Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. One Arifa Amanullah (petitioner) is the wife of the detenu M.O. Amanullah. The detenu, it is said without previous general or special permission of Reserve Bank of India, illegally acquired and dealt with foreign exchange, in the shape of U.S. dollars to the tune of 3,35,000 equivalent in Indian currency to the tune of Rs. 1,06,000 violating the salient provisions adumbrated under Sec. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (Act 46 of 1973 - for short “FERA”) as amended by Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment Ordinance, 1993 (9 of 1993), punishable under Sec. 56 thereof. 2. Apart from the proceedings taken by the Enforcement Directorate to launch a prosecution against the detenu under FERA, steps had been taken to preventively detain him under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Act 52 of 1974 for short ‘COFEPOSA’ - as amended) by the sponsoring authority’ namely Enforcement Directorate, Southern Zone, Madras. Relevant and requisite materials had been placed by the sponsoring authority before the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi (first respondent), empowered authority under COFEPOSA. 3. The first respondent in turn, on consideration of the materials placed, after deriving the subjective satisfaction, clamped upon the detenu, the impugned order of detention in F.No. 673/158 94/CUS. VIII. dated 29th September, 1994, with a view to preventing him in future from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange. 4. A letter P.No. 673/158/94-CUS VIII, dated 29. 1994, emerged from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, addressed to the Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Madras, enclosing five copies of the detention order and three copies of the grounds of detention of even number dated 29. 1994 (along with relied upon documents), issued by the Government of India under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the COFEPOSA against the detenu M.O. Amanullah, with a request that necessary arrangements may be made to get the detention order along with the grounds of detention (along with relied upon documents) served on the detenu, at the earliest under intimation to the Ministry. A copy of the said letter had also been marked to the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Madras for rendering any assistance, which may be deemed necessary in this regard, with a further request to keep the Ministry apprised of the progress made in this regard from time to time. 5. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Madras, by a letter dated 110. 1994 addressed to the Secretary Government of Tamil Nadu Public (SC) Department, Fort St. George, Madras-600009 also enclosed a xerox copy of the photograph of the detenu M.O. Amnanulla for the purpose of identification. 6. Before the impugned order of detention was executed, the detenu M.O. Amanullah surrendered before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (EO-II), Egmore, Madras-8 on 211. 1994 and was lodged at Central Prison, Madras. 7. The impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds of detention had been served upon the detenu, lodged at Central Prison, Madras, on 211. 1994 itself. A teleprinter message had been sent on 211. 1994 from the. Secretary to Government of Tamil .Nadu, Public (SC) Department, Madras-9 to the Additional Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi, informing him as to the service of the aforesaid documents having been affected upon the detenu M.O. Amanullah at Central Prison Madras on 211. 1994, with a copy of the said message being marked to the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Madras-6. 8. The detenu sent a representation dated 112. 1994 to the first respondent- Detaining Authority asking for Tamil translation of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and documents relied upon for formulation of the grounds. The request so made in the said representation had been rejected by the first respondent on 1. 1995, by observing as follows: “Seen. Documents have been explained in the grounds. Only order of detention/grounds of detention may be translated in Tamil and given to the detenu and that too without any prejudice to the detenu’s knowledge of English as pointed out by the sponsoring authority.” 9. The detenu again, on 21. 1995, sent a representation, through the medium of jail authorities, addressed to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi. The said representation had been disposed of by passing an order of rejection on 3. 1995. 10. The detenu again, on 21. 1995, sent a representation, through the medium of jail authorities, addressed to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi. The said representation had been disposed of by passing an order of rejection on 3. 1995. 10. Mr.G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would press into service the following points for consideration: 1. The detenu, a Tamilian by birth, having studied up to VIII Standard, in a rustic village atmosphere in a school at Ramanathapuram District, not having any kind of working knowledge of English, was handicapped to make an effective and purposeful representation to the competent authorities under COFEPOSA, in as much as most of the documents relied upon by the first respondent-Detaining Authority for the formulation of the grounds of detention are in English, a language not very much conversant with by the detenu, notwithstanding the fact that he made a representation for furnishing copies thereof: thereby infringing his fundamental rights under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India: .(c) On 29. 1994, the date on which the impugned order of detention was passed, the detenu was a free-lance, in the sense of not being lodged in any prison for any offence whatever, thereby having the contumacious facility to revel in activities prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange and therefore, there was no need at all for the first respondent- Detaining Authority to say anything as to the compelling necessity for his preventive detention under COFEPOSA: but on the other hand, on 211. 1994, the date on which the impugned order of detention had been served, the detenu was lodged in Central Prison, Madras and such being the factual position, it is but necessary for the first respondent- Detaining Authority to consider the question of imminent possibility of the detenu coming out of prison on bail and his further indulging in activities prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange and admittedly, this question, not having been considered by the first respondent Detaining Authority, it goes without saying that the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside; and .(3) Non-consideration of the representation dated 21. 1995 by the second respondent-Central Government till upto today vitiates the impugned order of detention. 11. 1995 by the second respondent-Central Government till upto today vitiates the impugned order of detention. 11. Mr.K. Asokan, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel representing the respondents would, however, repel all those submissions and produce the relevant files for perusal and consideration of this Court. 12. Taking the first submission or point, by whatever name, it maybe called we find that Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India provide that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made an shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 13. The scope and amplitude of this provision came up for consideration on occasion, more than one, before the Apex Court of this country and a Bench of this Court and some of the polstar decisions rendered in that respect may usefully be referred to here, serving as a guide to proceed towards the direction of the destination in the sense of arriving at a just decision in the case on hand. .(a) In Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 911: (1962)1 Crl.L.J. 797, a Constitution Bench expressed in paragraph 7 thus: .“In order that the detenue should be in a position effectively to make his representation against the order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of detention which are in the nature of the charge against him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the authorities attributes to him. Communication, in this context, must therefore, mean imparting to the detenue sufficient knowledge of all grounds on which the order of detention is based. In this case the grounds are several and are based on numerous speeches said to have been made by the appellant himself on different occasions and different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer serving to communicating the grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the order of Detention is. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer serving to communicating the grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the order of Detention is. based.” .(b) In Nainmal Pertap Mal Shah v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2129, the detenu stated that he did not know the English language and therefore, he could not understand the grounds of detention; nor was he given a copy of the grounds duly translated in vernacular language. In the counter-affidavit the Detaining Authority suggested that as the detenu had singed a number of documents in English, it must be presumed that he was fully conversant with English language. Rejecting that contention, it was held that merely because he might have signed come documents, it could not be presumed in the absence of cogent material, that he had a working knowledge of English and under those circumstances, there has been clear violation of the constitutional provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India so as to vitiate the order of detention. .(c) In Surjeet Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1153: 1981 Crl.L.J. 614, the petitioner on being served with the detention order and the grounds in English contended that English was not a language, which he understood and this factor rendered it necessary for the grounds of detention to be served on him in Hindi, which was his mother-tongue, and the same not having been done, there was in law no communication of such grounds to him and it was held that under those facts and circumstances it had not been shown that the petitioner had the opportunity, which the law contemplated in his favour of making an effective representation against his detention, which was, therefore, illegal and liable to be set aside. .(d) In Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 728: 1981 M.L.J. (Crl.) 350: 1981 Crl.L.J. 283: (1981)2 S.C.C. 427 : (1981)2 S.C.J. 37, the detenu did not know English but the grounds of detention were drawn up in English and the Detaining Authority in affidavit stated that the police Inspector while serving the grounds of detention fully explained the grounds in Gujarati to the detenu Admittedly, no translation of the grounds of detention into Gujarati was given to the detenu. It was held that there was no sufficient compliance with them and date of Art.22(5) of the Constitution which required that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu. “Communicate” is a strong word. It requires that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands so as to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the grounds are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Art.22(5) is infringed. .(e) In Ibrahim Ahmed Batti v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1500, the detenu under the COFEPOSA Act was a Pakistani national to whom the detention order and the grounds of detention order were served in English and he contended that as he did not know English and the grounds of detention and the documents relied on were not furnished in Urdu within the statutory period the detention was bad. Urdu translation of all the documents and statements referred to in the grounds for reaching the subjective satisfaction had not been supplied to the detenu in time and translations of quite a few of such documents and statements had not not been supplied at all. The petitioner’s mother tongue seemed to be Urdu and a little knowledge of English figured. It was evident that the petitioner knew English figures, understood English words written in capital letters and was also conversant with talking in Hindi and Gujarati and therefore it was argued for the Detaining Authority that the non-supply of Urdu translation of the documents could not be said to have caused prejudice to the petitioner in the matter of making representation against his detention. The Supreme Court held that the explanation was hardly satisfactory and could not condone the non-supply or Urdu translation of those documents. The Supreme Court held that the explanation was hardly satisfactory and could not condone the non-supply or Urdu translation of those documents. A large number of documents were in Hindi and Gujarati and were material documents which had obviously influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority in arriving at the subjective satisfaction and those were all in a script or language not understood by the detenu, and, therefore, it was held that the non-supply or Urdu translation of those documents had clearly prejudiced the petitioner’s right against his detention and hence the safeguards contained in Art.22(5) was clearly violated. .(f) In Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 605, the Apex Court referred to contend of decisions available on the subject and of them, the decisions referred to as above were also referred to. In that case, a polish national was detained under COFEPOSA. The detention order and grounds of detention were served on the detenu and he, in turn, received them and acknowledged the receipt thereof, as it appears from the records, putting his signature in English. He did not complain that the grounds of detention were not understood by him. On the other hand, in the very grounds of detention, it was stated that in course of interrogation, he answered the questions in English including the questions as to how he happened to learn English. The gist of his answers in this regard was also given in the grounds of detention. The statements he gave contained number of informations peculiar to the detenu himself, which could not have been communicated by him to the interrogators, unless he knew English language. This apart, in several places of the statements, he effected certain corrections putting appropriate English words and signing the corrections. In the background of such facts, the Apex Court held that though he was Polish National, he had a working knowledge of English enabling him to understand the grounds and that would be enough for making an effective and purposeful representation. .(g) In an unreported decision in the case of R. David v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No. 1349 of 1985, dated 4. 1985, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, the petitioner was arrested on 2. 1985, in pursuance of an order of detention dated 110. 1981 made under Sec. 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA. .(g) In an unreported decision in the case of R. David v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No. 1349 of 1985, dated 4. 1985, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, the petitioner was arrested on 2. 1985, in pursuance of an order of detention dated 110. 1981 made under Sec. 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA. Immediately after the arrest, the grounds of detention was served on the petitioner, along with a number of other documents most of which were in Tamil, but some of them were in English. In his representation dated 12. 1985, the petitioner invited the attention of the Government to certain statements said to have been given by one Krishna Pannayar and others and requested that those documents, which were in English, may be furnished to him in Tamil on the ground that, he knows only Tamil. This request was made only in order to enable him to file his representation against the order of detention. This request was rejected by the Government in proceedings dated 3. 1985. It is stated in the said proceedings that all the documents, which have been taken into account in respect of the detention order had been translated in Tamil and had been already furnished to him and that therefore his request is rejected. It had been admitted in the counter-affidavit dated 3. 1985 filed on behalf of the respondent that the detenu had not been supplied with Tamil translations of the statements referred to by him. However, it had been contended that the detenu knows English and therefore, by not furnishing Tamil translation, the detenu had not been denied any effective opportunity of putting forth his representation against, the detention. In such a context, the Division Bench expressed as below: "We are unable to accept this contention of the Public Prosecutor. For one thing it is conceded that the detenu’s mother tongue is Tamil and he knows Tamil. The Official Language of the State is Tamil. Added to that, the petitioner particularly requested for Tamil translation of those documents specifically stating that it is necessary for him in order to put forward his representations against the detention order. Inspite of all these factors, the documents had not been furnished to him in Tamil. The Official Language of the State is Tamil. Added to that, the petitioner particularly requested for Tamil translation of those documents specifically stating that it is necessary for him in order to put forward his representations against the detention order. Inspite of all these factors, the documents had not been furnished to him in Tamil. If the petitioner knows English and if the petitioner had not made a specific request for furnishing of those documents in Tamil, probably the Public Prosecutor would have been right in contending that since the detenu knows English it was not necessary for the Government to furnish those documents in Tamil. But in this case, he had asked for specifically the Tamil translations of those document. Therefore, even if he had known English language it might be that he felt that he could put forward his defence much better in his own mother tongue than in English language and therefore it was necessary to have those documents in Tamil. It is not the case of the respondent that those documents had not been referred to for the purpose of detention: nor are they considered to be innocuous or immaterial documents for the purpose of detention. In the circumstances, we consider that the detenu had not been given an effective opportunity of making his representation against the order of detention as provided for under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and therefore the order of detention is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The respondent is directed to release the petitioner forthwith. The writ petition is accordingly allowed." .14. Coming to the facts of the instant case, the contention put forward by the detenu is that he knows only to read and write Tamil and he does not at all know English to read and write. This sort of a projection of a contention is referred to in petition, which reads as below: ."The petitioner stated that the detenu Amanulla is a native of Ramnad District and he had studied upto VIII Standard in his native village at Ramnad and joined the school called Sohwartz. but he had to discontinue his studies in the middle due to difficult family circumstances. The detenu therefore, had stopped studies 20 years back. Thereafter he was doing business as a broker in the purchase and sale of arnaments. but he had to discontinue his studies in the middle due to difficult family circumstances. The detenu therefore, had stopped studies 20 years back. Thereafter he was doing business as a broker in the purchase and sale of arnaments. After his marriage with the help of the funds provided by his father-in-law he started a small jewellery business. The detenu knows only to read and write Tamil and the job he was doing all along is not conductive of educational attainments. The detenu does not at all know English to read and write." .15. No doubt true it is, in the grounds of detention and documents furnished to the detenu, which are all only in English, endorsement had been obtained from him that all of them were read over and explained to the detenu in the language known to him. With regard to some, what he had stated in his affidavit is relevant, which is getting reflected in paragraph 5 as below: ."Hence, the endorsement that the grounds of detention and the documents which are all only in English language were read over and explained to the detenu is wholly insufficient and hence meet the requirement of constitutional mandate under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution. The petitioner, therefore, submits since there is no communication of grounds in a language known to the detenu, the detention order has become invalid on the 5th day of detention." .16. The case of the detenu, as projected above is countered by the respondents in their counter affidavit which is getting reflected in paragraph 5, as below: ."5. I state that the contentions raised in para.4 of the affidavit are not tenable. The contentions that the detenu is not conversant with or has working knowledge of English language has been made for the purpose of this writ petition. The detenu was not available for investigation and had absconded. Attempts made by the Officials of the Enforcement Directorate to examine the detenu with regard to the case were of no avail and the detenu also did not come forward to give any statement to establish his innocence which he now claims. Neither the petitioner herein who is the wife of the detenu nor the relatives of the detenu, namely, Kasim Mohammed, Abdul Azeez, Smt. Yacooth Marzan who were examined by the Officers gave any indication of the detenu’s whereabouts. Neither the petitioner herein who is the wife of the detenu nor the relatives of the detenu, namely, Kasim Mohammed, Abdul Azeez, Smt. Yacooth Marzan who were examined by the Officers gave any indication of the detenu’s whereabouts. The school in which the detenu has studied had been reaching English language. The detenu had been looking after the Jewellery business of the petitioner herein which has been confirmed by Abdul Azeez, the uncle of the detenu who has also stated that the detenu was looking after the business and also used to file the income-tax and sales-tax returns on behalf of his wife. This fact had been corroborated by the petitioner’s mother. It is submitted that even after the detention the detenu has refused to give any statement in his own hand-writing for obvious reasons, lest it should be known that the detenu was conversant with English language. The petitioner is only feigning ignorance of English language for the purpose of this writ petition." 17. Subsequent to the execution of the impugned order of detention at Central Prison, Madras on 211. 1994 and furnishing copy of the grounds and detention and documents, on which grounds had been formulated, the detenu, as already stated, made a representation on 112. 1994 asking for Tamil version of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds. On that the first respondent-Detaining Authority passed an order on 1. 1995 issuing a direction for furnishing to the detenu, the Tamil version of the impugned order of detention and grounds of detention, without prejudice to the detenu’s knowledge of English and the Tamil version of the impugned order of detention and grounds of detention were furnished to the detenu on 21. 1995. To put it otherwise, his request for grant of Tamil version of the documents relied on for formulating the grounds had not at all been furnished to him. .18. The respondents also produced a certificate dated 11. 1995 from the Headmaster, Schwarta High Secondary School, Ramanathapuram to highlight the knowledge of the detenu in English and the said letter is addressed to the Chief Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, 8-A-1, 16th Cross Street (Extn.) Krishnapuram Colony, Madurai-625014. The contents of the said letter are reflected as below . .“With reference to letter dated 1. 1995. I wish to state that Mr. The contents of the said letter are reflected as below . .“With reference to letter dated 1. 1995. I wish to state that Mr. M.O. Amanullah son of Omar Kathab of Marakayar Pattinam was a student of our school in Standard IX during the academic year 1974-75. He had already studied in Standard IX in Government Higher Secondary School, Kadukaivalasi and discontinued. He joined our school on 26. 1994 and left on 33. 1975. The medium of instruction was Tamil. English was one of the two languages taught other than Tamil.” 19. It is thus clear that the definite stand that is taken by the detenu is that he knows to read and write Tamil alone and does not know to read and write English language whereas it is the definite stand of the respondents that the detenu having studied upto IX Standard had working knowledge of English. From the stand so taken and other materials available on record, the following factors emerge; .(1) The detenu is a Tamilian. .(2) His mother tongue is Tamil .(3) He had studied upto IX Standard. .(4) His school career was in a rustic atmosphere in Ramanathapuram district. .(5) The medium of instruction in the school in which he had studied was Tamil. .(6) English was taught as a Second Language. It is common knowledge that in Tamil Medium, English is taught from VI Standard and therefore, the detenu could have had the facility of learning English language for a period of two or three years, which event had happened some two decades before. .(7) He had been transacting business in jewellery and had been submitting tax returns to the competent authorities for and on behalf of his wife. .(8) He used to sign in English. .(9) He somehow or other evaded his being examined by the authorities and consequently there was no opportunity or scope to measure his knowledge of English by the authorities. .(10) He was not at all willing to give any statement in his own handwriting when he was examined by the Enforcement Directorate personally whilst in prison. 20. From all these factors is it possible to infer that the detenu is having a working knowledge of English and simply feigning as if he is not conversant with English language for the purposes of this. case. 20. From all these factors is it possible to infer that the detenu is having a working knowledge of English and simply feigning as if he is not conversant with English language for the purposes of this. case. Whether the statement of detenu or the statement of the respondents is correct or not in this regard would, of course, involve a subjective determination in an action of this nature-summary proceedings. The safer course to be adopted, in such a situation, is to furnish copies of translated documents in the language known to the detenu, so as to enable him to make an effective and purposeful representation, when especially the documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds consists of innumerable number of pages in English language running about 1647 pages. The Apex Court, almost onal occasions, expressed the view that it would be open for the court to consider the facts and circumstances of a case to reasonably ascertain whether the detenu is feigning ignorance of English language or has such working knowledge as to understand the grounds of detention and the contents of the documents furnished. 21. In the case on hand, taking into consideration the various factors and other circumstances we rather feel that recording of a finding in the way or the other is not conducive and the safer course could have been in the circumstances of the case, to have furnished translated copies of documents, as requested for by the detenu in his own language, when especially reliance had been made on all those documents in the grounds of detention which itself run to 56 pages. We also feel that even assuming for argument’s sake that the detenu had a working knowledge of English, it might be that he felt that he could put forward his defence much better in his own mother-tongue Tamil then in English language and therefore, it was necessary to have those documents in Tamil. In that view of the matter we are of the view that non-furnishing of Tamil version of the documents, on which implicit reliance had been made, infringed the constitutional right of the detenu inhering in his favour under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, and consequently, the impugned order of detention is vitiated. 22. In that view of the matter we are of the view that non-furnishing of Tamil version of the documents, on which implicit reliance had been made, infringed the constitutional right of the detenu inhering in his favour under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, and consequently, the impugned order of detention is vitiated. 22. Let us now delve deep and enter into the arena of discussion relatable to non-consideration of imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his indulging in further prejudicial activities, affecting the conservation of foreign exchange. There is no plea of controversy that 29th September, 1994, the date, on which the impugned order of detention had been passed the detenu was a freelance, in the sense of his being in a position to freely move about without any legal fetters curtailing his movements. The order so passed, for whatever be the reason had not been executed till upto 28th November, 1994.The execution of the order, why? Rather say, service of the order-got fructified this way. Subsequent to the passing of the impugned order of detention, the detenu, obviously, having smelt about the impugned order of detention, surrendered before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O. II), Madras-8 on 211. 1994. It is also intriguing to note that the officers entrusted with the task of execution of the impugned order of detention not being in a position to trace about his whereabouts, however, came to know of his surrender, without any loss of time and served the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention along with the documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds on the very date of the surrender of the detenu before Court on his being lodged at Central Prison, Madras. The happening of such an event, we rather feel, is not without any significance, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. As adverted to earlier, the violation or refraction the detenu was alleged to have committed is relatable to Sec. 8 of FERA, punishable under Sec. 56 thereof. The scheme of the said Act, if properly understood the offence under Sec. 56 is a non-cognisable one. No doubt, true it is that Sec. 35 gives power to any officer of the Enforcement authorised by the Central Government, by general or special order to arrest any person, refracting or violating the provisions of the said Act. The scheme of the said Act, if properly understood the offence under Sec. 56 is a non-cognisable one. No doubt, true it is that Sec. 35 gives power to any officer of the Enforcement authorised by the Central Government, by general or special order to arrest any person, refracting or violating the provisions of the said Act. Sec. 45 empowers certain categories of officers specified therein to search any public place and arrest any person without a warrant found therein, who is reasonably suspected of having committed or of committing or being about to commit a contravention of the provisions of Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 8. Sec. 62 dealing with certain offences to be non cognizable offences reads as under: "Subject to the provisions of Sec. 45 and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence punishable under Sec. 56 shall be deemed to be non-cognizable within the meaning of that Code". 23. From a harmonious construction of various provisions, referred to above, it goes without saying that an offence under Sec. 56 is a non-cognizable one. Such being the case, we are unable to understand as to how it could have been possible for the detenu to have surrendered before the Court, as aforesaid when especially it is the admitted case that no warrant of arrest had been obtained from any court whatever for the apprehension of the detenu. Such surrender is nothing but an ingenious device to escape from the cluthches law. Admittedly the office of the first respondent Detaining Authority is located at Delhi, a far away place. The execution of the impugned order of detention is sought to be effectuated through the medium of the State Government and their authorities. The executing authorities cannot be expected to be quite conversant with the legal nuances of serving of the impugned order of detention on the detenu, when especially he was lodged in prison, prior to the service of the said order. The executing authorities cannot be expected to be quite conversant with the legal nuances of serving of the impugned order of detention on the detenu, when especially he was lodged in prison, prior to the service of the said order. If the impugned order of detention had been served on the detenu, when he was lodged in prison in some other substantive case, it behaves upon the Detaining Authority, like the first respondent herein, to consider the impelling necessity of executing the order of detention, notwithstanding that the detenu was lodged in prison, as a remand prisoner and if the impelling or compelling necessity had not been considered at the time of execution of the impugned order of detention, then that sort of a non-consideration of such necessity itself would vitiate the impugned order of detention, as had been held by the Apex Court in the case of Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090. It is better far us to extract, what Their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed in the said case, as available in paragraph 6, which reads as under: "6. In this case, there were grounds for the passing of the detention order, but after that the detenu has surrendered for whatever reasons, therefore, the order of detention though justified when it was passed but at the time of the service of the order there was no proper consideration of the fact that the detenu was in custody or that there was any real danger of his release. Nor does it appear that before the service there was consideration of this aspect properly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, the continued detention of the detenu under the Act is not justified." .24. If such a surrender had been made in almost all the cases, it is impossible for a Detaining Authority like the first respondent being situated at a far away place, namely, Delhi to have had any knowledge of the surrender of the detenu, before the service of the impugned order of detention; but for an intimation having been given by the officer executing the impugned order of detention. As already pointed out, there was no possibility at all for the executing officer to have informed the Detaining Authority as to the factum of the detenu having been lodged in prison before over the impugned order has been served upon such a detenu and there could have been no opportunity at all for such a Detaining Authority to consider the question of imminent possibility 6f such a detenu coming out on bail and indulging in further prejudicial activities affecting the conservation of foreign exchange and if there is no such reconsideration, there is no other go for the court except to obey the mandate or dictum as laid down by the Apex Court in Binod Singh’s case, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090. If the Magistrate, before whom, the detenu surrendered had been agile in scrutinising the legal provisions, before ever he accepted the surrender, this sort of a stage, managed show enacted by the detenu with legal brain, could have been altogether avoided. Anyhow, the Apex Court in Binod’s Singh’s case, categorically stated that it is the duty of the Detaining Authority to reconsider the imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his indulging further prejudicial activities affecting conservation of foreign exchange, even at the time of execution of the order, in case, the detenu was lodged in prison, as a remand prisoner concerned in a substantive case. In the case on hand, such a reconsideration was not at all there and therefore, it goes without saying that the impugned order of detention, on this ground also, is liable to be set aside. .25. The last, but not the least, of the submissions revolves on the question of non-consideration of the representation dated 21. 1995 by the second respondent Central Government. The moot question is as to whether any representation had been sent to the second respondent- Central Government, as claimed by the detenu. In paragraphs 63 of the grounds of detention, the detenu’s right of making a representation is specifically referred to and it is couched as below: ."63. You have a right to make representation to the Central Government, Detaining Authority and Advisory Board. In paragraphs 63 of the grounds of detention, the detenu’s right of making a representation is specifically referred to and it is couched as below: ."63. You have a right to make representation to the Central Government, Detaining Authority and Advisory Board. If you wish to make a representation against your detention to the Central Government (Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue) Detaining Authority you may do so by addressing it to the Secretary/ Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, 6th Floor, "B" wing, Janpath Bhawan, Janpath, New Delhi-110001 and forward the same through Superintendent of the Prison wherein you are detained. If you desire to make any representation to the Advisory Board, you may address it to the Chairman, Central Advisory Board (COFEPOSA) High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road, New Delhi and forward the same through the Superintendent of the prison wherein you are detained. You are further informed that you shall be heard by the Advisory Board in course, if the Board considers it essential to do so, or if you so desire." .26. The representation dated 21. 1995 had been sent not to the second respondent-Central Government but to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, a Department of the Central Government. This is discernible from the address of the addressee mentioned in the said representation in Tamil. Such being the question the question of consideration of the representation by the Central Government will not at all arise. This point, as point, as such, is of no substance and the same is accordingly rejected. 27. In view of our findings on point Nos.1 and 2, it goes without saying that the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside and the same is accordingly set aside. The detenu is therefore ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, unless and until he is required to be detained in connection with any other case. The habeas corpus petition is thus allowed.