JUDGMENT Ajoy Nath Roy, J.: This is an application made under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similar reliefs have already been prayed for by the applicant in an application made under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. That application was tiled in or about the month of June, 1993 but is not in today's list. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate date 16-1-95 whereby he ordered the Investigating Officer to open the lock and to hand over the possession of the disputed shop room to the respondent no. 2, the de facto complainant. 3. The applicant is also aggrieved by the order of the dismissal passed by the learned Sessions Judge in a criminal revision bearing no. 2 of 1995 dated 7-4-95. 4. The de facto complainant, being a lady made complaint leading to charges under section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, criminal exclusion or restraint of her from her tenanted shop room, during the time the room locked for road widening. 5. The case of the accused, who is the petitioner herein, is that the de facto complainant was never excluded by any illegal force or by employment of any criminal means. But that she had voluntarily left the shop room which had been erstwhile under her tenancy and that it had been readvertised giving, fresh tenancy. 6. Neither the shop room nor any property in the shop room had been seized at any point of time by any police officer including the Investigating Officer. Although seals were put on the locks as recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, there was no seizure as none of the provisions for seizing the property as mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code could be appropriately invoked in the circumstances of this case. 7. To fortify the position that there had been no seizure it is noted that the Investigating Officer himself made application for permission to inspect the contents of the locked shop room so that a conclusion could be drawn as to the persons in whose possession it was at the material time. However, before any order could be passed in such petition, the Investigating Officer filed his final report. 7A. In these circumstances, what has happened in the two lower courts appears to me to be the most extraordinary. However, before any order could be passed in such petition, the Investigating Officer filed his final report. 7A. In these circumstances, what has happened in the two lower courts appears to me to be the most extraordinary. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has entered into the probabilities of the case as to who should be decided as being the possessor at the material time, and by adjudicating on these issues he directed for handing over of the shop room to the de facto complainant. 8. Where the trial before the Id. Magistrate is about a criminal restraint or exclusion of the tenant, a finding to the above effect is necessarily prejudging a major part of the issue. If the possession was of the de facto complainant, the establishment of the charge against the petitioner herein has already much advanced. Secondly, even if the petitioner is ultimately held to be guilty and punished, the Chief Judicial Magistrate would not have any power while imposing such punishment to direct the accused to hand over the shop room to the de facto complainant. That would be a power vested with the Civil Court only. 9. The learned Sessions Judge has maintained the order of restoration of possession by coming to the conclusion that the shop room should be treated as seized and seized property could, under s. 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be restored to the proper party. Unfortunately there was no seizure here. By holding that there was a seizure where there was none, the learned Sessions Judge had also given a read-judication on the landlord's possession, which is also executed the same by restoring possession to the de facto complainant claiming herself to be a tenant. 10. It appears, therefore, that the two courts exercise powers inter alia under the Criminal Procedure and Indian Penal Code have completely gone beyond their limits and have passed orders, which are properly into the domain of Civil Courts. Were it not so, any tenant, even after voluntary delivery of possession, could get back by summary process his possession by making a complaint under s. 341 and by obtaining summary adjudication orders like the ones passed in the instant case. 11. Were it not so, any tenant, even after voluntary delivery of possession, could get back by summary process his possession by making a complaint under s. 341 and by obtaining summary adjudication orders like the ones passed in the instant case. 11. The learned Counsel for the de fecto complainant has relied upon the case of Dharampal and Others vs. Ramshri (8mt) and Others, reported in 1993(1) SCC 333 and has placed before me the passage at page 336 which runs as follows : "The Sessions Judge had dismissed the said application on May 14, 1979. Section 397(3) bars a second revised application by the same party. It is now well settled that the inherent powers under s. 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of respondent 1. On this short group itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside," The above passage is quite a good authority, in my opinion, for residing an application under s. 482 which is the somewhat akin to s. 151 of our Civil Procedure Code. 12. The case of Madhu Limaye reported in AIR 1987 SC 47 in my opinion, does run to the contrary. The passages placed on behalf of the applicant being paragraph 10 and subsequent thereto shall rather than the powers of the High Court to interfere with interlocutory orders under s. 482, and contain discussions more apposite to the bar contained in s. 397(2) rather than s. 397(3) which is the bar we are concerned with. 13. The question, therefore, arises as to what I should do when I find the two orders to have been given clearly side the bounds of authority by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge. 14. The learned Counsel for the de facto complainant, argued fairly and completely also placed before me the decision which is apposite in a situation like the present in regard to the High Court's power of superintendence. 14. The learned Counsel for the de facto complainant, argued fairly and completely also placed before me the decision which is apposite in a situation like the present in regard to the High Court's power of superintendence. He relied upon the case of Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh, reported in AIR 1979 SC 381 and submitted that in a case where the powers under s. 482 could not be invoked, there having been an earlier revision application filed and dismissed prior thereto, there could not be an application under Art. 227 either. 15. I have paid the most careful attention to this case and in my opinion, paragraph 6 of the said judgement is the most relevant. The Supreme Court disapproved of the High Court's exercise of power under s. 482 and refused to treat it as a good exercise even under Art. 227. The Supreme Court gives three reasons for it. First, the High Court had not purported to exercise its power under Art. 227. Secondly, the High Court can not merely by treating an application, which is revisional in nature as an application made under Art. 227 bypass the statutory bar of 397(3). Under Art. 227, the High Court exercises power not merely of revision and correction but of superintendence, that is for keeping the authorities within the bounds of their own jurisdiction. Thirdly, the Supreme Court refused to interfere in view of Art. 227 sub-Art. (5) introduced at that time inside our Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act. The said introduction has already been erased out. The High Court now exercise powers of judicial superintendence with as much freedom as it used to previously. 16. I find in this case the substante of complaint is a complaint against jurisdiction. Why it is a point of jurisdiction I have explained above and I need not repeat it. It should be borne in mind that although for convenience and harmonious procedure, different Judges of the same High Court exercise power or jurisdiction with regard to different branches of law, yet the High Court Judge never ceases to be a High Court Judge and in proper case the power vested by the Constitution not only can be but should be exercised in the interest of justice and in the interest of discharge of a High Court Judge's duty. 17. 17. In my opinion, it would be harse to the applicant to shuttle him between a s. 482 Procedure and an Art. 227 Procedure when the point of possession has already been argued threadbare by both sides. I, therefore, treat this application as an application also made under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and I grant the applicant the reliefs as prayed for. 18. Although not prayed for in so many words in the petition, the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directing the Investigating Officer to open the lock and to hand over the possession of the shop room being the order dated 16.1.1995 is hereby set aside. The order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 7.4.95 is also set aside as prayed for in prayer (b). The judgement and order passed herein will, in no manner, impede any trial including the trial on the charge framed under s. 341 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. Certified Xerox copy of this order be given to the learned Advocates for the parties and also to any other learned Advocate who intends to take it on usual undertakings of the petitioner. Application allowed.