JUDGMENT Vishnu Sahai, J. - In this appeal the appellant has challenged the judgment and order dated. 24.11.1993 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 446 of 1992, convicting him under sections 376, 366 and 363 I.P.C. We may mention that under the first count, the learned trial judge awarded a sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment and under the second count a sentence of 3 years rigourous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default of payment of fine to further under go on one month's rigorous imprisonment. We may also point out that under Section 363 IPC the learned trial judge has chosen not to award a separate sentence to the appellant. The sentences of the appellant under sections 376 and 366 IPC have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution story in brief runs as follows: The prosecutrix Shittal Ginnilal Agarwal (P.W. l) was the daughter of Ginnilal Bhadrilal Agarwal (P.W. 3), who was employed at Yogna Poultry Farm. She used to sell coconut. On 9.6.1992 at about 5.30 p.m. her father came at the shop where she used to sell coconut and asked her to go home. After about 1 1/2 hours the prosecutrix again came to the shop. Her father asked her to collect Rs. 65/- from one Shantaram which was due towards payment for coconuts. The shop of Shantaram was situate near Shadal Baba Darga. The prosecutrix went to collect the amount. Shantaram promised that he would come to her house and make the payment. Consequently the prosecutrix started returning back and when she had reached near Cheema Garden the appellant came in a Maruti Van and asked her to accompany him for a pleasure trip. The prosecutrix acceded to the request of the appellant and boarded the aforesaid Maruti Van. The appellant took the vehic1e to Deccan College Dambar plant and parked the vehicle near the Vad tree within the premises of Deccan college. He asked the prosecutrix to marry him to which the prosecutrix consented. The appellant also asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. The prosecutrix also consented to this. Thereafter the appellant is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. He asked the prosecutrix to marry him to which the prosecutrix consented. The appellant also asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. The prosecutrix also consented to this. Thereafter the appellant is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. After that both of them sat in the vehicle for 2 hours. Then the appellant brought the vehicle outside the compound of Deccan College. While he and the prosecutrix were sleeping in the vehicle the police I came there and took them to the police chowky along with the vehicle. At about 4.30 a.m. on 10.6.1992 the police came and informed the informant Ginnilal Agarwal (P.W. 3) that his daughter was at Parnakuti Police Chowky along with the appellant. The informant came there and asked the prosecutrix who narrated to him the version mentioned above. The F.I.R. of the incident was lodged by Ginnilal Agarwal, father of the prosecutrix on 10.6.92 at Parnakuti Police Chowki, Pune. On the basis of the F.I.R. Maruti Yeswant Jagtap (P.W. 8) registered a case under sections 363, 376, 366 and 354 IPC, against the appellant. After completing the usual investigation he submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. 3. Going backwards, the medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted by Dr. Arun Pundlik PW 9 of Sassoon Hospital, Pune. On medical examination Dr. Arun Pundlik found that there was injury on the hymen of the prosecutrix. It was 4 millimeter deep. It was actively bleeding on touch. In the opinion of the doctor the prosecutrix was habituated to sexual intercourse and there was probable evidence of recent forceful intercourse having been committed upon her. The injury report is Exhibit 47. In Exhibit 47 it has also been mentioned that the age of the prosecutrix according to her relations was about 15 years. In order to find out the exact age of the prosecutrix her radiological examination was conducted and on the basis of the same Dr. Perwani (P.W. 7) opined that she was aged about 13 to 14 years. 4. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner w here charges under sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC were framed against the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In the trial court as many as 10 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. In defence no witness was examined. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner w here charges under sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC were framed against the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In the trial court as many as 10 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. In defence no witness was examined. We may mention that the defence of the appellant, as it emerged from his statement recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C. is that he has been falsely implicated in the instant case. The learned trial Judge after assessing the evidence adduced before him passed the impugned order. 6. We have heard Mr. Prafulla Shah for the appellant and Mr. K.H. Chopda, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Maharashtra. 7. Mr. Prafulla Shah first tried to assail the conviction of the appellant on merits but finding that he could not make any impression on us switched on to his alternative contention, viz, that from the statement of the prosecutrix itself it appears that she had attained the age of discretion and was a consenting party. In this view of the matter the contention of Mr. Prafulla Shah was that the offence committed by the appellant was only a technical one. 8. So far as the contention of Mr. Shah to the effect that the conviction of the appellant has been wrongly arrived at is concerned we find the same to be devoid of Substance. In our opinion the statement of the prosecutrix leaves no room for doubt that the appellant committed sexual intercourse on her (though with her consent). We are not prepared to believe that the prosecutrix would falsely aver this in her statement. After all her own honour was at stake. We find ample corroboration to the statement of the prosecutrix by the medical evidence to which we have referred to in paragraph 3 of our judgment. 9. It is true that sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix was committed by the appellant with her own consent. However, section 375 of the Indian Penal Code provides that consent is immaterial if the victim is aged below 16 years of age. The relevant part of section 375 IPC wherein rape has been defined reads thus: "375. 9. It is true that sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix was committed by the appellant with her own consent. However, section 375 of the Indian Penal Code provides that consent is immaterial if the victim is aged below 16 years of age. The relevant part of section 375 IPC wherein rape has been defined reads thus: "375. Rape - A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case here-in-after excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions: … … … … … … Sixthly-With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age." In other words the crucial question would be as to whether the prosecutrix was under sixteen years of age at the time of the incident. In the instant case we find that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident. As seen earlier, the incident took place on 9.6.92. In her statement under section 313 Cr. P.C., recorded on 1.11.1993, the prosecutrix has given out her age as 17 years. In other words she was aged about 15 1/2 years at the time of the incident. The medical evidence also shows that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident. Dr. Ferwani (P.W. 7), on the basis of ex-ray examination of the prosecutrix opined her age to be about 13 to 14 years. Since the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident, even though she was subjected to sexual intercourse with her consent, the appellant would be guilty of the offence under section 376 IPC. It is another matter that the offence would be merely technical and on that score a case for drastically reducing the jail sentence of the appellant would be made out. 10. In our view the learned trial Judge thus acted correctly in convicting the appellant on all .the three counts, i.e., sections 376, 363 arid 366 I.P.C. 11. This leave us with the question as to what should be the quantum of sentence which should be awarded to the appellant. Section 376 IPC reads thus: 376. 10. In our view the learned trial Judge thus acted correctly in convicting the appellant on all .the three counts, i.e., sections 376, 363 arid 366 I.P.C. 11. This leave us with the question as to what should be the quantum of sentence which should be awarded to the appellant. Section 376 IPC reads thus: 376. Punishment for rape "(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped in his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which case, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both; Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years." In the earlier part of our judgment we have stated the facts of the present case. It would become clear from their perusal that the act of the appellant would not fall within the ambit of sub section (2) of section 376 IPC and that being so the minimum sentence which should be awarded would be 7 years. However, we find that section 376 (1) provides that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. 12. In our opinion in the instant case adequate and special reasons warrant the imposition of a sentence of less than 7 years. We now propose enumerating those reasons in our judgment. From a reading of the evidence of the prosecutrix it appears that she had been carrying on with the appellant from before the incident. In the first instance had this not been so we find it impossible to believe that on the offer of the appellant to sit in his Maruti Van the prosecutrix would have sat. Secondly the circumstance that the appellant asked her to marry him and she consented leads to the same inference. In the first instance had this not been so we find it impossible to believe that on the offer of the appellant to sit in his Maruti Van the prosecutrix would have sat. Secondly the circumstance that the appellant asked her to marry him and she consented leads to the same inference. Thirdly the circumstance that the appellant asked her to have sexual intercourse with him and she agreed to the same also point in the same direction. In this connection we may also mention that Dr. Arun Pundalik P.W. 9 who medically examined the prosecutix found her to be habituated to sexual intercourse. What appears to us is that she was having sexual relations with the appellant from before the incident. All these circumstances amply and clearly show that it was with the full connivance of the prosecutrix that not only was she subjected to sexual intercourse but her abduction also took place. 13. In our judgment the circumstances mentioned in the proceeding paragraph constitute adequate and special reasons for not imposing the minimum sentence of 7 years R.I. under section 376 IPC. In our view the ends of justice would be squarely met if the jail sentence of the appellant under section 376 and 366 IPC is reduced to the period already undergone by him and the sentence of fine imposed on both the counts is set aside. We may mention that the appellant has served more than 1 year and 7 months after his conviction from the trial court, on 24.11.1993. 14. In the result this appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. Although we confirm the conviction of the appellant on all the three counts viz. under sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC but we reduce the period of his sentence under sections 366 and 376 IPC to the period already undergone by him. We also set aside the sentence of fine imposed on him on the aforesaid counts. In case the appellant has paid the fine the same shall stand refunded to him. The appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case. Office is directed to forthwith communicate the operative part of this judgment to the Superintendent of Jail in which the appellant is detained. Appeal partly allowed. 1. AIR 1957 SC 637 . 2. AIR 1952 SC 354 . 3. 1971 Cr. L.J. 1057. 4. 1973 Cr. He shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case. Office is directed to forthwith communicate the operative part of this judgment to the Superintendent of Jail in which the appellant is detained. Appeal partly allowed. 1. AIR 1957 SC 637 . 2. AIR 1952 SC 354 . 3. 1971 Cr. L.J. 1057. 4. 1973 Cr. L.J. 677.