JUDGMENT B. M. Mitra, J. : The present revisional application is directed against Order No.3 dated 25th August, 1994 passed by the 10th Court of Assistant District Judge at Alipore in Misc. Case No. 18 of 1994 arising out of a petition and/or proceeding under section 41 of the Arbitration Act. By the impugned order, the Trial Court did not find any prima facie case to grant an order of ad-interim injunction and it refused to grant the same, as according to its considered opinion, the injury likely to be suffered by the party can be compensated in terms of the money value. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present revisional application has been moved. Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has contended before this Court that guidelines governing analogous provisions of Order 39, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure granting ad-interim injunction should fit in and squarely apply in a proceeding under section 41 of the Arbitration Act. Mr. Roychowdhury in this context has tried to compare the language of both the provisions of different statute and according to him, Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply in a pending suit and section 41 of the Arbitration Act will be applicable in case of a pending agreement wherein arbitration clause is there. 2. The facts as appearing from the scrutiny of the available materials on record of this proceeding indicate that the petitioner Shamon Galva & Colortex Pvt. Ltd. entered into a contract with Steel Authority of India Limited on 14th October, 1993 for design and engineering and supply of materials within a specified date. The terms and conditions of the said contract are contained in a letter dated 14th October, 1993. The contract as appearing contains an arbitration' clause (Clause 29.0) which is as follows :- "29.0 : Arbitration : If at any time any question, dispute or differences, whatsoever, shall arise between the PURCHASER and CONTRACTOR upon, on in relation to, or in connection with the contract, either party may forthwith give to the other, notice in writing of the existence of such question, dispute or differences and the same shall be referred to the adjudication of sole arbitrator appointed by the SAIL. In case where the amount claimed is Rs.20,00,000/- and below, Director (RDCIS), SAIL or Chief Executive of R & D (SAIL) or his nominee would be the sole arbitrator. In respect of disputes where the amount claimed is more than Rs.20,00,000/- Chairman, SAIL or his nominee would be the sole arbitrator. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties and the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and of the rules, thereunder and any statutory modification thereof shall be deemed to apply to and be incorporated in this contract. The award given by the Arbitrator shall be the speaking award i.e., giving reasons. The venue of arbitration proceeding shall be at RANCHI." 3. In the process of transaction between the parties, certain disputes cropped up resulting in termination of the contract and/or agreement. Thereafter, arbitration clause was invoked, ultimately giving rise to a connected miscellaneous case under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The same was accompanied by execution in the form of a letter with the caption "Guarantee Bond." Mr. Roychowdhury while addressing this Court has strongly tried to impeach the character of the said instrument by drawing an attention of this Court in view of the language contained therein wherefrom it appears that the revisionist petitioner undertakes to indemnify and keep Steel Authority of India Limited indemnified. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, the instrument is required to be governed not by its nomenclature but with reference to the pith and substance of the same. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, the same may at best be treated as some sort of indemnity bond but it cannot be rated as Bond of Guarantee. Therefore, Mr. Roychowdhury submits that entire parimateria guiding governance of Bank Guarantee should not be made applicable with regard to Indemnity Bond. Mr. Roychowdhury further submits that it relates to the interpretation of a document and the Court at an ad-interim stage before obtaining the show cause ought not to have arrived at any conclusion and the question is required to be kept open at large. To repel such contentions Mr. Mittel', the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, has stated that the letters in question dubbed as Guarantee Bonds are in consonance with usual formats issued by the Bank and such stipulation for indemnity is required to be written even on a parent document like that of Bank Guarantee. To repel such contentions Mr. Mittel', the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, has stated that the letters in question dubbed as Guarantee Bonds are in consonance with usual formats issued by the Bank and such stipulation for indemnity is required to be written even on a parent document like that of Bank Guarantee. Mr. Roychowdhury has tried to contest the said proposition and according to him, this is not the stage where such question should be looked into by way of indepth analysis. This Court while considering the contentions of Mr. Roychowdhury was confronted with a decision in the case of Centax {India} Limited VB. Vinmar Impex Inc reported in AIR 1986 Cal., page 356. A Division Bench of this Court held as follows (at page 364) :- "Whether it is a bank guarantee or a letter of credit or contract of indemnity, the enforceability of such an instrument against the bank depends on the terms and conditions of the same. . . . . . . If it has been so fulfilled, then, the beneficiary is entitled to enforce the same against the bank and, it is not fit and proper on the part of the Court as a matter of fact and law, it is not open to the court to pass an interlocutory order, whereby the beneficiary will be deprived of the benefit of the same and he is prevented from enforcing the same against the bank. There should be a sanctity in respect of any such instrument executed by a bank assuring payment to a beneficiary, otherwise, all commercial transactions will be injeopardy and foreign trade will be seriously affected. . . . . . . . The dispute as to the sufficiency of the performance between the buyer and seller or between the seller and the buyer cannot be the reason for withholding the payment claimed under such instrument. In such a case, the bank has only to see whether the event has happened on which its obligation to pay has arisen. In such a case the courts should not pass any interim injunction; otherwise the whole banking system would fail and trade will collapse." 4. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench of this High Court has been approved by the Apex Court. Mr. In such a case the courts should not pass any interim injunction; otherwise the whole banking system would fail and trade will collapse." 4. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench of this High Court has been approved by the Apex Court. Mr. Mittel', appearing for the opposite party, has strongly contended on a proposition of law by contending that section 41 of the Arbitration Act can only relate to a decision arising out of the agreement in question and bank guarantee is not in the nature of an agreement or contract which is a part and parcel of the agreement in dispute between the parties for which arbitration has become necessary. According to Mr. Mittear, section 41 of the Arbitration Act relates to any proceeding in respect of an agreement between the parties as a result of which question of arbitration arises and bank guarantees is not covered within the compass of such fabric of agreement on which the dispute between the parties rests. 5. According to Mr. Mittear, the bank guarantee is completely separate from the original contract which give rise to proceeding for arbitration and as such, in view of the language of section 41, the same is capable of being invoked only when it relates to a question of controversy relating to such original contract or agreement. In aid of submissions of the said proposition, Mr. Mittear has relied on a decision in the case of Hindustan Paper C01poration Limited vs. Kenail House Angame reported in 1990 Compo Cases, Volume 68, page 361 wherein a Division Bench of this Court have held that the bank guarantee itself is a contract separate from the original contract pursuant to which the bank guarantee is furnished. In that event as per the decision of this present case, it has opined that the arbitration clause in the parent contract include the question as to whether terms and conditions of the bank guarantee have been fulfilled. Mr. Roychowdhury has tried to place his reliance on the decision of a Single Bench of this High Court in the case of M/s. Baneljee & Baneljee vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited reported in AIR 1986 Cal, page 374 and much has been sought to be argued by Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury has tried to place his reliance on the decision of a Single Bench of this High Court in the case of M/s. Baneljee & Baneljee vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited reported in AIR 1986 Cal, page 374 and much has been sought to be argued by Mr. Roychowdhury by placement of reliance on the said decision but, unfortunately, however, the aforesaid Division Bench decision reported in 1990 Compo Cases, Volume 68, page 361 overruled the said decision by holding that a proposition of law expounded in the said decision is no longer good law. As such, this Court is not in a position to re-appreciate the submissions of Mr. Roychowdhury on that score in view of the Single Bench decision being overruled by the Division Bench. The Court after giving its anxious consideration is, in respectful agreement with the proposition. of law as expounded in the Division Bench decision as referred to above as the arbitration clause in the parent contract cannot include the question relating to the bank guarantee. A bank guarantee itself is a separate contract from the original contract pursuant to which it is furnished. It is significant to mention that the bank is not a party to the original contract. Similarly, the party at whose instance the bank guarantee has been furnished pursuant to the agreement is not a party to the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee is to be enforced if it complies with the terms and conditions of the bank guarantee itself and not when there is any doubt about breach of terms and conditions of the main contract. In view of the same, this Court has its doubt whether section 41 of the Arbitration Act can be pressed into service in aid to enforceability of bank guarantee. It is also salient to refer that in the instrument itself and in further correspondence the revisionist petitioner has agreed and bound itself that it shall not object to enforcement of the bank guarantee and the said will be enforceable without any demur from the side of the party. In this context, a reference may be made to a well-known decision in the case of u.p. Co-operative Federation Limited vs. Singh Consultants and Engineering Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1988 Volume 1 SCC page 174 wherein it has been held that commitments of banks must be honoured free from interference by the Court. In this context, a reference may be made to a well-known decision in the case of u.p. Co-operative Federation Limited vs. Singh Consultants and Engineering Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1988 Volume 1 SCC page 174 wherein it has been held that commitments of banks must be honoured free from interference by the Court. As otherwise the very purpose of bank guarantee would be negatived and fabric of trading operations will get jeopardised. In the said decision, a combined rule of the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 41 of the Arbitration Act after having been mace, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. has held that the net effect of the injunction to stall a bank guarantee is to restrain the bank from performing its solemn guarantee which cannot be allowed to be done. The aggrieved party in the eventuality of enforcement of bank guarantee is not without any remedy as it can use the other party for damages. The Arbitrator while passing the award can take into account the entire gamut of the referable dispute and if any excess payment is made because of the encashment of the bank guarantee, the same can be compensated by modifying the award by the Arbitrator. In the main lis being one under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, that being the position it is doubtful whether the lis as framed by way of a prayer for injunction under section 41 of the Arbitration Act in respect of a bank guarantee which is independent of the main agreement between the parties is actionable in law in the way in which it has been prayed for. Mr. Roychowdhury's submissions about the enforcement of bank guarantee will cast the shade of imminent danger of irreparable loss pales into insignificance in view of the ratio of law propounded in 1988 Volume 1SCC page 174. A catena of decisions have been referred to by the respective parties in support of their contentiUl1S and this Court has taken note also of the other decisions as cited but has leaned in favour of the decisions relied upon in this judgement for arriving at its own conclusion and inferences. In view of the reasons as stated hereinbefore this Court does not feel inclined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Judge in passing the impugned order. In view of the reasons as stated hereinbefore this Court does not feel inclined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Judge in passing the impugned order. Accordingly, the order under challenge does not require intervention by this Court. The revisional application, accordingly, stands dismissed on contest. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. The Trial Court may try to expedite the proceedings. Application dismissed.