JUDGMENT : 1. This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an interlocutory order of the Industrial Court, Thane, dated September 23, 1994 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 166 of 1993 under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The Petitioner is a registered trade union which represents some of the workmen working in the industrial establishment of the 1st Respondent at Wagle Estate, Thane. The Petitioner filed Complaint (ULP) No. 166 of 1993 before the Industrial Court at Thane alleging, inter alia, therein that the workmen of the 1st Respondent had not been paid their wages from February 1992, though their services had not been terminated by following any procedure known to law. It was also pointed out that right from February 1992, neither was any manufacturing activity going on in the industrial establishment of the 1st Respondent, nor was any attempt made to terminate the services of the concerned workmen. This act of non-payment of the wages of the workmen from February 1992 till the date of the Complaint, was alleged to be unfair labour practices inter alia, under item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. An application for interim relief was made to the Industrial Court on March 29, 1993. By an order made on March 29, 1993, the Industrial Court granted ad-interim relief in terms of the following prayers : "2(a) That pending the hearing and disposal of this case, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to restrain the Respondents from terminating the services of the workmen listed at Annexure 'A' to the Complaint; 2(b) That pending the bearing and final disposal of this case, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Respondents to deposit in this Hon'ble Court on the seventh day of each month the due wages of the workmen listed in Annexure 'A' for the preceding month and the said workmen be granted liberty to withdraw the same." and issued a notice to the Respondent returnable on April 19, 1993. On June 9, 1993, the Respondents appeared and filed their reply to the interim relief application in the form of an affidavit of one Parshuram, Senior Executive dated June 9, 1993 in which a reference was made to a Settlement dated March 15, 1993. On June 9, 1993, the Respondents appeared and filed their reply to the interim relief application in the form of an affidavit of one Parshuram, Senior Executive dated June 9, 1993 in which a reference was made to a Settlement dated March 15, 1993. Thereafter, the matter was not immediately heard by the industrial Court for confirmation or vacation o the ad-interim order. For one reason or the other the hearing of the interim relief application appears to have been adjourned for a period of about one year and odd, upto July 6, 1994. On that day the Ist Respondent filed a copy of an alleged settlement dated March 15, 1993 between the 1st Respondent and the Secretary of a Trade Union, by name, Rashtriya General Kamgar Union. Relying on the terms of the said settlement, it was contended by the Respondents that under the Settlement, 65 workmen had voluntarily resigned from the service of the company and that the other workmen in the industrial establishment of the 1st Respondent had, in a spirit of sacrifice, agreed to forego their wages and other emoluments upto the date of the settlement and also made certain concessions with a view to improving the viability of the 1st Respondent's Industrial establishment. It was further contended by the Respondents that the settlement acted as a bar to the claim of the workmen for wages from February 1992 onwards and that it also estopped them from claiming any wages thereafter. This contention was accepted by the Industrial Court and by the impugned order dated September 23, 1994, which runs into about 41 pages, the Industrial Court vacated the ex-parte ad-interim orders and dismissed the application for interim relief. Hence, this Writ Petition. 3. Mr. Sanjay Singhvi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, raised two contentions, both of which deserve acceptance. 4. Firstly, it is contended by Mr. Singhvi that it was admitted on both sides that at the material point of time, a registered trade union by the name, Bombay Labour Union, was the union recognised under Chapter 3 of the Act as the recognised union of the workmen in the Industrial establishment of the 1st Respondent. 4. Firstly, it is contended by Mr. Singhvi that it was admitted on both sides that at the material point of time, a registered trade union by the name, Bombay Labour Union, was the union recognised under Chapter 3 of the Act as the recognised union of the workmen in the Industrial establishment of the 1st Respondent. (This position appears to have been accepted by both the sides as seen from the contents of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the impugned order wherein the learned Judge has summarised the stands taken by the respective Advocates and the contentions urged by them.). Mr. Singhvi urged that in the face of the existence of a recognised Union under Chapter 3 of the Act, it was not legally permissible for any other union to represent the workmen of the 1st Respondent's establishment and enter into a settlement with the employer so as to bind the workmen. 5. Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was amended as a result of Section 20(2)(b) read with Schedule I of the Act. As a result of the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, coming into force from September 15, 1975, a proviso came to be added to sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The amended Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, reads as under" 18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding - (i) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Provided that, where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law for the time being in force than such agreement (not being an agreement in respect of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee) shall be arrived at between the employer and the recognized union only; and such agreement shall be binding on all persons referred to in clause (c) and clause (d) of sub-section (3) of this Section. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where; a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of Section 10A or an arbitration award in case where there is a recognized union for any undertaking under any law for the time being in force or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, Arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." The net effect of the amendment is that, where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under the provisions of the Act, any settlement (other than in respect of the special subjects mentioned in the Section) is required to be arrived at between the employer and the recognised union only, and, when arrived at, such settlement shall be binding on the employer and the workmen employer in the said undertaking. Mr. Singhvi is, therefore, right in his contention that Industrial Disputes Act does not recognise as binding on workmen any settlement other than a settlement entered into with a recognised union, if one exists. To that extent the settlement dated March 15, 1993, on which the 1st Respondent placed reliance before the Industrial Court, was incapable of binding the workmen of the 1st Respondent or of barring adjudication of their claims to wages. 6. The next contention of Mr. To that extent the settlement dated March 15, 1993, on which the 1st Respondent placed reliance before the Industrial Court, was incapable of binding the workmen of the 1st Respondent or of barring adjudication of their claims to wages. 6. The next contention of Mr. Singhvi is that, in any event, even assuming the settlement was a binding settlement in law and thereby it prevented the workmen from claiming wages, the settlement, as a matter of fact does not preclude the claim to wages from the date of the settlement. He has drawn my attention to Clause 6 of the settlement, the relevant portion of which reads as under : "6. Since virtually no work was performed for the period commencing February 1, 1992 till the date of signing of this settlement, the workmen and the union have voluntarily relinquished all their rights. If any, for the above period. The Company in consideration has agreed to pay a maximum amount of Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) as an ex-gratia on pro-rata basis for the above period to be computed on the number of days attended and on the clocking-in and clocking-out time of the daily attendance. To the extent leave was available as on February 1, 1992, the absence from February 1, 1992 shall be treated as leave. Pro-rata deductions shall be made for the balance number of days the workmen were absent without leave. No other statutory benefit or contributions will be paid on the above ex-gratia amount nor any benefits or allowance of any kind shall be paid or accrue to the workmen for the above period. However, for those of the workmen still in the employment of the company, the company shall without creating any precedent credit the account of each such workman with 7 days leave as an ex-gratia grant." Under this Clause, what has been voluntarily relinquished is the right of the workmen if any, for the period commencing February 1, 1992 till the date of the signing of the settlement, i.e. March 15, 1993. It is not possible to read this clause as meaning that the workmen have given up their right to claim wages even from the date of signing of the said settlement i.e. on and from March 15, 1993. The Industrial Court, therefore, was clearly in error in completely vacating the ad-interim order and dismissing the application for interim relief. It is not possible to read this clause as meaning that the workmen have given up their right to claim wages even from the date of signing of the said settlement i.e. on and from March 15, 1993. The Industrial Court, therefore, was clearly in error in completely vacating the ad-interim order and dismissing the application for interim relief. In any event, the claim for wages for the period subsequent to March 15, 1993, could not have been considered, even prima facie, barred as a result of the settlement. Mr. Singhvi, however, points out that, on and from December 23, 1993, there was a lock out in the establishment and the question as to whether the workmen are entitled to wages for the period of the lockout, is an issue which the workmen would separately raise for adjudication by the appropriate forum. For the present, he urged that the direction of the Industrial Court contained in the ad-interim order dated March 29, 1993, at least for the period between December 15, 1993 to December 22, 1993, could not have been vacated by the Industrial Court by placing reliance on this settlement. This contention is also sound and needs to be upheld. 7. In the result, the impugned order of the Industrial Court is hereby modified and it is ordered as under : "1. The 1st Respondent shall deposit before the Industrial Court the amount of wages due to the workmen listed in Annexure 'A' to the Complaint, for the period commencing from March 16, 1993 upto and including December 22, 1993 and the concerned workmen shall be at liberty to withdraw the same on the undertaking, that in case the Complaint of the Petitioner fails and it is declared by the Industrial Court that the workmen are not entitled to wages at the final determination of the Complaint, the workmen concerned shall refund to the employer the amount paid to them as wages for the aforesaid period. 2. The 1st Respondent shall deposit the amount of wages as ordered within a period of six weeks from today. 3. Considering the nature of the claim involved in the Complaint, the Industrial Court shall give precedence to the hearing of the Complaint and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible." 8. Rule made absolute accordingly. The 1st Respondent to pay the costs of this Writ petition quantified at Rs. 500/-. 9. 3. Considering the nature of the claim involved in the Complaint, the Industrial Court shall give precedence to the hearing of the Complaint and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible." 8. Rule made absolute accordingly. The 1st Respondent to pay the costs of this Writ petition quantified at Rs. 500/-. 9. Issuance of the certified copy of this judgment is expedited.