M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS la. Has been filed by the appellant who was directed by this court by Order dated 19-10-1994 to deposit 50% of the decretal amount in court within 10 weeks from 19-10-1994. Those 10 weeks elapsed at the beginning of january, 1995. The amount was not deposited. The matter has been regularly appearing before the court from time to time and on 20-6-1995, this court passed a speaking Order that if the condition imposed by this court was not complied with before the next date of hearing, that the appellant will forfeit his right to a hearing. Today, the appellant who is a practising Advocate in bellary, has filed an affidavit in which he states that he is in economic difficulties, that he has already paid certain amounts in the course of the litigation namely, an amount of Rs. 28,000/- prior to the filing of the suit and an amount of Rs. 40,000/- in the course of the hearing. His contention is that the trial court has been in error with regard to the computation of the different heads and the passing of the decree and that he is prepared to give the security of his house for half the amount of the decree and that this court should accept the same. ( 2 ) CERTAIN significant and equally distasteful facts in relation to this litigation require to be set out namely, the fact that the appellant who is a practising Advocate of the bellary bar was functioning as official receiver between the period from 10-10-1973 to 13-12-1980. It is alleged that he avoided handing over the records etc. , for almost one year and it was under court orders that the possession was taken over when books of accounts etc. , were not traceable. It is important to point out that the appellant was appointed receiver in an insolvency proceeding and that he was virtually a trustee in respect of huge properties extending over 59 acres 91 cents. The allegation is that in the course of his official duties, he had failed to account for a total of Rs. 1,55,082. 68/- or in other words, that the amount had been misappropriated. The learned trial judge has, after a detailed discussion, passed a decree for the full amount on 20-1-1994. The allegation is that in the course of his official duties, he had failed to account for a total of Rs. 1,55,082. 68/- or in other words, that the amount had been misappropriated. The learned trial judge has, after a detailed discussion, passed a decree for the full amount on 20-1-1994. It is unfortunate that a suit had to be filed in this case against a lawyer and that even thereafter he contested the proceeding and a decree had to be passed against him. Thereafter, he has filed the present appeal challenging the correctness of the judgment which came up before the court only in october 1994 and is yet to be even admitted. The interim directions of this court to deposit 50% of the decretal amount takes into consideration the argument that there is a dispute in respect of certain heads and therefore, the court on a prima facie consideration made allowances for those heads. ( 3 ) BY the present application, certain alternate security issought to be offered by way of an immovable property. The more important submission canvassed by the appellant's learned Advocate is that the direction of this court to deposit the amount pending appeal is virtually a condition precedent and that it would not be permissible in law to either dismiss the appeal or refuse the appellant a right of hearing if this condition is breached. He submits that even though the court may impose conditions in cases of a money decree such as a requirement to deposit the whole or part of the amount, that in. Actual fact, the only consequence if default is committed could be that the stay of the operation of the decree can either be refused or the stay if already granted can be vacated. The learned Advocate submits that the appellant cannot be deprived of his right of appeal if there is a default in observance of the condition. In support of his submission, he draws my attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the Case of Prabhakar v. Vinayakrao, wherein the learned judge has considered the scope of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1. In support of his submission, he draws my attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the Case of Prabhakar v. Vinayakrao, wherein the learned judge has considered the scope of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1. The learned judge has held that having regard to the history of these provisions, that the court must take cognizance of Rule 5 which specifies that if the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 41, the court shall not make an Order staying the execution of the decree. The learned judge has taken the view that this would not ipso facto disqualify the appellant from exercising his right of appeal. The next decision relied on by the appellant's learned Advocate is a decision of the andhra pradesh High Court in the case of J. Lakshmikantham v. Uppala Rajamma and others. The learned single judge in this case had occasion to follow the ratio of the decision in the case of Union Bank of India and Another v. Jagan Nath Radhey Shyam And Co. and another and to record a similar view to that taken by the Bombay High Court in the decision referred to earlier, namely that the depositing of the decretal amount or furnishing security in the appeal court was not a condition precedent for hearing and disposal of the appeal. ( 4 ) AS regards the position in law, it is very clear that once a money decree is passed, that Order 41 makes provision for the appellate court to direct that the whole or part of the amount be deposited or that security be provided for the same. There is a good reason for this insofar as once there is a finding against the appellant, it is not the object of the law to permit further litigation unless that Order is respected and sufficiently complied with. This is a special provision in relation to money decrees and it is true that the legislature has also incorporated Rule 5 (5) which clearly lays down that in the event of non-compliance, that no stay Order shall be permissible. This is a special provision in relation to money decrees and it is true that the legislature has also incorporated Rule 5 (5) which clearly lays down that in the event of non-compliance, that no stay Order shall be permissible. To my mind, these provisions have been incorporated in Order 41 with a definite purpose and the Rule of harmonious construction would require that not only should a court give effect to these provisions, but that a court should avoid a situation whereby the effect of these provisions is nullified. Under these circumstances, the court is required to take into account an overall view and the cumulative effect and to interpret the law in keeping therewith. It would be an erroneous position to interpret one set of rules or sections technically if this procedure is going to be self-defeating. One needs to take cognizance of the fact that the non-observance of these provisions disqualifies an appellant from a stay of the operation of the decree of the trial court. This necessarily presupposes that the decree will be executed and if the decree has already been executed, it virtually renders the appeal infructuous. ( 5 ) IT may be that on very strict technicalities, an appeal could still be entertained virtually for academic reasons and if that appeal were to be ultimately allowed wholly or partially, that the appeal court would have to then reverse the effects of the decree and direct restoration of whole or part of the amount. One needs to be practical while construing these provisions insofar as inevitably once the decree is executed, the original plaintiff is unlikely to take any further part in the proceedings and in actual fact, if the decree is executed, the appellant himself will completely lose all interest in prosecuting the appeal. The real question arises as to whether, once a decree has been executed, the appeal court should re-examine the matter only for academic purposes and the answer to this question would be an emphatic 'no' if the appeal is virtually and factually infructuous, then it would be incorrect to hold that the default in complying with the conditions imposed by the appeal court comes in the way or deprives the appellant of his rights in appeal. The correct view would be that the appellant himself by virtue of his conduct, has forfeited the right to continue and this is entirely different from a situation whereby an appellant is prevented or precluded from presenting an appeal or prosecuting it by virtue of an Order passed by a court de hors his conduct. The option is entirely that of the appellant and if the appellant defaults, then the consequences ensue. To my mind, the view taken in the aforesaid decisions is too narrow and incorrect and would therefore, not bind the present case. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position in law, the position that emerges is that the appellant had defaulted in complying with the condition in january 1995 and consequently, the stay which was dependent on this condition being complied with, has automatically been vacated. The respondent is therefore, free to execute the decree and ought to have executed it much earlier. The offer made by the appellant at this point of time is belated and having regard to the special facts and background of this case, is unworthy of acceptance. ( 7 ) UNDER these circumstances, the i. a. fails and stands dismissed. As a necessary consequence of the legal position that emerges, nothing would therefore survive in the appeal and the appeal also to stand disposed of. --- *** --- .