JUDGMENT ASHOK AGARWAL, J. :---(i) Is the lock-out declared by first respondent company illegal or deemed to be illegal; (ii) Is the first respondent-company justified in insisting upon its workers to execute an undertaking of good behaviour and diligent work by way of condition precedent for lifting the lock-out? and (iii) does the Appellant, which is not a recognised union, have a locus to file a complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971? are the questions which are posed for our consideration in the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The first respondent is a limited company engaged in manufacture of containers and allied products. The present management has taken over the company some time in the year 1983. The list which has led to the filing of the present Letters Patent Appeal commenced some-time in 1985. On 24th of October, 1985 the respondent company filed an application before the Government under section 25(o) of the Industrial Disputes Act for closure. By an order passed by the Government on the 18th of December, 1985 that application came to be rejected. This was followed by certain notices being issued by the first respondent alleging violence on the part of the workers. On 26th of December, 1985 the respondent issued a notice alleging inter alia that various notices had been issued advising the workmen to maintain discipline and not to indulge in unlawful activities. The workmen have, however, not paid any heed and have continued committing acts of indiscipline and have been intensifying the same day to day. The workers are become more hostile and aggressive and have started humiliating and hurling threats openly on the personnel of the company of dire consequences without any provocation. They are also threatening to damage the companys properties. The notice has further gone on to state that on the date of the notice, workmen gheraoed Shri R.K. Barot, the Maintenance Manager and Satyapal Goel, the stores keeper. They declared that they would not lift the gherao till assurances were given to them as to when they would be paid their wages. The two officers were humiliated, insulted, intimidated and absued in most vulgar and filthy language. The officers were threatened that none of the officers of the company would be allowed to enter the factory premises . They declared that they would not lift the gherao till assurances were given to them as to when they would be paid their wages. The two officers were humiliated, insulted, intimidated and absued in most vulgar and filthy language. The officers were threatened that none of the officers of the company would be allowed to enter the factory premises . If any officer dared to come inside the factory he would have to face dire consequences. By the violent and hostile activities workers have created tension and panic in the minds of officers and all officers are afraid to come inside the factory premises. The workmen are keeping the situation on the factory premises surcharged with tension. 3. A further notice dated the 28th of December, 1985 was issued by the respondent-company alleging that the workmen have taken over the reign of the entire factory. There is no law and order inside the factory premises. They are not obeying the directions of the security personnel. Yet, a further notice dated the 31st of December, 1985 is issued alleging violent activities on the part of the workmen on the 25th and 26th December, 1985. It was further alleged that the situation in and around the factory was very tense and that the workers have determined to assault the officers whosoever came in the factory. On 31st December, 1985, some of the officers could enter into the factory premises only in the presence of police. Apprehending grave danger to life and property the Chairman of the company rushed to the factory in the presence of the police. The Chairman tried to pacify the workmen explaining them the financial crisis being faced by the company and the paucity of funds. The explanations and persuations of the Chairman, however, have gone in-vain. A further notice dated the 2nd January, 1986 containing similar allegations was also issued. 4. On the 7th of January, 1986 the respondent Company issued a notice of lock-out with effect from the 21st of January, 1986. The notice is accompanied by an annexure containing statement of reasons for effecting the lock-out. The reasons inter alia point out that the present management had taken over the company in October, 1983 with a hope that it would be able to make it economically viable. It has invested a sum of Rs. 1 Crore for the purpose. The company, however, continued incurring huge losses. The reasons inter alia point out that the present management had taken over the company in October, 1983 with a hope that it would be able to make it economically viable. It has invested a sum of Rs. 1 Crore for the purpose. The company, however, continued incurring huge losses. The management, therefore, vide its application dated 24th of October, 1985, applied for closure. The workers instead of extending their hands of co-operation, started indulging in grave and serious acts of misconduct. They did not pay heed to the personal pursuations and explanation and advise but continued to intensify their unlawful activities. A reference is made to the aforesaid notices issued and to the incidents mentioned in the said notices. It further recited that on the 1st of January, 1986 none of the officers could come to the factory because of apprehension of danger to their lives. On that day itself someone put fire inside the mill board division near the pulper where raw material is stored with an intention to put the entire factory on fire. It was planned that the fire should intensify after the workers had left the factory at about 4.00 p.m. so that nobody should remain present to help in extinguishing the fire. Fortunately, the fire was noticed at about 2.50 p.m. and the same was immediately brought under control and the factory was saved from being engulfed in fire and reduced to ashes. The threats of damages are, thus, executed by the workmen. Not being contained, workers are giving open threats of assault and further damage to companys properties. On 6th of January, 1986 there was internal clashes and fights amongst the workers creating a lot of problems. In the circumstances, it has been decided to effect lock-out with effect from 21st of January, 1986. The workers were advised not to return during the notice period as they will be treated as on duty and would be entitled for wages during the notice period. 5. On 18th June, 1986 the appellant union filed a complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986 in the Industrial Court at Thane alleging that the respondent-company has committed offences under Item 6 of Schedule-II and Item 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV of the M.R.T.U P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. The complaint is filed beyond the period of 90 days after closure was effected by the respondent-company. The complaint is filed beyond the period of 90 days after closure was effected by the respondent-company. In the complain, the appellant alleged that the lock-out was a equal to the permission for closure having been rejected by the Government. The lock out is challenged on grounds inter alia that the notice of lock out was not served on each and every employee. The reasons alleged in the lock out notice are totally false, baseless and devoid of material particulars and truth. The reasons are not bona fide. The allegations in the notice of lock out are denied and the respondents are put to the strict proof of the same. As far as the prayer for condonation of delay, in filing the complaint, is concerned, the appellant submitted that since the employees were not given individual lock out notices they did not know the reasons for the lock out and, therefore, could not approach the Court in time. The lock out notice, which was sent to the appellant-union, was unfortunately misplaced in the office and the same mingled in some other files. On a search being made the same was traced on the 6th of May, 1986. A reply to the said notice was sent on the very day calling upon the respondents to lift the lock out. A further time upto the 18th June, 1986 was taken in giving instructions to the Advocates. 6. The respondent-company, on the 20th of January, 1987, filed its written statement. Pending the complaint, a settlement dated the 15th of April, 1987, was arrived at between substantial number of workers and the respondent company. Under the settlement 190 workers were permitted to rejoin the company after they had given an undertaking of good behaviour. Hence, the aforesaid workers resumed duties and the lock out in so far as they are concerned, was lifted with effect from the 27th of April, 1987. This has left only 27 workers who have not chosen to sign the undertaking and hence they have not been permitted to join duties. The said 27 workers are represented by the appellant-union who, on the 8th of July, 1987, filed a second complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 220 of 1987 of the Industrial Court, Thane. The complaint alleges offences under Items, 1, 4 and 6 of Schedule-II and Items 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. The said 27 workers are represented by the appellant-union who, on the 8th of July, 1987, filed a second complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 220 of 1987 of the Industrial Court, Thane. The complaint alleges offences under Items, 1, 4 and 6 of Schedule-II and Items 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. In substance the complaint of the appellant in the second complaint is that the demand by the respondent-company of the undertaking, from the workers, by way of a condition predecent for permitting them to join duties, is illegal, improper, bad-in-law and mala fide and in gross violation of various provisions of the Industrial Law and of service conditions of employees as well as of model standing orders etc. 7. By a judgment and order passed on the 18th of January, 1988, the aforesaid second complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 220 of 1987 has come to be dismissed as not being maintainable as the cause of action of the second complaint was the subject matter of the first complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986. The appellant has not chosen to challenge the aforesaid judgment and order of the 18th of January, 1988 and hence the dismissal of the second complaint has become final. 8. By a judgment and order dated the 18th of September, 1989 the first complaint, being Complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986, is also dismissed. By the said order, delay in filing the complaint, is condoned. The lock out imposed by the respondent-company, it is held, cannot be deemed to be illegal and hence no offence can be said to have been made out under Item 6 of Schedule-II and Item 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. Taking exception to the aforesaid findings and the consequent dismissal of the complaint, the appellant preferred, in this Court, a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No. 252 of 1990. By an order passed on 24th of April, 1990, by a learned Single Judge S.W. Puranik, J., the petition is summarily rejected. Taking exception to the aforesaid findings and the consequent dismissal of the complaint, the appellant preferred, in this Court, a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No. 252 of 1990. By an order passed on 24th of April, 1990, by a learned Single Judge S.W. Puranik, J., the petition is summarily rejected. The contention put forth on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal should have assessed the truth or otherwise of the statement of reasons appended to the notice of lock out, is rejected by observing that, while exercising jurisdiction under the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, the Court has only to be guided by definition of `illegal lock-out as stated in section 24(2) of the Act. In the instant case, the Court found that the respondent-employer had followed the prescribed form, reasons and procedure within the stipulated time and as such the declaration of lock-out was legal. Having so held, the other alleged unfair labour practices do not survive for consideration inasmuch as those would come up only if the lock-out was held to be illegal, holding that there exist no reason to interfere, the learned Single Judge has proceeded to reject the petition. Taking exception to the aforesaid summary rejection of the writ petition the appellant-union has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 9. Shri Deshmukh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-union has strenuously submitted that the non-existing thing cannot be a reason for doing something. It must factually exist. He is apparently referring to the reasons which are contained in the annexure to the notice of lock-out. According to him, a thing cannot be a reason for doing something unless it has come into existence before that something for doing of which the thing is a reason. When a person is under the statutory obligation to give notice of action he proposes to take and to state in the notice the reasons for which he proposes to take the action, the reason must, in fact, exist prior to the giving of the notice. When a person is under the statutory obligation to give notice of action he proposes to take and to state in the notice the reasons for which he proposes to take the action, the reason must, in fact, exist prior to the giving of the notice. If the reasons stated in the notice are found to be non-existant the notice must be held to be without stating reasons required to be stated by law and to be violative of statutory obligation and, therefore, not a notice as required under the law, in the present case as required under section 24(2)(a) of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 and the rules made thereunder. An inquiry by the Court as to whether the reasons given in the required notice, in fact, exists is essentially an inquiry for determining whether the notice is in conformity with law and only incidentally it happens to be an inquiry into the justification for the action as by definition all reasons are in the nature of justification. Such an inquiry cannot be shut out on the ground that the Court cannot go into justification for the action proposed to be taken or taken, in this case lock-out. When the law requires to state reasons in a notice, what is required is not only that reasons must be stated correctly in form but also that what is stated as reasons is true in substance and is factually existant. 10. Shri Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has resisted the above submissions by first contending that the appellant, not being a recognised union, has no right to file a complaint when there is a recognised union for the respondent-undertaking. As far as the contention in regard to the unreasonableness on the part of the respondent company for insisting upon an undertaking as a condition precedent before permitting the workers to rejoin duties and for lifting up the lock-out, the same was a subject matter of the second complaint being complaint (ULP) No. 220 of 1987. The said issue does not arise in the first complaint being complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986. As far as the second complaint is concerned, the same has been dismissed. Since no challenge is raised to its dismissal the dismissal has become final. The said issue does not arise in the first complaint being complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986. As far as the second complaint is concerned, the same has been dismissed. Since no challenge is raised to its dismissal the dismissal has become final. The appellant cannot be permitted to raise the said contention in the first complaint in the fact of the dismissal of the second complaint. Even on merits the undertaking demanded by the first respondent for lifting the lock-out and for allowing the workers to resume work, was reasonable in the circumstances of the case and the finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Court requires no interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. As far as the notice of lock out is concerned, Shri Singhvi submitted that under Item 6 Schedule-II it is not permissible for the Industrial Court to go into justification of the lock-out. The lock-out becomes illegal only if the employer after declaration of illegality does not, within 48 hours, withdraw the lock-out. The question as to how much wages are to be paid to the workers for the period of lock-out cannot be gone into by the Industrial Court while deciding complaint regarding illegal lock-out. In any case, no wages can be made payable when the lock out is legal. 11. As far as lock out and strikes are concerned, lock out can be described as the antithesis of a strike. Just as a strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their industrial demands, a lock out is a weapon available to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees to see his point of view and to accept his demands. The main object of notice of 14 days before lock-out or strike is to avoid possible dislocation to the employers and their workmen and give some breathing time to adjust. It is not that the law does not permit the employers to resort to lock-out in the same manner as the workmen are entitled to use the weapon of strike for achieving their objects. The contemplated notice under section 24 firstly operates as a warning to the employees that the employer cannot make any further concession and gives an opportunity to them to reconsider their strategy by weighining the reasonableness of their claim as also their overall strength and capacity to endure suffering involved. The contemplated notice under section 24 firstly operates as a warning to the employees that the employer cannot make any further concession and gives an opportunity to them to reconsider their strategy by weighining the reasonableness of their claim as also their overall strength and capacity to endure suffering involved. Secondly, such notice enables them to make necessary adjustments to face impending unemployment in the event of their determination to fight. Thirdly, it also gives an opportunity to those interested in industrial peace, including the Government machinery in this behalf, to make moves for ironing out some settlement. 12. Illegal strikes and lock-outs are dealt with in Chapter-V of the Act. Section 24(1) defines `illegal strike and section 24(2) defines `illegal lock-out. As far as the present inquiry is concerned, the same pertains to illegal lock-out, section 24(2) in so far as is relevant to the present enquiry provides : "24(2) "illegal lock-out" means a lockout which is commenced or continued,--- (a) without giving to the employees, a notice of lock-out in the prescribed form or within fourteen days of the giving of such notice;" Under Rule 23 of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Rules, 1975 the notice of lock-out is required to be given in Form-J and is required to be sent by registered post. The notice is required to be accompanied by an annexure containing a statement of reasons. Thus, all that a Court is required to determine is as to whether the management has given the requisite notice in the prescribed form accompanied by an annexure containing the reasons for clamping a lock-out. The further inquiry which is required to be made, is whether the lock-out has or has not been commenced within the 14 days notice period. These are the parameters of the inquiry. Once it is found that the requisite notice in the prescribed form has been given and that notice is accompanied by an annexure containing the reasons for the lock-out and the lock-out has not been commenced prior the notice period of 14 days, the inquiry is complete. On the aforesaid findings being given the only conclusion that follows is that the lock-out is not illegal and hence no offence can be said to have been committed under Item 6 of Schedule II of the Act. On the aforesaid findings being given the only conclusion that follows is that the lock-out is not illegal and hence no offence can be said to have been committed under Item 6 of Schedule II of the Act. The Court, in proceedings under the Act, is, therefore, not required or in other words it is not open to the Court to go into the truth or otherwise or the justification or otherwise of the reasons which have led the management to clamp a lock-out. The enquiry is beyond the scope and ambit of the relevant provisions of the Act. If a Court were to find that the lock-out is illegal, it will make a declaration to that effect. It is only after the management fails to lift the illegal lock-out within a period of 48 hours that under sub section (5) of section 25 the lock-out will be deemed to be an illegal lock-out. It is only in such a case that the provisions of Item 6 of Schedule II will come into operation. The said item provides that `proposing or continuing a lock-out deemed to be illegal under this Act is made an unfair labour practice on the part of employers. The aforesaid provision, therefore, does not contemplate an inquiry into the justification or otherwise of the reasons which have led to the clamping of a lock-out. That does not form part of the inquiry under the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. 13. As far as the question of illegality or otherwise of the lock-out in the present case is concerned, a reference to the case of (The Premier Automobiles Ltd. and others v. G.R. Sapre and others)1, 1981 LAB I.C. 221 can usefully be made. In paras 23 and 24 of the judgment, this Court has observed, as follows : "23. Section 24(2) so far as relevant reads as follows : "24 (2) `illegal lock-out means a lock-out which is commenced or continued- (a) without giving to the employees, a notice of lock-out in the prescribed form or within fourteen days of the giving of such notice." In other words, resorting to `lock-out by the employer by itself is not illegal. It is the non-compliance with the requirements of the above Clause (a) that makes it illegal. It is the non-compliance with the requirements of the above Clause (a) that makes it illegal. Under the above Clause (a) lock-out will be illegal, if it is (1) commenced without giving a notice, or (2) commenced within 14 days of the notice, even if notice is given, or (3) continued from day-to-day if commenced without notice, or (4) so continued from day-to-day during the period of 14 days, even if notice is so given. Not mere commencement of lock-out without notice, but even continuance thereof without compliance with section 24(2)(a) appears to have been deliberately rendered illegal, in an anxiety to extend intended relief to the employees and expose the employer to legal consequences for the entire period of illegality." "24. But such an illegality can be brought to an end by discontinuing the lock-out, so commenced illegally and resuming the operations. The same result would follow after the expiry of 14 days of the notice, if notice is given, in compliance with section 24(2)(a), either at the commencement of such illegal lock-out, or during the pendency thereof with a view to get rid of such illegality. There is nothing in section 24 or any other provisions militating against this." 14. In the case of "(Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and others v. Balkrishna Pen Pvt. Ltd. and others)2", 1987(3) Bom.C.R. 425 : 1988 Mh. L. J. 832, in para 14 of the judgment, this Court has observed, as follows : "14... ... ...when the Court records its finding whether the strike or the lock-out is legal or illegal. It comes to the conclusion that it is legal, it will proceed to dispose of the complaints forthwith accordingly. However where the conclusion is that it is illegal, it should make the declaration in the open Court as required by sub-section (3) of section 25 and give 48 hours time to the party concerned to withdraw it as required by sub-section (5) of the said section. It is only if the strike or the lock-out is not withdrawn during the said period, that it should proceed to decide whether it is "deemed to be illegal under the Act" as required by Item I of Schedule III and Item 6 of Schedule II as the case may be. It is only if the strike or the lock-out is not withdrawn during the said period, that it should proceed to decide whether it is "deemed to be illegal under the Act" as required by Item I of Schedule III and Item 6 of Schedule II as the case may be. The last stage is the stage where the Court proceeds to find out whether, in the case of strike, there was advice active support or instigation and by whom, and in the case of lock-out, whether it was proposed or continued. If this procedure is followed, there should ordinarily be no difficulty in trying the complaints." 15. In the case of "(Syndicate Bank and another v. Shri K. Umesh Nayak)3", Judgment Today 1994 (5) S.C. 647 the Supreme Court has observed, as follows : "29. It has to be remembered in this connection that a strike may be illegal if it contravenes the provisions of sections 22, 23 or 24 of the Act or of any other law or of the terms of employment depending upon the facts of each case. Similarly, a strike may be justified or unjustified depending upon several factors such as the service conditions of the workmen, the nature of demands of the workmen, the cause which led to the strike, the urgency of the cause or the demand of the workmen, the reason for not resorting to the dispute resolving machinery provided by the Act or the contract of employment or the service rules and regulations etc. An enquiry into these issues is essentially an enquiry into the facts which in some cases may require taking of oral and documentary evidence. Hence such an enquiry has to be conducted by the machinery which is primarily invested with the jurisdiction and duty to investigate and resolve the dispute. The machinery has to come to its findings on the said issue by examining all the pros and cons of the dispute as any other dispute between the employer and the employee. .... ... ... ... "32. The question whether a strike or lock-out is legal or illegal does not present much difficulty for resolution since all that is required to be examined to answer the question is whether there has been a breach of the relevant provisions. .... ... ... ... "32. The question whether a strike or lock-out is legal or illegal does not present much difficulty for resolution since all that is required to be examined to answer the question is whether there has been a breach of the relevant provisions. However, whether the action is justified or unjustified has to be examined by taking into consideration various factors some of which are indicated earlier. In almost all such cases, the prominent question that arises is whether the dispute was of such a nature that its solution could not brook delay and await resolution by the mechanism provided under the law or the contract or the service rules. ......." 16. In the case of (Billion Plastics Pvt. Limited v. Dyes and Chemical Workers Union and others)4, 1983(2) Bom.C.R. 25 : 1983 Mh.L.J. 572, this Court has observed, thus : "4. What is covered by Item No. 1 of Schedule III is the strike which is deemed to be illegal under the said Act. If the strike is legal under the act, then obviously it is not covered by Item No. I of Schedule III. Even while continuing the strike, if the employees indulged in the acts of force and violence and hold out threats or intimidation in connection with the strike either against non-striking employees or against managerial staff, the same is treated as an unfair labour practice as per Schedule III, entry 2(b). Other items of the Schedule III enumerate the practices which can be treated as unfair labour practices on the part of the trade union. It is needless to say that when the schedule describes unfair labour practices on the part of the trade union, it must include in its import members of the trade union. Trade union is after all a representative of the employees and therefore the Industrial Court was not wholly right in saying that it had no jurisdication to restrain workmen from resorting to strike. It only meant that it cannot restrain workmen from resorting to a legal strike. It is not disputed before me even by the learned Counsel for the Union that if the workmen or Union resort to an illegal strike then obviously it is covered by Item No. 1 Schedule III. It only meant that it cannot restrain workmen from resorting to a legal strike. It is not disputed before me even by the learned Counsel for the Union that if the workmen or Union resort to an illegal strike then obviously it is covered by Item No. 1 Schedule III. But while deciding the question of unfair labour practice, what the Court has to see is whether the strike is deemed to be illegal under the Act or not and the Court cannot adjudicate upon its justifiability or propriety. The said area is not covered by section 30 of the Act, which confers a limited power upon the courts to deal with the complaints regarding unfair labour practice. It is needless to say that if a particular controversy is not triable within the purview of the Act, then the jurisdiction of the courts referred to in section 59 or section 60 of the Act is not barred." 17. In the case of (Mazdoor Congress v. Shri S.A. Patil and others)5, 1992 (1) C.L.R. 408, to which one of us (Ashok Agarwal, J.) is a party, the aforesaid decision in the case of (Billion Plastics Pvt. Limited v. Dyes and Chemical Workers Union) (supra) is referred and it is further observed, thus : "8. In my view, the above decision which is binding upon me answers the controversy raised in the petition. Once it is held that the lock-out for the period 19th May, 1977 to 3rd August, 1977 is not illegal lock-out, there can arise no question of giving a finding in respect of an unfair labour practice in regard to the aforesaid period. If there is no unfair labour practice during that period, there can arise no question of entitlement for wages during the said period under this Act. The jurisdiction under the Act is limited. It is concerned with the finding of unfair labour practices covered by the Act. It concerns the grant of consequential reliefs in respect of the period covered by the unfair labour practice held to have been proved. It is, therefore, not open to the workers to contend about justifiability or otherwise of the lock-out. Consequently, the workers are not entitled to the wages for a period from 19th May, 1977 to 3rd August, 1977 as claimed." 18. It is, therefore, not open to the workers to contend about justifiability or otherwise of the lock-out. Consequently, the workers are not entitled to the wages for a period from 19th May, 1977 to 3rd August, 1977 as claimed." 18. The aforesaid decisions make it abundantly clear that as far as proceedings under the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 are concerned, the Court is only required to decide whether the strike or a lock-out is illegal or otherwise as contemplated under the Act. The Court is not called-upon to adjudicate upon the justifiability or otherwise of the strike or lock-outs. Hence, we have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal is justified in arriving at its finding that the lock-out in the instant case is not illegal and hence no offence under the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 is made out. 19. Since it has been a consistant endeavour on the part of Shri Deshmukh to contend that the Tribunal ought to have gone into the justification or otherwise of the lock-out and that it was not justified in not doing so, we were taken through the relevant material and evidence on record relating to the justification or otherwise of the lock-out. We have noticed that after the application of the respondent for closure under section 25(o) of the Industrial Disputes Act was dismissed, several notices were issued by the respondent alleging serious misconduct on the part of the workers. We have reproduced the gist of some of the notices in the preceding paragraphs. After the notices, the first respondent, on the 7th of January, 1986, has issued its notice of lock-out. It has given reasons for issuing the notice of lock-out. Despite the earlier notices alleging violence on the part of the workers and the notice of lock-out dated 7th of January, 1986, no reply had been sent by the appellant for a considerable period. It is only on the 6th of May, 1986, which is after a long gap of four months, that a reply denying the allegations is sent. The present complaint is also belatedly filed on the 18th of June, 1986 which is beyond the period of limitation of 90 days. Notices of 26th of December, 1985 and thereafter are not notices of insignificant nature. They contain serious allegations of misconduct and violence. These notices have gone unreplied. The present complaint is also belatedly filed on the 18th of June, 1986 which is beyond the period of limitation of 90 days. Notices of 26th of December, 1985 and thereafter are not notices of insignificant nature. They contain serious allegations of misconduct and violence. These notices have gone unreplied. Inaction on the part of appellants can be a factor that can be taken into account for holding that the allegations have been acceded for want of denials. Similar is the case of notice of lock-out dated 7th of January, 1986. Though the notice containing serious allegations there is no immediate reply. In fact, the reply which is sent after a lapse of four months, can be said to be an after-thought. Similar is the case in respect of the complaint, which is filed after over five months from the date of the notice of lock-out. By way of explaining the delay, it is stated that the lock-out notices were not individually served on the workers and hence the employees did not know the reasons of the lock-out. In respect of lock-out notice, which is served upon the appellant-union, the same, it is alleged, was misplaced as it got mingled with some other files. On search it was found on 6th of May, 1986 and, thereafter, the same was replied. The rest of the time was taken for giving instructions to file the complaint. In our view, though the explanation offered for condonation of delay has found favour with the Tribunal, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that if the allegations contained in the notices were got up and were totally false and baseless, as is sought to be contended before us, the same would not have been treated so calously and casually. In the circumstances, we are inclined to hold that there is a grain of truth in the allegations contained in the notices. 20. Before the Tribunal, evidence was led by the contending parties. Affidavits of the parties were treated as examination-in-chief and witnesses were offered for cross-examination. On behalf of the respondents, Shri Suresh Kumar Suri, Works Manager of the Company, has been examined. In the affidavit, which is treated as examination-in-chief, he has inter alia stated, as under : "....I say that further workers engaged themselves in violent activities, Gherao, act of intimidation, abuses threatening to the managerial persons. On behalf of the respondents, Shri Suresh Kumar Suri, Works Manager of the Company, has been examined. In the affidavit, which is treated as examination-in-chief, he has inter alia stated, as under : "....I say that further workers engaged themselves in violent activities, Gherao, act of intimidation, abuses threatening to the managerial persons. I say that the management put up several notices dated 2-12-1985, 26-12-1985, 7-12-1985, 23-12-1985, 31-12-1985 and 2-1-1986 asking the workmen not to take law in their hands and to maintain normalcy. I say that on 26-12-1985 two officers of the Company namely Mr. R.K. Barot and Mr. Satpal Goel were Gharaoed, insulted and abused and manhandled. I say that as the situation was worsening day by day. I say that some of the miscreants workmen went to the extreme stage and on 1-1-1986 someone put fire inside the Mill Board Division where the raw material is stored. I say that this resulted in the damage to the Company. I say that fortunately fired was put off. I say that as the situation worsened to the extreme and therefore the Management put up a notice of lock-out dated 7-1-1986 declaring the lock-out from 21-1-1986. I say that as regards the closure application the High Court admitted the writ petition of the company. I say that the said notice of lock out was served upon several employees as soon as they come on duty on 7-1-1986. I say that the said notices were displayed on the notice board at the main gate and the copies were sent to the various authorities. I say that the workmen refused to accept the individual notices of the lock out. I say that lock-out was declared following provisions of law i.e. giving 14 days notice pay which the workmen have collected. I say that the copy of the lock-out notice was also sent to the union. ..." As far as the cross-examination of this witness is concerned, we find that there is no challenge at all to the aforesaid allegations contained in examination-in-chief. As far as the evidence of Eknath Gabaji Shelke, who had been examined on behalf of the appellant union is concerned, he has not denied the allegations made. All that he has stated is as under : "...It is true that before effecting lock-out the company had from time to time displayed on the notice board notices. As far as the evidence of Eknath Gabaji Shelke, who had been examined on behalf of the appellant union is concerned, he has not denied the allegations made. All that he has stated is as under : "...It is true that before effecting lock-out the company had from time to time displayed on the notice board notices. However, contents of the same were false." 21. In out view, though it is not necessary or for that matter it is not open to a Court to go into the justification of the reasons for effecting a lock-out, even if one were to go into the issue, as Shri Deshmukh wants us to do, there is sufficient material on record to come to a conclusion that there existed sufficient and cogent reasons for effecting a lock-out. In the circumstances, we hold that the lock-out declared by the first respondent company is not illegal. If the same is not illegal the question of its being deemed illegal does not arise. With this finding it would ordinarily have been enough for the disposal of the Latters Patent Appeal. The finding of the tribunal that no offence is made out under Schedule II Item 6 and Schedule IV Item 9 and 10 deserves to be up-held. Similarly, the dismissal of the complaint also deserves to be confirmed. We, however, are dealing with the other two issues as the learned Counsel appearing for the contending parties have addressed us on those issues at considerable length. 21-A. The second question, as to whether the first respondent-company was justified in insisting upon its workers to execute an undertaking of good behaviour and diligent work by way of condition precedent for lifting the lock-out strictly speaking, is not an issue which arises in the present complaint bearing complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986. The said issue squarely arose in the second complaint bearing complaint (ULP) No. 220 of 1987. That, however, came to be dismissed on 18th of January, 1988. The dismissal, no doubt, was not on merits but was on the maintainability of the complaint. May be, the order was not justified, however, appellant has not taken an exception to the dismissal of the complaint and that dismissal has become final. That, however, came to be dismissed on 18th of January, 1988. The dismissal, no doubt, was not on merits but was on the maintainability of the complaint. May be, the order was not justified, however, appellant has not taken an exception to the dismissal of the complaint and that dismissal has become final. As far as the present complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1986 is concerned, the same concerns only with the issue regarding the illegality or otherwise of the lock-out. No issue regarding the undertaking has been raised in the complaint. Despite this, we propose to deal with the submissions, as even at the commencement of the hearing we had suggested to the counsel appearing for the appellant as to whether these 27 workers, even at this stage, could be persuaded to join on giving an undertaking in an amended form which would not cast any aspertions on their past conduct prior to the issue of the lock-out. The form of undertaking suggested before a Division Bench prior to the appeal being placed before us, reads as under : "To The Manager Solid Containers Limited, Vadavli PO Mohane KALYAN Dear Sir Sub : UNDERTAKING. On resumption of duties - 1. I shall maintain proper discipline. 2. I shall work normally. Thanking you, Yours faithfully ," Shri Deshmukh, on again taking instructions, has informed us that his clients are unwilling to sign any undertaking as according to them the entire exercise is shrouded with illegality. According to them, what is sought in the undertaking is an implied term of employment and the same is sought by the management merely by way of satisfying their ego. 22. We have already found that the allegations which are contained in the notice of lock-out and the notices that have preceded the same, are well born-out on the material on record. If this be the case, in our judgment, the insistance on the part of the management on giving of an undertaking, as has been done in the present case, cannot be said to be unjustified and, therefore, cannot be faulted. 23. In this context, reference can be had to the case of "(Industrial Tubes Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. S.R. Samant, Judge, Industrial Court and others)6", 1980 L.L.J. 444. The relevant facts of the case are reproduced in para 4 of the judgment, as under : "4. ... ... ... ... 23. In this context, reference can be had to the case of "(Industrial Tubes Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. S.R. Samant, Judge, Industrial Court and others)6", 1980 L.L.J. 444. The relevant facts of the case are reproduced in para 4 of the judgment, as under : "4. ... ... ... ... The employers, however, showed reluctance to permit the workmen to join duty unless they executed a bond as a condition precedent, to the following effects : "I am willing to terminate the strike and resume duties forthwith. Upon resumption of work I am willing to perform my duties sincerely and diligently and continue give normal output, observe normal discipline whilst on duty. I, therefore, request you to permit me to resume work." The workmen refused to execute any such bond and insisted on joining duty unconditionally. The employers refused and the stalemates continued." A question that arose for determination in the said case is reproduced in paragraph 8, as under : "8. The question is, if preventing the workmen from joining duties without executing almost "good conduct bond" amounts to "lock-out". The Court has answered the question in the following terms : "16. Thus refusal to employ any number of workmen does not amount to lock-out unless, the coercive process involved therein is aimed at persuading the employees to "See his point of view" and "to accept his demands." As seen earlier, the employers insist on execution of this bond and to ensure avoidance of the "go-slow tactics" and acts of assaults and violence alleged to have been indulged in by the workmen from January, 1979, even as prelude to the commencement of their illegal strike on 13-3-1979 and continued even during the period of the strike. This according to the employer became indispensable due to the attitude of naked displayed by the workmen throughout in addition to resorting to illegal strike. In the events of this being true, the employers cannot but be said to have been justified in insisting on such a bond by way of assurance. By seeking an assurance not to act in defiance of law and the rules and, to act according to the terms of the employment, the employers cannot be said to be making any "demands" on the workmen nor can they be said to have any "point of view" excepting what is implicit in the terms of the employment. By seeking an assurance not to act in defiance of law and the rules and, to act according to the terms of the employment, the employers cannot be said to be making any "demands" on the workmen nor can they be said to have any "point of view" excepting what is implicit in the terms of the employment. It is difficult to conceive of any employee having any different view on this point. Any dispute about demand and need to resort to coercive processaries ordinarily when "the demand" lacks the sanction of contract or law. Insistence on bond as condition, therefore, cannot amount to refusal to employ or "lock-out". That the legislature should have restricted the prohibition against such bond to workmen going on "legal strike" under the above Item 4, pre-supposes its awareness of the needs thereof in different situations and permissibility thereof to meet the same." 24. If the ratio of the above case is applied to the facts of the present case, the inference is irresistable that the insistence on the part of the respondent on the workers to sign an undertaking before they are permitted to resume duties, cannot be said to be unjustified. As far as the majority of workers are concerned, they have settled with the respondent and have resumed duty after signing the requisite undertaking. The question that really arises is, whether the denial on the part of 27 workers in executing the undertaking even in the form, which is reproduced above, can be said to be justified. If the insistence on the part of the respondent is to be held to be justified, the refusal to give the undertaking by the minority of the workers, who are allegiance to the appellant-union, has to be termed as unreasonable. 25. Shri Deshmukh has placed reliance on the case of "(Vaman Maruty Gharat and others v. M.S. Apte and others)7", 1995 (70) F.L.R. 30 where two judges of this Court viz. P.B. Sawant and V.V. Vaze, JJ., had given differing views in the matter and the matter was referred to a third Judge R.A. Jahagirdar, J., whose judgment is reported in "1988 II C.L.R. 222". Jahagirdar, J. in his judgment concurred with Sawant, J. In para 15 of his judgment, Sawant, J., on facts, has observed as under : "As pointed out above there is no evidence of violence and indiscipline in the present case. Jahagirdar, J. in his judgment concurred with Sawant, J. In para 15 of his judgment, Sawant, J., on facts, has observed as under : "As pointed out above there is no evidence of violence and indiscipline in the present case. Hence the second part of the undertaking is not justified." "Assuming, however, that the employer has succeeded in proving that there were acts of violence, indiscipline and damage to the property, the question that still falls for consideration is whether insistence on such an undertaking from all workmen, whether they were parties to the said acts or not, is justified. Surely in the last quarter of this century it is not necessary to emphasise that the contract of employment is always bilateral. The employer and employees are equal partners in the enterprise of production. The employees are no longer to be looked upon as bonded slaves. The terms of their relationship with the employer are governed by the contract of employment. and/or the relevant statutes. The employees therefore cannot be treated as a tribe of delinquents much less can they be humiliated by asking them to sign undertakings which imply that they had indulged in misdeeds which they had not and that they attune for the same. One can understand and the employer will be justified, if such undertaking is taken from those workmen who are guilty of the misdeeds. But to insist on such undertaking from one and all is to subtract from the terms of their employment. It is not suggested that it is one of the terms of employment that whenever there are misdeeds on the part of some workmen, all workmen should enter, so to say the penitentiary, and give such undertaking. The contend that to act in a disciplined manner is an implied condition of service and hence there is nothing wrong in insisting upon such undertaking is to beg the question. If it is an implied condition of service, there is no need of such undertaking. If the undertaking is innocuous, it serves no purpose except satisfying the ego of the employer which is nothing but a display of a feudalistic attitude towards the employees. Such attitude has to be discouraged in any egalitarian society and much more so in a society like ours which has pledged itself to establish a Socialist Republic. If the undertaking is innocuous, it serves no purpose except satisfying the ego of the employer which is nothing but a display of a feudalistic attitude towards the employees. Such attitude has to be discouraged in any egalitarian society and much more so in a society like ours which has pledged itself to establish a Socialist Republic. Article 43-A of the Constitution, specifically directs the State to take steps to secure participation of workers in the management of the industry. It cannot be argued that the case of these constitutional objectives will be furthered by acquiescing in or conniving at the action of the employers in insisting on such undertakings even from the innocent workmen which has the inevitable effect of demeaning the workmen. I am therefore of the view that to insist upon such undertakings from all workmen, irrespective of their conduct, is to subject them to indignity. The dignity of an individual is the bed rock of all human rights. It is and should be the basis of all human relationships including his contract of employment. To insist upon such undertaking therefore is to affect the terms of his employment. I have therefore my own reservations about the decision of this Court reported in Industrial Tubes Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V.S.R. Samant Judge Industrial Court and others (supra). It is however binding on me as a Single Judge. Since I have even otherwise come to the conclusion, as above, that the lock-out was illegal, it does not make any difference to the result of the petition." Jahagirdar, J., in his concurring Judgment has observed, as under : "This undertaking required an employee who wanted to join work to state that he was calling off the illegal strike that he commenced with all the other employees with effect from 2nd of April, 1978. It also required the employee to assure the respondent that after entering the factory, he would discharge his duties properly and would not cause any damage to the property. After saying this, he must express willingness to resume his normal duties. Was this form of the undertaking justified and was the respondent justified in refusing to give work to those employees who did not sign this undertaking ? After saying this, he must express willingness to resume his normal duties. Was this form of the undertaking justified and was the respondent justified in refusing to give work to those employees who did not sign this undertaking ? In my opinion, the answer is `no and that is the answer given by Sawant, J. In addition to the reasons which Sawant, J. has already given in his judgment, I wish to say something more on the subject." In paragraph 15 of the Judgment Jahagirdar, J. has emphasised that the management in that case did not care to lead any evidence. In paragraphs 16, 17, 20 and 21 Jahagirdar, J. has observed, as under : "16. In the first place, there was not issue before the labour Court in the earlier proceedings as to whether there were acts of violence or whether there were acts of indiscipline on the part of the employees. The only question was whether the strike was legal or illegal. In fact, the question as to whether the employees had indulged in acts of violence or acts of indiscipline was totally irrelevant to the question as to whether the strike was legal or illegal. Therefore, no point was framed for determination by the Labour Court in the earlier proceedings on this aspect. Can it be said that the Labour Court did give a finding that the employees indulged in acts of violence and acts of indiscipline when the Labour Court mentioned that the deposition of Mr. Fotedar on this point was not challenged in the cross-examination? In my opinion, this inference cannot be drawn. Since the labour Courts attention was necessarily focussed on the question as to whether the strike was legal or illegal and the evidence on that question alone was relevant in the proceedings before the Labour Court, the Labour Court could have, at best, accepted the testimony of Mr. Fotedar in so far as it related to the legality or illegality of the strike. To that extent, the Labour Court can be deemed to have accepted the fact that the employees resorted to a strike which in law was illegal. Fotedar in so far as it related to the legality or illegality of the strike. To that extent, the Labour Court can be deemed to have accepted the fact that the employees resorted to a strike which in law was illegal. There is nothing on record, and nothing was brought on record, by the respondent, in these proceedings to show that there were acts of violence and acts of indiscipline which made the respondent to insist upon the undertaking of the type involved in this case. In the total absence of evidence in this regard, Sawant, J. naturally came to the conclusion, with which conclusion I must respectfully agree, that the Industrial Court has given its finding without any evidence in that regard. It may be true, as Mr. Ramaswami suggested, that the labour Court in the present proceedings did not apply itself to this aspect of the question, namely the necessity of the undertaking which was prompted by violent activities of the employees. The Industrial Court was justified in analysing this question and give a finding in that regard. If this is so, it can be said reasonably that the industrial Court did not exceed its jurisdiction." "17. The fact that the Industrial Court did not exceed the jurisdiction vested in it does not necessarily make the finding given by it legal or valid. If that finding is unsupportable by the evidence on record, then that finding itself becomes vulnerable and can be interferred with in this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. That is what has been done by Sawant, J. and with whom, as I have mentioned above, respectfully agree. It was repeatedly suggested by Mr. Ramaswami that the material which was already on the record in Application No. 39 of 1978 could be legitimately looked into and if from the entire material on record an inference is justified, then that inference, if drawn by the Industrial Court, should not be interfered with by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India." "20. That apart, even considering the material which is on record in these proceedings, it is impossible to come to the conclusion that the undertaking insisted upon by the respondent is justified either in law or on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. That apart, even considering the material which is on record in these proceedings, it is impossible to come to the conclusion that the undertaking insisted upon by the respondent is justified either in law or on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The undertaking which was insisted upon by the respondent consists of two parts. The first part requires the employee to state that he is calling off the illegal strike that he commenced with all the other employees with effect from 2nd of April, 1978. Was this justified on the facts and circumstances of this case? ... ... .... ... ... but to insist on 5th of May 1978 that the employee must confess that the strike was illegal or must acquiesce in the finding given by the Labour Court is wholly unjustified. If the undertaking required the employee to merely say that he was calling off the strike which had been held to be illegal, one would not have complained, but the first part of the undertaking insists upon the confession on two grounds. The first ground is that the strike was an illegal strike and that the concerned employee did commence it with all the other employees with effect from 2nd of April, 1978. In my opinion, by this the employees would have been prevented from agitating about the correctness of the finding given by the Labour Court in Application No. 39 of 1978." "21. Even if one leaves aside this part of the undertaking, the second part of the undertaking insisted upon by the respondent is also objectionable. In the second part of the undertaking, the employee was required to give an assurance that after entering the factory, he would not cause any damage to the property, machinery and any material in the factory. Was the insistence upon this part of the undertaking justified? The answer, in my opinion, is in the negative because there is, as I have repeatedly pointed out earlier, no evidence on record at all to show that at any time any particular employee or employees have indulged in causing any damage to the property, machinery and any material in the factory. If there was material on record, may be on the basis of the present law, the employer might have been justified in asking for an undertaking of this type. If there was material on record, may be on the basis of the present law, the employer might have been justified in asking for an undertaking of this type. In the instant case, there is no material at all to justify this part of the undertaking." 26. We have given our anxious consideration to the above decision and we find that the same was a decision based on facts of that particular case. In paragraph 16, it has been emphasised that there is nothing on record and nothing was brought on record by the respondent in this regard to show that acts of violence and acts of indiscipline made that respondent company to insist upon the undertaking of the type involved in this case. This, however, is not the case in the case at hand. We have, on facts, found that the workers have been guilty of acts of violence and indiscipline causing harm to the officers of the first respondent company and causing damage to the property. Hence, on facts of the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that the insistence on the part of the first respondent company, in taking an undertaking is fully justified. 27. In this context, a reference to the case of "(Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay and others v. S. Taki Belgrami and another)8", 1970 Lab. I. C. 1373 can usefully be made. This Court, in that case, observed, as under : "8. ... ... ... Now, it is true that, in law, what is illegal can never be held to be justified but it is not true that the consequence of a lockout being declared illegal must be that, for the period of that illegal lock-out, workmen must be entitled to payment of wages. It is true that, ordinarily, when workmen are, against their consent and desire, not allowed to enter factory premises, it should be held in their favour that, for the period during which, against their consent and desire, they are not allowed to enter the factory they should be entitled to wages. It is at the same time permissible for an employer to prove that an illegal lockout was the result of such misdemeanour and misconduct of the workmen as left no option to the employer but to declare a lockout. It is at the same time permissible for an employer to prove that an illegal lockout was the result of such misdemeanour and misconduct of the workmen as left no option to the employer but to declare a lockout. It is permissible for an employer in connection with claims made against him for wages for the period of an illegal lockout, to prove misdemeanour and misconduct of employees sufficient to absolve him from the liability to pay wages for the period of such illegal lockout. ...."