M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS interim application for condonation of delay will virtually decide the fate of this appeal. The applicant was the defendant before the trial court in a civil suit where in a dispute arose with regard to the possession of a certain plot of land. The plaintiff had contended that he has acquired a title to the site by virtue of the law of adverse possession and he prayed for a consequential relief against the defendant restraining him from interfering with the plaintiffs possession. The suit was contested and the learned trial judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. It is relevant for me to record that this litigation was preceded by some other legal proceedings which went up to the Supreme Court where the question with regard to the alleged allocation of the plot in question to the defendant was in issue. The plaintiff had contended inter alia that he was eligible for reconveyance of that plot. That aspect of the matter is really subsidiary to the present question which centers around the solitary point as to whether the present interim application which is for condonation of delay of 872 days in presenting this appeal should be granted or not. The principal ground on which the applicant has prayed for condonation of delay is that he is an elderly person aged about 70 years and that he is a permanent resident of gulbarga town. He has annexed certain medical certificates and other documents on the basis of which it is contended that he is a heart patient and effectively the ground made out is that because of the illness of the applicant that he was unable to come to Bangalore and instruct his learned Advocate to prefer an appeal during this long period of almost 3 years. A strong plea has been advanced by the learned Advocate which basically is to the effect that if applicant has demonstrated that he was only a person of advanced years but also ailing, that it is a fit case in which judicial discretion must be exercised in his favour and the delay should be condoned. A strong plea has been advanced by the learned Advocate which basically is to the effect that if applicant has demonstrated that he was only a person of advanced years but also ailing, that it is a fit case in which judicial discretion must be exercised in his favour and the delay should be condoned. I need to record in passing, that the certificates produced fall under three heads, the first two being from certain cardiologists and i had requested the appellant's learned Advocate to ascertain the nature of the so called degrees on these letter heads, most of which are hitherto known. Some explanation has been put forward that these are honorary qualifications which are issued by certain institutions in the united states of america. The third set of documents is in relation to the certificates issued by the hospital which only show that the appellant had obtained certain treatment as an out patient. . the totality of evidence under this head is rather patchy but i do not propose to discard it because the generality of these documents would cumulatively indicate that the appellant was suffering from some sort of heart ailment. Having regard to his age, this was quite possible. The respondent has seriously contested the matter and has contended that this material should be rejected insofar as it does not inspire complete confidence. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, to my mind, even though some degree of reliance can be placed on the documents produced, it would at the highest indicate that the appellant was to some extent indisposed during this long period of time. In order to substantiate his plea that he was unable to instruct his learned Advocate and to make arrangements for the filing of the appeal, it would be necessary for the appellant to demonstrate much more than this. It is an essential requirement of law, having regard to the long delay, that he would have to satisfy this court that during this entire period of time his condition was so serious that he was virtually unable to make necessary arrangements. It is an essential requirement of law, having regard to the long delay, that he would have to satisfy this court that during this entire period of time his condition was so serious that he was virtually unable to make necessary arrangements. This would include the fact that the appellant could not get the assistance of family members of third parties, that he was unable to make telephone calls or write letters and generally, that he was so gravely handicapped all through this period of time that it was impossible for him to attend to the filing of the appeal. The totality of the material produced before the court falls gravely short of this requirement. ( 2 ) APPELLANT's learned Advocate has placed strong reliance on the well known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of collector, land acquisition, anantnag and another v mst. Katiji and others wherein, the Supreme Court has laid down six guiding principles which are reproduced below:"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of Justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every day's delay must be explained" does not meanthat a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial Justice and technical considerationsare pitted against each other, cause of substantial Justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. THERE is no presumption that delay is occasioneddeliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not onaccount of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not onaccount of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'state' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the state as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'state' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the state which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view do even-handed Justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the high court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the high court. The high court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides". The order of the high court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the high court. The high court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides". ( 3 ) THE learned Advocate basically draws my attention to the fact that supreme court had crystallised the position by pointing out that the court is required to adopt a justice-oriented approach while dealing with applications for condonation of delay which means that the approach should not be mechanical nor should the same involve a procedure resulting in injustice to either of the parties. The learned Advocate therefore submits, that since this is a valuable plot and the appellant had seriously contested the proceedings earlier and furthermore, since he has been able to show valid ground for his inability to prosecute the matter during the long lapse of time, that this court should not deprive him of the opportunity of contesting the matter on merits. ( 4 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the argument totally overlooks one very cardinal principle namely, the fact that there are always two parties to a litigation before the court and in adopting an over-sympathetic approach which would result perhaps in a over-liberal situation in matters of condonation of delay, that a court would be doing injustice to the opposite party. The concept of doing Justice requires even-handed treatment to both the litigants and goes against the principle of bending over-backwards in favour of one of them at the expense of the other one. It is precisely this aspect of the matter that arose before the english courts in several decisions as a result of which the well defined principle was enunciated which is still valid in matters relating to condonation of delay namely, that once the period of litigation has elapsed, that a corresponding right accrues as far as the opposite party is concerned. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in a decision in ramlal and others v rewa coalfields limited. Para 7 of judgment reads as follows:"in construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in a decision in ramlal and others v rewa coalfields limited. Para 7 of judgment reads as follows:"in construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in krishna v chathappan. "section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood, the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substan- tial Justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant". the Supreme Court had very clearly upheld the principle that the court while exercising judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to view the consequences of an act of condonation from the reverse direction namely as to whether rights have accrued in the opposite party and to my mind, the court would have to go further in cases of gross-delay to ex- amine the consequences of this legal position". ( 5 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the respondent's learned Advocate has in the first instance attacked the evidence with regard to illness and incapacity by producing xerox copies of certain documents namely bus passes obtained by the respondent in his capacity as being an ex-m. l. a. during the relevant period, the use of these bus passes and his residence in Bangalore at different points of time. The appellant's learned Advocate points out to me that these are xerox copies of certain documents and that therefore the court should ignore them. The Provisions of the Evidence Act are not to be mechanically applied in this proceeding and the court will normally not refuse to rely on undisputed documents if prima facie, they appear to be xerox copies of genuine ones. Apart from the documents, there is a specific certificate that has been produced from the k. s. r. t. c. in relation to the issue and use of these bus passes. Since I have held that the material produced by the appellant is not sufficient to indicate that he was precluded from attending to the appeal, it is unnecessary for me to go deeper into the matter except to record that the material produced by the respondent does weigh heavily against the appellant. ( 6 ) COMING to the more important aspect of the case, the respondent's learned Advocate states that after the period of limitation expired, his client proceeded on the assumption that the decree has reached finality and therefore, that he obtained requisite permission from the various authorities copies of which have been produced and thereafter he commenced construction of a residential building on the plot. Certain photographs have been produced before the court in support of the plea that the construction has reached an advance stage. A statement on oath is made to the effect that the respondent has spent over Rs. 10 lakhs. The limited reason for my reference to this material is in order to demonstrate that once the period of limitation expired, the respondent proceeded on the assumption that the rights conferred on him by virtue of the decree were rights on the basis of which he could safely proceed, the public authorities have acted on this basis and the respondent has spent considerable amounts of money on the construction. The consequence of this state of affairs is that the court will have to take note of one important factor namely that the decree in question has now virtually become irreversible. If that is the situation, regardless of whatever principles or whatever material the appellant may put forward, the appeal would be rendered wholly academic and infructuous. It is for this reason that the court is required while considering cases of long delays or inordinate delays to first examine as to whether any useful purpose will be served at this late point of time even if the delay were to be condoned because valid ground is shown. If the answer is 'no', the court cannot and should not condone the delay. ( 7 ) SECTION 5 of the Limitation Act does invest a court with adis cretion to condone the delay and that discretion should be exercised only in appropriate and selective cases as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to supra, for purposes of advancing the cause of justice. That cause will not be advanced if injustice is being done to one party and appeals that are virtually dead are sought to be revived. Under these circumstances, to my mind, viewed at from any angle, the present applicant does not qualify for the delay of 872 days being condoned. I need to also observe that the assumption that if any sort of material is produced and an application is mechanically filed for condonation of delay, that a court is obliged to condone the delay is an incorrect assumption and it is high time that the parties realise that unless just and valid ground is shown and unless the delay is of reasonable dimensions, that the discretion under Section 5 will not be exercised. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position, la. No. I fails and stand rejected. As a necessary consequence, the appeal itself is liable to be dismissed. --- *** --- .