Judgment :- AR.Lakshmanan, J. The 9th defendant in the suit is the appellant in this appeal. Respondents 1 and 2/ plaintiffs filed O.S. No.135 of 1979 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore through their mother and next friend, for partition and separate possession of the suit property of the’plaintiffs 2/6th share in the joint family properties and for provisions for the performance of the trust in turns according to their legitimate share over the plaint A schedule properties as per the provisions of the Will and as per the decree in C.S. No.49 of 1938 on the file of the High Court and for accounting of the income and for the allotment of their legitimate share from the defendants 1 and 2 from 13. 1939. .2. The second defendant Ramasamy Chettiar and the first defendant Venkatesa Chettiar are the sons of Madhava Chettiar. The respondents 1 and 2 plaintiffs are the sons of the first defendant Venkatesa Chettiar. Madhava Chettiar died on 21. 1935 and his wife is the third defendant in the suit. Ramasamy Chettiar the plaintiffs’ paternal great grandfather owned the properties described in Schedule A and on 8. 1910 he executed a Will to take effect after his death and thereby constituted several trusts in respect of all his properties mentioned in the schedule constituting his son Krishnasamy and his male issue to carry out the trusts as trustees and to take the surplus income if any, for their maintenance absolutely. The properties mentioned in Schedule A are the trust properties. In respect of the other family properties, the decree provides that B schedule properties in that plaint were to be taken by the plaintiffs in that suit, namely, defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No.1135 of 1979. Thus under the said decree, in confirmation of the Will of Ramasamy Chettiar, the plaintiffs in that suit namely, defendants herein had the right to perform the trust and take the surplus income during their turn. The A schedule properties, in this suit are to be taken absolutely by the plaintiffs in that suit (defendants 1 and 2 herein). As already stated A schedule properties are trust properties to be carried out as provided therein and that the ‘B’ Schedule properties are joint family properties of defendants 1 and 2 herein and are entitled to share them equally. As already stated A schedule properties are trust properties to be carried out as provided therein and that the ‘B’ Schedule properties are joint family properties of defendants 1 and 2 herein and are entitled to share them equally. Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that the properties in Schedule A and B are to be divided into two equal shares one share to be taken by the plaintiffs and the first defendant and another share to be taken by the second defendant. The plaintiffs in the suit challenged some of the debts incurred by their father which according to them are not real and not valid and binding upon them, besides they are for illegal and immoral purposes. No amount was really due to the defendants and that the defendants are not entitled to proceed against the plaintiffs’ share and they are, therefore, restrained by an injunction from proceeding against the suit properties in execution and from executing the decrees permanently in respect of plaintiffs’ share until the partition is effected. 3. The 9th defendant who is the appellant herein in his written-statement has contended that he obtained a decree in O.S. No.1083 of 1969 against the 1st defendant to the tune of Rs.60,000 and that in pursuance of the agreement dated 112. 1960 between the 1st defendant and the 9th defendant the 1st defendant was granted negative rights of the Tamil Film “Anubhavam Puthumai” and since the 1st defendant did not pay the money as per the agreement, the 9th defendant filed suit on the face of the agreement and obtained a compromise decree on 111. 1970. According to the 9th defendant since the money was advanced for a commercial activity, the same cannot be treated as one tainted with illegality or immorality and hence, it is binding on the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs are liable to pay money from and out of their share in the joint family properties. .4. It is also not out of place to mention about the appeal A.S. No.544 of 1981 filed by the very same plaintiffs in this Court against the very same decree in O.S.No.135 of 1979. The plaintiffs challenged the decree of the Subordinate Judge dated 24. 1981. The plaintiffs impleaded defendants 2, 3, 7, 8, 12 and 13 as respondents in that appeal A.S. No.544 of 1981. The plaintiffs challenged the decree of the Subordinate Judge dated 24. 1981. The plaintiffs impleaded defendants 2, 3, 7, 8, 12 and 13 as respondents in that appeal A.S. No.544 of 1981. The 9th defendant in the suit namely the appellant in A.S. No.217 of 1984 was not a party in the said appeal A.S. No.544 of 1981. The said appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 16. 1987 for non-prosecution. The plaintiffs thereupon filed C.M.P. No.8593 of 1990 to condone the delay of 1074 days in filing the set aside petition for the dismissal of the appeal A.S. No.544 of 1987 and the Division Bench of this Court by a detailed order dated 19. 1990 dismissed the C.M.P. No.8593 of 1990. 5. In the suit the plaintiffs have examined their mother Sulochana Ammal as P.W.I and one Subramania Iyer as P.W.2 and one P.N.Rangasamy, Advocate as P.W.3. On the side of the defendants 14th defendant was examined as D.W. 1 and the 2nd defendants was examined as D.W.2. On the side of the plaintiffs Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked and on the side of the defendants B-1 to B-7 were marked. 6. Learned Subordinate Judge framed necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings and decreed the suit for partition and separate possession of the plaintiffs 2/3rd share over the B schedule items of Ex.A-3 partition deed dated 13. 1969 except item No.2 of Ex.A-3 namely R.S.No.45 measuring 3.64 acres. The plaintiffs were also given liberty to seek partition over available items in D schedule in Ex.A-3 common properties after satisfaction of the surplus lands to be declared by the land ceiling authorities finally in a separate suit. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit in other respects. Thus the claim of the 9th defendant in the said suit was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge on the ground that the plaintiffs’ father was indulging in borrowing amounts for his film business and therefore, the decrees in favour of the defendants 4 and 6, 9 to 11 and 14 to 21 are not binding on the minor plaintiff’s share in the joint family properties. .7. .7. Though the learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of the very same oral evidence has held that the debts incurred by their father for his commercial activity in favour of some of the other defendants are valid and binding on the plaintiffs’ share, has curiously enough rejected the claim of the 9th defendant who is the appellant before this Court. Admittedly, in this case, the 9th defendant has advanced monies for the purpose of carrying on business in distribution rights of the Tamil Film “Anubhavam Puthumai” in pursuance of an agreement dated 112. 1986 entered into between the 9th defendant and the 1st defendant. There is no dispute that the 1st defendant was given negative rights of the said picture by the producer. There is also no dispute with regard to the agreement entered into between the parties and compromise decree ordered by the court in O.S. No.1083 of 1969 dated 111. 1970. We are not able to appreciate the findings rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge that the cinema business is. a dangerous commercial activity and such an involvement cannot be said to be for the benefit of the family and for the interest of the family. 8. Learned Subordinate Judge himself in his judgment at paragraph 33, while considering the evidence of P.W.3 has clearly stated that P.W.3 was unable to state the borrowing contracted by father with the immorality pleaded by him. P.W.I the mother of the plaintiffs has simply stated that she came to know about the immorality of her husband through P.W.3, who is an Advocate and neighbour to the plaintiffs’ father. P.W.3 in his evidence has only stated that he has seen the plaintiffs’ father once with some lady in Woodlands Hotel and also in the Guindy Race course. There is absolutely no evidence or proof or direct connection between the debt and the act of alleged immorality. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in rejecting the lawful claim of the 9th defendant. There is absolutely no evidence or proof or direct connection between the debt and the act of alleged immorality. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in rejecting the lawful claim of the 9th defendant. We, therefore, set aside that part of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge which holds that debts incurred by the plaintiffs’ father as against the 9th defendant and grant a decree against the plaintiffs and in favour of the 9th defendant in so far as the amounts due to the 9th defendant under the decree in O.S. No.1083 of 1969 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, is concerned. The 9th defendant is at liberty to proceed against the assets of plaintiffs and realise the monies in a manner known to law We allow the appeal with costs of the 9th defendant/ appellant. 9. Since the respondents/ plaintiffs are not represented at all either in person or through their counsel, we heard the learned counsel for the appellant Mr.D. Rajagopal at a great length. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the entire pleadings and evidence both oral and documentary and also placed before us many decisions in support of his contention. It is unnecessary for us to refer all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant since the proposition of law placed before us is very well settled by catena of decisions of our High Court and also of other Courts. 10. We refer to Chotkao Singh v. Hazan Haqar, A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 458, wherein the Division Bench of the State has held: “Where father incurs debts and a decree is passed in that respect it is open to the creditor to take all joint family property in execution of that decree and son cannot object to it unless the debt was incurred for immoral purpose.” The Division Bench of the Oudh High Court has also in turn followed the decision reported in Raja Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50. The very same contention as raised in the present case was raised before the Division Bench, namely the speculative nature of the business. The very same contention as raised in the present case was raised before the Division Bench, namely the speculative nature of the business. While answering the said contention the Division Bench has held as follows: “Speculation is not usually repugnant to good morals and if the transaction in question is speculative the debt cannot be considered to be tainted with immorality unless it is tainted with fraud.” 11. The Division Bench of Lahore High Court also in Pirthi Singh v. Mamchand, A.I.R. 1935 Lahore 761, has held that: “The speculative debts incurred by father estate of family is open to be taken in execution of decree unless debts are incurred for immoral or illegal purposes.” The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Chander Deo v. Suraj Bali Rai, A.I.R. 1947 All. 184, that there must be proof of direct connection between debt and act of alleged immorality. The Division Bench has also observed that: “General charge of immorality is not sufficient and that the decree obtained by the creditor and the sale which follows in execution of the sale would undoubtedly be binding on the sons unless the sons establish that the debt contracted by the father was for an immoral purpose.” In the case on hand as already observed by us, there is absolutely no proof at all to show that the amount borrowed by the father of the plaintiffs had been spend for any immoral or illegal purposes. 12. In Nidavolu Atchutam alias Atchutaramayya and others v. Ratnaji and two others, 50 M.L.J. 208: A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 323: I.L.R. 49 Mad. 211: 23 L.W. 193: 1926 M.W.N. 258: 92 I.C. 977, our High Court has observed that: “The pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his father’s debts extends to commercial debts. A Hindu son is, therefore, liable for debts contracted by his father in the conductof a hardware trade started by him.” 13. In the case of Gulalchand v. Vadilal Sarabhai Co., A.I.R. 1950 Kutch 78, the father incurring debts in regard to buying and selling of shares was questioned. The son contended that the debts incurred by the father was for immoral purpose. In the case of Gulalchand v. Vadilal Sarabhai Co., A.I.R. 1950 Kutch 78, the father incurring debts in regard to buying and selling of shares was questioned. The son contended that the debts incurred by the father was for immoral purpose. Rejecting the contention, the Court has held as follows: “Where the debt incurred by a Hindu father arises out of a transaction of actual buying and selling particular set of shares which results in a loss, the debt cannot be said to be immoral or illegal merely because it was entered into with the intention of earning profit.” 14. The case reported in Loganathan v. Ponnuswami Naicker, (1968)1 M.L.J. 422 , can be beneficially noticed for noting down the principles of pious obligation, and it has been held that, “Under the Hindu Law a son is under a pious obligation to discharge his father’s debts out of his ancestral property even if he had not been benefited by the debts, provided the debts are not avyavaharika. Colebrooke’s translation of the expression avyavaharika as meaning” debts for a cause repugnant to good morals, “ has been generally accepted as the nearest approach to the true conception of the term. The sons get exonerated from their obligation to discharge the debt of their father from the family assets only if the debt was one tainted with immorality or illegality. The duty that is cast upon the son being religious and moral, the liability of the son for the debt must be examined with reference to its character when the debt was first incurred. If at the origin there was nothing illegal or repugnant to good morals, the subsequent dishonesty of the father in not discharging his obligation will not absolve the son from his liability for the debt.” 15. In this case of the plaintiffs contended before the lower court that the debt incurred by the father for the cinema business is not binding on them and that the father has borrowed money not for the regular family business (Kulachara) but for some other trade. Learned Subordinate Judge has also accepted the said contention of the plaintiffs and rejected the claim on this ground as well. We are not able to appreciate the stand taken by the plaintiffs or the findings given by the learned Judge. Learned Subordinate Judge has also accepted the said contention of the plaintiffs and rejected the claim on this ground as well. We are not able to appreciate the stand taken by the plaintiffs or the findings given by the learned Judge. Since it is well settled that a debt by a Hindu father in connection with a trade started by himself when trade was not the normal occupation of the family cannot be held to be immoral so as to not to be binding on the sons. This has been observed by the Division Bench of our Court in Irukulapati Venkateswara Rao v. Vemuri Ammayya and others, (1939)1 M.L.J. 493 : A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 561: 49 L. W. 529: 1939 M.W.N. 326: 186 I.C. 200. 16. Sridharan and others v. Murthi Brothers, Tirupur, (1976)1 M.L.J. 100 , is the judgment of a Division Bench of our High Court wherein the father manager departs from the usual avocation of the family and starts a new business as an entrepreneur. It was contended that since the manager has departed from the usual avocation the loss incurred by him in the business is not binding on the members of the family. Rejecting the said contention Ramaprasada Rao J., as he then was speaking for the Bench has observed as under: “In a joint family which is a non-trading family, it is left to the option of the father-manager, as patria potestas of the family to formulate schemes of expansion in the matter of acquisition of property by lawful means and if, in the course of such wishful thinking, the father-manager departs from the usual avocation of the family to start a new business as an entrepreneur, that by itself cannot be characterised as an activity of the father which is not contemplated in the personal law or against it. If such a business conducted by the father-manager is ex facie a speculative one or one which no reasonable or prudent person would characterise as a business undertaken by the father-manager in the interests of the other members of the family, then things might be different. If such a business conducted by the father-manager is ex facie a speculative one or one which no reasonable or prudent person would characterise as a business undertaken by the father-manager in the interests of the other members of the family, then things might be different. But, on the only ground that the new business has been started by the father-manager, as a commercial activity thought of by him and for the purpose of prudentially conducting it for the benefit and welfare of his children and other coparceners of the family, that by itself would not raise any presumption much less a reasonable presumption that the debt contracted in the course of the working of such a commercial activity are by themselves avyavaharika debts. Avyavaharika is a concept which is peculiar to the personal law of the Hindus. It is not avyavaharika. The term ”avyavahara “ means in the normal course.” The opposite of “avyavaharika” therefore should give an impression to a normal person that an abnormal activity was thought of by the father-manager or indulged in by him.“ 17. In S.M.Jakati and another v. S.M.Borkar and others, (1959)2 M.L.J. 21 (S.C.): A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 282, the Supreme Court has observed that: ”The liability of the sons to discharge the debts of the father which are not tainted with immorality or illegality is based on the pious obligation of the sons which continues to exist in the lifetime and after the death of the father and which does not come to an end as a result of partition of the joint family property. All that results from partition is that the right of the father to make alienation comes to an end. “ In that case the father was employed in a Co-operative Bank. He was not vigilant in investing monies of the bank. Therefore, he was ordered to make a contribution in liquidation proceedings on the ground of his mis-feasance and gross negligence in the discharge of his duties. His son contended that the claim of the Bank that the liability cannot be said to have been incurred for a cause since it is repugnant to good morals. The Supreme Court rejected the said contention and held that the debt was not incurred for immoral purposes and, therefore, binding cm the sons of the debtor. 18. His son contended that the claim of the Bank that the liability cannot be said to have been incurred for a cause since it is repugnant to good morals. The Supreme Court rejected the said contention and held that the debt was not incurred for immoral purposes and, therefore, binding cm the sons of the debtor. 18. A passage occurring in Mullah’s Hindu Law, at page 360 also may be usefully noticed in this context. ”Commercial Debt: The text of Gautama, Chapter XII, S. 41 to the effect that the sons are not liable for their father’s commercial debts has long become obsolete, and sons are now liable for simple money debts incurred by the father in the course of business even though started by the father himself (k) (Sec. 240). A debt incurred by the father in connection with buying and selling of shares which resulted in loss is not an immoral debt (1). If a money decree is passed against the father alone for such debt, the sons cannot resist in execution (m). Such debts though speculative are good as antecedent debts to support a further mortgage (n) as they are not repugnant to good morals (o). “ Paragraph 298 (page 356 of Mullah - The Hindu Law), can also be beneficially looked into which reads thus: ”Immoral (avyavaharika) debt: Sons, grandsons and great grandsons are bound to pay all debts contracted by the father, grandfather or greatgrandfather except the following debts (j)-(I) (1) debts for spirituous liquors; .(2) debts due for losses at play; .(3) debts due for promises made without consideration: A promissory note for a time-barred debt is not a promise without consideration (k); .(4) debts contracted under the influenceof lust or wrath; .(5) debts for being surety for the appearance for the honesty of another (1); .(6) unpaid fines (m); .(7) unpaid tolls; and .(8) any debt which is avyavaharika which is rendered by Colebrooke as equivalent to a debt or a cause "repugnant to good morals? II. II. The burden of proving that the debt was avyavaharika or illegal is on the son (ml)." Paragraph 290 at page 327 deals with pious obligation of son, grandson and great-grandson to pay ancestor’s debts: "The liability to pay the debts contracted by the father, though for his own benefit arise from an obligation of religion and piety (pious obligation) which is placed upon the sons under the Mitakashara Law to discharge the father’s debts, where the debts are not tainted with immorality. ....The application of the doctrine of pious obligation extends to all debts not tainted by illegality or immorality and is not confined to only antecedent debts of the father." It is also to be noticed that the liability of the sons, grand-sons and great-grandsons to pay the ancestors’ debts can only be to the extent of their interest in the joint family property. 19. The decision reported in S,Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram, (1989)2 S.C.C. 574 , is a leading case on the question of freedom of speech under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which means the right to express one’s opinion by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture or in any other manner. It would also include the freedom of communication and the right to propagate or public opinion and that the communication of ideas could be made through any medium, newspaper, magazine or movie. But the said right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interests of the community and country set out under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution of India, which restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed and the social interests specified under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution of India. 20. The Supreme Court in the above case while pointing out the difference between the movie and other modes of communications held thus: "Movie doubtless enjoys the guarantee under Art.l9(l)(a) but there is one significant difference between the movie and other modes of communication. The movie cannot function in a free market place like the newspaper, magazine or advertisement. Movie motivates thought and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual and aural senses. The focussing of an intense light on a screen with the dramatizing of facts and opinion makes the ideas more effective. Movie motivates thought and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual and aural senses. The focussing of an intense light on a screen with the dramatizing of facts and opinion makes the ideas more effective. The combination of act and speech, sight and sound in semi-darkness of the theatre with elimination of all distracting ideas will have an impact in the minds of spectators. In some cases, it will have a complete and immediate influence on, and appeal for every one who sees it. In view of the scientific improvements in photography and production the present movie is a powerful means of communication. It is said, "as an instrument of education it has unusual power to impart information to influence specific attitudes towards objects of social value, to affect emotions either in gross or in microscopic proportions, to affect health in a minor degree through sleep disturbance, and to affect profoundly the paterns of conduct of children’ (See Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Second Edition by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, page 390). The authors of this book have demonstrated (at pages 391 to 401) by scientific tests the potential of the motion pictures in formation of opinion by spectators and also on their attitudes. These tests have also shown that the effect of motion pictures is cumulative. It is proved that even though one movie relating to a social issue may not significantly affect the attitude of an individual or group, continual exposure to films of a similar character will produce a change. It can, therefore, be said that the movie has unique capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as much potential for evil as it has for good. It has an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent or good behaviour. With these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally not selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with other modes of communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a free market place just as does the newspapers or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but also necessary". 21. Before parting with this case, it needs to be observed that the view of the lower court that cinema business is a dangerous business does not appear to be sound. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but also necessary". 21. Before parting with this case, it needs to be observed that the view of the lower court that cinema business is a dangerous business does not appear to be sound. In the modern era of business growth, any business carries with it an element of risk. Nobody can succeed in a business if he is afraid of taking the necessary and legitimate risk. It cannot be said that carrying on business in cinema viz., either production or distribution, is speculative in nature. Even speculative transactions or business, notwithstanding the risk involved cannot be characterised as dangerous. In cinema, no doubt, some amount of risk is involved either in the production or distribution of cinema films and that risk cannot by any stretch of imagination be characterised or called as speculative. In our view, it is only the risk taken by the plaintiff’s father in the course of his business of distribution of films. 22. In the present modern world, cinema is a very powerful public media through which ideas and thoughts are communicated directly to the general public. Besides cinema, video, T.V. etc., have got a greater and direct impact on the minds of the general public. The message, thoughts or ideas have a direct and immediate impact on the viewers of cinema either in the theatre or in the T.V. Video, etc. Tremendous impact is created on the minds of the viewers through the medium of cinema. We are at a loss to understand as to how a cinema business at all can be viewed as a dangerous one or a speculative one. Tremendous business acumen, study of the moods and taste of the general public are absolutely necessary to make a film, a box office hit. Merely because the decision of the producer proves to be wrong and consequently loss is suffered, it does not mean that a particular business is speculative or risky. Making a film involves study of the psychology of the people, their current values, taste, etc..besides huge financial investment. Therefore, it cannot be said that making a film is a speculative or a risky one. 23. For the foregoing reasons, we see merit in the appeal. We, therefore, allow the appeal. However, there will be no order as to costs.