JUDGMENT This revision has been preferred against the order dated 25th of October, 1994, passed by VI Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior, rejecting the application of the petitioner for causing interference in the execution proceedings against the judgment-debtors. The petitioner claims to be a third party and was not a party in the regular suit filed by the opposite parties against other defendants. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri V.N. Phatak and Shri S.K. Jain, learned counsel for the opposite parties, and examining the record, it appears that a suit for declaration and possession was filed by Ganpatlal (since dead) against the other. respondents Chameli Devi and others. Legal representatives of Ganpatlal were brought on record and they pursued the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial Court for compensation instead of possession. In appeal, the appellate Court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and was also entitled to recover possession from the defendants. The appellate Court directed modifying the order of the trial Court that the decree for possession be also passed against the defendants. Two second appeals were led before this Court being S.A. No. 75/90 and another S.A. No. 79/90. They were heard and disposed of by a judgment of this Court dated 22nd of June, 1993. Against this judgment the aggrieved defendant preferred a special appeal before the Apex Court and the Apex Court by order dated 10th of January, 1994 dismissed both the special leave petitions, confirming the judgment and decree passed by this Court. The plaintiff/opposite parties then applied for execution of the decree in the execution proceedings. The present petitioner raised an objection that he was actually in possession of a part of the disputed premises and the decree was not binding upon him and the same cannot be executed resulting in his dispossession. This point was considered by the trial Court and the trial Court held that since the decree has become final as against the defendants/judgment debtors upto the Apex Court and in execution proceedings the warrants were issued and the objections of the petitioner, who was the third party, was not entertained on the ground that he had no locus standi in the execution proceedings. Nothing has been shown to this Court that at any stage of the pendency of the earlier suit or appeal, the petitioner claimed any title or possession or he ever objected to the proceedings as against other judgment debtors. The petitioner had· not applied for being impleaded as a party in the earlier suit. It is true that the petitioner was not bound to apply to become a party and it was the duty of the plaintiff to implead him if, at all, a decree was sought against him for recovery of possession. The decree was obtained by plaintiff/decree holders against the other defendants/judgment debtors who were found in wrongful possession of the suit property and this Court had decreed the suit and upheld the judgment and decree of the appellate Court so far as the establishment of total recovery of possession was concerned. The only question raised in this revision was as to whether the petitioner being a third party could object to the execution proceedings, so far as his possession was concerned. After a long litigation at this stage the executing Court could not consider the claim of the petitioner regarding his title and possession over the disputed property when other defendants had already contested the matter at length in different Courts upto the Apex Court. The proper course for the petitioner was to file a regular civil suit to defend his title and possession, if any, based on genuine acquisition of title from a lawful source. The position of the petitioner as a third party is that of intruder in execution proceedings. The trial Court was, therefore, fully justified in rejecting his prayer to stay the execution and to hear him as party in the proceedings. The questioned decree has already been confirmed by the Apex Court. Therefore, this revision cannot be entertained to consider the title and possession of the petitioner independently of the decree passed against other judgment-debtors. It will be going beyond the purview of law in entertaining such revisions for establishment of title and possession independently of the decree in question. As such the proper remedy lies in a separate civil suit in which the question could be considered after the evidence being led by the concerned parties. In view of the above discussions, this revision cannot be entertained and is dismissed at the stage of admission.