dies intestate leaving behind his movable properties along with others. The family of the deceased is being governed under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and the succession to the estate of the deceased is being governed by the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. The petitioner along with other proforma opposite parties inherited the assets, debts and securities left behind by the deceased. The petitioner along with other opposite parties are entitled to the grant of succession certificate in respect of the estate of the deceased under no. X of Act XXXIX of 1925 and amended by Act XVIII of 1929. The petitioner while filing the application for grant of succession certificate deposited Rs. 10,000/- as stamp duty on 2nd April, 1993. The estate of the deceased had been valued at Rs. 17,24,273.25p. The learned court below directed the petitioner to pay an additional stamp duty of Rs. 1,01,850/- over and above the stamp duty of Rs, 10,000/- paid earlier. Being aggrieved by such order the petitioner filed this application. 3. During the pendency of this application a Division Bench of this court presided over by N. K. Mitra, J. directed the applicant to pay the balance stamp duty pursuant to the direction issued by the court below but it will be subject to the result of this application. In accordance with such direction it appears that the petitioner has already deposited the additional stamp duty of Rs. 1,01,850/- as per the challan No. 22476 dated 6th August, 1994. 4. Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing for the applicant strongly contended that the learned trial court has committed a gross jurisdictional error in issuing such direction by which the petitioner had to deposit the balance stamp duty. It is also argued that this point had appeared more often than not before the Supreme Court and the Apex Court in its decision reported in AIR 1989 SC, page 100 held the "If in respect of all other suits of whatever nature and complexity an .upper limit of Rs. It is also argued that this point had appeared more often than not before the Supreme Court and the Apex Court in its decision reported in AIR 1989 SC, page 100 held the "If in respect of all other suits of whatever nature and complexity an .upper limit of Rs. 15,000/- on the court-fee is fixed, there is no logical justification for singling out the proceeding for grant of probate and letters of administration for an ad valorem impost without the benefit of some upper limit prescribed by the same statute respecting all other litigants. The discrimination brought about by the statute fails to pass the constitutional muster". It also held that "immediate steps are called for and are imperative to rationalise the levies of court-fees. In doing so that States should realise the desirability of levying on the initial slab of the subject matter-say up to Rs. 15,000/- a nominal court fees not exceeding 2 to 2½ % so that small claims are not priced out of Courts. "Those who have less in life" it is said "should have more in law". Claims in excess of Rs. 15,000/ - might admit of an ad valorem levy at rates which, preferably, should not exceed 7½% subject further of an upper limit which, having regard to all circumstances, could be envisaged at Rs. 75,000/-. Having regard to steep inflation over the two decades the upper limit could perhaps go up to Rs 75,000/-. After that limit is reached, it is appropriate to impose on gradually increasing slabs of the value of the subject matter progressively decreasing rates, say from 7½% down to ½% in graduated scales. The governments concerned should bestow attention on these matters and bring about a rationalisation of the levies". 5. Following the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment there was an occasion beforehand to consider the applicability of payment of ad valorem court-fee in respect of the probate proceeding covered under Art. 10, Schedule-I. It was held in the Civil Order No. 16771 (W) of 1991 by Justice S.C. Sen, (as He then was) that the levy of ad valorem imposed without any upper limit in respect of grant of probate and letters of administration as provided by the West Bengal Court-fees Act, 1970 ultra vires the provision of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is further held that all cases, including the present case probate duty in excess of Rs. 10,000/- cannot be levied by the respondent State. 6. Mr Basu, learned Advocate appearing for the State as well as for the learned Advocate General has, however made a feeble attempt to distinguish from the judgment by stating that in the judgment cited, supra, this Court had an occasion to go to examine the validity of the court-fee payable in respect of Article 10 of Sch. I, but in this case it is a matter which is squarely coming under Art. 11. Therefore, there has been no previous decision on this point whether the State Government could realise irrespective of the selling limit of Rs. 10,000/- as stamp duty from the petitioner, While repelling such contention Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon another unreported decision of this court in C. O. 523/94 where it has been specifically held that even in case of grant of succession certificate the maximum amount of stamp duty could be realised would not exceed Rs.10,000/-. In the aforesaid judgment also it is indicated that the State cannot discriminate case where more than Rs. 10,000/- as stamp duty would be realised and in other the case it would remain only up to Rs. 10,000/-. Such discrimination being hit under Art. 14 of the Constitution and in the light of Supreme Court decision cited (supra). The levy of such stamp duty beyond Rs. 10,000/- appears to be unreasonable and arbitraty and violative of Art. 14. Accordingly the realisation of stamp duty of Rs. 1,01,850/- from the petitioner being not in-conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court and the petitioner, if claims may be entitled to refund of such amount together with interest fixed at the rate of 6% per annum. The amount shall be payable by the State Government at 6% rate of interest within three months, failing which the petitioner and the proforma opposite parties may claim interest at the rate of 12% per. annum till realisation. 7. In the above background I hold that the learned court below committed a jurisdictional error in directing the petitioner and other proforma opposite parties to pay extra stamp duty over and above Rs.10,000/- paid earlier. 8. In the result the petition succeeds and the order dated 5th January, 1994 is set aside but in the circumstances without cost. 9. 7. In the above background I hold that the learned court below committed a jurisdictional error in directing the petitioner and other proforma opposite parties to pay extra stamp duty over and above Rs.10,000/- paid earlier. 8. In the result the petition succeeds and the order dated 5th January, 1994 is set aside but in the circumstances without cost. 9. The prayer of stay of this order sought by the learned counsel for the State• is hereby refused. Petition allowed. Order set aside. Stay refused.