This revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Dhubri in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1989 reversing the decree passed in Title Suit No. 11 of 1986. The suit for ejectment of the defendant/tenant was filed on two grounds i.e.(l) defaulter and (2) bonafide requirement. We are not concerned with the ground of defaulter inasmuch as both the Courts below have found that there was no default in payment of rent. The only ground with which we are concerned is the ground of bonafide requirement. The pleading is in paragraph 4 of the plaint which is quoted below : "That the plaintiffs submit that the suit premises have become very old and in dilapidated condition as such it is bonafide required for the purposes of repairs and also for rebuilding whichever will be found convenient." So, the pleading of bonafide requirement was that the building is required for the purpose of repair and also for re-building. This plea of bonafide requirement was denied by the tenant in paragraph 10 of the written statement. In the written statement it is stated that in the year 1982 the house was repaired by her, taking permission from the father. There is no specific issue regarding bonafide requirement in the suit. But the issue Nos.4 and 5 read as follows : (i) Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises ? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the reliefs claimed ? 2. Regarding issue No.4, the trial Court held as follows : "Assuming that suit the premises are required by the plaintiffs for repairing or rebuilding on the ground of the suit houses becoming old or being in old condition. In that case the plaintiffs have also failed to justify their requirement for rebuilding or repairing of the suit houses as because they have not shown any permission obtained from the authorities of the Municipality or Town Committee as the case may be since the suit houses are situated within the town area at Gouripur town. In that case the plaintiffs have also failed to justify their requirement for rebuilding or repairing of the suit houses as because they have not shown any permission obtained from the authorities of the Municipality or Town Committee as the case may be since the suit houses are situated within the town area at Gouripur town. What they have stressed while adducing evidence is that the suit premises are required for their occupation and since they were born at Gouripur and their friends are living there so the plaintiff No. 11 (PW 2) wished to pass his remaining days of life at Gouripur out of sentiment. In my reasoned opinion, the sentiment alone does not count much in the eye of law unless the requirement prima facie appears to be genuine one. It is in the evidence of the plaintiffs that they have got houses at Dhubri also where they live and one house at Dhubri has been let out on rent, again, it is in the evidence of PW 2 (plaintiff No. 1) that they have got no other houses apart from the suit houses at Gauripur. It is PW 2 who further stated that in the event of his getting the suit houses he would perhaps let out the house at Dhubri, on rent. It is further seen in the evidence of P W 2 that unless the suit houses are demolished, the mutual partition of the suit premises between them (the plaintiffs) would not be possible. Hence, from the nature of evidence of the plaintiffs discussed above it appears that the requirement of the suit premises by them is not pressing one." Having arrived at this finding the suit was dismissed by the trial Court. There was an appeal being the Title Appeal No. 13 of 1989. The lower appellate Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment has decided as follows : "There is not the least of doubt that when the landlord requires his houses for repairs or rebuilding, he requires it bonafide unless the tenant can prove that the landlord has come oblique motive behind evicting him. It is not even necessary to prove by the landlord that the house is in a ramshackle condition. It is not even necessary to prove by the landlord that the house is in a ramshackle condition. In the case in hand the defendant tried to prove that the plaintiff/appellants do not want the house bonafide for repairs or rebuilding but they intend to sell it to some Manvari-people but her written statement is completely silent about it. It is therefore, can not be accepted as the parties cannot go beyond their pleading." 3. I have heard Sri DC Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner/ defendant and Sri SN Medhi, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/opposite parties. Sri Mahanta submits that the finding arrived at by the learned Judge is absolutely a perverse finding and he further submitted that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to pass a decree on the ground of bonafide requirement without considering the ingredient necessary to establish the plea of bonafide requirement and in this connection Sri Mahanta places reliance on a decision of this Court reported in 1991 (2) GLJ 185 (Shri THok Chand Bajaj vs. Madanlal Kabra)where in paragraph 18 this Court pointed out is follows : " The expression 'bonafide' means 'honest' in the context. The bonafide requirement under the Act is to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely having sufficient means of funds of the landlord for re-construction and also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation. In a sense, if the building happens to be dilapidated, it may be one of the circumstances for bona-fide requirement of the landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means or funds of the landlord for re-construction would not be sufficient. In other words, a landlord having means or funds for re-construction after demolishing the building by itself may not be of a very recent construction. Sufficient funds or means and other steps such as sanctioned plans from the concerned authority may be relevent factor for establishing bonafide requirement, if there is no oblique motive. What is to be established is the honest requirement in the circumstances." 4. Sufficient funds or means and other steps such as sanctioned plans from the concerned authority may be relevent factor for establishing bonafide requirement, if there is no oblique motive. What is to be established is the honest requirement in the circumstances." 4. On the other hand Sri SN Medhi, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties submits that the finding of bonafide requirement arrived at by the lower Court below is finding of facts and in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction, I am not entitled to interfere with this finding. In support of this contention Sri Medhi places reliance in AIR 1965 SC 553 (M/s Misrilal Parasmal vs. HP Sadasiviah & others) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that - "in an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no interference can be made merely on the ground that the decision is erroneous in law or facf 'Sri Medhi further submits relying on (1973) 1 SCC 635 (Brij Gopal Mathur & others vs. Kishan Gopal & others) that the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 115, by the revisional Court is absolutely discretionary even if the three clauses i.e. (a), (b) or (c) of section 115, are fulfilled and/or attracted, the jevisional Court is not entitled to interfere with the order of the subordinate Court if it is found that the order has not caused a substantial failure of justice. Sri Mahanta also relied on AIR 1991 SC 969 (Smti. Prabhavatiben Bhikubhai Mehta vs. Shri Mahesh Kumar K.Sheth). That was a case regarding balance of hardship in favour of eviction. That espect of the matter need not be considered inasmuch as the question of hardship under Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 is absolutely irrelevant one. A Court can pass a decree once the condition as mentioned under section 5 (1) (a) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent, 1972 are fulfilled. The Court gets jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment, but the material question is as to .whether the ground of bonafide requirement as required to be established has been made out. In the judgment, I have quoted, the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court regarding bonafide requirement. The Court gets jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment, but the material question is as to .whether the ground of bonafide requirement as required to be established has been made out. In the judgment, I have quoted, the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court regarding bonafide requirement. A bare perusal of finding will show that the appellate Court did not consider the requirement of bonafide as required to be established by a decision of this Court indicated above in paragraph 18 of the Tilokchand judgment. If these ingredients are not considered and the finding of bonafide requirement is arrived at by the Courts below, that will amount jurisdictional error and the revisional Court shall have the jurisdiction to interfere with the matter Sri Medhi submits that even then this will be the error of law and that will not amount the jurisdictional error giving a right to Court to interfere under section 115.1 am not in a position to accept this contention of Sri Medhi inasmuch as the duty of the Court is to acquire the jurisdiction to in relief for ejectment by finding out whether it is required or not and that position must be arrived at by considering pleadings the materials and by considering the evidence necessary for arriving at the plea of bonafide requirement. That was not done in the instant case. 5. Accordingly, this revision application is allowed. The judgment dated 13.2.91 passed in Title SuitNo.13 of 19 89 by the Assistant District Judge, Dhubri shall stand quashed and the judgment dated 21.6.89 passed by the learned Munsiff, Dhubri in Title Suit No. 12 of 1986 shall stand restored. I make no order as to costs.