JUDGMENT : D.M. Patnaik, J. - Short question for decision in this revision is, order dated 16.9.1995 of the Executive Magistrate, Puri in Misc. Case No. 440/95, converting the proceeding u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure (initiated by the first party) to the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is legally tenable or not. The present Petitioner was the second party in the lower Court. 2. The first party approached the Executive Magistrate to pass an appropriate prohibitory order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the Ashram/school and other properties of Thakur Nigamananda was managed by him pursuant to a Power of Attorney from the Adhakshya Srimat Swami Mahasananda Saraswati. It was further alleged that the second party (present Petitioner) with the help of some antisocial elements, rioting, arson threatened and entered forcibly into the Ashram premises with a view to create disturbances in performing customary festivals during Rathipurnima Utsav which was to continue for a month. It further alleged that there was possibilities of rioting, arson and endanger to human life and properties of the said Ashram. The Executive Magistrate passed a preliminary order u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure., but before expiry of the statutory period of two months, by the impugned order dated 16.9.95 he converted the proceeding to one u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 3. Case of the second party a is found from the objection filed in their case is that Thakur Nigamananda Saraswati formed the Trust Board sometime in the year 1980 with 11 members and he himself was the President of the Board. According to the deed, Mahant was supposed to manage the entire properties of the trust and accordingly one Pragyanda Saraswati was appointed by him as Mahant of the Trust Board and thereafter one Chidananda Saraswati, Atmananda Saraswati were nominated as Mahanta to manage the properties of the Trust. Said Atmananda managed the properties of the Trust Board for more than 36 years and due to his old age he nominated Sri mat Swami Jyotirmayananda Saraswati, the second party, as the Mahanta of the Trust Board in the year 1976 and since then the second party as the Mahanta of the Trust Board had been managing the properties of the Trust. So far as the status of the first party is concerned, in the objection the second party mentioned that first party became Brahmachari and Sanyashi and he took Dikhya from opposite party-second party sometime during 1991-92 at Nasik Kumbha Mela. The second party seeing the devotion of the Petitioner sent him to Nigamananda Saraswati Ashram, Puri as Sevak. But the first party during his stay at Puri betrayed the confidence and created various types of disturbances and misdeeds etc. For his misdeeds a meeting was convened and the misdeeds were discussed in the meeting in which the first party begged apology, but again he indulged in those activities and created disturbances when the second party was managing the affairs of the Ashram. Being enraged by the action of the second party, the first party filed this false case. Since the second party happens to be Mahanta and Head of the Trust Board he claimed to have got every right to perform various functions of the Ashram. Challenging the power of attorney in favour of the first party the second party stated that there was no such power of attorney executed by Mahasananda Saraswati, Adhakhya of Nigamananda Saraswati Ashram, Puri. Since latter had tendered his resignation from the post of Adhakhya which was accepted by the second party No. 1 on 1.8.95 and in his place second party No. 2 has been appointed as Adhakhya of the said Ashram from that date, he claimed to drop the proceeding. 4. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Counsel for the second party-petitioner strenuously urged in support of his revision petition that, the initiation of Section 144 proceeding in the present case is misconceived from the inception as there was no question of apprehension of breach of peace as is found from the allegations. Secondly, the conversion of Section 144 proceeding to Section 145 proceeding is nothing but is a distinct and independent proceeding and so far as the present case is concerned, since there is no doubt with regard to possession of any immovable properties with the second party, converting a proceeding to Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure proceeding is untenable in the eye of law. Thirdly, the right to management of the Ashram and its properties and possession of those properties, is the subject matter of a civil suit pending. Thirdly, the right to management of the Ashram and its properties and possession of those properties, is the subject matter of a civil suit pending. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the certified copy of interim order of injunction passed by the Civil Court as well as true copy of the plaint filed by the second party in the suit. 5. Mr. G.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, has submitted that it is wrong to say that in the proceeding u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure no immovable properties is involved and in fact Sri Mishra has drawn attention to the schedule of the properties mentioned in Section 144 petition. It is further countered by submitting that it is not known that whether the suit filed by the second party In the civil suit relates to immovable properties connected with the present proceeding and according to him there is nothing wrong or improper with the order of the Magistrate since on being satisfied that there is apprehension of breach of peace for possession of the disputed land he has drawn up a proceeding and asked the parties to file written statement. 6. Having gone through the impugned order I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. S.P. Mishra that the order should be set aside, the reason being satisfied with the petition with affidavit of first party that there was apprehension of breach of peace, Magistrate drew up a proceeding u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure which was within his jurisdiction. The contention of Mr. Mishra that prohibitory order did not relate to any immovable property, is not correct. In the petition the first party gave schedule of land in respect of which there is allegation of dispute for management and possession. The fair contention that Magistrate committed error in converting proceeding to one u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is also not acceptable to me since Magistrate having been satisfied that there still existed apprehension of breach of peace relating to possession, drew up a preliminary order u/s 145 and that too within the statutory period of two months of Section 144 proceeding. In so doing the Magistrate does not lack jurisdiction. However, we may examine the contention of Mr. Mishra that when admittedly civil suit is pending, Section 144 proceeding should be dropped. Mr. In so doing the Magistrate does not lack jurisdiction. However, we may examine the contention of Mr. Mishra that when admittedly civil suit is pending, Section 144 proceeding should be dropped. Mr. G.K Mishra, on the other hand, countered it by saying that it is not the law that in every case where a civil suit is pending Section 145 proceeding already initiated should be dropped. I feel it unnecessary to adjudicate on the correctness or otherwise of the contention so raised by counsel for both sides. There is no doubt with the Magistrate power in Section 145 proceeding to drop the same in case he is satisfied that there is no apprehension of breach of peace and that a civil suit is pending between the parties relating to the same subject matter and prayer in the suit is essentially one for possession as well as title. Admittedly, in the present case, the second party has rushed to the Court without filing written statement. Therefore, it would be appropriate to dispose of this petition with the following direction. 7. In the result, the revision is disposed of with a direction that both parties shall file written statement before the Magistrate within a period off our weeks from the date of this order and the Magistrate shall examine the pleadings of the parties and may take such evidence as would be necessary and in case it is satisfied at any stage of the proceeding that the civil suit is pending touching subject matter of the suit and their title and possession which the civil Court is competent to adjudicate and further it feels that it would be a sure wastage of Court's time and abuse of process of Court to proceed with Section 145 proceeding, he may drop the Section 145 proceeding. This entirely depends upon the Magistrate whether to drop the matter or proceed depending upon the satisfaction of the Magistrate. Order accordingly.