Anjali Roy v. State — 1995 DIGILAW 349 (CAL)

JUDGMENT These writ petitions relate to the question of extension of service of certain numbers of teaching staff in certain schools beyond 60 years of age. On the 7th March, 1990 the Education Department, Government of West Bengal issued memorandum No. 33-Edn.(B). Broadly speaking this memo No. 33-Edn. dated the 7th March, 1990 inter alia offered option to the teachers of Government sponsored or aided schools to retain pre-revised scale of pay, that is, pre 1986 scale of pay with the right to be considered for extension of service after attaining 60 years (upto 65 years) of age or to opt for the revised scale of pay by foregoing the right to be considered for extension of service beyond 60 years of age. The option was required to be exercised within 90 days from the date of issue of the said memo. No. 33- Edn., that is, from 7.3.90. The said memo No. 33-Edn. was however challenged in the Court by the West Bengal Head Masters Association and others. By an interim order dated the 18th July, 1990 a Division Bench of this Court allowed opportunity to exercise option in terms of the impugned memo dated 7.3.90 without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. 2. By an order dated the 6th August, 1991 a Division Bench upheld the validity of the memo No. 33-Edn. dated 7.3.90 and directed that fresh opportunity be given to exercise option within a time to be specified by the State Government and that those who exercise option in favour of the revised scale of pay shall be deemed to have waived their statutory right for being considered for extension of their services after superannuation, but those who opt to continue in service with the existing scales of pay shall be considered for extension of service after superannuation at the age of 60 years. Pursuant to that the State Government issued memorandum No. 348-Edn. (B) dated 30.8.91 fixing 30.9.91 as the date within which such option was to be exercised. The Government also issued a notification, being notification No. 1151-Edn. (S) dated 20.8.91, by which Rule 28 of the Management Rules, 1969 was amended. Both the notification No. 1151-Edn. (B) dated 20.8.91 and the memo No. 348-Edn. (B) dated 30.8.91 were however challenged by writ petition. Subsequently the Government issued notification No. 458-Edn. The Government also issued a notification, being notification No. 1151-Edn. (S) dated 20.8.91, by which Rule 28 of the Management Rules, 1969 was amended. Both the notification No. 1151-Edn. (B) dated 20.8.91 and the memo No. 348-Edn. (B) dated 30.8.91 were however challenged by writ petition. Subsequently the Government issued notification No. 458-Edn. (S) dated 27.4.92 further amending Rule 28 of the Management Rules and also issued memo No. 196-Edn. (B) dated 27.4.92 by this memo No. 196-Edn. (B) dated 27.4.92 the Government permitted the teaching and non-teaching staff to withdraw their earlier option exercise in favour of the revised scale and revert to the pre 1986 scale of pay on condition that they will have to refund the excess amount, if any down by them consequent upon fixation of their in pay the revised scales introduced with effect from 1.1.86. Such withdrawal of option was required to be effected by submission of a written statement to the concerned authorities to that effect in the form provided for the purpose within 90 days from 27.4.92 and also of an undertaking to refund the excess amount if any, dawn by them within 60 days from the date of submission of the written statement and undertaking. The said notification No. 458-Edn. dated 27.4.92 and memo No. 196-Edn. dated 27.4.92 were however challenged by writ petition. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 23.7.92 directed that till disposal of the writ petition, undertaking referred to in the memo dated 27.4.92 (meaning meme No. 196-Edn.) shall not be given effect to by the State respondents. In the subsequent order dated 28.7.92 the Division Bench recorded that on 23.7.92 on behalf of the writ petitioners an undertaking was given to the Court that if the matter in dispute was ultimately decided against them they would refund back whatever would be payable by them as a result of the decision going against them. The Division Bench also by its order dated 28.7.92 extended the time for exercising option by the writ petitioners upto 7th August, 1992. As we have already seen, by memo No. 196-Edn. the option was required to be exercised within 90 days from 27.4.92, that is by the 24th July, 1992. The Division Bench by order dated 28.7.92 however extended the time for exercising option upto 7th August, 1992. By memo No. 300-Edn. As we have already seen, by memo No. 196-Edn. the option was required to be exercised within 90 days from 27.4.92, that is by the 24th July, 1992. The Division Bench by order dated 28.7.92 however extended the time for exercising option upto 7th August, 1992. By memo No. 300-Edn. dated 13.8.92 the Government prescribed the procedure for refund of over-payment made to the employees who, pursuant to memorandum No. 196-Edn. dated 27.4.92 opted to revert to the pre 1986 scale to pay. It is stated in Clause (1) of that memorandum that the employees shall submit written option to retain the pre 1986 scale to pay to the authority of the school and the D.I. of Schools shall intimate the employee concerned the overpayment made to such employee within three weeks from the date of receipt of such option. Clause (2) provides that on receipt of such intimation from the D.I. the concerned employee shall deposit the amount in the Reserve Bank or the Treasury within the stipulated period of time. It is contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that since in Clause (1) of the said memo No. 300-Edn. it is stated that the employee shall submit option to retain the pre 1986 scale of pay to the authority of the school and thus uses future tense "shall" in this context, the time for, exercising option gets automatically extended and that too, without any outer time limit. On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances including the recital of the context contained in the said memo No. 300-Edn., this argument does not seem to be tenable at all. The memo No. 300-Edn. describes as its background the earlier memo No. 196-Edn., by which an option was required to be exercised within a particular time limit for reverting to the pre 1986 scale with condition to refund the excess amount drawn by virtue of earlier exercise of option to come under the revised scale of pay. Therefore inspite of any imperfection of language used in memo No. 300-Edn. it cannot be held that this memo No. 300-Edn. sets at naught the time limit fixed by memo No. 196-Edn. Memo No. 300-Edn. Therefore inspite of any imperfection of language used in memo No. 300-Edn. it cannot be held that this memo No. 300-Edn. sets at naught the time limit fixed by memo No. 196-Edn. Memo No. 300-Edn. for all practical purposes and inspite of any imperfection of the language, rather prescribes the procedure for refund of the excess amount drawn by the concerned employee prior to the exercise of option to revert to the pre 1986 scale of pay. The procedure prescribed is that the D.I. of Schools would intimate the employee concerned the over drawn amount within three weeks from the date of receipt of the option exercised by the employee to revert to the pre 1986 scale and on receipt of such intimation the concerned employee shall deposit the amount in the Reserve Bank of India or the Treasury within the stipulated period of time fixed for the purpose. In Clause 3(d) it is provided that till the Treasury challan showing the deposit is submitted to the D.I. the drawal of pay in the pre 1986 scale shall be treated as provisional. This provision thus makes it clear and this is also the natural import of the exercise of the option to revert to the pre 1986 scale, that on the exercise of the option to revert to the pre 1986 scale, that is, pre-revised scale from the revised scale of pay the employee concerned will draw pay in the pre-revised scale and will not any more draw pay in the revised scale. As we have seen, the revised scale of pay is coupled with a condition that the incumbent concerned will have to retire at 60 years without claiming the benefit of consideration for extension of service beyond 60 years of age. But an employee who by exercise of option, original or fresh, within time retains or reverts to the pre-revised scale of pay will be entitled to be considered for extension beyond 60 years of age. 3. There cannot however be any question that an employee who inspite of exercise of option in favour of the pre-revised scale draws or continues to draw pay in the revised scale will yet be entitled to the benefit of consideration for extension beyond 60 years simply because he has exercised option in paper only. 3. There cannot however be any question that an employee who inspite of exercise of option in favour of the pre-revised scale draws or continues to draw pay in the revised scale will yet be entitled to the benefit of consideration for extension beyond 60 years simply because he has exercised option in paper only. Obviously one cannot have both the benefits, namely, the benefit of the revised scale of pay and also the benefit of consideration for extension beyond 60 years of age. But of course the excess amount drawn by enjoying the benefit of the revised scale in terms of memo No. 33-Edn. dated 7.3.90 till the exercise of option for reversion to the pre-revised scale pursuant to memo No. 196-Edn. was required under memo No. 300-Edn. to be quantified by the D.I. and the employee concerned was required to deposit the quantified amount within the prescribed time on receipt of the communication from the D.I. in that respect. As we have seen, in Clause 3(d) of memo No. 300-Edn. it is stated that till the Treasury challan showing deposit of the excess amount drawn, obviously till reversion to the pre-revised scale, the drawal of pay in the pre-revised scale will be treated as provisional. The import of this clause is that till the over-drawn amount is refunded by the incumbent concerned in accordance with the prescribed procedure he cannot claim the benefit of extension beyond 60 years of age simply because he has been drawing pay in the pre-revised scale, and any extension beyond 60 years, even if granted or availed of, will be only provisional and will be subject to the liability to refund the over-drawn amount. The argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the incumbent concerned has no responsibility to see that he draws pay in the pre-revised scale rather than in the revised scale after exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale does not seem to be tenable. It may be that the pay statement is submitted by the school authorities and the D.I. passes the bill or sanctions the amount but that does not mean that the incumbent concerned has no responsibility in the matter. It may be that the pay statement is submitted by the school authorities and the D.I. passes the bill or sanctions the amount but that does not mean that the incumbent concerned has no responsibility in the matter. After the exercise of the option to revert to the pre-revised scale if the incumbent concerned finds that he is being given pay by the school authorities in the revised scale of pay it is his duty to point out the irregularity to the school authorities and ask them to prepare the pay bill for him in the pre-revised scale rather than in the revised scale. He cannot continue to draw the pay in the revised scale after exercising the option to revert to the pre-revised scale without pointing out the same to the school authorities. Of course if there were any bona fide mistake or confusion in the matter, that could be remedied or rectified by subsequent acts by refunding the excess amount drawn after the exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale and by drawing pay in the pre-revised scale with due promptitude. A similar memorandum being memo No 10-Edn. (E) dated the 10th January, 1993 was issued in the same line as the memo No. 300-Edn. It is further to be noted here that although in view of memo No. 196-Edn. dated 27.4.92 the option for reversion to the pre-revised scale was required to be exercised within 90 days, that is, 24th July, 1992 yet the time for exercising such option, as we have already noticed, s toad extended upto 7th August, 1992 in view of the order of the Division Beach dated 28.7.92. The Government by its memo No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995 took note of the fact that the option to revert to the pre-revised scale was required to be exercised within 90 days from the date of the issue of memo No. 196-Edn. dated 27.4.92 and the time was subsequently extended by the High Court upto 7.8.92 and accordingly, all such options for reversion to the pre 1986 scale were required to be exercised by 7.8.92. There is no doubt that this is the correct position. 4. dated 27.4.92 and the time was subsequently extended by the High Court upto 7.8.92 and accordingly, all such options for reversion to the pre 1986 scale were required to be exercised by 7.8.92. There is no doubt that this is the correct position. 4. The said memo No. 59-SE(B) recites that some of the employees who exercised undertaking to revert to the pre 1986 scale of pay within the stipulated period have drawn salary as per the revised scale of pay in terms of memo No. 33-Edn. even after the date of exercising such undertaking to revert to pre 1986 scale and they have now prayed for extension of service on attaining the age of superannuation at 60 years but it has been decided that actually continuing to draw pay in the revised scale of pay allowed in memo No. 33-Edn. (D) even after the date of exercising the undertaking to revert to pre 1986 pay scale shall, by such actual action itself, be construed as continuing the first option in favour of the scale of pay as revised in memo No. 33-Edn and as such they are not entitled to any extension of service beyond 60 years of age and trey will be deemed to have retired or will have to retire on attaining the age of superannuation at 60 years and over-payments, if any, due to over-stayal beyond the date of superannuation, should be recovered from them immediately. It is further provided in the said memo No. 59-SE(B) that the teaching and non-teaching staff who exercised undertaking to revert to pre 1986 scale of pay on or before 7.8.92 and subsequently drew their salary as per the scale of pay prevalent prior to 1.1.86, after the said undertaking may continue upto 65 years of age provided they have refunded their over-drawn amount and also fulfil other conditions regarding extension of service. In my opinion no fault perhaps can be found with this memo No. 59-SE(B). But in pressing that memorandum into service it will also have to be considered as to whether it was due to bonafide mistake or confusion that an incumbent continued to draw pay in revised scale for some time even after the exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale and whether he has subsequently refunded the excess amount drawn by mistake even after exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioners attracted my attention to the form for exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale in terms of memo No. 196-Edn. dated 27.4.92. In the first paragraph of that form the incumbent declares that he withdraws the option exercised by him earlier for the revised scale of pay introduced with effect from 1.1.86 and elects to retain the pre 1986 scale of pay. In the second paragraph the incumbent undertakes to refund to the Government the excess amount, it any, drawn by him consequent upon fixation of his pay in the revised scale of pay introduced with effect from 1.1.86 within 60 days of submission of the said undertaking. The learned Advocate for the petitioners sought to argue that the first paragraph relating to withdrawal of option earlier exercised and election to retain the pre 1986 scale is also a mere undertaking and that undertaking also was directed by the Division Bench by its order dated 23.7.92 not to be given effect to. There is no doubt that by the order dated 23.7.92 the Division Bench directed that till the disposal of the writ petition the undertaking referred to in memo dated 27.4.92 shall not be given effect to. In the said memo No. 196-Edn. dated the 27th April 1992 the only undertaking spoken of was the undertaking to refund the excess amount within a particular period. Withdrawal of earlier option for revised scale of pay and declaration for retention of the pre 1986 scale as envisaged in the memorandum No. 196-Edn. is not a part of the undertaking mentioned in the said memorandum and the same is only a declaration which is absolutely separate and different from an undertaking to refund the excess amount upon such reversion to the pre-revises scale. By the Division Bench order dated 23.7.92 only the undertaking to refund get stayed and obviously not the operation of the other part of the memo No. 196-Edn., namely, the actual reversion to the pre-revised scale with effect from the date of exercise of the option. The mere fact that the form of option contains a heading 'Undertaking' does not change the purport and text of the memorandum No. 196-Edn. The mere fact that the form of option contains a heading 'Undertaking' does not change the purport and text of the memorandum No. 196-Edn. It is quite understandable that the form contains the heading 'Undertaking' because in paragraph 2 of the form the incumbent concerned, in view of the option of reversion exercised by him in paragraph 1 thereof, undertakes to refund the excess amount. By reason of the heading of the form, the option to revert to the pre-revised scale cannot, contrary to the text of the memo itself, assume the character of a mere undertaking. 6. It may be mentioned here that by judgment dated 16.5.95 delivered by a Division Bench of this Court the concerned writ petitions including the one in which the Division Bench granted extension of time for exercising option have been disposed of by deciding against the writ petitioners. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that in view of such dismissal of the writ petitions the benefit of option exercised after the time limit prescribed in memo No. 196-Edn but within the extended time granted by the High Court can no mere be availed of. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that the extension of time for exercising option as granted by the Division Bench was only an interlocutory order and it has merged in the final judgment of the Court and therefore now one cannot avail of the benefit of the option exercised within that extended time. This argument as raised on behalf of the respondents, however does not seem to be tenable and also not much relevant in the present context. In the present case or cases the respondents have sought to enforce memo No. 59-SE(B) dated 17.4.95 and the petitioners have assailed the action taken by the respondents under the said memo No. 59-SE(B). In the said memo No. 59-SE(B) itself the action pattern has been designed on accepting 7.8.92 as the outer limit of time for exercising option to revert to the pre 1986 scale. In the said memo No. 59-SE(B) itself the action pattern has been designed on accepting 7.8.92 as the outer limit of time for exercising option to revert to the pre 1986 scale. Since the impugned memo No. 59-SE(B) itself proceeds on the basis that the revised option could be exercised upto 7.8.92 there cannot be now any plea on the part of the respondents that action under the said memo No. 59-SE(B) can he taken even where the option has been exercised before 7.8.92 but after the expiry of the original time limit fixed by memo No. 196-Edn. If the respondents want to take action as they purport to do, within the parameter of memo No. 59-SE(B), they will have to go by the terms of the said memorandum and cannot make any deviation therefrom by raising a contention that even the option exercised prior to 7.8.92 is bad simply because such option was not exercised within 90 days from the date on which memo No. 196-Edn. (B) was issued. 7. In C.O. No. 10552(W) of 1995 the petitioner Shrimati Gouri Rani Paul exercised the relevant option and undertaking on 7.8.92, that is, within the extended time stipulated for the purpose by the Division Bench of this Court. She attained 60 years of age on 1.8.94. Even after exercising the said option on 7.8.92 she however continued to draw pay in the revised scale for the months of August 1992 to November 1992. But thereafter she drew pay in the pre 1986 scale. She has also refunded the excess amount drawn by her for the months from August 1992 to November 1092. She applied for extension of service on 12.3.94. It has been certified by the Secretary of the school that due to mistake on the part of the school authorities the petitioner was given salary in the revised scale for the period from August 1992 to November 1992 and she has also subsequently refunded the excess amount drawn for the said months and has been drawing the pre 1986 scale since December 1992. Now, by applying the memorandum No. 59-SE(B) her prayer for extension of service beyond 60 years has been rejected by the D.I. of schools on the ground that she drew the pay in the revised scale of pay eyen after exercising option to revert to the pre-revised scale. Now, by applying the memorandum No. 59-SE(B) her prayer for extension of service beyond 60 years has been rejected by the D.I. of schools on the ground that she drew the pay in the revised scale of pay eyen after exercising option to revert to the pre-revised scale. The fact however remains that although for a few months after the exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale she continued to draw pay in the revised scale yet subsequently she drew pay in the pre-revised scale and also refunded the excess amount drawn by her even after exercise of such option for reversion to the pre-revised scale thereby placing herself in the same position as the one drawing pay in the pre 1986 scale since the date of option exercised for reversion to pre-revised scale. There is, therefore, no scope of applying memo No. 59-SE(B) dated 17.4.95 to defeat her claim for consideration of extension of service beyond 60 years by application of that memo No. 59-SE(B). Since the Managing Committee of the school was satisfied that the petitioner was physically and mentally fit for extension of service and the petitioner has been enjoying the pre-revised scale and has also refunded the excess amount drawn for the period from August 1992 to November 1992 and has, in the circumstances, to be treated on the footing that she has been for all practical purposes, taking pay in the pre-revised scale since exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale I quash the D.I.'s memo No. 953/G dated 26.7.95 which is annexure-X to the supplementary affidavit and direct the D.I. (SE) North 24-Parganas to accord approval to the extension of service of the petitioner for the first year of extension with effect from 1.8.94 within three weeks from the date of communication of this order. The D.I. is further directed to consider the question of extension for the second year for the petitioner with effect from 1.8.95 and communicate his decision thereon in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order. It is needless to mention that in view of the facts and circumstances stated above the Education Department memo No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995 will not be applicable to the petitioner in respect of his prayer for second extension or any of the subsequent extensions. It is needless to mention that in view of the facts and circumstances stated above the Education Department memo No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995 will not be applicable to the petitioner in respect of his prayer for second extension or any of the subsequent extensions. In view of the decision of the Division Bench as already mentioned it is now incumbent upon the petitioner to refund the excess amount drawn by her in the revised scale till reversion to the pre-revised scale in August 1992. The D.I. of Schools shall, before granting approval for the second term of extension communicate to the petitioner the amount she is required to refund for the excess drawal in the revised scale and on receipt of such communication the amount mentioned therein shall be refunded by the petitioner within three weeks from the date of receipt of the communication and shall submit the challan showing deposit to the D.I. of Schools within one week from the date of refund by deposit and thereafter the D.I. of Schools shall finally communicate his decision regarding the extension of service for the second term to the petitioner and the school authorities within three weeks. 8. In C.O. No. 12219(W) of 1995 the writ petitioner Shrimati Anjali Roy is an Assistant Teacher of the concerned school. She exercised option of reversion to the pre-revised scale on 6.8.92 but continued to draw pay in the revised scale from August 1992 to October 1992 by reason of some mistake on the part of the school authorities as certified by the Secretary of the school. Since November 1992 she was however drawing pay in the pre-revised scale and she also refunded the over drawn amount for the period from August 1992 to October 1992. She attained 60 years of age on 31.5.95. Her prayer for extension of service has however been turned down by D.I. of Schools as communicated under his memo No. 2847(S) dated 13.6.95 annexure-G to the writ petition. She attained 60 years of age on 31.5.95. Her prayer for extension of service has however been turned down by D.I. of Schools as communicated under his memo No. 2847(S) dated 13.6.95 annexure-G to the writ petition. Since as a result of mistake the petitioner drew salary in the revised scale for a few months even after exercise of option for reversion to the pre-revised scale and since see has refunded the over drawn amount for the period subsequent to the exercise of option for reversion before making application for extension of service beyond 60 years her case also for the same reason as held in C.O. No. 10552(W) of 1995 and as discussed above also does not come within the mischief of Education Department memo No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995. Accordingly I quash the D.I.'s memo No. 2847(S) dated 13.6.95 annexure-G to the writ petition. I also direct the D.I. to take fresh decision in the light of the recommendations of the Managing Committee and communicate his decision regarding extension of the petitioner's service beyond 60 years to the petitioner as well as to the school authorities within four weeks from the date of communication of this order. The D.I. shall also inform the petitioner the overdrawn amount she is required to refund due to drawal of pay in the revised scale till exercise of option to revert to the pre-revised scale and on receipt of such information about the amount required to be deposited as overdrawn amount the petitioner shall deposit the same within two weeks of receipt of communication from the D.I. of Schools and shall submit the challan for such deposit to the D.I. of Schools who shall thereafter communicate his final decision regarding the extension of the petitioner's service within two weeks from the date of receipt of the challan from the petitioner. The said writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. 9. In C.O. No. 12220(W) of 1995 the writ petitioner Shrimati Prabahini Kander is also an Assistant Teacher of the concerned school. She exercised option of reversion to the pre-revised scale on 6.8.92. She also drew pay in the revised scale upto October 1992 as a result of mistake. She however drew pay in the pre-revised scale since November 1992 and refunded the overdrawn amount for the period from August 1992 to October 1992. She exercised option of reversion to the pre-revised scale on 6.8.92. She also drew pay in the revised scale upto October 1992 as a result of mistake. She however drew pay in the pre-revised scale since November 1992 and refunded the overdrawn amount for the period from August 1992 to October 1992. Subsequently, she applied for extension of service beyond 60 years. She attained the age of 60 years on 28.2.95. Her prayer for extension, although recommended by the school authorities, was turned down by the D.I. of Schools (SE), Midnapore by applying the G.O. No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995 as communicated under the D.I.’s memo No. 2847(S) dated 13.6.95, annexure-F to the writ petition. For the same reason as discussed above in C.O. 12219(W) of 1995, in the case of the writ petitioner Prabahini Kander also the said G.O. No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995 is not applicable and accordingly the memo No. 2847(S) dated 13.6.95 issued by the D.I. of Schools (SE), Midnapore Annexure-F to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The same directions as have been given in C.O. 12219(W) of 1995, will also apply in C.O. No. 12220(W) of 1995. 10. In C.O. No. 14247(W) of 1995, the writ petitioner Bisnupada Das is the Head Master of the concerned school. He exercised option of reversion on 7.8.92. He however continued to draw pay in the revised scale upto January 1994. His case is that he refunded the overdrawn amount for the period from August 1992 to January 1994 amounting to Rs. 29,896.00 by challan dated 9.5.94. He attained the age of 60 years on 23.8.94 and his prayer for extension for the first term till 23.8.95 has been granted by the D.I. But his prayer for extension for the second term was rejected by the D.I. of Schools (SE), Hooghly as communicated under his memo No. 1878(s) dated 3.8.95 annexure-B to the writ petition by applying the G.O. No. 59-SE(B) dated the 17th April, 1995. Since the petitioner was granted extension for the first term and since the petitioner deposited the overdrawn amount for the period subsequent to the exercise of option for reversion to the pre-revised scale, there is no reason to apply G.O. No. 59-SE(B) dated 17.4.95 to his case at this stage. Since the petitioner was granted extension for the first term and since the petitioner deposited the overdrawn amount for the period subsequent to the exercise of option for reversion to the pre-revised scale, there is no reason to apply G.O. No. 59-SE(B) dated 17.4.95 to his case at this stage. Accordingly memo No. 1878 dated 3.8.95 issued by the D.I. of Schools (SE), Hooghly annexure-B to the writ petition is hereby quashed. Similar direction as given in C.O. No. 12219(W) of 1995 above will apply in this case also mutatis mutandis. 11. In the case of C.O. No. 12221 (W) of 1995 the writ petitioner Shri Iswar Chandra Das, an Assistant Teacher, has not disclosed in the writ petition the date of exercise of the revised option. He continued to draw pay in the revised scale upto February 1993. From the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 29.6.94 annexure-D to the writ petition it appears that the petitioner did not apply for extension before he attained the age of 60 years. Be that as it may it also appears that he did not refund the excess amount drawn by him for the period from August 1992 to February 1993. His prayer for extension of service was rejected by the D.I. of Schools (SE). Midnapore by his memo No. 1010 dated 20.2.95 annexure-J to the writ petition on the ground that he drew pay in the revised scale of pay for months together. Since the petitioner did not refund the overdrawn amount in the revised scale of pay for the period subsequent to August 1992 and thus retained with him the benefit of the revised scale even now in respect of some period subsequent to the exercise of option for reversion to the pre-revised scale (assuming that he exercised such option of reversion within the stipulated time), in his case the G.O. No. 59-SE (B) dated the 17th April, 1995 seems to be applicable and that being so no interference of the Court in this case, that is, in C.O. No. 12221 (W) of 1995 is warranted and accordingly this writ petition stands dismissed. All the writ petitions stand disposed of in accordance with the directions recorded above in connection with the respective writ petitions.