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Madras High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 331 (MAD)

Royala Corporation Private Limited represented by Mr. M. P. Ranjit and Others v. The Provident Fund Inspector, Madras

1995-03-21

RENGASAMY

body1995
Judgment : These petitions have been filed under Sec. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the C.C.Nos. 7096 of 1990 to 7099 of 1990. 7086 of 1990 to 7095 of 1990 and 7100 of 1990 respectively on the file of XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras. .2. The petitioners are the Company, its Managing Director and Director. For the nonpayment of the contribution of the employer’s share of provident Fund, the deposit linked insurance contribution and administrative charges within the prescribed time, these petitioners have been prosecuted for the noncompliance of Secs. 6 and 6 (c) of the Provident Fund Act and paragraph 38 of the Employees Provident Fund scheme. .The petitions 17104 of 1992 to 17108 of 1992 and 5210 of 1993 have been filed to quash the criminal cases C.C.Nos. 1796 of 1990 to 1799 of 1990 and 7100 of 1990 initiated for the non-payment of the employer’s share of the Provident Fund amount for the different period in 1988-89. Petitions 17106 of 1992, 5201 to 5204 of 1993 are the petitions to quash the proceedings viz., C.C. Nos.7087 of 1990 to 7090 of 1990 for the non-payment of the deposit linked insurance contribution for the different months in 1988 and 89. Petitions 5205 of 1993 to 5209 of 1993 have been filed to quash CC.Nos.7091 of 1990 to 7095 of 1990 for the non-employment of the administrative charges within the prescribed period for the period from May, 1988 to August, 1989. 3. In these petitions for quashing the criminal cases, the grounds taken are that the contributions have been paid fully before the filing of the complaints before the Magistrate, that there are no guidelines under the Provident Fund Act as to who to be prosecuted and who to subject to recovery of damages and as this is arbitrary, it is discriminatory and offending Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, that their company had no mens red for the delayed payment as they were unable to pay the contribution due to certain reasons beyond their control, that the circular dated 110. 1973 by the Government directs for the prosecution within 7 days from the date of receipt of the sanction but in this case, there is delay of 5 months in filing the complaint, that as the contribution has been paid already before launching of the prosecution, the prosecution should have been withdrawn, that in the complaints, there is no specific reference as to who is the actual employer and the complaints are in the printed form which contain certain words not scored out, the complaints have been filed without application of mind and therefore the proceedings have to be quashed. 4. In Crl.O.P.Nos.5201 of 1993 to 5209 of 1993, one more additional ground is that the day-to-day business of the first petitioner are entrusted with some person, who are managing and conducting the daily affairs and the petitioners 2 and 3 are not in charge and responsible the day-to-day business of the company, that under Art. 122(4) of the Memorandum of the Company. The Directors are empowered to appoint Secretaries, Officers, etc., and the Directors have appointed the Factory Managers to be in charge and responsible for the day-today running of the factory and from 111. 1983 onwards. General Manager was appointed for the company with administrative responsibility of the company and therefore, the petitioners 2 and 3 cannot be prosecuted. 5. Even though the above grounds have been taken in the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners did not urge all these points except one relating to the delay in filing the complaints after the sanction order. It was argued that the circular issued by the Head of the Department dated 110. 1973 reads that within 7 days of the receipt of the sanction order, the prosecution should be filed but in this case, even though the sanction order is dated 25. 1990, the complaint was filed on 210. 1990 and therefore, the prosecution is not sustainable. The circular referred to is only an administrative instruction to speed up the filing of the complaints. In the Employees Provident Fund Act, there is no direction that complaint should be filed within 7 days after the receipt of the sanction order. Therefore, when there is an law for filing the complaint within 7 days, the administrative instruction cannot invalidate the legal proceedings initiated against the petitioners. Hence, this ground raised in the petitions has no substance. .6. Therefore, when there is an law for filing the complaint within 7 days, the administrative instruction cannot invalidate the legal proceedings initiated against the petitioners. Hence, this ground raised in the petitions has no substance. .6. So far as the contention that the petitioners 2 and 3 are not looking after the day-to-day affairs of the company and the General Manager was appointed by the Directors to administer the day-to-day affairs of the company Sec. 144-A of the Employees Provident Fund Act reads that if a person committing the offence is a company, every person, who at the time of the offences was committed, was incharge and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the company, as well as the company, should be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against the punished accordingly. Therefore, there should be averment in the complaint that the accused mentioned in the complaint are the persons who are incharge of the day-to-day affairs of the company. In this case, the first accused in the company, the second accused is the Managing Director and the third accused is the Director. In paragraph 3 of the complaint, it is mentioned that the accused 1 to 3 are the persons incharge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the establishment. When such an allegation is found in the complaint that these accused are in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company under the proviso to Sec. 14-A of the Employee’s Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, the accused have right to prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. At this stage, there cannot be evidence for this purpose and it can be only at the time of the trial. Therefore, this contention deserves to be rejected. 7. The other contentions namely payment of the contribution before the lodging of the complaint will not set right in the contravention of the provisions of the Act. Under Employee’s Provident Fund Scheme, paragraphs 38 and 8, 15 days time is prescribed for the payment of the employers contribution of the provident fund, deposit linked insurance and the administrative charges. The petitioners have not disputed the allegation of non-payment of these contributions within the time specified. Under Employee’s Provident Fund Scheme, paragraphs 38 and 8, 15 days time is prescribed for the payment of the employers contribution of the provident fund, deposit linked insurance and the administrative charges. The petitioners have not disputed the allegation of non-payment of these contributions within the time specified. Therefore, the non-payment within the time is a contravention of the provisions for which the respondent/complainant is entitled to take legal action. The reason that the complainant has paid the provident fund amount before the lodging of the complaint, cannot invalidate the legal actions. Therefore, this ground taken in the petitions has no force. 8. The other contentions that the provision is arbitrary and unguided and discriminatory offending Art. 14 of the Constitution and that the petitioners had no mens rea for the delayed payment, have no substance in view of the fact that the section is clear as to who has to make the contribution and the effect of non-payments leading to the contravention of the provisions irrespective of the mens rea or intention to commit the offence. Therefore, these contentions have to be ignored. 9. Other contentions found in the petitions are that the mere delay will not amount to default and that no special reference is in the complaint as to the employer and there was non-application of the mind while filing the complaint. When contribution was not paid within the time prescribed, certainly, it will amount to default because the time-limit is prescribed to enable the employer to make himself ready for payment and thereafter to pay the amount within the last date. The contention that there is no reference in the complaint as to the employer has no substance because the first and accused company and its directors are the employers. Simply because certain sentences have not been scored out in the complaint which is the printed form, it cannot be stated that the prosecution is not valid for the non-application of the mind. Therefore, all these grounds, though raised in the petitions but not argued, have no merit at all. .10. The main argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to the provision under which these petitioners are to be prosecuted. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, for the non-payment of the contribution of provident fund amount, and the administrative charges, the petitioners have been prosecuted under Secs. .10. The main argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to the provision under which these petitioners are to be prosecuted. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, for the non-payment of the contribution of provident fund amount, and the administrative charges, the petitioners have been prosecuted under Secs. 14(1-A) and 14(1-B) of the Act whereas for the nonpayment of the deposit linked insurance, they have been prosecuted under Secs. l4(l-B) and 14(1-A) that Secs. 14(1-A) and 14(1-B) of the Act are mandatory provisions for imposing compulsory imprisonment for certain violations of the Act but in these cases, the above provisions should not have been invoked because paragraph 76 of the Employee’s Provident Fund Scheme, which is a penal provision, contemplates only maximum of one year imprisonment or fine upto Rs.4,000 or with both and the respondent complainant ought to have prosecuted the petitioners only under paragraph 76 of the Employee’s Provident Fund Scheme and as the complaint under the abovementioned sections of the Act is illegal, the complaints have to be quashed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sec. 6 of the Provident Fund Act directs the payment of the contribution of the employer’s share towards the provident fund and the period for payment is fixed only under the scheme, that under Sec. 14(1-A) of the Act, the compulsory imprisonment is imposable only when Sec. 6 of the Act was not complied with, but in these cases as the contributions have been made though belatedly Sec. 6 of the Act cannot be said to have been contravened, because only when the contribution was not made by the employer, it will amount to contravention and hence Sec. 6 of the Act is not attracted. For the deposit linked insurance premium, Sec. 6(C) is the relevant section directing the employer to pay the premium for the employees’ deposit linked insurance scheme. According to the learned counsel, the insurance premium also has been paid by the petitioners before the Filing of these complaints and under Sec. 6(C) of the Act, that is he fails to pay deposit linked insurance scheme premium, he shall be dealt with under this sub-section and as the insurance premium has been paid already even before the date of these complaints. Sec. 14(1-B) also is not attracted. .11. Sec. 14(1-B) also is not attracted. .11. Under Sec. l4(l-A) of the Act, the violation of paragraph 38 of the Scheme relating to the non-payment of the administrative charges, also, attracts punishment under this sub-section. The learned counsel for the petitioners would admit that Sec. 14(1-A) of the Act is invoked against the petitioners for the non-payment of the administrative charges also within the time, because it is governed by the paragraph 38 of the scheme which is referred to in Sec. 14(1-A) specifically, for the administrative charges, but the petitioners were permitted to pay the administrative charges on instalments and therefore for the non-payment of the administrative charges also within time Sec. l4(l-A) cannot be invoked in these cases. Whether the petitioners were permitted to pay the administrative charges on instalments or not, cannot be decided in these petitions because the respondent/ complainant disputes the right of payment on instalments by the petitioners. Therefore, for the reason that the petitioners say that they had right to pay on instalments, it cannot be concluded at this stage that the petitioners who contravened paragraph 38 of the Scheme cannot be dealt with under Sec. 14(1-A). Necessarily, for the non-payment of the administrative charges, the petitioners have to face the trial. .12. According to the learned counsel for the respondent paragraph 76 of the scheme governs only certain specific categories not governed under the provisions of The Employee’s Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and Secs. 6 and 6(c) are the relevant provisions for the payment of the contribution of the employer’s share of the Provident Fund and the deposit linked insurance premium and for non-payment of those contributions, they have to be dealt with only under Secs. 14(1-A) and 14(1-B). According to the learned counsel, paragraph 76 of the scheme cannot be made applicable the prosecution under the above sections is correct. Sec. 14(1-A) refers to the contravention of Sec. 5 and also paragraph 38 of the scheme for the non-payment of the employer’s share of the Provident Fund and also the administrative charges. Sec. l4(1-B) is intended to deal with the person who contravened Sec. 6(C) for non-payment of the deposit linked insurance premium. When the law is that these contributions should be paid within prescribed time, the non-payment of these contributions will certainly amount to contravention of these provisions. Sec. l4(1-B) is intended to deal with the person who contravened Sec. 6(C) for non-payment of the deposit linked insurance premium. When the law is that these contributions should be paid within prescribed time, the non-payment of these contributions will certainly amount to contravention of these provisions. As the petitioners have paid these contributions only just before the filing of these complaints, they cannot contend that they have not contravened the provisions of Secs. 6 and 6(c) of the Provident Fund Act. Further, when the non-payment of the contribution within the time prescribed is admitted and the petitioners contend that they are liable to be dealt with only under paragraph 76 of the Scheme it is a matter to be considered by the trial court, as to which is the penal section to be invoked against the petitioners for imposing the punishment. When the petitioners contend that they cannot be dealt with under Secs. 14(1-A) and 14(1B), but only under paragraph 76 of the Scheme for the purpose of punishment that cannot be a ground to quash the complaints initiated against them. But the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that as the prosecution itself is under the wrong provision of law, they are entitled to seek the quashing of the proceedings itself. In the petitions for the nonpayment of the employer’s share of the provident fund, Secs. 6, 14(1-A) and 14(A) refers to the status of the accused namely the company. Sec. 14(1A) alone is penal section for the punishment of the accused. Similarly, in the other petitions for the nonpayment of the insurance premium, Sec. 6(c) to the employers liability to pay the contribution and Sec. l4-A is in respect of the status of the accused as it is a company. Sec. 14(1-B) is the penal section. As admittedly the petitioners/accused have not paid the contributions within the time prescribed under the Act, for which they have to be dealt with, the only question is whether, they should be punished under Secs. l4(1-A) and 14(1-B) of paragraph 76 of the scheme. Even if the wrong penal section is quoted in the complaints, it is not going to affect the prosecution case because the nature of violation the status of the accused etc. are all given in the complaints. l4(1-A) and 14(1-B) of paragraph 76 of the scheme. Even if the wrong penal section is quoted in the complaints, it is not going to affect the prosecution case because the nature of violation the status of the accused etc. are all given in the complaints. When facts relating to the contravention are mentioned in the complaints, even if the punishment section is wrongly mentioned, the trial court is always entitled to invoke the correct provisions are quoted, Sec. 6 related to the payment of the contribution amount and Sec. 14-A of law when the accused persons are found guilty. Therefore, on the assumption that wrong provisions is given in the complaint for the punishment of the accused, these complaints cannot be quashed. The petitioners have to face the trial according to law. 13. In the result, as all the contentions raised by the petitioners are rejected, these petitions deserve to be dismissed, and accordingly, they are dismissed. The observations made by the above, will not in any way prejudice the defence of the petitioners to be taken before the trial court.