Kisan Renhat Industry v. Pushpa Harishankar Singhal
1995-03-15
U.L.BHAT
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER U.L. Bhat, C.J. 1. Defendant in the suit is the revision petitioner. 2. Respondent herein filed a suit on the basis of a promissory note dated 20-4-1991, said to have been executed by the defendant in her favour for a sum of Rs. 45,000/-, alleging that no part of the interest and the principal had been paid but the relief claimed was for declaration that the plaintiff would be entitled to receive Rs. 45,000/- as principal and Rs. 23,625/- as interest from the defendant. The relief of declaration was valued at the total amount and fixed court-fee was paid under Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act. The court on 25-4-1994, directed the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court-fee. On 13-7-1994, plaintiff filed an application seeking to pay the ad valorem court-fee less the court-fee already paid and seeking amendment in the plaint seeking to substitute the recovery of principal and the interest amount for the declaration originally prayed for. On the date of the application, a new suit for recovery of the money due under promissory note would have been barred by limitation. The defendant opposed the application on that ground, but the lower court allowed the application. This order is now challenged. 3. The promissory note bears the date 20-4-1991. The suit was originally filed on 19-3-1994, within three years from the date of promissory note. The application for amendment was filed on 13-7-1994, more than three years after the date of the promissory note. A suit for recovery of money on the basis of the promissory note would have been clearly barred on the date of application. On the strength of the decision in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shindgonda Patil and others, AIR 1957 SC 363 , learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that amendment taking away right accrued to a party by lapse of time cannot be allowed. The court observed that : "All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs.
Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused, to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test, therefore still remains the same : can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side or can it not?" 4. In L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Messrs Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 , the suit was for damages for conversion. An alternative claim for damages for breach of contract was sought to be added. The court observed that : "It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does nt affect the power of the court to order it. if that is required in the interests of justice." The court noticed that the claim could not be said to be foreign to the suit, that all necessary facts were placed in the plaint and what was lacking was only the allegation that the plaintiffs are, in the alternative, entitled to claim damages for breach of contract by the defendants in not delivering the goods. The Supreme Court allowed the amendment. In A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 , the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that it was entitled to enhancement of 20% over the tendered rates. The High Court held against the maintainability of the suit.
The Supreme Court allowed the amendment. In A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 , the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that it was entitled to enhancement of 20% over the tendered rates. The High Court held against the maintainability of the suit. The plaintiff sought the leave of the High Court to amend the plaint by adding an extra relief for a decree for the contract money or such other amount as was to be found due on proper account being taken. The application was refused. Thus, the matter reached the Supreme Court. It was noticed that on the date of application for amendment, a suit for money-claim under contract was barred. The Supreme Court allowed the amendment finding that it was necessary for a decision of real dispute between the parties, that the dispute was clearly involved in the plaint as originally filed and all necessary basic facts had been stated and only claim for relief on those facts had not been asked. The court observed : "The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation". The court further observed : "The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are first, that the object of courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistake and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended". 5. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court have to be applied to the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner has invited my attention to several decisions of this Court including those in Damodarrao and Anr.
5. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court have to be applied to the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner has invited my attention to several decisions of this Court including those in Damodarrao and Anr. v. Mainabai and another, 1987 MPLJ 126 , and in Kartar Singh and Ors. v. Kanhai Singh and others, 1989 JU 461. These decisions have only applied to the facts of the given cases the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court. 6. The defendant is yet to file written statement. He is waiting for the clarification by the plaintiff, ordered to be furnished by the lower court. We have only the plaint before us. The plaint recites execution of the promissory note by the defendant in favour of plaintiff, the passing of consideration therefore and the failure of the defendant to repay any part of the principal and interest and the correct amount of principal and interest due on the date of suit. On the basis of these facts, plaintiff chose to claim a relief for declaration that he is entitled to the amount from the defendant, perhaps, as suggested by the lower court to postpone the payment of ad valorem court fee due. The facts averred in the plaint are precisely the facts which are required to be averred in a suit for claiming decree for recovery of the principal and interest due under the promissory note. No additional facts are necessary for such a suit. It cannot, therefore, be said that the entire cause of action of the suit will be altered or that a new relief not in the contemplation of the plaintiff and the relief which could not have been claimed on the basis of the averments of the plaint is attempted to be incorporated by way of amendment. This is a case which constitutes an exception to the ordinary rule under which the court would not countenance an amendment in relation to a matter which would be otherwise barred by limitation on the date of application for amendment. 7. In the circumstance, I find no error of jurisdiction in the impugned order. Accordingly, I dismiss the revision petition, but without costs.