K. L. SHARMA, J. These are two petitions under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3 of 1992, initiated under Section 145, Cr. P. C. pending before the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chandpur, District Bijnor, and for quashing the orders passed on 24-6-1994 and 30-1-1995 by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bijnor directing the applicant to deposit in the Court Rs. 24,700 and Rs. 30,000 as the price of the cane crops harvested by him in the disputed land. 2. I have heard Sri Veer Singh counsel for the applicant and Sri Anil Sharma, learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 as well as learned A. Q. A. and perused the materials brought on the record in both the petitions. 3. The admitted facts of the case are that the applicant Nana Singh, presently pradhan, was allotted Gaou Sab ha land and even after the expiry of the Patta (lease) he has continued his cultivation in the disputed land and during crucial years he has grown cane crops therein and has also harvested the same. His name was also recorded in column 4 but in the consolidation proceedings the learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Chandpur changed the entry of his name from column No. 4 to column No. 3 opposite party No. 3 initiated proceedings purporting to be under Section 145, Cr. P. C. with a prayer that the applicant Nanak Singh be restrained from harvesting the cane crops standing in the disputed land in the learned Magis trate without passing any order either under Section 145 Cr. P. C. or 146 Cr. P. C. restrained Nanafc Singh from harvesting the cane crops without furnishing bank guarantee. In one year Nanak Singh de posited a bank guarantee of Rs. 30,000 but in the subsequent year he harvested the cane crops without depositing the may or without depositing the bank guarantee, The learned Magistrate has not decided the proceed ings and concluded the inquiry under Section 145, Cr. P. C. He has not passed any order of attachment and appointed a receiver in respect of the standing cane crops but without concluding the inquiry he directed the applicant to deposit the bank guarantee by orders dated 24-6-1994 and 30-1-1995. P. C. He has not passed any order of attachment and appointed a receiver in respect of the standing cane crops but without concluding the inquiry he directed the applicant to deposit the bank guarantee by orders dated 24-6-1994 and 30-1-1995. He felt aggrieved and file a criminal revision against the order dated 24- 6-1994 before the learned Sessions Judge, Bijnor, but unfortunately the learned Sessions Judge dismissed summarily the aforesaid revisions on the ground that it was an interlocutory order, against which no revision was maintainable. Thereafter, the applicant filed the present petition No. 4332 of 1994 in this Court and obtained the stay order on 6-9-1994. 4. This Court had already directed to learned Magistrate to dispose of the case expeditiously but unfortunately the learned Magistrate instead of disposing of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. expeditiously, further passed an order on 30-1-1995 directing the applicant to deposit Rs. 30,000 as the price of the cane crops harvested by him in violation of the injunction order passed by him. Against this subsequent order he has filed the petition No. 413 of 1995, under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. 5. From the perusal of the admitted facts of the cases it is crystal clear that opposite patty No. 2 Nanwa has thing to do with the land of the Qaon Sabha and with the cane crops cultivated and harvested by he applicant during these years right from 1992. He was merely interested to restrain the applicant from harvesting the crops Even though he clearly admitted that the applicant who was in actual possession of the land, even after the expiry of the period of allotment of the Gaon Sabha land. 6. The learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the nature of the proceedings of the fact that the suit for declaration of title was also pending before him an a Revenue Court. He did not even see the scope of the order p issued by him in the light of the provisions contained in sub section (8) of Section 145, Cr. He did not even see the scope of the order p issued by him in the light of the provisions contained in sub section (8) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. He did not make any arrangement of the custody and sale of the cane crops which was of a perishable nature which was required to be harvested by a particular time and instead of doing so without concluding the inquiry under Section 145, Cr. P. C. he passed the impugned order directing the applicant to deposit the price of the cane crops harvested by him. 7. These orders are obviously illegal being in violation of the provisions of Sections 145 (8) and 146, Cr. P. C. All these proceedings are also mis conceived and are not maintainable inasmuch as opposite party No. 2 has never claimed himself to be in possession either on :be disputed land of the crops standing thereon, therefore, in view of the matter the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. as well as the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has contended that this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. is not maintainable for the reasons that the petitioner had a right of revision before the Court of Session as in the past he had availed of that right of revision against an order of learned Magistrate whereby ha was directed to deposit the price of Rs. 24700 but against the subsequent order of the learned Magistrate directing him to deposit the price of Rs. 30,000 he has directly invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his contention he has relied upon the full bench decision of this Court in the case of H. K. Rawal v. Nidhi Prakash, 1989 J1c 540 (FB) : 1989 (26) ACC 395. I have perused this judgment and find that the application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. was filed in the High Court for quashing the order passed by the, See dons Judge in a criminal revision against the summoning order t f the Judicial Magistrate, Meerut and for quashing the complaint case and the summoning order therein. The present case is distinguishable from the one which was considered by the full bench of this Court, inasmuch as, the petitioner here has directly invoked the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482, Cr. The present case is distinguishable from the one which was considered by the full bench of this Court, inasmuch as, the petitioner here has directly invoked the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C, on the ground that She order passed by the learned S. D. M. directing him to deposit the price of the cane crop harvested by him is without jurisdiction and is an abuse of the process of the Court. 9. However, the Full Bench of this Court had considered the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482, Cr. P. C, and followed the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj an Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka, 1988 J1c 529 (SC): 1988 ACC 54. In these cases it has been clarified that if a Sessions Judge has deter mined the dispute between the parties in a criminal revision against the orders of coavictioa or discharge or against the orders in cases under Sections 128,133/138 and 145, Cr. P. C. , the High Court tumult exorcise its revisional power under Section 397 or its inherent power under Sec tion 482, Cr. P. C. at the instance of the same party or suo moto. This principle clearly admits that the other party who did not file the revision before the Court of Session can file a revision or an application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. challenging the order which has been passed against him. Similarly it admits further that in case no revision has been filed by the applicant before the Court of Session there is no legal bar for him to file a revision under Section 397, Cr. P. C. or an application under Section 482, Cr. P C. It is true that the High Court rarely exercises its inherent juris diction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. when there is an alternative remedy and it also does not exercise its revisional power if the applicant had an opportunity of filing revision before the Court of Session. The power of the High Court remains intact under Section 482, Cr. P. C, in the rare cases where High Court is satisfied that the impugned order or proceeding has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or interference is called for to secure the ends of justice. The power of the High Court remains intact under Section 482, Cr. P. C, in the rare cases where High Court is satisfied that the impugned order or proceeding has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or interference is called for to secure the ends of justice. This power can also be invoked and exercised by High Court in a case wherein the Court of Session has dismissed a criminal revision on the ground that the summoning order passed by the Magistrate is an interlocutory order. 10. The learned counsel for petitioner replied that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Magistrate contrary to the provision of Section 145 (8), Cr. P. C. without actually determining the rights of the parties, which resulted in grave injustice and the petitioner had no other remedy to challenge this interlocutory order in Criminal Revision before the Court of Session. He has further submitted that the opposite party has abused the process of the Court without claiming any right of possession over the disputed land or right of cultivation or harvesting in respect of the cane crop which was admittedly in possession of and belonged to the petitioner and as such it is only the High Court which can secure the ends of justice by quashing the impugned order. I find substance in this submission and I have examined the merit of the impugned order in the foregoing paragraphs. The learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order in a manner contrary to the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 145 and in ignorance of the admitted facts of the case. Therefore, this petition under Section 482, Cr. PC. is clearly maintainable for invoking the inherent jurisdiction, of the High Court. The exercise of inherent power of the High Court is justified in facts and circumstances of this case. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is hereby allowed and the impugned orders as well as criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3 of 1992 under Section, 145, Cr. P. C. pending before the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Chandpar, district Bijmar are hereby quashed. Petition allowed. .