JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of the Labour Court, Nasik, dated September 7, 1991, made in Application (IDA) No. 140 of 1988 under the Provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. The Petitioner was in the employment of the First Respondent and, on an allegation of lo misconduct, he was suspended from work with effect from September 1, 1987 and served with a charge-sheet. A lengthy domestic enquiry was held against the Petitioner, which resulted in the Enquiry Officer finding the Petitioner guilty of the charges alleged against him. Under the Standing Order 28(c) applicable to the First Respondent establishment, the employer is required to give the delinquent workman a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalties proposed. Accordingly, the Petitioner was given a show cause notice dated July 29, 1987 informing him that he has been found guilty of the charges alleged against him by the charge-sheet and called upon to show cause as to why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed upon him. Instead of replying to the said show-cause notice, the Petitioner rushed to the Labour Court and filed a complaint under the Act and obtained an exparte injunction order restraining the First Respondent from taking action against him. This injunction order was vacated on December 10, 1987 after the First Respondent appeared before the Labour Court and contested the complaint and the application for interim relief Even then, the petitioner did not give any reply to the show cause notice, but moved the Industrial Court by his Revision Application (ULP) No. 75 of 1987 and again obtained an interim order restraining the First Respondent from taking further action. The First Respondent entered appearance, and contested the Revision Application. The interim order made in the Revision Application was ultimately vacated by the Industrial Court. Not being satisfied, the petitioner moved this Court by Writ Petition No. 2130 of 1988, which came to be dismissed on June 20, 1988. An order of dismissal came to be passed against the Petitioner on June 24, 1988. The Petitioner remained on suspension from September 1, 1987 to June 24, 1988. Not being satisfied, the petitioner moved this Court by Writ Petition No. 2130 of 1988, which came to be dismissed on June 20, 1988. An order of dismissal came to be passed against the Petitioner on June 24, 1988. The Petitioner remained on suspension from September 1, 1987 to June 24, 1988. The First Respondent has paid to the Petitioner subsistence allowance at the rate of 50% of his last drawn wages during the entire period of suspension. 3. The Petitioner filed the application before the Labour Court, Nasik, u/s 33-C(2) of the Act and alleged that, under the applicable Standing Order, he was entitled to be paid 75% of his emoluments as subsistence allowance for the period in question and claimed the difference between what was already paid and what was being claimed by him. The Petitioner made his claim under Standing Order 28(b)(i), which reads as under :- "28. Payment of Subsistence Allowance to workmen placed under suspension pending enquiry : (a) ................. (b) A workman who is placed under suspension under clause (a) shall, during the period of such suspension, be paid a subsistence allowance at the following rates, namely :- (i) Where the enquiry contemplated or pending is departmental, the subsistence. Allowance shall, for the first ninety days from the date of suspension be equal to one-half of the basic wages, dearness allowance and other compensatory allowances to which the workman would have been entitled if he were on leave with wages. If the departmental enquiry gets prolonged and the workman continues to be under suspension for a period exceeding ninety days, the subsistence shall for such period be equal to three-fourths of such basic wages, dearness allowance and other compensatory allowances : Provided that where such enquiry is prolonged beyond a period of ninety days for reasons directly attributable to the workman, the subsistence allowance shall, for the period exceeding ninety days, be reduced to one fourth of such basic wages, dearness allowance and other compensatory allowances." 4. The claim of the Petitioner was contested by the First Respondent by pointing out that the action against the petitioner was delayed, not on account of any reason attributable to the First Respondent, but for reasons directly attributed to the Petitioner, as, instead of dealing with the show cause notice and replying it, the Petitioner had resorted to frivolous litigation, which was carried on for considerable time, till finally set to rest by this Court's order. The First Respondent, therefore, invoked the proviso to Standing Order 28(b) (i) and contended that the Petitioners case was covered by proviso and that the subsistence allowance payable for the period between the date of the show-cause notice and the order of dismissal being in excess of 90 days, the Petitioner was not entitled to be paid more than 1/4th of his emoluments as subsistence allowance. The Labour Court accepted the contention of the First Respondent and dismissed the application. Hence, this Petition. 5. The scheme of the disciplinary action contemplated under the Certified Standing Orders 28, 29 and 30 indicates that the First Respondent employer is empowered to suspend a delinquent employee even on contemplation of disciplinary proceedings or if disciplinary proceedings are pending, or where criminal proceedings against the employee have been in respect of an offence which is under investigation or trial. Upon a consideration of the scheme of the Certified Standing Orders, applicable to the First Respondent establishment, it is not possible to take the narrow view that the enquiry contemplated under Standing Order 28(b) or (b)(i) or (ii) would only be during the period between the service of the charge-sheet and making of the Enquiry Officer's report. I am of the view that, for the purpose of the application of the proviso, the expression 'enquiry' used therein needs to be liberally construed. It would also include, within its purview, the period between the date on which the Enquiry Officer makes his report and the date on which the final order is made by the punishing authority. I am of the view that, for the purpose of the application of the proviso, the expression 'enquiry' used therein needs to be liberally construed. It would also include, within its purview, the period between the date on which the Enquiry Officer makes his report and the date on which the final order is made by the punishing authority. Taken in conjunction with the fact that under the applicable Standing Orders a final order of dismissal cannot be passed against the employee unless he is given an opportunity to make representation as contemplated by Standing Order 28(c), it would be reasonable to construe the Standing Order by taking the view that the proviso to Standing Order 28(b)(i) would operate even beyond the date on which the Enquiry Officer makes his report and would take within its ambit the period between the date of the Enquiry Officers' report and the date of the final order passed by the punishing authority. The delay, beyond ninety days, in completing the inquiry is undoubtedly attributable to the Petitioner's acts of filing several frivolous cases and obtaining exparte orders of injunction. The Petitioner's case is therefore, covered by the proviso to Standing Order 28(b)(i). In this view of the matter, I find that there is no error in the impugned order of the Labour Court. As the Labour Court has pointed out, though, strictly speaking, the Petitioner was entitled to 1/4th of monthly emoluments as subsistence allowance during the relevant period, he has actually been paid 50% thereof. The Petitioner, therefore, had no case before the Labour Court, nor does he have here. The Petition is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. 6. In the result, Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.