S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-detenu has challenged the legality and validity of the order of detention dated 17th of September, 1994 passed by Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad city on his being satisfied under Sec. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and, therefore, he was required to be detained under the provisions of the said Act. Along with the order of detention, the grounds of detention of even date duly formulated under Sec. 9 (1) of the said Act are supplied to the detenu. ( 2 ) FROM the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu, it becomes clear that it is alleged against the detenu that in the area of Kalupur Police Station, the detenu and his associates were operating and/or demanding and extorting instalments and money from various businessmen and traders and in case of resistence being offered by any trader, he was pushed out from his shop and was threatened of dire consequences at the point of knife. It is also alleged against him that he was possessed of unlicensed revolver and was carrying on anti-social activities. Thereafter, the detaining authority has set out two offences in tabular form being Crime register Nos. 445 of 1992 and 21 of 1994 which were pending against the detenu. In view of his involvement in the aforesaid two offences, the detaining authority has described the detenu as "a dangerous person" within the meaning of the said term as defined by Sec. 2 (c) of the said Act. ( 3 ) THE detaining authority has thereafter proceeded extensively to refer to and rely upon the other prejudicial activities of the detenu and his associates in the area of Kalupur. It is alleged against the detenu that he was also carrying on the activities of dealing in Brown Sugar at Vadodara. Thereafter, the detaining authority has in a tabular form set out three offences alleged to have been committed by the detenu and which were either pending in the Court for trial or which were pending investigation. Such offences are punbishable under the provisions of the Narcotics drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Thereafter, the detaining authority has in a tabular form set out three offences alleged to have been committed by the detenu and which were either pending in the Court for trial or which were pending investigation. Such offences are punbishable under the provisions of the Narcotics drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of such offences is Crime register No. 282 of 1990 which is pending trial in the Court while other two offences are pending investigation being Crime Register Nos. 10 of 1994 and 183 of 1994. The detaining authority has also relied upon the statements of other witnesses who have desired to be anonymous and whose identity is not disclosed to the detenu by claiming privilege under Sec. 9 (2) of the said Act. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the detaining authority has stated that based on the aforesaid offences and activity of the detenu in the area of Kalupur Police Station of demanding and extorting money or instalments from the traders at the point of knife or at the point of revolver, he was satisfied that the detenu was a "dangerous person" withing the meaning of Sec. 2 (c) of the said term and that he has created an atmosphere of horror and terror. Thereafter, the detaining authority has further recorded the satisfaction that detenu was carrying on anti-social activities of illegally selling Brown Sugar at Ahmedabad and at Vadodara and such activity of dealing in Brown Sugar was anti-social activity and, therefore, also the detenu was required to be detained as "dangerous person". ( 5 ) BASED on the aforesaid material and satisfaction, the order of detention is passed by the detaining authority. ( 6 ) MR. B. N. Raval and Mrs. Subhadra Patel, learned Counsels appearing for the detenu have challenged the order of detention on the ground that totally extraneous factor and material is taken into consideration by the detaining authority for the purpose of recording safisfaction that detenu was "dangerous person" within the meaning of the said term as defined by Sec. 2 (c) of the said Act. The word "dangerous person" is defined by Sec. 2 (c) as under :"2. The word "dangerous person" is defined by Sec. 2 (c) as under :"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires; (c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI of Chapter XVII of the Indian penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959. "from the aforesaid definition of "dangerous person" it becomes clear that a person can be described as a dangerous person if he by himself or as a member of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. The word "habitually" would mean that there is tendency to commit or abet the commission of offences, such offences must be offences punishable under Chapter xvi or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. The definition does not refer to other offences. Obviously a separate provision is made for offences under the bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and person involved in such offences could be detained as a "bootlegger". Similarly, the Legislature has not included the offences which can be punishable under special statute like Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 or Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Legislature has also not included in the definition of "dangerous person" offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. For all such offences, separate provisions are made and it would be necessary at this stage to make reference to the definition of "drug offender" as defined by Sec. 2 (f) of the said Act. For all such offences, separate provisions are made and it would be necessary at this stage to make reference to the definition of "drug offender" as defined by Sec. 2 (f) of the said Act. The said definition is reproduced hereunder :" (F) "drug offender" means a person who - (i) imports any drug in contravention of Sec. 10 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter in this definition referred to as "the Drugs Act"), (ii) manufacturers for sale, or sells, or stocks in contravention of Sec. 18 of the drugs Act, (iii) manufacturers for sale any Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani drug in contravention of Sec. 33d of the Drugs Act, (iv) sells, or stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes any Ayurvedic (including siddha) or Unani drug other than that manufactured by a manufacturer licensed under Chapter IV-A in contravention of Sec. 33e of the Drugs Act. (v) cultivates any coca plant, opium poppy, or cannabis plant or products, manufactures, possess, sells, purchases, transports, warehouses, imports inter- state, exports inter-State, imports into India, exports from India or tranships any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in contravention of Sec. 8 of the Narcotic drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (vi) knowingly expends or supplies any money in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things mentioned in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) or through any other person, or (vii) abets in any manner the doing of any of the things mentioned in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (vi ). "therefore, if a person has committed offences with respect to Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances in contravention of Sec. 8 of the Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, such a person is "drug offender" within the meaning of the said term as defined by Sec. 2 (f) of the said Act. For the activities which are set out in Sec. 2 (f) (v), (vi) and (vii), a person can be detained not as a "dangerous person" but as a "drug offender". ( 7 ) SIMILARLY, a person who habitually commits or abets the commission of any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, can be detained as "immoral traffic offender" as defined by Sec. 2 (g) of the said act. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY, a person who habitually commits or abets the commission of any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, can be detained as "immoral traffic offender" as defined by Sec. 2 (g) of the said act. The Act makes further provision enabling the detaining authority even to detain a person who illegally takes possession of any lands not belonging to himself and belonging to Government, the local authority or any other person by describing such person as "property grabber" as defined in Sec. 2 (h) of the said Act. It is thus clear that various types of anti-social activities are sought to be covered under this statute and persons dealing in different or distinct illegal or anti-social activity can be detained provided such activities fall within the definition of "bootlegger" as defined in Sec. 2 (b), "dangerous person" as defined in Sec. 2 (c), "drug offender" as defined in Sec. 2 (f), "immoral traffic offender" as defined in Sec. 2 (g) or "property grabber" as defined in Sec. 2 (h) of the said Act. If the activities of a person fall under one description, he cannot be detained by describing his activities as those falling under another heading. From the various definitions of the words referred to hereinabove which are exhaustively enacted by the State Legislature, it becomes clear that legislature never wanted all anti-social activities to be clubbed together and to describe them by one head of "anti-social activities". A person carrying on prohibited activities under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 or business of manufacturing, possessing, selling, purchasing or transporting narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance can be detained as "a drug offender", but he cannot be detained as "a dangerous person". By defining "dangerous person" the Legislature has advisedly limited the power of detaining authority to those persons who either by themselves or as member of a gang habitually commit or attempt to commit or abet commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal code. The word "dangerous person" is not used in a generic sense so as to include all persons carrying on activities which are dangerous or anti-social in nature. The detaining authority, therefore, is expected first to find out as to in which area of prohibited activities or prejudicial activities, the activities of the detenu fall. The word "dangerous person" is not used in a generic sense so as to include all persons carrying on activities which are dangerous or anti-social in nature. The detaining authority, therefore, is expected first to find out as to in which area of prohibited activities or prejudicial activities, the activities of the detenu fall. Having so determined the area of prejudicial activities of the detenu, the detaining authority is required to record a positive satisfaction that he was detaining the detenu as the anti-social and/or dangerous activities of the detenu falling under a particular head were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If reference is made at this stage to the Preamble of the said Act, the Legislative intent becomes more clear. The Preamble reads as under :"an Act to provide for preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for preventing their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. "the Preamble also classifies the nature of activities by reference to 5 classes of persons, namely, bottleggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers. It thus becomes clear that a person found to be guilty of committing offences as "drug offender" cannot be detained as "a dangerous person", because the definition of "dangerous person" as given by the statute does not include "drug offender". ( 8 ) THE next question which is required to be examined is as to whether a person whose prejudicial activities fall under a separate head can be detained as a person under another head though his activities do not fall under another head. To be precise, the question is as to whether an "immoral traffic offender" can be detained as "a dangerous person" or whether a property grabber can be detained as "dangerous person". Similarly, the question may arise whether a "drug offender" can be detained as "a dangerous person". It may be that activities of all such offenders are anti-social or dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. But nonetheless, their activities are classified and placed under specific heads and, therefore, all such offenders cannot be detained as dangerous person. It is more so when the Legislature has advisedly restricted the meaning of "dangerous person" to those offenders who habitually commit or attempt to commit offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. But nonetheless, their activities are classified and placed under specific heads and, therefore, all such offenders cannot be detained as dangerous person. It is more so when the Legislature has advisedly restricted the meaning of "dangerous person" to those offenders who habitually commit or attempt to commit offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. The words "dangerous person" are, therefore, not the words of general description, but they carry the specific meaning and therefore, a drug offender whose prejudicial activity specifically falls under the definition given by Sec. 2 (f) cannot be detained as "a dangerous person". ( 9 ) THEN comes another question which is not easy to be answered. When prejudicial activities or anti-social activities of a person fall under two specific heads such as "dangerous person" and "drug offender", (as is the case in this petition), whether the detaining authority can detain a person by generally describing him as "dangerous person" and not referring him as "a drug offender" at all. From the grounds of detention it becomes clear that the detaining authority in the present case was totally oblivious of the provisions of Sec. 2 (f) of the said Act. It was not knowing that a person can be detained as "drug offender". It was also not knowing that for offences punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances act, 1985, a person can be detained as a "drug offender". It was in fact ignorant of this provision. It confused all such offences as falling within the definition of "dangerous person". It in fact did not refer to the definition of "dangerous person". Had the detaining authority referred to the definition clause of the said Act, it would have been clear to the authority that the Legislature has given very restrictive meaning to the word "dangerous person". The offender who is a "drug offender" cannot be said to be committing offences under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. He cannot, therefore, be detained as "a dangerous person". The offender who is a "drug offender" cannot be said to be committing offences under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. He cannot, therefore, be detained as "a dangerous person". In the present case, the reliance placed by the detaining authority on involvement of the detenu in offences punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act, 1985 is so great and all pervasive in the grounds of detention that in absence of involvement of the detenu in such activities, perhaps the detaining authority would not have thought of detaining the detenu as "dangerous person". It is undoubtedly true that the reference is made to two offences punishable under chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code but involvement in such two offences alone was perhaps not sufficient to brand him as habitual offender. Even if the said two offences are taken as providing sufficient material to brand the detenu as dangerous person, it is doubtful whether the detaining authority would have exercised the power of detention because in the second offence he was simply found to be possessed of revolver which act was an offence under Sec. 25 (1) of the Arms Act, 1959. The power of detention without trial is undoubtedly a very drastic power to be very sparingly and exceptionally used for the genuine purpose of maintenance of public order. The detaining authority appears to be conscious of this fact and, therefore, it has placed great reliance upon the other anti-social or prejudicial activities of the detenu, namely, his activities as "drug offender". Howerver, while referring to such activity, it did not notice that it could detain the detenu as "a drug offender". This omission is because of the fact that the detaining authority was unaware of the statutory provision. It was totally oblivious of the fact that it has power to detain a person as "a drug offender". It in fact did not refer to the definition clause at all. It simply found that activities of the detenu, namely, his involvement in various offences punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was dangerous activity and, therefore, such an offender was "a dangerous person". It may be that the activities of such an offender may be anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. But, such a person is not "a dangerous person". It may be that the activities of such an offender may be anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. But, such a person is not "a dangerous person". Such a person is separately defined by the Legislature as "drug offender". In view of the aforesaid, in my opinion, the satisfaction of the detaining authority is vitiated and the order of detention is liable to be quashed and set aside. In this case, the question of applicability of Sec. 6 of the said Act is not raised and is not separately examined because going through the grounds of detention, this Court has no manner of doubt that the detaining authotiry has mainly relied upon the activities of the detenu as "drug offender" as dangerous activities but has unfortunately regarded the detenu as "dangerous person" instead of branding him as "drug offender". ( 10 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds. The order of detention dated 17th of september, 1994 stands vitiated and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. The third respondent is directed to release the detenu forthwith unless his presence is required in connection with any other offence. Rule is made absolute. .