M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this case was employed as a watchman/peon in the court of the munsiff at kadur. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him on the ground that he had absented himself for duties for a period of 120 days without having applied for leave, without having got the leave sanctioned or without having intimated the authorities of the grounds on which he was not attending his duties. The record indicates that two notices were sought to be sent to him to resume his duties which he did not do and after a long period of four months he merrily reported for duty. It was inevitable that disciplinary proceedings had to be instituted under the conduct regulations. He was asked to show cause as to why he should not be punished for unauthorised absence from duty over this long period of time. The petitioner did not dispute his absence and the only justification put forward by him was that due to financial difficulties he had borrowed money from various persons who were pressing him for the refund of those amounts and who made his life miserable because he could not repay the debts whereupon he was reduced to a situation of desperation and he went into a mental depression which was why he just went away from that place. He has expressed his unconditional regret and he has sought to state that he had no intention either to dislocate the government work or to obstruct functioning thereof and it was only because of the aforesaid circumstances which resulted in a mental problem to him that he had remained absent. The enquiry officer, in view of this unequivocal admission found it unnecessary to record any evidence and ultimately an order came to be passed against the petitioner removing him from service. That order has been challenged through the present petition. I find from the endorsement in the order sheet that the learned judge who admitted the matter had effectively confined the consideration to the question of whether or not the imposition of the extreme punishment of removal from service was justified or whether it was disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct that was established. I find from the endorsement in the order sheet that the learned judge who admitted the matter had effectively confined the consideration to the question of whether or not the imposition of the extreme punishment of removal from service was justified or whether it was disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct that was established. ( 2 ) THE respondents have filed their reply and the learned government Advocate who represents them has raised a two fold preliminary objection which i require to deal with. In the first instance, he points out that there is a clear provision for the filing of an appeal and he states that since that remedy was not exhausted that this petition is not maintainable and is liable to be summarily dismissed. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the only submission in defence that emerges from the petitioner's side is that in his status he was unaware of the fact that he could file an appeal. His learned Advocate submits that obviously, this aspect of the matter was overlooked by everybody including the respondents, when the matter came up at the admission stage. He submits that even at that point of time if he was directed to file an appeal that he would have done so but after the lapse of five years, if he is directed to file the appeal, that it would be extremely harsh in so far as after this long lapse of time when the petition has come up for final hearing it would only relegate the petitioner to one more round of litigation. The defence pleaded on behalf of the petitioner is extremely weak. The learned government Advocate is right in pointing out that an alternate remedy was available to the petitioner but the availability of an alternate remedy does not present a total legal bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. It is well-settled law that normally when such an alternate remedy is available that a court will not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226. There are however exceptional cases in which the court does not entertain a petition. It is well-settled law that normally when such an alternate remedy is available that a court will not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226. There are however exceptional cases in which the court does not entertain a petition. In the present instance, it appears that this aspect of the matter was overlooked by everyone concerned at an earlier point of time and under these circumstances, though it is not intended to create any precedent whereby parties will be justified in bypassing an appellate remedy and coming to the court only because of the lapse of five years and the fact that Rule was originally issued on this petition, to my mind would require that at this point of time it would not be proper to uphold such an objection. It is only in these circumstances that i refrain from upholding the objection of the learned government advocate. ( 3 ) THE second objection raised by the learned government Advocate is that this is a case in which admittedly the petitioner has virtually abandoned his duties. The learned government Advocate points out that the petitioner was a watchman/peon and regardless of the fact that it was class iv employment, that it was an assignment of some responsibility. He submits that the unauthorised absence under these circumstances constitutes abandonment of services and is not to be viewed as innocently as the petitioner makes it out to be. Under these circumstances he submits that the present case exemplifies a situation whereby this court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction. The submission proceeds on the footing that the exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 must be directed towards the removal of injustice and if it can be demonstrated that the conduct of the petitioner has been so gross and so brazen, that the court should refuse to interfere with the punishment order. As will be presently pointed out by me, there can be no two opinions with regard to the correctness of these submissions and this court would ordinarily have straightaway upheld them. The only difficulty that is posed is that the petitioner's learned Advocate has made a strong plea on the basis of well defined legal principles that the limited interference that is asked for is only with regard to the quantum of punishment. The only difficulty that is posed is that the petitioner's learned Advocate has made a strong plea on the basis of well defined legal principles that the limited interference that is asked for is only with regard to the quantum of punishment. Had the punishment been proportionate to the misconduct alleged, this court would have refused interference insofar as the petitioner's learned Advocate is right that the punishment is disproportionate to the misconduct alleged, which is why the court cannot refuse interference. ( 4 ) ON the point of the gravity of punishment, petitioner's learned Advocate alludes to the well known plea that in these difficult times, the deprivation of employment is synonymous with economic death. She therefore submits that where extreme cases of dishonesty are established or where a misconduct is persistent or where the misconduct which is so extremely gross as to warrant a removal from service alone that the punishment would have been justified. In the instant case, the submission is that even though the petitioner did remain absent from his duties for four months, that there were some extenuating circumstances. It may be that he ran into financial difficulties and in a weak moment he borrowed money and thereafter the consequences followed, but except for this one occasion, the petitioner had an unblemished service record for 8 years. The fact that this was a solitary instance is something that the various authorities have overlooked right through. I do not propose to condone what the petitioner has done nor do i propose to take it as lightly as the petitioner's learned Advocate submits that it should be. To my mind, every form of employment regardless of the status or level has to be accompanied with a certain level of interest and devotion to duty. Cases are rampant particularly among government servants where the assumption is that they can get away with any form of misbehaviour. Staying away from duty has almost become chronic because of the confidence that the consequences will not be serious. Under these circumstances unauthorised absence will have to be viewed at very seriously and is not to be taken as lightly as is sought to be made out. It would become impossible for the government departments to even function if such acts were to be condoned. Under these circumstances unauthorised absence will have to be viewed at very seriously and is not to be taken as lightly as is sought to be made out. It would become impossible for the government departments to even function if such acts were to be condoned. I am fully in agreement with the submissions canvassed by the learned government Advocate when he points out that this aspect of the matter lends considerable gravity to the misconduct. I need to further observe that in the present economic context where unemployment is one of the biggest economic problems, if those who are holding jobs are not interested in them and decide to irresponsibly stay away from their work, such an employer would be fully justified in getting rid of them and filling those posts with more worthy candidates. ( 5 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate has drawn my attention to an earlier decision of this court reported in ramu v district and sessions judge , wherein, under almost identical circumstances, this court was required to show some mercy on the ground that the object of punishment should be reformative whereunder in appropriate cases the employee should be given some concession. The learned single judge had occasion to refer to the well known decision of the Supreme Court in ranjit thakur v union of India and others. For a long time, the scope of judicial review was considered to be relatively restricted and an expansion came particularly after the decision in council of civil service unions v minister for the civil service , wherein lord diplock had occasion to observe as follows:"judicial review has i think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which Administrative Action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground i would call illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the european economic community. . . . . ". I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the european economic community. . . . . ". in bhagat ram v state of Himachal Pradesh and others, this court held:"it is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of article 14 of the constitution". the point to note and emphasise is that all powers have legally defined parameters. The scope of judicial review has been extended in recent times where service jurisprudence is concerned and the courts have gone into the doctrine of proportionality whereunder, even in cases which would earlier have not qualified for any judicial interference, the courts have reached out to the extent of setting right the gravity of punishment. As far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, I am unable to uphold the various pleas put forward on behalf of the petitioner and would have to take serious note of the statements which have been canvassed by the learned government Advocate particularly because these decisions create precedents and as indicated by me earlier, certain laxity has developed in various service matters because of the confidence that even in cases of considerably serious misconduct, that the courts will ultimately go to show sympathy. Such a sympathetic approach will be valid in appropriate cases and appropriate situations only. In the present case, the petitioner has been out of employment from the date when the action was taken against him. More than five years have now elapsed and the petitioner who is a poor person has been deprived of his salary during that period of time. This to my mind, is more than sufficient punishment however harsh it may be, is for the misconduct that was committed by him. Having undergone this punishment, to my mind the petitioner does qualify for being reinstated in service. The petitioner shall however be administered a severe warning whereby, he shall be directed to give an undertaking specifying that he shall not repeat this or any other form of misconduct and if he does so he will forfeit his right to continue in service. ( 6 ) THE petition partially succeeds. The petitioner shall however be administered a severe warning whereby, he shall be directed to give an undertaking specifying that he shall not repeat this or any other form of misconduct and if he does so he will forfeit his right to continue in service. ( 6 ) THE petition partially succeeds. It is directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with effect from 1-9- 1995 but that the government shall not be liable to pay him any arrears by way of backwages for the entire period of absence. ( 7 ) THE Rule is made absolute to the extent that the removal from service Annexure-E is quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to resume his duties from 1-9-1995. The petitioner shall not be liable to any payment against arrears or backwages for the entire period. --- *** --- .