RAM JATAN v. STATE OF U P — 1995 DIGILAW 349 (ALL)

K. L. SHARMA, J. This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the complaint filed by the Deputy Registrar, Allahabad High Court on 31. 9. 89 against the petitioner. Under Sections 191, 192, 193, 196, 420, 465, 468 and 471, IPC, Police Station Civil Lines, Allahabad registered as Criminal Case No. 7893 of 1989 in the Court of the C. J. M. , Allahabad and the summoning order dated 4-8-89 passed by the C. J. M. , Allahabad in the aforesaid complaint case and for quashing the order dated 25-7-90 passed by the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Allahabad dismissing the Criminal Revision No. 2 of 1990 Ram Jatan v. Deputy Registrar, High Court, Allahabad. 2. The facts necessary for the proper appreciation of the controversy involved in this Writ Petition are stated as follows: According to the petitioners case, he had filed case No. 10/137 against one Mahadeo and others in the Court of Consolidation Officer in which an order dated 28-11-75 was passed by the Consolidation Officer, Handia, Allahabad mutating his name in respect of the Khata Nos. 86,89 and 100 of Village Usmanpur, Pargana Kaha Tahsil, Handia, Allahabad. On 15-7-86 the petitioner moved an application under Section 52 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for giving effect to the order dated 28-11- 75 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Handia, Allahabad in his case No. 10/137. The Consolidation Officer allowed this application ex parte on 6-9-86. As soon as the opposite parties came to know about this order, they moved an application on 18-9- 86 before the Consolidation Officer, Handia for setting aside the ex parte order dated 6-9-86 on the ground that it was based on a forged order. The consolidation Officer held an inquiry and after hearing allowed the application of the opposite parties on 19-9-86 and set aside the ex parte order dated 6-9-86 by holding that the order dated 28-11-75 was a forged one. Against this order, the petitioner filed an application before the Consolidation Officer on 29- 9-86 for recalling the order dated 19-9-86 but the Consolidation Officer was pleased to reject this petition on 17-10-1986. This order has become final as it was not challenged before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation or the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Against this order, the petitioner filed an application before the Consolidation Officer on 29- 9-86 for recalling the order dated 19-9-86 but the Consolidation Officer was pleased to reject this petition on 17-10-1986. This order has become final as it was not challenged before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation or the Deputy Director of Consolidation. However, against the same order dated 19-9-86 the petitioner also filed simultaneously a Revision No. 11 of 1987 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who was pleased to set aside the ex parte order dated 19-9-86 and remanded the case by his order dated 24-12-87 to the Consolidation Officer to decide it afresh. Thereupon, the Consolidation Officer decided the same on 27-6-88. Thereafter the petitioner filed a Revision No. 443 of 1988 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation Allahabad challenging the orders dated 27-6-88 passed by the Consolidation Officer in Case No. 179 of 1986 under Section 52 (2), C. H. Act. This revision was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 23-9-88. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988 in this Court challenging the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolida tion and the Consolidation Officer. This Writ Petition was heard and dismissed after hearing the parties by Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh of this Court on August 10, 1988. Thereafter a Review Petition No. 17627 of 1988 was also filed by the petitioner against the order and judgment dated 10-8-88 rendered by Honble M. P. Singh, J. But this review petition was summarily rejected. 3. The opposite party Bindeshwari Prasad, Harishanker and Om Prakash filed an application in this Court on 8-5-89 praying that this Court be pleased to file a criminal complaint against Ram Jatan petitioner for his criminal act in forging the order dated 28-11-75 which he filed as evidence before the Consolidation Officer. On the basis of this application the Deputy Registrar of this Court dealing with such complaints examined the matter and put up his note before the Honble M. P. Singh, J. and after obtaining order he sent the complaint against the petitioner Ram Jatan to the Court of C. J. M. Allahabad for the offences mentioned in the prayer clause of the present Writ Petition. The Chief Judicial Magistrate Allahabad took cognizance of the offence and issued an order summoning the petitioner Ram Jatan. The Chief Judicial Magistrate Allahabad took cognizance of the offence and issued an order summoning the petitioner Ram Jatan. Against this summoning order the petitioner filed a criminal revision in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Allahabad but this revision has been dismissed after hearing the parties. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the summoning order passed by the C. J. M. , Allahabad and also for quashing the complaint proceed ings lodged by the Deputy Registrar, High Court Allahabad and the dismissal order of the criminal revision passed by the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Allahabad. This petition was heard by Honble O. P. Jain, J. who held on 25-10-94 that this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. is not maintainable, but on the application of the petitioner Ram Jatan, leave was granted to convert this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. into a Writ Petition. Consequently the petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. was converted into the present Writ Petition under judgment. 4. This Writ Petition has been contested by the opposite parties by asserting that the High Court has got jurisdiction to file a criminal complaint against the petitioner Ram Jatan. 5. I have heard Sri B. P. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. P. Srivastava learned Counsel for the opposite party as well as Sri H. R. Mishra learned Standing Counsel and perused the entire record including the record of the earlier Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to lodge the complaint against the petitioner and as such the complaint sent by the Deputy Registrar of this Court to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad is liable to be quashed. He has strenuously read the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) which places a bar on the power of the Court to take cognizance of offences pertaining to contempt of lawful authority of public services and offences against public justice and offences relating to documents given in evidence. It is therefore appropriate that the provisions of Section 195 of the Code be and are hereby reproduced in whole: 195. It is therefore appropriate that the provisions of Section 195 of the Code be and are hereby reproduced in whole: 195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence - (1) No Court shall take cognizance - (a) (i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of Some other court to which that court is subordinate. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term Court means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term Court means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that - (a) Where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate (b) Where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case of proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. B. P. Singh has focussed the attention of this Court to the definition clause in sub-section (3) of Section 195 and has urged that the High Court is not included within the definition of the word court for the purposes of this section. I do not agree with his submission for the simple reason that Section 6 of the Code itself recognises the High Court also as a Criminal Court for the purposes of the Code. Section 6 dealing with the clauses of Criminal Court reads: 6. Classes of Criminal Courts - Besides the High Courts and the Courts con stituted under any law, other than this Code, there shall be, in every State, the following classes of Criminal Courts, namely: (i) Courts of Session (ii) Judicial Magistrates of the first class and, in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrates (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the second class and (iv) Executive Magistrates. The word high Court has also been specified by Section 2 (e) of the Code as: High Court means: (i) In relation to any State, the High Court for the state. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. The word high Court has also been specified by Section 2 (e) of the Code as: High Court means: (i) In relation to any State, the High Court for the state. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. B. P. Singh has in continuation of his submission further urged that even if the High Court is also a criminal court for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code, it cannot exercise the jurisdiction of lodging complaint in respect of an offence of giving a forged document in evidence before the Consolidation Officer, if it has not exercised either the power of an appellate Court or the power of a revisional Court. It is true that the High Court has not exercised its power as an appellate court while hearing an appeal against the petitioner of a subordinate Court. Allegedly a forged document in the form of an order of the Consolidation Officer was produced before the Consolidation Officer in a consolida tion proceeding and against that decision, an appeal lay only to the Consolidation Officer, Settlement and against the decision of the Consolidation Officer Settlement, a revision lay before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and thereafter only a Writ Petition can be Sled in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988 in this Court against the decision of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and in that Writ Petition also he submitted a copy of that order of the Consolidation Officer in support of his claim which is said to have been forged and held to be forged not only by the Consolidation Officer but also by the superior Consolidation Authorities. The High Court did not of course exercise the appellate or revisional jurisdiction in respect of the impugned decisions of the Consolidation Officer or the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the High Court exercised its original and constitutional jurisdic tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A complaint can be filed not only by the Court in which the initial proceedings are commenced, but it can also be filed by some other court to which that court is subordinate. A complaint can be filed not only by the Court in which the initial proceedings are commenced, but it can also be filed by some other court to which that court is subordinate. The Consolidation Officer, Consolidation Officer settlement and Deputy Director of Consolidation and other authorities created by U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are not strictly speaking courts but they have been constituted by a State Act for special purposes under the Act. They have acquired the characters of a Tribunal constituted by a special Act but the Act constituting such authorities has not declared them as a court. In the case of Baliram Woman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin, A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 2267 the following obser vations have been made regarding the interpretation of sub- section (3) of Section 195 of the Code: Sub-section (S)-provision in statute deeming a tribunal as a court essential - Subsection (3) of Section 195 of the Cr. P. C. , 1973 has brought about a change in law. In view of this change, a tribunal Constituted by or under a Central, provincial or State Act can be deemed to be a court only if it is declared to be so by that Act for the purposes of Section 195. It is now a familiar feature of recent Acts to insert a specific provision deeming a tribunal to be a court and wherever such a provision is not there, the court cannot deem a tribunal to be a court. It is no more a question of interpretation but one of express enactment. 9, The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Singh pointed out that in the case of Krishna Mishra v. State of U. P, 1976 A. C. C. All 209, a division Bench of this Court has held that the Consolidation Officer will be deemed to be a court under Section 195 (i) (b) of the Code. This case has been decided following the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 S. C. 66. This case has been decided following the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 S. C. 66. I have perused these cases and I find that these decisions are no longer applicable in view of the emphatic decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Baliram Waman Hiray (supra) reported in the year 1988 laying down the proposition of law that it is no more a question of interpretation but one of express enactment. On a perusal of the entire U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is nowhere found that the Consolidation Authorities constituted under the Act have been expressly declared as a court. In the absence of this express provision declaring any authority to be a Court that authority cannot be held to be a court for the purposes of Section 195 (i) (b) of the Code. However, it cannot be denied that thee consolidation authorities are holding a judicial proceeding for a specific purpose under the special Act the authority cannot be deemed to have assumed the character and status of a Court. 10. However these consolidation authorities constituted under the Act in the form of a Tribunal for adjudication of particular disputes under that Act are subor dinate to the High Court. Article 227 of the Constitution of India makes a clear provision in the following words: 227. (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may -. (a) call for returns from such courts (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to b0 allowed to the sheriff and ail clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superinten dence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed forces. 11. Considering these various provisions, I am of the opinion that the High Court is also a Criminal Court for the purposes of the Code and the Consolidation Authorities are the Tribunals subordinate to the High Court. As such the High Court not only exercises the original jurisdiction but also exercises revisional and appellate jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 and extraordinary inherent jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. Therefore the High Court is also a superior Court in every aspect. The High Court not only exercises criminal jurisdic tion but it also exercises civil jurisdiction as well as revenue jurisdiction by virtue of conferment of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has got constitutional power to make a judicial review of every judicial or administrative order passed by any authority judicial or administrative not only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to issue appropriate writs or directions. The Code cannot and has not in fact put any legal bar against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court. In fact the Code itself recognises the inherent powers of the High Court by express provisions contained in Section 482 of the Code which reads as follows: Section 482 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. By virtue of this express provision in the Code, no restriction has been placed on the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court, even by the express provisions in the Code. That means, the rider, if any, as urged by Mr. By virtue of this express provision in the Code, no restriction has been placed on the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court, even by the express provisions in the Code. That means, the rider, if any, as urged by Mr. B. P. Singh Counsel for applicant, does not affect or limit the inherent powers of the High Court to make such an order, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of any process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The letter portion of this section makes it amply clear that if the consolidation authorities having not acquired the status of a Court, could not legally and have not factually lodged the complaint against the petitioner for giving the forged document in evidence before them, the High Court has got inherent powers to lodge the complaint to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of any court inasmuch as the petitioner had the guts to file a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to claim the relief from the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction by reiterating and filing a copy of the forged order against which was filed before the Consolidation Officer and other consolidation authorities who held in crystal clear terms that the order did not actually exist as there was no such case in which such an order could have been passed but it has been forged with a specific purpose and has been given in evidence before the Consolidation Officer. Not only these consolidation authorities but also the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition has made clear cut observation which shall be referred to hereinafter a the appropriate stage. The High Court has taken a serious note while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988 and confirmed the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and Consolidation Officer in which it has been held that the petitioner has committed forgery in begnging it into existence an order alleged to have been passed on 28. 11. 1975 by some Consolidation Officer. 11. 1975 by some Consolidation Officer. Therefore, the High Court exercised its jurisdiction in lodging the complaint of forgery against the petitioner as a Constitu tional Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which confers extraordi nary jurisdiction not limited or controlled or abridged by the Code or by any other law. For that purpose, the High Court will be deemed to have exercised its original jurisdiction in disposing of the Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988 as a Court of original jurisdiction as referred to in Section 195 (1) (b ). I am therefore unable to find sub stance in the contention raised by Mr. B. P. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner that the High Court does not have any jurisdiction to lodge the complaint against the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case under Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code. 12. The learned Standing Counsel and the learned Counsel for contesting op posite party have replied that even if assuming, for the sake of arguments that the High Court does not have power under Section 195 of the Code to lodge a complaint in respect of the alleged forgery of a judicial order, the High Court being the Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has got inherent jurisdiction to lodge such a complaint irrespective of any disability under the Code. In this connec tion paras 709 to 720 of Volume X of Halsburys Laws of England, IVth Edition were referred to. Para 709 relates to the. Courts of record and it is worthwhile to reproduce this paragraph for proper understanding: 709-Court of record - Another manner of division is into courts of record and courts not of record. Certain courts are expressly declared by statute to be courts of record. In the case of courts not expressly declared to be courts of record, the answer to the question whether a court is a court of record seems to depend in general upon whether it has power to fine or imprison by statute or otherwise for contempt of itself or other substantive offences if it has such power, it seems that it is a court of record. In the case of criminal courts, this seems to be the only test, although any court of record having a criminal jurisdiction has the ancillary power to bind over a person before it to keep the peace or to be good behaviour. In the case of civil courts, it has been said that courts of record at common law are such courts as have power to hear and determine according to the course of common law, actions in which the debt, damages or value of the property claimed is dollar 2 or above. In the case of civil Courts the further distinction formerly existed between courts of record and Courts not of record that in a court of record a writ of error lay where a judgment was alleged to be wrong, whereas in a court not of record the remedy was by way of a writ of false judgment. All courts of record are courts of the Queen, even though a subject or corporation has the benefit of the court, as in the case of borough and city courts 0f record. The proceedings of a court of record preserved in its archives are called records, and are conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein. This description of the courts of record has been given with a special reference to the courts constituted in England. Here the Constitution of India has described the High Court specially designating it as a court of record with the intendement to convey a superior position of the High Court vis-a-\is the other courts constituted either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other special enactment. Even though the courts constituted under laws other than the Constitution of India have got the powers to determine the question of their own jurisdiction and to preserve their own record in their record rooms, they do not have similar powers, as have been conferred by the Constitution of India specially on the High Court and the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court is much more than the courts of record declared in England. Therefore, the position of the Courts established by law is not the same as the High Court occupies in the Hierarchy of the State judiciary. The jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court is much more than the courts of record declared in England. Therefore, the position of the Courts established by law is not the same as the High Court occupies in the Hierarchy of the State judiciary. All the courts and the tribunals established by law within the territory of the State have been made subordinate to and placed under the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The extraordinary power conferred on High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India leaves no scope for putting any rider to exercise all the judicial power either in respect of administrative orders or judicial orders passed by the subordinate courts. The High Court, for example, is a court of universal jurisdiction and superintendence in regard to all classes of actions. I am therefore unable to hold the view that the jurisdiction of the High Court is subject to the riders placed by Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in lodging a complaint in respect of the allegedly forged judicial order produced initially before a subordinate authority. I have already referred to other provisions in the Code to justify the lodging of the complaint by the High Court in the exercise of its independent jurisdiction. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Singh invited attention to the Central Administrative Tribunals Act to show that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been wholly included. So far this state ment is concerned, it cannot be disputed but this case is not at all relevant here and applicable to the present case for the simple reason that the Central Administrative Tribunals Act has been enacted by the parliament in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 323- A of the Constitution of India for the limited purpose only with regard to adjudication or trial of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public Service and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union and corporations or of any other authority within the territory of India, it does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been taken away for all purposes. The power and the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot b4 abridged or taken away by any Act of Parliament or the State Legislature enacted other than in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution incorporated under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution of India. As regards the facts and circumstances of the present case and the questions involved here, there is no such provision in any law which has taken away or abridged the power of the High Court conferred by Articles 215, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the cases Santokh Singh v. Izhar Husain and another, AIR (SC) 1973 2190 Nirmal Jeet Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1972 SC 2639 and AIR 1983 S. C. 1053, in order to fortify his contention that it is only the Consolidation Officer who had the jurisdiction to file a complaint under Section 195, Cr. P. C. I have perused these cases and I do not find any decision of the Honble Supreme Court to say that the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to file a complaint in a matter which has come to the High Court through a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In fact, none of these cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner touches upon the question of Jurisdiction of the High Court which has heard and decided Writ Petition filed by the petitioner himself. The Consolidation Officer as well as the Deputy Director of Consolidation had given a clear finding that the alleged judicial order produced by the petitioner was found to be false inasmuch as there did not exist any such case in which such a judicial order could be made by the Consolidation Officer. These findings have been clearly con firmed by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner. The authorities established by the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act have not been declared to be courts for the purpose of Section 195 and as such they could not legally file the complaint. These findings have been clearly con firmed by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner. The authorities established by the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act have not been declared to be courts for the purpose of Section 195 and as such they could not legally file the complaint. It appears that the Consolidation Officer had sent a report to the police station but that report is not permitted by law when the alleged forged false document has been produced in a judicial proceeding either before the Court of original jurisdiction or before the Court of appellate jurisdiction. These cases referred to by the learned Counsel reiterate the principle that either a court of original jurisdiction or an appellate court has the jurisdiction to file the complaint. But this principle does not oust the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by the Constitution of India, and particularly when the High Court has itself exercised its original jurisdiction in the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner. The facts and cir cumstances in the cited cases are quite distinguishable from those of the present one and the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court in such circumstances has never been decided by the Honble Supreme Court. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner reiterated his contention by referring a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishna Mishra v. State of U. P, 1976 A. C. C. 209. It is true that in fact in this case the Division Bench of this Court followed an earlier decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1956 S. C. 66. In this case the Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation were held to be courts of the competent jurisdic tion for the purposes of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P. C. for the reason that the proceedings conducted by them were judicial proceedings in which affidavits were filed. I have already referred to a later decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Baliram Women Hirray (supra) in which it has been declared that it is no more a question of interpretation but one of express enactment. P. C. for the reason that the proceedings conducted by them were judicial proceedings in which affidavits were filed. I have already referred to a later decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Baliram Women Hirray (supra) in which it has been declared that it is no more a question of interpretation but one of express enactment. On perusal of the various sections of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is found that the consolidation authorities have not been declared to be Courts for the purposes of Section 195, Cr. P. C. but the proceedings before them have been declared by Section 40 of the U. P. C. H. Act to be judicial proceedings for these purposes. In my opinion, by virtue of the provision of Section 40, the Consolidation Authorities cannot be deemed to have been declared as a court for the purposes of Section 195, Cr. P. C. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raised another point for consideration that the complaint on the basis of the observations made in the Writ Petition without a clear cut finding or direction, cannot be created to be a valid complaint for the purposes of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P. C. I, therefore, refer to the various observa tions made by Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 1182 of 1988 and a review petition filed by the petitioners: A person who has polluted his hands by being a party or privy to a fraudulent action shall not be allowed to approach the fountain of justice with his own infamy on his lips and obtain relief on the strength of such a dirty action. A forged order dated 28. 11. 1975 alleged to have been gassed by the Consolidation Officer, Civil Lines, Allahabad, is the foundation of the present Writi Petition. Categorical findings have been recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation that this order has never been passed by any Consolidation Officer in) any proceeding and is the result of fraud played by the petitioner in collusion with staff of the consolidation authorities. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It is one of these rare cases where there is no difficulty in confirming the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 24-12-1987 and of the Consolidation Officer dated 19. 9. 1986 and 27. 6. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It is one of these rare cases where there is no difficulty in confirming the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 24-12-1987 and of the Consolidation Officer dated 19. 9. 1986 and 27. 6. 1988 in which it has been held that the petitioner has committed forgery in bringing into existence an order alleged to have been passed on 28. 11. 1975 by some Consolidation Officer. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The Deputy Director of Consolidation has decided the matter after giving full opportunity to Counsel for both the parties, details of which have been mentioned in the impugned order itself. He has recorded clear finding that on the alleged copy of the order dated 28. 11. 1975 there is neither signature of any Consolidation Officer nor there is any name mentioned, nor the year is mentioned. Even stamps fixed on the same do not disclose the date and name of the stamp vend or and his registration number. The case No. 10/137 is not traceable in the record room. The order of Amaldaramad dated 6. 9. 1986 is based on a non-existing order on record. In addition to this order dated 27. 6. 1988, earlier in his order dated 17. 1 (1. 1986, which has become final, a detailed finding has been recorded by the Consolidation Officer regarding fraud played by the petitioner in Court. After perusing these two orders and the impugned order dated 24. 12. 1987,i amof the definite view that no such order dated 28. 11. 1975 was ever passed by any Consolidation Officer. There was no lis between the parties. There was no case registered as case No. 10/137. The alleged order dated 28. 11. 1975 is a forged order. I am the opinion that the impugned order suffers from no error apparent on the face of the record. In pursuance to the remand order of the Deputy 24. 12. 1987 a fresh order has been passed by the Consolidation Officer on 27. 6. 1988 rendering the Writ Petition in fructuous. The Consolidation Officer has taken a serious view of the matter and has directed for initiation of criminal proceedings under the Indian Penal Code against the person found involved in the forgery. Since the order passed by the Consolidation Officer is appealable, I am not inclined to record any finding on the correctness of the same. The person found guilty must be adequately punished. 17. Since the order passed by the Consolidation Officer is appealable, I am not inclined to record any finding on the correctness of the same. The person found guilty must be adequately punished. 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of C. Chellappan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1979 S. C. 1761 AIR 1971 S. C. 1367 to show that in the absence of a dear cut finding, no complaint can be lodged under Section 195 (1) (b) of the C. r. P. C. The principle of law is undisputed. In my opinion, the observations made by this Court while disposing of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner are not merely observations but they amount to a clear finding whereby findings of the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the point have been confirmed by this Court. The petitioner who founded his claim on the basis of the alleged judicial order through the Writ Petition has further subjected himself to the prosecution by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction, in addition to the jurisdiction of tie consolidation authorities, if the latter were declared by that Act to be Court. Since the Consolidation Authorities were not the Courts declared by law, they could not legally file a complaint under Section 195 (1) (b) of the Cr. P. C. and as a matter of fact none of these Authorities has filed such a complaint against the petitioner. The report by the Consolidation Officer to the police does not amount to a complaint within the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such circumstances the High Court was bound to exercise its independent jurisdiction to order the prosecution by filing of a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged offence of producing a copy of forged judicial order byway of evidence in the proceedings, not only before the consolidation authorities but also before the High Court in the writ proceedings. 18. It has been stressed upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh while disposing of the petition had not recorded any finding on the correctness of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, it cannot be said that he had recorded any finding about the alleged forgery. 18. It has been stressed upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh while disposing of the petition had not recorded any finding on the correctness of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, it cannot be said that he had recorded any finding about the alleged forgery. The relevant observations have already been reproduced in detail in the foregoing paragraph, but the specific observation referred and relied upon by Justice Singh has to be repeated as follows: . . . I am of the definite view that no such order dated 28. 11. 75 was ever passed by the Consolidation Officer. There was no Us between the parties. There was no case registered as case No. 10/137. The alleged order dated 28. 11. 75 is a forged order. . . . . . The Consolidation Officer has taken a serious view of the matter and has directed for initiation of criminal proceedings under the Indian Penal Code against the person found involved in the forgery. Since the order passed by the Consolidation Officer is appealable, I am not inclined to record any finding on the correctness of the same. The person found guilty must be adequately punished. In my view, Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh was not inclined to record any finding on the correctness of the order by which the Consolidation Officer directed the initiation of Criminal Proceedings under the Indian Penal Code against the person found involved in the forgery. But in the next sentence he reiterated that the person found guilty must be adequately punished. Honble Justice M. P. Singh did not dispute the correctness of the finding recorded by the Consolidation Officer that the judicial order failed by the petitioner before him was a forged one and consequently he confirmed that finding clearly. Had it not been so, his Lordship would not have recorded that the person found guilty must be adequately punished. As regards the correctness of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer directing the initiation of the criminal proceedings under the Indian Penal Code was of course not examined. But this question was different from the one that the petitioner was involved in the forgery of a judicial order. As regards the correctness of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer directing the initiation of the criminal proceedings under the Indian Penal Code was of course not examined. But this question was different from the one that the petitioner was involved in the forgery of a judicial order. It has already been discussed here in the forgoing paragraphs that the Consolidation Officer having not been declared as a court by U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act could not have lodged a complaint against the petitioner under Section 195, Cr. P. C. The First Information Report pursuant to his direction to the police station was also not permissible in law inasmuch as the forged judicial order was given in evidence in a judicial proceedings before the Consolidation Officer and therefore only a complaint could have been lodged by that Court or by a superior Court. Since Honble Justice M. P. Singh did not address himself to this question as to who could initiate criminal proceedings against the person found involved in the forgery, he indicated that he was not recording any finding on the correctness of that order. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the direction given by this Court in the Writ Petition that the person found guilty must be adequately punished, is a finding on the involvement of the person in the forgery of a judicial order given in the judicial proceedings not only before the Consolidation Authorities but also before the Honble High Court in the writ proceedings. I have already taken the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court had the inherent power to lodge such a complaint when other authorities could not legally do so. The jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court does not suffer from any limits. 19. Mr. B. P. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the complaint sent by the Deputy Registrar, Criminal, High Court on the basis of the argument that the maker of the complaint was not appointed by the Court as required by sub-section (3) (a) of Section 340 of the Cr. PC. Therefore, I proceed to examine this argument by reference to the rules of the Court which have been made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India. PC. Therefore, I proceed to examine this argument by reference to the rules of the Court which have been made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The Registrar of the Court has been defined by Chapter I, Rule 3 as follows: Registrar includes - (i) the (joint) Registrar at Lucknow, in matters relating do the Lucknow Bench. (ii) (the Additional Registrar), the joint Registrar or any other officer, with respect to such functions and duties of the Registrar as may have been assigned to (the Additional Registrar) the Joint Registrar or such officer by the Chief Justice and (iii) in the absence of the Registrar (the Additional Registrar) the Joint Registrar or any other Officer authorised to act on his behalf. The powers and the duties of the Registrar have been enumerated by Rule I of Chapter-II of the Rules. A detailed narration of the powers and duties of the Registrar has been given but a general power has been conferred on the Registrar by clause (xvi) to do such other act as may be directed by the Court. The Honble Judge sitting single disposing of the Writ Petition No. 1j182 of 1988 recorded a clear direction that the person found guilty must be punished. The direction given by the Court was of course required to be complied with by the Registrar of the Court or by other officer authorised in this behalf. The Honble Chief Justice has the power of allocating the administrative work amongst the officers of the Registry of the Court and the Officers subordinate to the Registrar have also been authorised to persorm certain administrative duties. The Deputy Registrar (Cr.) Section has been made in-charge of the criminal matters and as such stands Authorised by the Court to take action in all matters relating to the criminal nature Truly, he did not himself act according to the directions of the Court till a formal application was received from the respondent-Bindeshwari Prasad. Thereupon, he examined the whole matter and put up a note before Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singr who had disposed of the Writ Petition on that report. The matter was examined by the Joint Registrar, Criminal Section and put up through the Registrar before Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh for orders. Thereupon, he examined the whole matter and put up a note before Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singr who had disposed of the Writ Petition on that report. The matter was examined by the Joint Registrar, Criminal Section and put up through the Registrar before Honble Mr. Justice M. P. Singh for orders. The following order was passed by Honble Judge: It is a fit case for initiating criminal prosecution against the person responsible for the said offence. In the note submitted by the Joint Registrar, Criminal, the permission for filing complaint against Ram Jatan authorising Deputy Registrar, Criminal was also sought. The Honble Judge after going through the note passed an order in his own manner but sufficiently indicated that the note put up by the Joint Registrar Criminal was approved. Permission for initiating criminal prosecution was also granted and the Deputy Registrar Criminal was also authorised to file a criminal complaint against Ram Jatan. To my mind, there is no infirmity or illegality in this procedure and the complaint lodged by the Deputy Registrar Criminal is perfectly valid so far as the initiation of the criminal prosecution against the petitioner is concerned. 20. Another argument was pressed into service by Mr. B. P. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Honble High Court did noj make any preliminary inquiry before making this complaint and no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before a complaint was actually lodged by the Deputy Registrar, Criminal for and on behalf of High Court and also a right of appeal was lost. In this connection he invited attention to the provision of Section 340, pr. P. C. and stressed upon the need of a preliminary inquiry by the Court before a complaint is actually sent to the Magistrate of the competent jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 of the Cr. In this connection he invited attention to the provision of Section 340, pr. P. C. and stressed upon the need of a preliminary inquiry by the Court before a complaint is actually sent to the Magistrate of the competent jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 of the Cr. P. C. reads as follows: (1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such court may, after such prelimi nary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary - (a) record a finding to that effect (b) make a complaint thereof in writing (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate, and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. The opening sentence of the provision reproduced above clearly shows that the preliminary inquiry is necessary only when the Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or as the case may be in respect of a document produced to given in evidence in a proceeding in that court. If the Court thinks that the preliminary inquiry is not necessary then this inquiry need not be made, and a complaint can be lodged on the basis of a finding recorded in the judicial proceeding itself. In fact, such an inquiry is called for only when the Court disposing of the judicial proceedings does not notice the commission of an offence and it is only subsequently that an offence is brought to the notice of the Court. In fact, such an inquiry is called for only when the Court disposing of the judicial proceedings does not notice the commission of an offence and it is only subsequently that an offence is brought to the notice of the Court. In the case in which the Court itself finds the commission of an offence in relation to a proceeding or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in the proceedings, it itself records the findings whether such document given in evidence is a false one. In the present case, this finding has been clearly recorded by every court in which this document was produced for example, initially the forged judicial order was produced before the Consolidation Officer. He made necessary inquiry after giving opportunity to the petitioner Ram Jatan and clearly recorded a finding that the alleged judicial order was a forged one as it was never recorded because there was no such case in which such a judicial order could be recorded. This finding has been confirmed by the superior authorities like the Deputy Director of Consolidation. When the petitioner Ram Jatan filed Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and again filed a copy of the document the alleged judicial order to sustain his claim and get relief from the High Court in the writ jurisdiction. This Writ Petition was disposed of after hearing the petitioner through his Counsel and the finding of the forgery of the judicial order was clearly confirmed by this Court and a direction was given that the person found guilty must be punished. As already stated, the Court of course did not examine the correctness of the order of the consolidation officer directing the initiation of prosecution, but, made a clear cut finding that the alleged judicial order was a forged one. Had there been no such finding recorded by the consolidation authorities or by the High Court after hearing the petitioner, then alone a preliminary inquiry as envisaged by Section 340 (1) of the Cr. P. C. would have been necessary and expedient in the interest of justice. This situation does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It cannot be said that this provision is mandatory in every case to hold preliminary inquiry, even though there has been recorded a clear finding in the judgment disposing of the judicial proceeding. P. C. would have been necessary and expedient in the interest of justice. This situation does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It cannot be said that this provision is mandatory in every case to hold preliminary inquiry, even though there has been recorded a clear finding in the judgment disposing of the judicial proceeding. It cannot be said that the petitioner has not been given an opportunity of being heard. There is also no question of losing any right of appeal when the matter has been heard before consolidation authorities as well as before the High Court on the motion of the petitioner himself. Had there been any preliminary inquiry under Section 340 (i) and an adverse decision might have been (recorded in that preliminary inquiry, only then the question of filing an appeal under Section 341, Cr. PC. could have arisen. But there is no right of an appeal in favour of a person against whom findings have been recorded after hearing in the judicial proceeding itself. The petitioner has himself availed of the right of appeal, revision and right of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of such findings and he has been heard by every authority and this Court, but the finding has remained in-tact. As a matter of fact no consolidation authority lias made the required complaint under Section 340, Cr. P. C. There is no right of appeal even under Section 341, Cr. P. C. if the High Court has made the complaint. It is now for the competent court of judicial Magistrate to examine the facts constituting the offence and to connect the commission of the offence with a person responsible for it. These questions of fact can not form a subject-matter of preliminary inquiry, even if considered necessary tinder Section 340 (i), Cr. P. C. These questions of fact as to who is guilty of the offence, have to be examined by the competent Magistrate on the basis of the evidence adduced there. The petitioner has been proceeded against because he is the person who had filed the alleged judicial order which was found to be forged and on the basis of the forged judicial order, he had claimed a right and benefit of that order. The petitioner has been proceeded against because he is the person who had filed the alleged judicial order which was found to be forged and on the basis of the forged judicial order, he had claimed a right and benefit of that order. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that a preliminary inquiry under Section 340, Cr. P. C. was not considered necessary and expedient and there is no question of denying any opportunity of hearing or denying the right of appeal to the petitioner when no such preliminary inquiry was required under law. 21. Another argument was urged by Mr. Singh that the Chief Judicial Magistrate neither followed the procedure prescribed for a complaint case nor examined whether any case was made out against the petitioner before issuing the summoning order. These are the questions which relate to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and can be examined only by him when the petitioner appears and files his statement of objection before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and ir thereafter an adverse order is passed against him he will be entitled to exercise his right of appeal or revision as the case may be under law. But in this Writ Petition filed by the petitioner against the lodging of the complaint by the Deputy Registrar of this Court, these questions do not call for a decision of this Court. The revisional order passed by the learned Sessions Judge against the ex pane order of summoning is also unquestionable in this Writ Petition. When the petitioner appears before the Magistrate in obedience to the summoning order and files objections and if the objections are decided against his interest, he can again seek the remedy of a revision. 22. Learned Standing Counsel Mr. H. R. Mishra appearing for the opposite party submitted that this Writ Petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the decision of this Court rendered in judicial proceedings of writ jurisdiction cannot be legally issued. The petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari quashing the complaint filed by the Deputy Registrar for and on behalf of this Court. A Writ of certiorari is only issued by the High Court in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitu tion of India to quash a decision of an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial Court. The petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari quashing the complaint filed by the Deputy Registrar for and on behalf of this Court. A Writ of certiorari is only issued by the High Court in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitu tion of India to quash a decision of an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial Court. Tribunal or other authority if that goes beyond jurisdiction. The object of this writ is to keep the exercise of powers by inferior judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals within the limit and jurisdiction as assigned to them by law and to restrain from acting in excess of their authority by removing to the High Court the proceedings of the inferior court or Tribunal for the purposes of quashing them. In the case of Arati v. Registrar, (1969) 2 SCC 756 , the Honble Supreme Court has held that no Court can issue certiorari to quash an order made by itself or a Court of equal status or co-ordinate jurisdiction or against an independent Tribunal. It has further held for the same reason that a High Court cannot issue a writ of certiorari against itself in its judicial capacity. In the present case, the High Court passed an order that the person found guilty must be punished for the alleged forgery of judicial order produced before the Consolidation authorities as well as before the High Court in the Writ Petition. In compliance with this judicial direction of the Court, the Deputy Registrar Criminal, was authorised to lodge the formal complaint against the petitioner before the competent court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. The act of the Deputy Registrar Criminal of High Court in sending the complaint to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is not purely an administrative act but it was a step in compliance of the Judicial direction of the Court. Therefore, this has to be distinguished from the administrative capacity of the High Court. No writ of certiorari can be issued legally to quash a judicial order of the High Court by a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party is perfectly valid and on this ground also, no writ of certiorari can be issued for quashing the complaint made by the High Court. 23. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party is perfectly valid and on this ground also, no writ of certiorari can be issued for quashing the complaint made by the High Court. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, I come to the conclusion that the complaint lodged under the directions of the High Court by Deputy Registrar, Criminal, who was duly authorised, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, is perfectly valid and it does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or any procedural error. The summoning order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad also does not suffer from any apparent error and is therefore, not liable to be quashed. 24. The petitioner can very well appear and file his statement of objection before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad who shall thereupon decide the same after hearing and affording full opportunity of being heard to the petitioner as an accused and then shall take a decision thereon. 25. The question whether the petitioner has committed the forgery of the alleged judicial order is one of facts and shall be Decided on the basis of the evidence by the learned Magistrate by following the prescribed procedure for trial in accordance with law. Therefore, no interference is called for in this Writ Petition with the trial of the case by the learned Magistrate. 26. Consequently, this Writ Petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. 27. However no order as to costs is made. 28. The interim stay order is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed. .