N. K. L. BATABYAL, J. ( 1 ) ALL these 4 matters are taken up altogether for analogous hearing as per orders dated February 23, 1993 and August 10, 1994. These are treated as on today's list. ( 2 ) SRI Gouranga Dhar, the petitioner in C. O. 1883 (W) of 1993 appointed by the respondent No. 3 (Managing Director, W. B. Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. , at Serampore Workshop) as a stipper-cum-flat grinder. The petitioner rendered satisfactory service to the management and had a clean service record. On June 13, 1992, the Respondent No. 4 (Technical Manager, W. B. Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. , Serampore) issued a notice against the petitioner under para 27 (i), (viii) and (ix) of the Model Standing Orders of the Government of West Bengal as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him as he was not found at his place of work during the period from 12. 30 to 1. 00 p. m. on June 8, 1992. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice denying the allegations. The copy of the show cause notice dated June 13, 1992 and a copy of the reply dated June 17, 1992 are enclosed with the writ petition and are collectively marked Annexure "a". As the explanation was not found satisfactory an inquiry was held and ultimately he was found guilty of misconduct, On January 28, 1993 as per the decision of the Managing Committee an order of dismissal was passed. The petitioner was not furnished with any copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer submitted by him nor was the petitioner given any show cause notice as to the quantum of punishment. According to the petitioner, the order of dismissal is bad in law, illegal and mala fide. After giving notice demanding justice, the petitioner has come to this Court for quashing the order of dismissal by the issue of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to recall or rescind or cancel the order of dismissal from service (marked Annexure "e") and to reinstate the petitioner immediately in service with all arrears, salaries and benefits and other reliefs. ( 3 ) SRI Nitai Das, the writ petitioner in C. O. 1884 (W) of 1993 was appointed by the Respondent No. 3 (Managing Director, W. B. Cooperative Spinning Mills Ltd. at its workshop at Serampore) on July 1, 1978 as a dropping boy. ( 3 ) SRI Nitai Das, the writ petitioner in C. O. 1884 (W) of 1993 was appointed by the Respondent No. 3 (Managing Director, W. B. Cooperative Spinning Mills Ltd. at its workshop at Serampore) on July 1, 1978 as a dropping boy. He rendered satisfactory service to the management and was promoted to the post of Back Tenter. On February 15, 1992 the Respondent No. 4 (the Technical Manager, W. B. Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. Serampore) issued a show cause notice against the petitioner under para 27 (viii) of the Model Standing Orders of the Government of West Bengal as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his alleged forced entry inside the factory premises on February 3, 1992 at 9. 30 a. m. disregarding the prevalent practice. A show cause notice was filed by the petitioner. The same consequences followed and he was ultimately dismissed from service. He was not given a copy of the inquiry report nor was he given the opportunity of second show cause against the punishment. According to him, the order of dismissal is bad in law and illegal and mala fide. After giving notice demanding justice he has come to this Court for the same relief as in the other case. ( 4 ) SRI Dhrubendu Poddar, the petitioner in C. O. 1885 (W) of 1993 was appointed by the Respondent No. 3 at the Workshop at Serampore on August 9, 1984 as a cobbler. The petitioner rendered satisfactory service to the establishment. On March 10, 1992 the respondent issued a show cause notice against the petitioner under para 27 (viii) of the Model Standing Orders of the Government of West Bengal as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his alleged quarrel with his superior officer within the factory premises. He gave his reply to the show cause which was not found satisfactory, A disciplinary proceeding was initiated and ultimately he was dismissed from service. He was not given a copy of the inquiry report nor was he given opportunity of second show cause against the proposed punishment. After given notice demanding justice, he has come before this Court for the same set of reliefs as before. ( 5 ) SRI Ahmed Hossain is the petitioner in C. O. 6617 (W) of 1993. He was not given a copy of the inquiry report nor was he given opportunity of second show cause against the proposed punishment. After given notice demanding justice, he has come before this Court for the same set of reliefs as before. ( 5 ) SRI Ahmed Hossain is the petitioner in C. O. 6617 (W) of 1993. He was appointed by the Respondent No. 3 on August 7, 1988 as a cleaner in the Ring Frame Department. He rendered satisfactory service to the management. On May 20, 1992 the Respondent No. 4 issued a show cause notice against him under para 27 (i), (viii) and (ix) of the West Bengal Model Standing Orders. The petitioner submitted a show cause which was found not satisfactory. Disciplinary proceeding was initiated and ultimately he was dismissed from service. According to him, the order of dismissal is mala fide, illegal and without jurisdiction. After serving notice demanding justice, the petitioner has come before this Court for the set of reliefs as stated above. ( 6 ) THE Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in all the above writ petitions have filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the material allegations. Mr. Dasan, learned Advocate for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in all the cases has submitted that the point of maintainability of writ petition may be taken up first as on the face of it the writ petition being directed against a Co-operative Spinning Mill, namely the W. B. Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. is not maintainable in law. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners in all the cases has no objection if the point of maintainability is taken up as a preliminary point. Accordingly, the only point which has been taken up at this stage for hearing is the question of maintainability of the writ petitions. ( 7 ) MR. Dasan, learned Advocate has in support of his contention referred to the following decisions of the Apex Court :-- (1) Tekraj v. Union of India, (1988-I-LLJ-341); (2) Chander Mohan Khanna v. N. C. E. R. T. , (1992-I-LLJ-331 ). ( 8 ) IN Tekraj's case (supra) it has been held that there are criteria formulated by several cases of the Supreme Court to find out whether an institution is a "state". There cannot indeed be a straight jacket formula. ( 8 ) IN Tekraj's case (supra) it has been held that there are criteria formulated by several cases of the Supreme Court to find out whether an institution is a "state". There cannot indeed be a straight jacket formula. It is not necessary that all the criteria should be satisfied for reaching the conclusion either for or against an institution to the "state in". In a given case some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. There may yet be other cases where the matter would be on the border line and it would be difficult to take one view or the other outright. ( 9 ) IN that case it has been further held that in a welfare State, Governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In the absence of a fair application of the decisions made, there is possibility of turning every non-Governmental Society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality. A broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences of the case in view so as to reach a reasonable conclusion. ( 10 ) IN Chander Mohan's case (supra) it has been held that Article 12 of the Constitution should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'state'. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency, are generally subject to 'state' control. The 'state' control does not render such bodies as State under Article 12. The "state" control, however, vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the state is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid is coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "state". The financial contribution by the state is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid is coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "state". If the Government operates behind a corporate veil carrying out govermental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "state" within the meaning of Article 12. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate, Mr. Dasan has also relied upon a single Bench decision of our High Court in Debabrata Majumdar v. Mayurakshi Cotton Mills Ltd. 1994 2 Cal LJ 431. in that case the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Manager-cum-Spinning Master for a period of 59 days. But he was continued in service after the expiry of 59 days. His service was subsequently terminated by an order passed by the Committee of Management of M. C. M. Ltd. The petitioner challenged the termination of the service before the High Court contending that as the State had majority share in the said Cotton Mill, therefore his services could not be terminated without complying the principles of Articles 311 of the Constitution. It was held that the respondent-Mill was not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. It was a trading concern like any other industry in the field of cotton production whose function could not be stated to be the functions of public law character and it was not closely related to governmental functions. So, the employment of the petitioner did not have a public law character or any public law element in it. That being so the writ petition was not maintainable. ( 12 ) MR. Bhattacharya, learned Advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the principles laid down in Managing Directors, Electronic Cor- poration of India Ltd, v. B. Karunakar, (1994-I-LLJ-162) (SC) in support of his contention that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity of the employee to prove his innocence and his breach of principles of natural justice. ( 13 ) MR. Bhattacharya has further submitted that in that case it has been laid down that Articles 311 (2) of the Constitution makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. ( 14 ) IT appears that as we are concerned only with the question of maintainability of the writ petitions as framed, therefore, it is not proper for this Court to go into the question whether the non-furnishing of copy of the Inquiry Officer's report has resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to the employees concerned. That question may be left open to be decided at a later stage. ( 15 ) MR. Bhattacharya has relied upon the principles laid down in a Division Bench decision of this Court in Arjed Ali Gazi v. State of West Bengal 1990 2 Cal HN 284. In that case the petitioner was an employee of a primary Cooperative Society for the alleged misappropriation of the sale proceeds of six bags of cement, the Governing Body of the Society adopted a resolution that extreme penalty of dismissal from service should not be passed for lapses for the first time and directed the petitioner to deposit the price of the said cement and the petitioner was demoted as a sub-staff of the Society. In spite of the said resolution and implementation of the order an Enquiry Committee was appointed by the Society which held that charge of misappropriation was established and the Society passed an order of dismissal of the petitioner from service without giving him any hearing. The validity was questioned in the writ petition. When the matter came up for hearing in view of a number of conflicting decisions of single Bench of this High Court as to the question of maintainability of a writ petition against a Co-operative Society, the learned Judge referred the matter for consideration by a Division Bench. ( 16 ) BEFORE the Division Bench, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents contending that no writ lies against Co-operative Society in respect of impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner, an employee of the Society. ( 17 ) HELD, it appears that the Governing Body had already imposed a penalty of fine and reversion. Therefore, there was no occasion to take further steps to cause enquiry on an admitted position and to pass an order of dismissal. In any event, such enquiry having been made ex parte and behind the back of the petitioner, there has been violation of the basic principles of natural justice. ( 18 ) HELD, further, that a Co-operative Society formed by private initiation of its members is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is also not a public body. It is essentially a Private Body. Hence, if the conditions of service of an employee of the Co-operative Society are not left to be controlled by the said statutory rules but are controlled by the terms of contract of service or bye-laws of the Society which is not a statutory rule, no writ will lie for enforcing breach of the terms of employment of the employee of the Co-operative Society. ( 19 ) MR. ( 19 ) MR. Bhattacharya, learned Advocate has on the basis of the decision cited above fay him submitted that since a Division Bench of this High Court has been pleased to hold that if the conditions of service of an employee of a Co-operative Society are not left to be controlled by the terms of contract of service or Bye-laws of the Society but are controlled by statutory rules, then a writ will lie for enforcing a breach of the terms of employment of the employee of the Co-operative Society. ( 20 ) MR. Dasan, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has taken the Tribunal to quote the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act to show that out of the 19 Directors in the Board, there are 3 nominated members by the State Govt. There are 214 share holders in the Co-operative Society and each share holder has only one vote. Therefore, it is obvious that there is no determinative financial control of the State Govt. over the affairs of the Co-operative Society. About the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya, it has been submitted by Mr. Dasan that in Chander Mohan case (supra), it has been held that the State control, however, vast and pervasive, is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the Co-operative Society and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory function of the State may largely point out that the particular body is a 'state' under Article 12. The function of the Co-operative Mill in the case at hand is like any other Co-operative Mill in the field of cotton production in the market and the function of the Co-operative Mill cannot be stated to be the function of the character. This particular aspect of the nature of function of the subject has been clearly highlighted in Debabrata Mazumdar's case (supra ). This particular aspect of the nature of function of the subject has been clearly highlighted in Debabrata Mazumdar's case (supra ). ( 21 ) IN view of the decision laid down by the Apex Court of our land in Tekraj's case (supra) and in Chander Mohan's case (supra), there can be no straight-jacket formula for deciding whether an institution is a 'state' under Article 12 of the Constitution, In a given case, some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. There may be other cases where the matter would be the border line and it would be difficult to take one view or the other out-right. In a welfare State, like ours, there may be some sort of Government control directly or indirectly touching all aspects of social life but the tendency to turn every non governmental body into an agency or instrumentality of the State for that purpose would not be conducive to the Society. A wide enlargement of the (sic) of Article 12 must be tempered with a wise limitation. In the case at hand, prima facie, there is nothing to show the financial control of the State over the affairs of the subject Cooperative Society. The Co-operative Spinning Mil! carries on business of production of cotton yarn like any other Mill in the market. The subject Mill does not discharge any essential function of any public law character in its day-to-day functioning. Thus, here is a border line case where it cannot be said outright that the subject Mill is an organ of the State in terms of the principles laid down in Tekraj's case (supra) or Chandermohan's case (supra) referred to above. But we cannot wish away the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Arjed Ali's case (supra) where it has been laid down that where the conditions of service of the employee of the Co-operative Society are controlled by Statutory Rules and not by the terms of contract between the parties or bye-laws ot Co-operative Society then though the Co-operative Society is essentially a private body still a writ petition is maintainable. In this view of the matter the present writ petition cannot be treated be held as not maintainable on the ground that a Co-operative Society does not come within the expression 'state' under Article 12 of our Constitution. In this view of the matter the present writ petition cannot be treated be held as not maintainable on the ground that a Co-operative Society does not come within the expression 'state' under Article 12 of our Constitution. ( 22 ) ANOTHER point which has been raised by Mr. Dasan is that the writ petitioners are workers under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the disputes are related to their service. Hence the appropriate forum for them, is the machinery set up under the I. D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the writ petition does not lie. Mr Bhattacharya, learned Advocate for the writ petitioners has submitted that the existence of an adequate alternative remedy, whether a statutory or an administrative appeal or otherwise, is no bar to the writ under Article 226 of our Constitution where a fundamental right has been infringed or where some mandatory provision of the Constitution has been violated. (State of Bombay v. United Motors Ltd. Kailash v. State of U. P. From the submissions of the learned Lawyers, it appears that in this case the petitioners have come to Court on the allegations that there has been a violation of the Rules of natural justice as also there has been a contravention of fundamental rights. Therefore, in view of the principles laid down in Champa Lal v. C. I. T. and State of U. P. v. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 . it can be well said that simply on the ground that the petitioners could have gone to the Tribunal or in appeal cannot be the basis for holding that the petitions are not maintainable. In view of the findings made above, this Court finds thai the writ petitions are maintainable. ( 23 ) AS the affidavits are already complete in this case, therefore, let the matters go before the appropriate Bench for further orders.