Sankaranarayanan Potti v. K. Sreedevi — 1995 DIGILAW 346 (KER)

ORDER P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. 1. In this revision the second defendant in O. S. 75 of 1958 challenges the order of the court below in I. A. 1307 of 1994. The suit was one for redemption of an Otti (mortgage) dt. 1-12-1944 executed by the tharwad of the plaintiffs in favour of one Parameswaran Pillai and his sons. A preliminary decree for redemption was passed on 22-1-1963. That decree was challenged in appeal. The appeal was dismissed. There was a Second Appeal in this Court as S. A. 334 of 1966 filed by the second defendant. That Second Appeal was dismissed confirming the preliminary decree for redemption passed by the Trial Court on 19-2-1969 but with a direction to allot the share of the first defendant in the suit to the second defendant. An application for the passing of a final decree was made by defendant No. 11 in the suit for redemption on 17-11-1979 as I. A. 5092 of 1979. Defendant No. 2 raised a contention that the application for the passing of the final decree was barred by limitation. The Trial Court by order dt. 7-4-1982 dismissed the application for passing of the final decree on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Defendant No. 11 filed A. S. 198 of 1982 against that decision. The appellate court by judgment dt. 10-1 -1983 allowed the appeal and held that the application for the passing of the final decree was not barred by limitation. The final decree application was remanded to the Trial Court for passing a final decree after considering the other objections raised by the second defendant. An objection that defendant No. 11 was not competent to apply for the passing of the final decree was also rejected. The second defendant filed C. M. A. 114 of 1984 before this court challenging the decision in A. S. 198 of 1982. This court by judgment dt. 19-8-1989 held that the appellate court was right in holding that the application for passing of the final decree was competent at the instance of defendant No. 11 and that it was not barred by limitation. This court by judgment dt. 19-8-1989 held that the appellate court was right in holding that the application for passing of the final decree was competent at the instance of defendant No. 11 and that it was not barred by limitation. Finding that there was no other objection to the passing of a final decree pursuant to the preliminary decree for redemption, this court confirmed the order of remand noticing that the appellate court itself has directed the Trial Court to go into the other objections raised by the second defendant. 2. Pursuant to this decision when the matter was again taken up in the Trial Court the second defendant wanted to file an application I. A. 1307 of 1994 praying that the question as to whether the decree holders were entitled to get a final decree passed in the suit in view of the issuance of a certificate of purchase in favour of defendant No. 2 by a Land Tribunal be decided as a preliminary issue before taking up the application for the passing of the final decree for a decision on the other questions raised therein. This application was made by the second defendant on the basis that subsequent to the affirmation of the preliminary decree by this court in S. A. 334 of 1966 on 19-2-1969, pursuant to the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, Act 35 of 1969 which came into force with effect from 1-1-1970, he had applied by way of O. A. 599 of 1973 on 24-12-1973 under S.72B of that Act for assignment of the right, title and interest of the decree holders over the decree schedule property on the basis that he was a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under that Act. According to him that application was allowed on 18-7-1974 and an attempt to file an appeal against that decision did not succeed and a suit attempted to be filed challenging the certificate of purchase issued to him on the basis of that order was also not pursued and got dismissed as not pressed. According to him that application was allowed on 18-7-1974 and an attempt to file an appeal against that decision did not succeed and a suit attempted to be filed challenging the certificate of purchase issued to him on the basis of that order was also not pursued and got dismissed as not pressed. Defendant No. 2 therefore contended that the said certificate of purchase issued subsequent to the preliminary decree but before the final decision in C. M. A. 114 of 1984 extinguishes the right of the mortgagors to redeem the mortgage and consequently the application for the passing of the final decree had only to be dismissed. This application was opposed contending that the certificate of purchase was issued subsequent to the preliminary decree and pending the suit and hence was not binding on the civil court and the order on it which was passed cannot prevail over the decisions in :he preliminary decree and the subsequent decision in C. M. A. 114 of 1984. The Trial Court accepted the contentions raised by the applicant for the passing of the final decree and dismissed the application made by defendant No. 2 Defendant No. 2 challenges that order in this revision. 3. The court below has essentially relied on the decision of this court in Parameswaran Thampi v. Podiyan Thomas ( 1984 KLT 397 ) rendered by a Division Bench on 18-2-1984 as well as the observations of another Division Bench in Bappu @ Moidunni v. Muhammed and another ( 1993 (2) KLJ 548 ) to find that the claim of the petitioner based on the order for purchase said to have been passed by the Land Tribunal subsequent to the preliminary decree for redemption and the certificate of purchase issued pursuant thereto cannot govern or conclude the decision in the suit and cannot prevent the discharge of the obligation by the court to pass a final decree for redemption in terms of the preliminary decree which has become final. Mr. T. R. Govinda Warrier appearing on behalf of defendant No. 2 has sought to question the correctness of the ratio of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case ( 1984 KLT 397 ). According to him a final decision by the Land Tribunal would operate as resjudicata and a plea of resjudicata would prevail over a plea of lis pendens. Mr. T. R. Govinda Warrier appearing on behalf of defendant No. 2 has sought to question the correctness of the ratio of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case ( 1984 KLT 397 ). According to him a final decision by the Land Tribunal would operate as resjudicata and a plea of resjudicata would prevail over a plea of lis pendens. Further a plea of lis pendence only enables a plaintiff to contend that any transfer of the property involved in the suit by the defendant in favour of another shall not affect his rights to proceed on the basis of the decree obtained by him. It has no application in a case where the plaintiff assigns his right in favour of the defendant. When the Land Tribunal assigned the right, title and interest of the land owner in this case, what it did was to assign the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit to the second defendant and in such a situation S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application at all. In the case on hand the assignment of the rights of the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant was a statutory assignment, if at all, and consequently S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot have any application. A Land Tribunal constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act was a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction entrusted with the power to assign the right, title and interest of the land owner in favour of a cultivating tenant and when a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction has acted in terms of the Statute, the decision of the Tribunal or the action taken by it cannot be ignored by the civil court especially when the order passed by the Tribunal has attained finality and would also operate as resjudicata in a subsequent civil proceeding. In the case on hand, according to Mr. Warrier, there was considerable delay in making the application for the passing of the final decree and the Kerala Land Reforms Act had fixed a time limit within which the cultivating tenants had to apply for assignment and the second defendant had necessarily to apply to the Land Tribunal seeking the enforcement of his rights under the Act and such an action cannot be described as one without bonafidess or as an attempt to scuttle the decision making process of the civil court. He finally contended that the preliminary decree was passed prior to 1-1-1970 the date of the coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, Act 35 of 1969 and that under the amendment additional benefits had been conferred on tenants and defendant No. 2 would be a tenant as per the amended provisions of the Act. I must say with all deference to him, that he did not specify what were the specific provisions under which the second defendant would be entitled to the protection of any of the amended provisions of the Act. 4. Before dealing with these submissions of Mr. Warrier, it appears to he necessary to notice certain vital aspects obtaining in the case and to see whether really the contentions sought to be raised by Mr. Warrier do arise in the case on hand. 5. Though the suit itself was filed in the year 1958 and the preliminary decree by the Trial Court was passed on 22-1-1963, the appeal A. S. 528 of 1963 filed by the 2nd defendant was pending before the lower appellate court when the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 came into force with effect from 1-4-1964. Subsequently going by the provisions of that Act it was open to the second defendant to claim that the transaction of 'otti' sought to be redeemed in this case was really a tenancy in terms of the Kerala Land Reforms Act on its true construction. A person like the second defendant was enabled to do this notwithstanding the nomenclature of the document by S.12 of that Act. The second defendant raised no contention that he was entitled to fixity of tenure under the Kerala Land Reforms Act since he was a tenant under that Act and that the transaction sought to be redeemed was a tenancy within the meaning of that Act. The appeal filed by the second defendant was dismissed only on 27-11-1965 and the second defendant filed S. A.334 of 1966 before this court. Before this court also no contention based on any right under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 was raised by the second defendant. In my view, he could have easily raised the contention that the transaction sought to be redeemed was a lease within the meaning of that Act. Before this court also no contention based on any right under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 was raised by the second defendant. In my view, he could have easily raised the contention that the transaction sought to be redeemed was a lease within the meaning of that Act. The Second Appeal was dismissed substantially though with a modification regarding the allotment of the shares of the first defendant only on 19-2-1969. From 1-4-1964 to 19-2-1969 controversies as to whether the transactions earlier understood as mortgages would be tenancies within the meaning of the Act was raging in the civil courts and in this court and the law reports will bear testimony to the varied situations and the various cases in which the said disputes had been raised, claims upheld or rejected. The failure of the second defendant to raise a claim that the transaction in question was not a mortgage but amounted to a transaction of lease is hence clearly barred by the preliminary decree ultimately passed by this court on 19-2-1969. 6. The only contention that Mr. Warrier was seen to urge was that in view of the introduction of the definition of Ottikuzhikanam in S.2(39A) of the Act by the Amending Act 35 of 1969, the position has changed and the second defendant was entitled to claim the benefit under the Act on the basis of that definition. The present transaction does not describe itself as an 'Ottikuzhikanam'. The definition introduced by Act 35 of 1969 also postulated that there should be a transfer of a land other than Nilam for consideration by an owner to another, for the enjoyment of the land to the transferee and for the purpose of making improvements thereon. S.2(39A) also does insist on the transfer of a piece of garden land being for the enjoyment of the transferee, which is the essential ingredient of a transaction of a lease. The 2nd defendant had at no stage, a contention that the transaction sued upon in this case was a transfer of land for the enjoyment of the transferee. I have noticed that the claim that the transaction is a lease since the transaction is one for enjoyment of the transferee, stands barred by the preliminary decree passed in the case. The 2nd defendant had at no stage, a contention that the transaction sued upon in this case was a transfer of land for the enjoyment of the transferee. I have noticed that the claim that the transaction is a lease since the transaction is one for enjoyment of the transferee, stands barred by the preliminary decree passed in the case. In my view therefore, nothing turns on the fact that a definition of 'Ottikuzhikanam' was introduced by the Amending Act 35 of 1969 into the statute book, when the second defendant is precluded from contending that the transaction was not a redeemable mortgage but was really one by way of a lease for the enjoyment of the transferee. That the nomenclature 'Ottikuzhikanam' or the use of that word in the operative portion of the document is by itself not conclusive in determining the nature of the transaction and the test would still be to see whether the transaction relied on is one for the enjoyment of the transferee is clear from the decision of the Full Bench in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan ( 1975 KLT 1 ). The introduction of the definition of Ottikuzhikanam into the parent Act by the amending Act by itself does not enlarge the rights of the second defendant or enable him to get over the preliminary decree passed in the case. There is no contention raised before me inspite of repeated questions put to counsel that the second defendant is entitled to protection of any of the deeming provisions introduced by the Amending Act 35 of 1969. 7. The Land Tribunal when it was moved by O. A. 599 of 1973 by the second defendant was therefore clearly precluded from going behind the finding in the Second Appeal rendered by this Court on 19-12-1969 that the transaction relied on by the second defendant was a redeemable mortgage. It is therefore obvious that the Land Tribunal could not hold in the face of the said adjudication binding on the second defendant that the transaction in question created a tenancy, being a transfer of land for the enjoyment of the transferee. The Land Tribunal obviously has held that the transaction in question amounts to a lease. It is therefore obvious that the Land Tribunal could not hold in the face of the said adjudication binding on the second defendant that the transaction in question created a tenancy, being a transfer of land for the enjoyment of the transferee. The Land Tribunal obviously has held that the transaction in question amounts to a lease. Since it had entered such a finding going behind the binding decision of the civil court, the adjudication by the Land Tribunal is clearly one without jurisdiction as expounded by the Full Bench in As observed by the Full Bench, in a proceeding under S.72B of the Act, only if a question arises whether a person is a tenant or not in terms of S.101(3) of that Act could the Tribunal be competent to decide that question. As explained in the decision referred to above, no such question could arise in the face of the binding adjudication already rendered by the civil court and confirmed in Second Appeal by this court on 19-2-1969 that the relationship between the second defendant and the plaintiff was only that of a mortgagee and mortgagor. The decision of the Land Tribunal and the certificate of purchase issued by it pursuant thereto are really one without jurisdiction and could confer no right on the second defendant. 8. At this stage there is another aspect to be considered. The Land Tribunal passed final orders on O. A. 599 of 1973 on 28-10-1974. According to the second defendant the certificate of purchase was issued to him on 25-7-1975. In defence to the application for passing of the final decree filed on 17-11-1979 the second defendant had contended that there was an order of assignment in his favour and that the application was barred by limitation. By order dt. 7-4-1982 the Trial Court had upheld the plea of the 2nd defendant that the application for the passing of the final decree was barred by limitation. The appeal filed by the 11th defendant against that decision was allowed on 10-1-1993 holding that the application for the passing of the final decree was not barred by limitation. The second defendant filed C. M. A. 114 of 1984 before this Court. The appeal filed by the 11th defendant against that decision was allowed on 10-1-1993 holding that the application for the passing of the final decree was not barred by limitation. The second defendant filed C. M. A. 114 of 1984 before this Court. Ground No. 7 in that appeal raised by the 2nd defendant was to this effect: "The proceedings of the Land Tribunal in O. A. No. 599/73, allowing this appellant to have assignment of the right, title and interest of the respondents also should have been found sufficient to hold that the respondent's application for passing of final decree is incompetent". This court after an elaborate consideration of the relevant aspects came to the conclusion that the application for the passing of the final decree was maintainable and that the application was in time. This court after noticing that since there was only a preliminary decree it meant that the suit was still pending proceeded to hold that none of the conditions in O.34 R.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure debarring the 11th defendant from applying for a final decree are present in this case. This court also noticed: "There is no case for the second defendant that there is any bar for the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged property and that there is no sale of the property by virtue of a final decree passed under sub-r.3 of R.8 of C. P. C." Finally this court confirmed the direction of the appellate court that the application for the passing of the final decree ought to be disposed of in accordance with law. In my view the second defendant might and ought to have pursued his claim based on the order of the Land Tribunal and the certificate of purchase issued by it pursuant thereto before this court in C. M. A. 114 of 1984 since the upholding of the claim of the 2nd defendant would have compelled this court to reject the application for the passing of the final decree as not maintainable and would not have led to the observations of this court that there is no case for the second defendant that there is any bar for the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged property. According to me pursuant to the order of remand in C. M. A. 114 of 1984, the Trial Court is bound to pass a final decree for redemption after considering the objections thereto raised by the 2nd defendant and the claim that no final decree can be passed because of the order of the Land Tribunal stands precluded by virtue of that decision rendered on 2-7-1984. Approaching it from another angle it can be said that since the decision in C. M. A. 114 of 1984 dt. 2-7-1984 is the later in point of time to the order of the Land Tribunal relied on by the 2nd defendant, it is the later decision that would prevail even if it is to be postulated that there is conflict between the two decisions. I am therefore inclined to hold that the claim based on the order of the Land Tribunal is also barred by the decision in C. M. A. 114 of 1984. 9. The Trial Court overruled the contention of the 2nd defendant based on the decision in Parameswaran Thampi ( 1984 KLT 397 ). The Trial Court held that since the order by the Land Tribunal and the certificate of purchase issued pursuant thereto were pending the litigation and subsequent to the preliminary decree passed in the case, the same was not binding on the civil court. Mr. Warrier made a strenuous attempt to challenge the correctness of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case. According to Mr. Warrier the final adjudication by the Land Tribunal would operate as resjudicata even before the civil court in a subsequent proceeding. According to him a final order had been passed by the Land Tribunal, though no doubt, pending the present suit. But once a final decision no doubt, pending the present suit. But once a final decision has been rendered though in a later litigation between the same parties, the said decision would operate as resjudicata on the litigation commenced earlier in view of the finality that it was achieved. In other words according to Mr. Warrier the rule of lis pendens has to give way to the rule of resjudicata. But once a final decision has been rendered though in a later litigation between the same parties, the said decision would operate as resjudicata on the litigation commenced earlier in view of the finality that it was achieved. In other words according to Mr. Warrier the rule of lis pendens has to give way to the rule of resjudicata. As noted by me in the beginning he had also a contention that when a Tribunal assigned with a statutory function passed an order arriving at the right of the plaintiff in a litigation to the defendant in that litigation, S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot have any application and that aspect had not been considered in Parameswaran Thampi's case. Whatever might have been the merits of the contention of Mr. Warrier on that score, according to me they cannot be accepted in view of the affirmation in appeal of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case by the Supreme Court in Mathevan Padmanabhan v. Parameswaran Thampi (1995 Supp. (1) SCC 479). Answering the contention specifically raised before the Supreme Court that the proceeding before the Land Tribunal was independent of the suit and the proceeding in the application before the Land Tribunal had commenced even before the suit was filed and consequently the Land Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the question and the High Court was in error in holding that the Land Tribunal was bound to follow the decision of the civil court, the Supreme Court held thus: "On a conspectus of the relevant provisions, the scheme of the Act and on the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that the High Court is right in its approach. The very dispute whether the appellant is a tenant and is entitled to purchase the property by virtue of that capacity, hinges upon the determination of the question whether he is a tenant. When that dispute is pending adjudication, the Tribunal was not right in directing the appellant to purchase the property. Ultimately, if the High Court on appeal, finds that the appellant is not a tenant, his entitlement to purchase the property also is lost. Under those circumstances, the appropriate course for the Tribunal would have been to keep the application filed under S.72B pending till the dispute is resolved in the court. Ultimately, if the High Court on appeal, finds that the appellant is not a tenant, his entitlement to purchase the property also is lost. Under those circumstances, the appropriate course for the Tribunal would have been to keep the application filed under S.72B pending till the dispute is resolved in the court. This according to me is a clear approval of the decision of this Court in Parameswaran Thampi's case that the primacy of adjudication is still with the civil court and that the Land Tribunal was bound to follow that decision in any proceeding that may arise before it under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act initiated earlier or subsequent to the commencement of the litigation in the civil court. Here, clearly, the application was made by the 2nd defendant after the preliminary decree for redemption had been passed and confirmed in Second Appeal and consequently the decision of the Land Tribunal is not binding on the civil court or cannot prevail over the preliminary decree already passed by the civil court or preclude it 'from passing a final decree for redemption pursuant to the preliminary decree. 10. At the time this case was being argued before me, the decision of a Full Bench on the question of the correctness of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi was being awaited. After the conclusion of the long arguments before me, but before I could pronounce the order, the Full Bench decision was rendered. The Full Bench has now held in Venkatarama Iyer v. Vasu Amma ( 1995 (2) KLT 295 ) that the ratio of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case does not require reconsideration. Overruling the arguments of Mr. Warriyar himself, the Full Bench has held: "The settled legal position is that the doctrine as expounded in S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies not merely to actual transfers of rights which are subject matter of litigation but to other dealings with it by any party to the suit or proceeding, so as to affect the right of any other party thereto. Thus when a civil suit is pending before a court where the crucial matter to be decided is regarding the tenancy set up by the defendant the decision of the Land Tribunal in suo motu proceedings initiated long after the suit cannot affect the right of the plaintiff. S.52 has been enacted with a definite purpose. Thus when a civil suit is pending before a court where the crucial matter to be decided is regarding the tenancy set up by the defendant the decision of the Land Tribunal in suo motu proceedings initiated long after the suit cannot affect the right of the plaintiff. S.52 has been enacted with a definite purpose. The purpose is that when any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of the opposite party. Ext. B6 order of the land Tribunal which is admittedly obtained during the pendency of the civil suit goes to the extent of extinguishing plaintiff's rights in the property. As plaintiff's right is thwarted when the entire dispute was before the civil court it cannot be held that doctrine of lis pendens has no application. The section cannot be confined to transfer of immovable property alone. It interdicts other sorts of dealings with property affecting the rights of the adversary in the suit or other proceeding. In otherwords, creation of any right in immovable property during pendency of a suit or proceeding adverse to the interests of the opposite party is also hit by the rule. The extinguishment of the title of the plaintiff as a result of the Tribunal's order in the suo motu proceedings would definitely be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens." (Head Note) The scope for reconsideration of the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case has dwindled in view of that decision. Moreover, in the case on hand, applying the ratio in Muhammed Haji's case ( 1993 (1) KLJ 1 (FB)) it can be seen that the decision of the Land Tribunal relied on by the second defendant can itself be found to be one without jurisdiction and hence not binding. 11. I must also observe that the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case was rendered by the Division Bench on 18-2-1984. The same has been followed for more than ten years by the courts in the State. The principle recognised therein has also now been affirmed by the Supreme Court. The entertaining of the plea by Mr. Warrier that the said decision requires reconsideration at this stage, would result in unsettling the settled position obtaining in the State and would lead to chaos and confusion. The principle recognised therein has also now been affirmed by the Supreme Court. The entertaining of the plea by Mr. Warrier that the said decision requires reconsideration at this stage, would result in unsettling the settled position obtaining in the State and would lead to chaos and confusion. That aspect also cannot be ignored by me while considering the contention of Mr. Warrier that the decision in Parameswaran Thampi's case requires reconsideration. 12. There is also another aspect. The Land Tribunal constituted in the State under the Kerala Land Reforms Act are manned by persons who have no legal training. Relying on my experience as a lawyer who had practiced in this court, I can even recall an occasion when a Veterinary Doctor had been appointed as the Land Tribunal to adjudicate on the disputes arising under the Act. As has been noticed by this court in two or three decisions, the Land Tribunals are ill equipped to adjudicate upon the complicated dispute between the parties regarding the nature and the consequences of a particular transaction entered into between them. To say that the decision of a non legally trained Tahsildar or a clerk in the Revenue Department or even by a Veterinary Doctor would bar the civil court from deciding the nature of the transaction between the parties in a pending action would, in my view, be a negation of justice to the litigants. As I see it, this aspect also cannot be ignored while entertaining the contention of Mr. Warrier that a decision rendered by the Land Tribunal pending an action in the civil court should be blindly followed or accepted by the civil court or that the civil court will be precluded from considering the contentions of parties on merits. 13. Thus on the whole, I have no hesitation in holding that the order of the Land Tribunal relied on by the 2nd defendant cannot bar the civil court from passing a final decree in the present case. 14. Ultimately, Mr. Warrier sought to raise a contention that the application for the passing of the final decree was barred in view of the decision in Kunhamma v. Bhageerathy Amma ( 1990 (1) KLT 504 ). 14. Ultimately, Mr. Warrier sought to raise a contention that the application for the passing of the final decree was barred in view of the decision in Kunhamma v. Bhageerathy Amma ( 1990 (1) KLT 504 ). I am afraid that the said contention is clearly barred by virtue of the decision in A. S. 198 of 1982 as confirmed by this court in C. M. A. 114 of 1984 wherein it was clearly held that the present application is not barred by limitation. No such contention was raised in the court below. No factual foundation had been laid by the second defendant for entertaining this plea in this revision for the first time even assuming that his claim in that behalf is not barred by the prior decision rendered in the suit. I therefore overrule the contention raised by Mr. Warrier based on the decision referred to above, the correctness of which itself may be open to question. 15. I also find that the second defendant was really misusing the process of court by making the present application seeking to prevent the passing of a final decree. In terms of the directions in the order of remand in A. S. 198 of 1982 as confirmed in C. M. A. 114 of 1984, it was not open to the second defendant to raise such contention piece meal. The Trial Court was really in error in purporting to entertain I. A. 1307 of 1994 filed by the second defendant. The plain duty of the Trial Court was to pass a final decree for redemption after hearing any objections that the second defendant may have in that regard. The Trial Court should therefore bear in mind that it must finally dispose of the application for the passing of the final decree and should not go on entertaining piece meal objections by the second defendant. I thus find no merit in this Civil Revision Petition. I reject the same. I direct the Trial Court to pass a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree in this case without any delay and without considering the objections to the final decree application piece meal. The proceedings will be expedited by the executing court bearing in mind that this is a suit of the year 1958.