Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli represented by its Secretary v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another
1995-01-06
SRINIVASAN
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : The petitioner’s main business is to mine lignite and out of the lignite mined, generate electricity, produce uren, leco, and other commercial by products. The petitioner is also having a transport Department which plies vehicles within the campus and outside the campus. The petitioner has got a fleet of buses, lorries, water tankers, bousers and other specialised vehicles. As per the memo filed by the petitioner, there are three categories of vehicles (a) vehicles (Heavy goods vehicles, stage carriages, omni buses, jeeps, cars and two-wheelers) plying inside and outside the petitioner’s campus for which tax is levied under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and paid periodically. There are 189 numbers of such vehicles, (b) vehicles, heavy goods vehicles etc. for which no tax is levied as they are exempted from payment of tax under G.O.Ms. No.2321, dated 112. 1975 and G.O.Ms.No.2742, dated 111. 1981. There are 581 such vehicles according to the petitioner, (c) Stage carriages and goods vehicles for which tax is demanded by the State Government and exemption has been cancelled. There are 113 such vehicles. According to the respondents, in category (b) 224 vehicles are not entitled to the exemption and they are also liable for payment of tax. But, it is not necessary for me to consider in this case which particular vehicles are liable for payment of tax and which are not. It is for the concerned authorities to work out the same. 2. Insofar as this writ petition is concerned, the only question is whether the Government Order No.932 dated 14. 1985 is valid or not. By that order, the Government exercised its power under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.20 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974 and partially modified the earlier order contained in Notification No.II(2)/H.O./2896/ 1963, dated 22nd May, 1963 and levied motor vehicles tax in respect of stage carriages and good vehicles belonging to the petitioner registered since 1974, with effect from 4. 974. .3. The petitioner has stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the Government has always maintained the distinction between two categories of vehicles, one using public roads to a large extent in the normal course and being liable for payment of tax and the other not being liable for payment of tax as they do not make use of public roads so much.
According to the petitioner, the transport, vehicles which are used on public roads beyond the campus of the petitioner are liable for payment of tax. The other category of vehicles is used only within the campus for the purpose of the petitioner’s work and they are not using the public road excepting for a very limited purpose of crossing the same between the mines. In 1962, the Government passed G.O.Ms.No.2616, dated 27. 1962. By that Government Order, the Government found that the vehicles are running within the limits of the property of the petitioner and they did not violate Sec.42 of the then Motor Vehicles Act even though the petitioner was taking fares from passengers for hiring out the entire vehicles.. The Government, therefore, accepted the contention of the petitioner that they need not take out permits for running the buses within its own premises and need not pay tax under the Madras Vehicles Taxation Act, 1931 and the Madras Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952. The petitioner was however directed to take out fitness certificate with reference to Sec.38(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 110 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules. .4. Then, the Government passed G.O.Ms. No. 1581, dated 9th May, 1963, It is provided in that Government Order that it was not necessary to require the petitioner to secure permits or pay tax when its buses and goods vehicles make occasionable use of the public road or frequent use of a short stretch of the Cuddalore-Vridhachalam Road. Goods vehicles of the petitioner which have to make frequent use of other public roads should, however, secure permits and pay the tax. Consequently, a notification was issued by that Government Order. The Notification was in the following terms: .“In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.11 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1931 (Madras Act III of 1931), the Government of Madras hereby exempts from payment of tax leviable under the said Act, the stage carriage and goods vehicles belonging to the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli provided they do not play outside the premises of the Corporation except for securing fitness certificates from the Motor Vehicles Inspectors or for crossing the Cuddalore-Vridhachalam Road which passes through the said premises.” 5. In 1974, the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1931 was repealed and a new Act was passed.
In 1974, the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1931 was repealed and a new Act was passed. Under the provisions of the new Act, tax was payable even if a vehicle is kept or used. The charging section as it stood then provided for levy of tax with respect to vehicles which were kept or used. An amendment was brought into force in 1983 by which the words ‘kept or used’ were substituted by the words ‘used or kept for use’. A question arose whether the vehicles which were used or kept for use in private roads were liable for payment of tax. It was held by this Court that such vehicles and only vehicles which were used or kept for use in public roads were liable for payment of tax. 6. After the passing of 1974 Act, the authorities started demanding payment of tax from the petitioner with respect to stage carriages and other vehicles. The petitioner was praying for exemption from payment of such tax. After considering the petitioner’s representations, the Government passed an order in G.O.Ms. No.2742, dated 111. 1981. That was a general Government Order relating to all motor vehicles running in any area which is not a public road as defined in Clause 6 of Sec.2 of the Act. But a condition was imposed that the owners of such vehicles should intimate in writing the non-usage or vehicles in public road and surrender the permit and the certificate of registration of the vehicle wherever applicable to the Regional Transport Office concerned. Thereafter, the Government passed an order in G.O.Ms. No.932, dated 14. 1984 rejecting the request of the petitioner for exemption of its vehicles. The Government Order reads thus: "In the Notification II issued in G.O. read above, the Government have exempted from payment of tax leviable under the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1931 the stage carriages and goods vehicles belonging to the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli provided they do not ply outside the premises of the Corporation except for securing fitness certificates from the Motor Vehicles Inspectors or for crossing the Cuddalore- Vridhachalam Road which passes through the said premises. According to the orders issued in the G.O. read above 56 (fifty six) vehicles of the above Corporation enjoyed the benefit, as they were registered prior to 1974. They were granted tax exemption endorsement.
According to the orders issued in the G.O. read above 56 (fifty six) vehicles of the above Corporation enjoyed the benefit, as they were registered prior to 1974. They were granted tax exemption endorsement. The above exemption is not applicable to the vehicles registered since 1974 onwards. 2. Consequent on the introduction of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974, the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli were requested to send all the registration certificate of the vehicles which were plying within their premises for making tax end orsement as per Sec.3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974. According to Sec.3(1) any motor vehicles which is kept or used should pay tax, But the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., Neyveli requested the Government to give exemption for the vehicles which are plying within their premises and rarely using the stretch of the Cuddalore- Vridhachalam road. As the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited has also given an undertaking to accept the tax liability that may arise as a result of the Governments decision on their request, the Government have issued instructions to effect transfer of ownership in respect of the vehicles auctioned by the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. As stated above, some of the vehicles of Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited are already exempted from payment of tax and the same continuous to be in force by virtue of the provisions under Sec.26(3) of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974. The Regional Transport Officer, South Arcot has not made either tax endorsements or tax exemption endorsements in the Registration Certificates of the vehicles of Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, which were registered on or after 4. 1974 since the matter regarding the levy of tax or otherwise of the vehicles which are using the stretch of the Cuddalore- Vridhachalam road rarely for the purpose of obtaining fitness certificate etc. is pending consideration before the Government. The Transport Commissioner has stated that these vehicles though used only within the premises of the Corporation, will have necessarily to use the public road when moved out for purpose of obtaining fitness certificate from Motor Vehicles and also while crossing the Cuddalore-Vridhachalam road which passes through the premises and hence the vehicle do not satisfy the guidelines issued in the Notification-I of the G.O. read above for tax exemption. Review of this exemption is under consideration of the Government for a while. 3.
Review of this exemption is under consideration of the Government for a while. 3. The Government have examined the proposal to levy the Motor Vehicle tax in respect of the Motor Vehicles belonging to the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli. After a detailed and thorough examination of the proposal and also after taking into account of the undertaking of the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited to accept the tax liability that may arise as a result of the Governments decision on their request, the Government have now reviewed the entire position and direct that the stage carriages and the goods vehicles belonging to the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli, registered since 1974, be levied motor vehicles tax, without insisting payment of penalty, with effect from 4. 1974. 4. The following notification will be published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette: Notification In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.20 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974 (Tamil Nadu Act 13 of 1974) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby in partial modification of the Home Department, Notification No.III (2)/H.O./2896/1963 published at page No.1300 of Part-II, Sec.2 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated the 22nd May, 1963, levy motor vehicle tax in respect of the stage carriage and goods vehicles belonging to the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. Neyveli, registered since 1974, with effect from 4. 1974. 5. The Transport Commissioner, Madras is requested to indicate immediately the actual amount of penalty to be waived so that, action will be initiated by Government.“ 7. It is the validity of the said Government Order which is questioned in this writ petition. The contentions of the petitioner are as follows: (1) The impugned Government order cancels the exemption granted earlier in 1963 with retrospective effect from 4. 1974. The Government has no such power to make a cancellation with retrospective effect in view of the provisions of Sec.20(2) of the Act. Sec.20 of the Act provides for exemption and enables the Government to make an exemption, reduce the rates or make any modification in regard to the tax payable subject to such conditions as it may specify with reference to any person or class or persons or in respect of any motor vehicle or class of motor vehicles or motor vehicles running in any particular area.
Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.20 relates to cancellation or variation of such exemptions or reduction or other modification. Last paragraph of Sec.20 reads thus: “A notification with respect to matters specified in clause (1) may be issued so as to have retrospective effect from a date not earlier than 1st April, 1974.” It is argued that the power under Sec.20 of the Act to pass an order with retrospective effect if only with reference to clause (1) and not with reference to clause (2). It is contended that the legislature has taken care to empower the Government to grant exemption with retrospective effect but not to cancel such exemption with retrospective effect. It is therefore argued that the present Government Order which purports to take effect from 4. 1974 is invalid inasmuch as it seeks to have retrospective effect. 8. As against this contention, it is submitted by the learned Government Pleader that though the Government Order refers to Sec.20(2) of the Act, the power of cancelling the exemption or varying the same is derived by the Government under Sec.26(3) of the Act. Sec.26(3) of the Act is in the following terms: “Subject to the provisions of Sub-sec.(2) anything done or any action taken, including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued or any rule, regulation or direction issued or any rule, regulation, form framed, certificate, licence or permit granted or registration effected, under the said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken under this Act and shall continue to have effect accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act.” According to the learned Government Pleader, when the notification granting exemption in favour of the petitioner was made under the provisions of the 1931 Act, it was with reference to tax payable under that Act and by virtue of Sec.26(3) of the Act, it may continue to operate even after the passing of the new Act. But such operation according to the Government Pleader is only with reference to tax payable for vehicle registered prior to 4. 1974. According to the learned Government Pleader, the operation of the exemption could be only with reference to vehicles governed by the Act of 1931 and after the passing of the 1974 Act, the exemption would not operate with reference to vehicles registered after 4. 1974.
1974. According to the learned Government Pleader, the operation of the exemption could be only with reference to vehicles governed by the Act of 1931 and after the passing of the 1974 Act, the exemption would not operate with reference to vehicles registered after 4. 1974. Alternatively it was contended that a general order of exemption made in 1981 under G.O.Ms. No.2742 would tantamount to supersession of the specific exemption granted in favour of the petitioner herein in 1963. Thirdly, it is argued that in any event the impugned Government Order supersedes the notification of 1963 granting exemption in favour of the petitioner. 9. With regard to the contention that the power is derived under Sec.26(3) of the Act and, therefore, there can be a cancellation with retrospective effect, I am of the view that Secs.20(2) and 26(3) of the Act must be read together. If the legislature had intended to permit the Government to effect cancellation of an exemption with retrospective effect it could have omitted the last paragraph in Sec.20 of the Act or it could have made the last paragraph applicable to both clauses (1) and (2) in Sec.20 of the Act. On the other hand, the legislature has taken care to say that an order under clause (1) could be made with retrospective effect. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius would apply and the very fact that there is no reference to clause (2) in the last paragraph of Sec.20 of the Act shows that such power to make retrospective order is not available with reference to clause (2). .10. Further, the general principle is that fiscal statutes are not normally construed to be retrospective. Unless there is an express provision that a particular fiscal provision will have retrospective effect, the courts will not construe the same as to have such retrospective effect. The Supreme Court had occasion to refer to this aspect of the matter while considering a case of income-tax and said that in the absence of express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to such provision a greater retrospective than is expressly mentioned (vide: S.S. Gadgil v. M/ s.Lal and Company, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 171). 11.
11. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that even when exemption is cancelled and tax liability is imposed it can have retrospective effect or that the Government has to power to impose such liability by virtue of Sec.26(3) of the Act. Sec.26(3) of the Act deals only with supersession of any Notification or order, instruction of direction issued underthe old Act. Whenever the Government chooses to supersede such notification, order, instruction or direction issued under the old Act, it can do so only with effect from the date of such notification. Even if the impugned notification can be construed to be one under Sec.26(3) of the Act, it can have effect only from its date and not from any earlier date. 12. The contention of the learned Government Pleader that the general order in G.O.Ms. No.2742, dated 111. 1981 would supersede the exemption granted in 1963 in favour of the petitioner herein cannot be accepted. That G.O. applies in general to all the vehicles referred to therein. That cannot be taken to supersede the particular notification in favour of the petitioner within the meaning of Sec.26(3).of the Act; nor can the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the exemption would not apply to vehicles registered after 4. 1974 as it was granted under the provisions of the old Act be accepted. The language of Sec.26(3) of the Act is very clear. It introduces a fiction that any notification, order, instruction or direction etc., issued under the old act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act of 1974 and shall continue to have effect accordingly. Once a legal fiction is introduced by a statute, the necessary consequences must follow. Hence the exemption granted under the repealed Act must be considered as one granted under Sec.20 of the new Act of 1974. That Act would apply to vehicles registered after 4. 1974 and tax is payable under that Act only. Therefore, the exemption will apply even to vehicle registered on and after 4. 1974. 13. The second contention of leaned Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned Government Order is totally invalid as there is no severability. According to him, no part of the Government Order can be severed and dealt with as if one part relates to vehicles registered prior to 4. 1974 and another relating to vehicles registered after 4.
1974. 13. The second contention of leaned Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned Government Order is totally invalid as there is no severability. According to him, no part of the Government Order can be severed and dealt with as if one part relates to vehicles registered prior to 4. 1974 and another relating to vehicles registered after 4. 1974. I am unable to accept this contention. The Government Order provides only that vehicles belonging to the petitioner registered since 1974 will be liable for payment of tax. If the Government Order is not ineffective with reference to the period prior to the date on which it was passed, it cannot automatically become ineffective for the future period. The Government Order can certainly be prospectively valid. There is no question of doctrine of inseverability being applied in this case. Hence, the contention that the Government Order is invalid in entirety cannot be accepted. 14. The third contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that under Sec.15-A of the Act, tax can be recovered with reference to escaped assessment only for a period of five years. It is not necessarily for me to deal with that contention as I have now hold the Government Order will not have retrospective effect. .15. I hold that the impugned Government Order is invalid in so far as it seeks to have retrospective effect from 4. 1974. On the other hand, the Government Order will have effect prospectively from the date of its passing viz., 14. 1985. The petitioner will be liable to pay tax for its vehicles from 14. 1985. The question as to which particular vehicles are liable for payment of tax has to be considered by the concerned authorities. As stated earlier, the petitioner has filed a memo containing the numbers of the vehicles belonging to three categories. Annexure-A to the memo contains the list of vehicles for which tax is being paid by the petitioner. Annexure-B contains the list of 581 vehicles for which no tax is levied, according to the petitioner, I have pointed out that according to the learned Government Pleader, 1 to 224 of the said list are liable for payment of tax. That is a matter to be considered by the authorities. Annexure-C contains the list of 113 vehicles which are admittedly governed by the impugned Government Order.
That is a matter to be considered by the authorities. Annexure-C contains the list of 113 vehicles which are admittedly governed by the impugned Government Order. For those vehicles and such other vehicles, which may be found to be governed by the Government Order the petitioner is liable to pay tax from 14. 1985 onwards. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner being a public sector enterprise and working only for the good of the nation as a whole should be exempted from payment of tax. It is entirely a matter for the State Government to consider. It is open to the petitioner to apply to the Government for such exemption and the latter may consider the same as and when the petitioner applies therefor. 17. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed and the impugned Government Order is quashed insofar as it provides for retrospective effect from 4. 1974, and it is declared that the Government Order will have effect from its date viz., 14. 1985. There will be no order as to costs. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for grant of four weeks time to pay the tax due from 14. 1985 as per the Government Order. I am of the view that the request is very reasonable and the petitioner is granted four weeks time for payment of tax from 14. 1985 onwards.