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1995 DIGILAW 344 (GUJ)

BADHARSING MOHANSING v. BAI SAVITA W/o. NAVNIT TRIBHOVANDAS

1995-07-24

J.N.BHATT

body1995
J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER the tenant is eligible and qualified to earn the protection of statutory umbrella of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, so as to save himself from the ejectment decree, on the ground of non-payment of rent, contending that re-cast or re-frame of Issue is the first day of hearing to pay or tender arrears of rent then due; (sic.) is the sole but an interesting question that has surfaced for judicial scrutiny, in this revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the original defendant-tenant in respect of the first floor and second floor of a residential property bearing Municipal Census No. 2960, situated in Ankleshwar. The parties are, hereinafter, addressed to as landlady and tenant, for the sake of convenience. ( 3 ) THE tenant was, initially, given first floor of the suit-demised premises consisting of three rooms and a balcony as well as bath room and a latrine on 1st september 1971, at the monthly rent of Rs. 101. 00. Thereafter, the tenant was given the second floor at the monthly rent of Rs. 50. 00. The tenant held over after the expiry of the period of lease in respect of both the floors. The total rent in respect of demised premises was fixed by the parties, at Rs. 151/ -. ( 4 ) THE landlady initiated legal battle by filing a suit for ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent. The trial Court decreed the suit with costs and directed the tenant to hand over possession of the demised premises by a judgment recorded, on 26- 2-1981. The tenant appealed by filing a Regular Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1981 in the District Court, Bharuch and lost the second innings also. The judgment and decree recorded by the trial Court came to be confirmed while dismissing the appeal. The ambit and scope of a revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent act is very much circumscribed. The judgment and decree recorded by the trial Court came to be confirmed while dismissing the appeal. The ambit and scope of a revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent act is very much circumscribed. The jurisdictional sweep in a revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act is though wider than one under Sec. 115 of the code of Civil Procedure (the code for brief), this Court could exercise its revisional powers or jurisdiction only for a limited purpose and that too, with a view to satisfying itself that the impugned decision is according to law or not. This proposition is very well settled by the Apex Court in Baichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhovan, AIR 1981 SC 1690 . Not only that, even when two views are possible, the High Court, cannot, substitute its views in place of the view of the lower Court. In Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasahab Kadri and ors. , AIR 1987 SC 1782 , it is held by the Supreme Court that the view taken by a Court in the impugned decree or an order once it is found to be possible, then it is not permissible for the High Court to take a different view and substitute its finding. The Courts below have recorded consistent and concurrent findings of facts. The finding of facts could not be interfered with, unless and until it is shown that the same are illegal, perverse, or based on non-application of mind. ( 5 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case, it cannot be contended that the finding of facts recorded by the Courts below about defaults committed by the tenant in payment of rent is perverse. The courts below have found on facts that the tenant is not entitled to protection of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) and have passed an ejectment decree thereunder. ( 6 ) A contention is raised that the ultimate conclusion of the Courts below that the tenant is not entitled to protection of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) is perverse and illegal. ( 7 ) WITH a view to appreciate the aforesaid sole contention, a few material facts may, shortly be, enumerated, at this juncture, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 7 ) WITH a view to appreciate the aforesaid sole contention, a few material facts may, shortly be, enumerated, at this juncture, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Sec. 12 (3) (b) reads as under : x x x x"in any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit, if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter - (i) continues to pay or tender in Court such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided; and (ii) also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. "section 12 (3) (b) is a part and parcel of the entire scheme of Sec. 12 which is provided by the Legislature pursuant to its policy on unreasonable eviction. Sec. 12, sub-sec. (1) serves an umbrella to a tenant against eviction so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases and observes and performs the terms and conditions of the tenancy. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12 provides further safeguards against ejectment on account of non-payment the rent. Sec. 12 places restriction on the free and unfettered right of a landlord to recover possession of the demised premises from the tenant during the subsistent (sic.) of the Rent Act. So long as a tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases, the tenant is a protected tenant and can resist any move for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent under this section. Sec. 12, Sub-sec. (2) provides that the demand of rent in arrears should be made by the landlord by a notice. ( 8 ) SUB-SEC. (2) of Sec. 12 provides a restriction upon the right of landlord to recover demised premises as stated also, in sub-sec. (1) and thereby a safeguard is made for the tenant in respect of his tenancy rights on the ground of non-payment of rent. The notice is aimed at to give the tenant whose interest is sought to be forfeited, an opportunity of considering his possession and remedying the things complained of before an action is brought against him. (1) and thereby a safeguard is made for the tenant in respect of his tenancy rights on the ground of non-payment of rent. The notice is aimed at to give the tenant whose interest is sought to be forfeited, an opportunity of considering his possession and remedying the things complained of before an action is brought against him. No suit will lie on the ground of non-payment of rent for ejectment if no notice of demand of rent pursuant to the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12 is served on the tenant. If desired, the right of the landlord to file a suit during the one continuous period lasts as long as the conditions laid down therein are complied with. Therefore, mere non-payment of rent by the tenant would not, ipso-facto, qualify the landlord to recover possession, unless he has complied with the other Sub-sections of Sec. 12. Section 12 (3) (a) and Sec. 12 (3) (b) are further provisions under which the tenant is given protection on certain contingencies. The decree for eviction could be passed under Sec. 12 (3) (a) only if the following conditions are established : (i) Rent is payable by month; (ii) Amount of standard rent and permitted increases is not disputed; (iii) Standard rent or permitted increases are unpaid for six months or more; (iv) Tenant is served with a notice under Sec. 12 (2); (v) Tenant neglects to pay or tender standard rent and permitted increases for such a period of one month after the notice under Sec. 12 (2 ). ( 9 ) IN the present case, the aforesaid first condition is not satisfied. The first condition is that, the rent must be payable by month; whereas, in the present case, the landlady had demanded the amount of arrears of rent along with the amount of taxes. The amount of taxes is not payable by month. Therefore, the case is governed by the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 10 ) IN order to earn the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b), the tenant is bound to satisfy the following conditions : clause (b) of Sub-sec. The amount of taxes is not payable by month. Therefore, the case is governed by the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 10 ) IN order to earn the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b), the tenant is bound to satisfy the following conditions : clause (b) of Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 12 lays down the following conditions for granting relief to the defaulting tenant : (1) On the first day of hearing of suit for eviction, on the ground of nonpayment of rent, or on such other date, as the Court may direct, on the application of the tenant, he must pay the arrears of rent and permitted increases then due to the landlord; and (2) The tenant should continue to pay regularly during the pendency of the suit, such amount of rent and permitted increases periodically as the Court may specify; and (3) The tenant should pay costs of the suit as and when directed by the Court. The Courts below have, concurrently, found from the facts that the tenant had failed to pay to the landlady or tender in the Court the amount of arrears of rent and taxes. It is settled proposition of law that the first day of hearing of the suit means, when the Court applies its mind or latest by the date when the Court raises or frames the issues. The tenant had not paid the full arrears of rent, on the first date of the hearing, in the present case. There is also clear and consistent finding of both the Courts that, the tenant had not paid rent regularly in the trial Court as well as during the course of the appeal. ( 11 ) THE following material and relevant facts have remained uncontroverted : (i) When the notice under Sec. 12 (2) dated 31-3-1976 was served on the tenant on 3-4-1976, at that time, rent was in arrears from 1-7-1975 to 31-3-1976. Thus, rent was in arrears for more than six months on the date of notice exh. 39; (ii) Notice was not replied, though it was received on 3-4-1976; (iii) No dispute of standard rent was raised within a period one month; (iv) But for the demand of taxes, the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (a) would have been attracted. Thus, rent was in arrears for more than six months on the date of notice exh. 39; (ii) Notice was not replied, though it was received on 3-4-1976; (iii) No dispute of standard rent was raised within a period one month; (iv) But for the demand of taxes, the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (a) would have been attracted. Thus, the case is governed by the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) as the amount of tax was demanded by notice which was not payable by month; (v) The rent was not paid regularly during the pendency of the suit and the appeal; (vi) The suit came to be filed on 3-7-1976; (vii) Summons of the suit was served on the defendant on 24-8-1976; (viii) Tenant appeared on 30-8-1976 and applied for filing written statement; (ix) Tenant engaged Advocate on 13-9-1976 who applied for time; (x) Though several dates were granted for filing written statement, no written statement was filed till 5-12-1976; (xi) The Court had fixed date for framing issues and issues were framed on 1-7-1977; (xii) Thereafter, on 21-7-1977, the tenant applied for permission for filing written statement and the permission was granted by order below Exh. 11; (xiii) The tenant did not deposit any amount towards arrears of rent. Landlady filed application Exh. 16, under Sec. 11, Sub-sec. (4) of the Bombay Rent act; (xiv) The Court passed an order below Exh. 16, on 17-7-1978, directing the tenant to pay arrears of rent on 25-7-1978 and then to go on regularly depositing the future rent as and when it becomes due; (xv) As the tenant failed to deposit arrears of rent by 25-7-1977, his defence was struck off; (xvi) Revision Application No. 1 of 1978 was preferred and during the pendency of this revision, on 17-12-1978, the tenant deposited, for the first time, an amount of Rs. 6,830. 00; (xvii) The tenant was permitted to raise his defence as the landlady had not objected for the same; (xviii) Issues were re-cast and re-framed in the light of the written statement, below Exh. 11, on 7-7-1979; (xix) Again, the tenant applied to raise issue of standard rent, by giving an application Exh. 91, on 3-2-1981; (xx) The trial Court fixed the issue of standard rent and decided the issue of standard rent in the judgment. The agreed rent came to be fixed as standard rent. 11, on 7-7-1979; (xix) Again, the tenant applied to raise issue of standard rent, by giving an application Exh. 91, on 3-2-1981; (xx) The trial Court fixed the issue of standard rent and decided the issue of standard rent in the judgment. The agreed rent came to be fixed as standard rent. ( 12 ) IT is contented on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that since the issue of standard rent was decided along with the suit, the trial Court ought to have given time for payment of arrears of rent. It is also contended that the tenant would be able to avail of protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) only if the standard rent was fixed early or by giving some time as the issue of standard rent was decided along with the suit. Since the Court has not decided the issue of standard rent, separately, and has not given time for payment of arrears of rent, the tenant is deprived of his right to claim protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). This contention is not sustainable in the light of the aforesaid facts and the settled proposition of law. ( 13 ) IF the tenant wants to avail of the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b), he has to satisfy the conditions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). A defaulting tenant could be granted relief under Sec. 12 (3) (b), if on the first day of hearing of the suit for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent, or on or before such other date, as the Court may fix, on the application of the tenant, he must pay the arrears of rent and permitted increases then due to the landlady as may be directed by the Court and thereafter, the tenant must continue to pay regularly, during the pendency of the suit and the appeal, such rent and permitted increases, periodically. The tenant is entitled to the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) on the aforesaid conditions which must be strictly complied with, by the tenant. In present case, he has failed to comply with the said condition. ( 14 ) THE payment of arrears of rent is required to be made on the first day of the suit and if this day had passed by, on such other day, as the Court may fix, on the application of the tenant. In present case, he has failed to comply with the said condition. ( 14 ) THE payment of arrears of rent is required to be made on the first day of the suit and if this day had passed by, on such other day, as the Court may fix, on the application of the tenant. The day on which issues were raised, as at Exh. 10, by the trial Court, on 1-7-1977, the tenant had failed to make the payment of the arrears of rent. He had not also filed written statemant then. No dispute of standard rent was raised. Thus, the first condition is not satisfied. ( 15 ) IT is now contended that the issues were re-cast on 7-7-1979 and, therefore, that date should be considered as first day of hearing. This submission cannot be accepted firstly, "the first day of hearing of the suit" in Sec. 12 (3) (b) means the day on which Court applies its mind or latest the day when the Court frames issues. The first day of hearing of the suit may be anterior to the date of framing of issues if the Court applied its mind and was invited to apply its mind. However, in the absence of any material on record, according to the settled proposition of law, in latest point of time, the day on which the Court frames the issues, the tenant is obliged to pay entire arrears of rent, in the absence of any dispute of standard rent or even in case of dispute of standard rent, as per the interim rent, when the Court has passed the order for interim rent. The dispute of standard rent was not raised on the first date of hearing, like that when the issues were framed, on 1-7-1977. ( 16 ) IT could not, now, be contended that the issues were re-cast and re-framed on the basis of late written statement, on 7-7-1979 and therefore, that date should be reckoned or considered as first day of hearing of the suit. This submission is advanced, presumably, because the amount of Rs. 6,830. 00 was deposited in the court on, 17-12-1978, and the issues were re-cast, on 7-7-1979. This submission is advanced, presumably, because the amount of Rs. 6,830. 00 was deposited in the court on, 17-12-1978, and the issues were re-cast, on 7-7-1979. First day of hearing of the suit is not the date when the Court re-frames or re-cast the issues; but the first day of hearing of the suit means the day on which the Court first applies its mind or latest by the stage when the Court settles the issues by applying its mind to the pleadings of the parties and to the documents. If no written statement is filed, if no dispute of standard rent is raised, on the first day of hearing, like that the date when the issues were setteled, the breach of the first condition of Sec. 12 (3) (b) cannot be remedied by paying arrears of rent and thereafter, requesting the Court to re-frame the issues after filing written statement late. If such as submission is accepted, it would, not only lead to an anomalous situation running counter to the spirit of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b); but in certain cases, it may encourage a tendency on the part of the tenant to avoid payment of rent then due on the date of the first hearing. If the tenant wants protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b), he has to be careful and vigilant by raising the dispute of standard rent, and to pay up the arrears of rent, even by inviting the order of the Court for interim rent. No written statement was filed when the issues were framed at Exh. 10, on 1-7-1977. There was no dispute of standard rent or permitted increases till written statement came to be filed long after the framing of the issues as at Exh. 10, on 1-7-1977 on the basis of the late written statement. Issues were re-cast two years after the main issues were framed, first on, 1-7-1977. Firstly, the court had raised the issues on 1-7-1977. The issues were re-cast on 7-7-1979. ( 17 ) THEREFORE, it is the date of raising of issues first which matters and not the subsequent date on which issues are re-cast or revised while considering the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Issues could be re-cast or revised at any time, at any stage, in view of application or an amendment in the pleadings. ( 17 ) THEREFORE, it is the date of raising of issues first which matters and not the subsequent date on which issues are re-cast or revised while considering the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). Issues could be re-cast or revised at any time, at any stage, in view of application or an amendment in the pleadings. Therefore, it is the date on which first issues are settled which is required to be considered for the purpose to pay or tender the amount of arrears of rent, as contemplated by Sec. 12 (3) (b ). In the circumstances, the contention that the date of the re-framing or re-casting of the issues, the relevant date to be considered for the purpose of Sec. 12 (3) (b) is not only sustainable, but is running counter to the spirit and the object of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). The tenant has failed to comply with the first condition to seek protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 18 ) AGAIN, the second condition to continue to pay or tender the rent, till the suit is finally decided is also not complied with. Both the Courts have, concurrently, held that the tenant was negligent and defaulter as he did not pay rent regularly, during the pendency of the suit. ( 19 ) THE expression "the first day of hearing" has to be read in conjunction with the words "till the suit is finally decided". It is very clear that the Legislature contemplated that on the day fixed for hearing as stated in the summons, the actual hearing may not take place and there might be considerable interval of time, between the first day of hearing stated in the summons or even after framing of issues and the final disposal of the suit. With a view to provide any such contingency, the Legislature has provided that during the pendency of the suit, the tenant shall continue to pay the rent and permitted increases regularly which might become due from time to time. With a view to provide any such contingency, the Legislature has provided that during the pendency of the suit, the tenant shall continue to pay the rent and permitted increases regularly which might become due from time to time. ( 20 ) THE words "on or before such other day as the Court may fix" which follow the first expression clearly indicate that the Legislature indicated first day of hearing as the one when the Court applies its mind and if the tenant fails to pay on the first day of hearing, he must pay on such other day as the Court may fix. It is very clear from the facts and circumstances that the tenant had not applied for extension of time. Not only that but, despite specific direction by the Court under Sec. 11 (4) of the Bombay Rent Act, below Exh. 16 passed, on 17-7-1978, the tenant had not paid up the rent. The tenant failed to comply with direction of the Court. Therefore, his defence was struck off. The tenant had also preferred revision before the District Court, and thereafter, during the pendency of the revision, the tenant had deposited, for the first time, Rs. 6,830. 00, on 17-12-1978. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove, it is very clear that the tenant has failed to comply with the conditions of Sec. 12 (3) (b ). . ( 21 ) THE tenant had not paid or tendered the amount of standard rent and permitted increases then due on the first date of hearing and he had also not complied with the directions of the Court. Not only that but the rent was not paid or tendered regularly, during the pendency of the suit as well as appeal. The question that the tenant was not in a position to comply with the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) for not fixing the standard rent, by the Court, would not arise, as no dispute of standard rent was raised till the first date of hearing. If the tenant intends to seek the protection under Sec. 12 (3) (b) in the absence of any dispute of standard rent, he has to pay or tender the amount of contractual rent then due, on or before the first date of hearing of the suit. If the tenant intends to seek the protection under Sec. 12 (3) (b) in the absence of any dispute of standard rent, he has to pay or tender the amount of contractual rent then due, on or before the first date of hearing of the suit. ( 22 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the tenant is obliged to fulfil and satisfy all the conditions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) in order to defeat the landladys claim for eviction. If the tenant does not fulfil the conditions set out in Sec. 12 (3) (b), he cannot claim protection against the eviction, on the ground of nonpayment of rent. ( 23 ) THIS Court has no hesitation in finding that the tenant is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) and the eviction decree passed against him is quite justified and legal. In the circumstances, this petition is required to be dismissed. ( 24 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. ( 25 ) THE petitioner-tenant is granted time to vacate the demised premises, till 31st December 1995, on his giving an undertaking to the effect that, he shall not transfer, sublet, or assign or alienate, in any manner, whatsoever, his interest in the demised premises and that he shall hand over the vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-landlady, and also on payment of arrears of rent and mesne profit, within one month. If no such undertaking is filed, on or before 23rd August 1995, it will be open for the respondent, original plaintiff-landlady, to execute the decree for possession. .